National OilWell Varco v. Mud King Products, L.L.C. et al
Filing
110
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas) Parties notified.(sashabranner, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO, L.P., §
Plaintiff,
§
§
v.
§
§
MUD KING PRODUCTS, INC., et al., §
Defendants.
§
CIVIL CASE NO. 4:12-3120
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On April 5, 2013, Defendant’ Mud King Products, Inc. (“Mud King”) filed a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy seeking protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Recognizing the imposition of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a), as to debtor Mud King, the Court requested that all parties in this trade secret
misappropriation case submit statements of their positions on whether this civil action
should be stayed in its entirety pending the conclusion of Mud King’s bankruptcy
proceeding or should proceed against the remaining defendants.
Plaintiff National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (“NOV”) contends that there is “no legal
justification for staying the prosecution of NOV’s claims” against the non-debtor
Defendants. The remaining defendants seek extension of the automatic stay to cover
them.
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I.
BACKGROUND
Originally, NOV asserted claims based on allegations that Mud King President,
Nigel Brassington, and Mud King Quality Control Manager, Freddy Rubiano, had
paid an NOV employee cash to access, print, and deliver certain proprietary NOV
engineering blueprints for oil field services equipment parts.1 In amended pleadings,
NOV named numerous other defendants that it alleged were involved in the theft of
NOV’s drawings.2 NOV now sues several Mud King employees, including Nigel
Brassington, a Mud King Director, Freddy Rubiano, Gary Clayton, Sean Cougot and
Martin Rodriguez (who are referred to collectively as the “Individual Mud King
Defendants”). Additionally, NOV asserts claims against Don Humiston, a former
Mud King employee whose electronic devices contained numerous NOV blueprints
and who apparently brought the matter to NOV’s attention.
NOV also has asserted claims against entities involved in manufacturing parts
from the stolen drawings, specifically, Oilman Group Co., Ltd., Wellhead Solutions,
Inc., and Dezhou L & A Petroleum Machinery Co., Ltd. (collectively, the
1
This case originally was filed in state court. Mud King timely removed this matter
to this court.
2
See Third Amended Complaint and Application for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction (“Complaint”) [Doc. # 70].
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“Manufacturing Defendants”),3 as well as against SMC, Inc. and Larry Murray
(collectively, the “SMC Defendants”), who allegedly provided NOV’s proprietary
drawings to Mud King in exchange for payments.
NOV has obtained injunctive relief against each of these defendants prohibiting,
inter alia, use of NOV’s drawings. NOV states that its two “primary goals” of this
litigation are “to discover from where the defendants obtained NOV’s proprietary
information” and “to discover to whom the defendants have disseminated NOV’s
proprietary information.” NOV obtained nearly twenty terabytes of data from Mud
King’s computers, through an authorized imaging process.
Mud King filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 5, 2013,4 the day before the
deposition of Mud King’s corporate representative was scheduled to take place.5 Mud
King in its bankruptcy petition lists assets of $10 to $50 million and liabilities of $1
3
The Manufacturing Defendants have not appeared in this action. Dezhou and Oilman
are being served under the Hague Convention, and returns of service are not expected
for several months. Wellhead, located in Houston, was served but has not appeared
or answered the complaint.
4
Brassington, a member of the Mud King Board of Directors, voted in favor of this
course.
5
Plaintiff has sought this deposition for some time. NOV contends that Mud King has
engaged in “incessant delay tactics,” including filing its bankruptcy petition. NOV’s
frustration is also attributable to the fact that the individual defendants have broadly
asserted their Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and not respond to discovery
because they have been informed that the United States Attorney’s Office is
investigating the matter. It is noted that the criminal investigation was initiated at
NOV’s request.
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to $10 million. See Exhibit A to NOV’s Position Statement Regarding Stay of Action
[Doc. # 107] (“NOV’s Statement”).6
Several days before Mud King filed bankruptcy, the company amended its
corporate bylaws to retroactively indemnify its employees. See Exhibit B to NOV’s
Position Statement Regarding Stay of Action [Doc. # 107]. Mud King thereby
increased its own potential liabilities. NOV states that it will challenge Mud King’s
petition as a bad faith filing in the bankruptcy proceeding.
NOV has asserted numerous claims: misappropriation of trade Secrets (asserted
against all Defendants); conversion (asserted against all Defendants); computer fraud
and abuse (asserted against Mud King, Brassington, and Rubiano); theft under
Chapter 134 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (asserted against all
Defendants); conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets, convert NOV’s property, and
to commit theft under Chapter 134 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
(asserted against the Mud King Defendants and Dezhou); conspiracy to
misappropriate trade secrets, convert NOV’s property, and to commit theft under
Chapter 134 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (asserted against the Mud
King Defendants, Oilman and Wellhead); conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets,
6
Other than the contingent liability arising from the dispute with NOV, Mud King has
approximately $3.3 million in liabilities. See Schedules D, E, & F of Mud King
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, No. 12-32101-H5-11 [Doc. # 18, at 42-51].
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convert NOV’s property, to commit theft under Chapter 134 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, and to breach Liliana Arredondo’s fiduciary duties
(asserted against the Mud King Defendants vis-à-vis Liliana Arredondo); aiding and
abetting (asserted against the Mud King Defendants vis-à-vis Liliana Arredondo);
unjust enrichment (asserted against all Defendants); conspiracy to misappropriate
trade secrets, convert NOV’s property, and to commit theft under Chapter 134 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (asserted against the Mud King Defendants
and SMC Defendants); and breach of contract (asserted against SMC).
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Extension of § 362 Stays. Section 362(a)(1) provides for an automatic stay of
any judicial “proceeding against the debtor.”
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
“Section 362(a)(3) provides that the filing of a petition ‘operates as a[n] [automatic
stay] applicable to all entities, of . . . any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate or of property from the estate.’” See Matter of S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d
1142, 1148 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)); Beran v. World
Telemetry, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (S. D. Tex. 2010) (Rosenthal, J.).
An automatic stay under § 362 typically does not apply to actions against a nondebtor. See In re TXNB Internal Case, 483 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007); Beran, 747
F. Supp. 2d at 722. However, a § 362 stay may apply to an action against non-debtor
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defendants under limited circumstances regarding the non-debtors’ relationship to the
debtor. See Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. v. Enron Can. Corp., 349 F.3d 816, 825 (5th
Cir. 2003). For instance, “a bankruptcy court may invoke § 362 to stay proceedings
against non-bankrupt codefendants where ‘there is such an identity between the debtor
and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant
and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment or
finding against the debtor.’” Reliant Energy Servs., 349 F.3d at 816 (quoting A.H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, the § 362 stay
“should extend to nonbankrupt codefendants only when there is a formal or
contractual relationship between the debtor and non-debtors such that a judgment
against one would in effect be a judgment against the other.” Beran, 747 F. Supp. 2d
at 723 (citing Arnold v. Garlock, Inc., 278 F.3d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 2001); GATX
Aircraft Corp. v. M/V Courtney Leigh, 768 F.2d 711, 717 (5th Cir. 1985); and Reliant
Energy Servs., 349 F.3d at 825). The “presence of identical allegations against the
debtor and non-debtor defendants are an insufficient ground to extend the stay to the
nondebtors.” Id. at 724. “There must be an actual, as opposed to an alleged or
potential identity of interests, such that a judgment against the nonbankrupt parties
would in fact be a judgment against the bankrupt party.” Id.
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The burden to show that the stay is applicable to a non-debtor is on the party
invoking the stay. See Beran, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 722-23 (citing 2 WILLIAM L.
NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 43:4 (3d ed. Supp. 2010)
(noting that in bankruptcy court proceedings, “the party seeking to extend the stay will
bear the burden to show that ‘unusual circumstances’ exist warranting such an
extension of the stay to a nondebtor”)); see also Garlock, 278 F.3d at 436 (holding
that the defendant had “no interest to establish such an identity [of interests] with [the]
debtor”).
Discretionary Stays. District courts may also exercise their discretion to stay
a proceeding against non-bankrupt co-defendants “in the interests of justice and in
control of their dockets.” Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 545 (5th
Cir. 1983); Beran, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (citing Wedgeworth, 706 F.2d at 545; Gulf
Coast Hotel–Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, No.
1:08CV1430–HSO–JMR, 2010 WL 972248, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 12, 2010) (finding
that a district court may issue a discretionary stay even when a § 362 is inappropriate);
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Tri-Lam Co., Civil Action No. SA-06-CA-207-XR,
2007 WL 1091311, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2007) (“The district court may also grant
a discretionary stay of the action against non-bankrupt co-defendants; however, this
discretion is limited.”)). “Proper use of this authority ‘calls for the exercise of
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judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.’”
Wedgeworth, 706 F.2d at 545 (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55
(1936)). “A stay can be justified only if, based on a balancing of the parties' interests,
there is a clear inequity to the suppliant who is required to defend while another action
remains unresolved and if the order granting a stay can be framed to contain
reasonable limits on its duration.” GATX, 768 F.2d at 716 (citing Wedgeworth, 706
F.2d at 545).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Mud King and Individual Mud King Defendants
1.
Parties’ Contentions
Defendant Mud King contends that the NOV litigation should be stayed as to
it as well as the Individual Mud King Defendants, who are officers, directors and
employees of Mud King, by virtue of § 362(a)(1). The basis for this request is Mud
King’s amendment of its corporate Bylaws on April 1, 2013, four days before the
corporation filed bankruptcy, to require the corporation to “indemnify a Director,
officer, committee member, employee or agent of the Corporation who was, is, or may
be named defendant or respondent in any proceeding as a result of his or her actions
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or omissions within the scope of his or her official capacity in the Corporation.”7 This
indemnification applies “only if he or she acted in good faith and reasonably believed
that the conduct was in the Corporation’s best interests.” Id.8 Mud King points out
that, if indemnification is appropriate, the indemnity covers judgments, penalties,
taxes, fines, settlements, and reasonable expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually
incurred in connection with the proceeding.9 The Amended Bylaws also provide that
“[b]efore the final disposition of a proceeding, the Corporation may pay
7
Amended Bylaws of Mud King Products, Inc., dated Apr. 1, 2013 (“Amended
Bylaws”), Art. 7.7 [Exh. A to Doc. # 102], at 1.
8
The Amended Bylaws also provide:
In a case of a criminal proceeding, the person may be indemnified only
if he or she had no reasonable cause to believe that the conduct was
unlawful. The Corporation shall not indemnify a person who is found
liable to the Corporation or is found liable to another on the basis of
gross negligence or improperly receiving a personal benefit. A person
is conclusively considered to have been found liable in relation to any
claim, issue, or matter if the person has been adjudges liable by a court
of competent jurisdiction and all appeals have been exhausted.
Amended Bylaws, Art. 7.7 [Exh. A to Doc. # 102, at 1]. Also, the “termination of a
proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or on a plea of nolo contendere
or its equivalent does not necessarily preclude indemnification by the Corporation.”
Id., Art. VII, Sec. 7.7.1 [Exh. A to Doc. # 102, at 2].
9
Id., Art. VII, Sec. 7.7.5 [Exh. A to Doc. # 102, at 2]. Indeed, the “Corporation shall
pay or reimburse expenses incurred by a Director, officer, committee member,
employee, or agent of the corporation in connection with the person’s appearance as
a witness or other participating in a proceeding involving or affecting the Corporation
when the person is not a named defendant or respondent in the proceeding.” Id., Sec.
7.7.2.
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indemnification expenses permitted by these Bylaws and authorized by the
Corporation.”10 Alternatively, Mud King seeks a stay of the entire litigation. Doc.
# 102, at 2.
Mud King argues that, as to indemnified individuals, this case fits within
Garlock, 278 F.3d at 426, because the claims against these individuals are the same
as claims against the bankruptcy estate and indemnification expenses would be to the
detriment of other creditors. Mud King also seeks a stay in the exercise of the Court’s
discretion.
The Individual Mud King Defendants Rubiano, Clayton, Cougot and Rodriguez
join in this request for a stay of all proceedings against them pending resolution of the
Mud King bankruptcy case, contending their interests are coextensive with Mud
King’s based on the right of indemnity established by the Amended Bylaws. See Doc.
# 105.11 Similarly, Defendant Brassington, a Mud King Director, seeks protection of
10
Id., Art. VII, Sec. 7.7.4 [Exh. A to Doc. # 102, at 2]. There are procedures set forth
in the Amended Bylaws for how the Corporation “must determine that
indemnification is permissible, authorize the indemnification, and must determine that
expenses to be reimbursed are reasonable.” Id., Art. VII, Sec. 7.7.6[Exh. A to Doc.
# 102, at 2-3].
11
These Defendants also claim (incorrectly) that discovery directed to them has been
stayed because of concerns surrounding the ongoing criminal investigation. See Doc.
# 105, at 2.
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the § 365 stay and/or a discretionary stay under the Court’s inherent powers. See Doc.
# 103.
Defendant Donald Humiston denies liability but, in any event, contends that
discovery should be stayed as to him because, at trial, there would need to be findings
of “contributory fault” vis à vis Mud King and because Mud King may have ratified
the alleged intentional and fraudulent acts of its agents. See Doc. # 104.
NOV explains that it learned about the amendment to the Mud King Bylaws in
Mud King’s position statement. NOV contends that neither the § 365 stay nor any
discretionary stay should be imposed preventing the prosecution of its claims against
the Defendants. NOV argues that the bankruptcy itself is of “questionable legality.”
NOV complains that Mud King voluntarily incurred substantial and unnecessary
obligations four days before the company filed for bankruptcy, an act that violates the
business judgment rule and amounts to self-dealing on the part of Brassington, one of
Mud King’s directors. NOV argues the bankruptcy filing is indicative of “rampant
mismanagement of Mud King” by the same individuals who allegedly are abusing
their corporate offices to avoid due process in this Court,” that Mud King “concocted
a last-minute attempt to create such a relationship” by amending its bylaws, and that
this is “not a clear-cut case of contractual indemnity.” Doc. # 107, at 6. NOV seeks
discovery of how this amendment came about, whether it passes the Business
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Judgment Rule, and what benefit Mud King derives from obligating itself in this
manner. Id. at 6-7 (citing Beran, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 723). NOV therefore asks the
Court to reject the Individual Mud King Defendants’ attempts to avail themselves of
the extension of the § 365 stay.
Further, NOV argues that the fact that allegations that the Individual Defendants
are associated with Mud King or that their conduct is alleged to be the same as Mud
King’s is insufficient to warrant a stay as to claims against the individuals. Id. at 7
(citing Sanchez v. Freddie Records, Inc., No. H-10-2995, 2011 WL 3606808, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2011) (Rosenthal, J.); Beran, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 724). NOV also
contends that the second potential ground to extend the stay—that the action against
non-debtors involves property of the estate or would have a significant impact on the
debtor’s ability to reorganize—does not apply. Id. at 7 (citing Carway v. Progressive
Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 183 B.R. 769, 774-75 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (internal citation
omitted)). NOV argues that this is not a case where a non-bankrupt codefendant may
be protected by the automatic stay of § 362(a)(1) because extension of the stay would
contribute to the debtor’s efforts of rehabilitation. Id. at 7-8 (quoting S.I. Acquisition,
817 F.2d at 1147).
2.
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Analysis
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The Court is cognizant of the fact that an automatic stay generally is not
available to benefit co-defendants who are not related to a bankrupt debtor because
“such an extension of the stay does not promote the underlying purposes of the
automatic stay provision, i.e., debtor/creditor protection,” S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817
F.2d at 1147. Nevertheless, the Court concludes the circumstances here are atypical.
The Bankruptcy Court presiding over the Mud King bankruptcy case must sort out the
scope, applicability, and overall enforceability of the indemnification duties in the
Amended Bylaws, at least in the first instance. See Garlock, 278 F.3d at 436 (citing
A.H. Robins Co., 788 F.3d at 999); Fidelity & Deposit Co., 2007 WL 1091311, at *3
(citing Garlock, 278 F.3d at 436).
Because the scope of the § 365 stay is principally within a bankruptcy court’s
bailiwick, this Court exercises its authority at this stage only on a preliminary basis,
in the interest of judicial efficiency and in conjunction with the Court’s exercise of its
discretion to impose a temporary stay in the interest of justice. The Court defers to
the Bankruptcy Court to develop a full record, to determine the legal applicability and
viability of the bankruptcy filing, and to evaluate the putative indemnity obligations
in light of bankruptcy principles and other law.
Specifically, at this preliminary stage of the inquiry, this Court extends the
§ 365 stay to the Individual Mud King Defendants Brassington, Rubiano, Clayton,
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Cougot and Rodriguez in order to preserve the sanctity of the bankruptcy estate, to
maintain the status quo, and to avoid potential interference with the automatic stay as
to Debtor Mud King. The automatic stay to preserve the bankruptcy estate’s assets
is a seminal right of bankruptcy and is crucial here, while the Debtor’s
indemnification obligations are clarified.12
The extension of the § 365 stay is temporary but warranted under the applicable
law. The Individual Mud King Defendants appear to have been the likely intended
beneficiaries of Mud King’s indemnity obligations by virtue of the Amended
Bylaws.13 If the indemnity is enforceable and applicable, there is an “actual” identity
of interests between the indemnified Individual Mud King Defendant and Debtor Mud
King itself. On the present, albeit preliminary, record, this Court finds that the
Amended Bylaws may create potential corporate indemnity obligations to one or more
of the Individual Mud King Defendants by virtue of a formal indemnity relationship.
The Amended Bylaws, taken at face value, are indistinguishable from a contractual
12
As noted, this ruling is without prejudice to the Bankruptcy Court’s full investigation
into the circumstances, propriety and legal basis (or lack thereof) of Debtor Mud
King’s April 1, 2013 amendment to its Bylaws and without prejudice to the
Bankruptcy Court’s independent decision as to the proper scope of the stay, as well
as that Court’s assessment of whether the bankruptcy filing is proper.
13
It is recognized that Mud King’s indemnification obligations are contingent liabilities
and arise only if it is determined that an Individual Mud King Defendant is entitled
to the indemnity after evaluation of the specific facts regarding that individual.
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indemnity. Compare Amended Bylaws, Art. 7.7 [Exh. A to Doc. # 102], at 1-3, with
Arnold, 278 F.3d at 436 (rejecting argument that non-bankrupt asbestos co-defendant
facing the same allegations as bankruptcy co-defendant was entitled to a § 365 stay);
GATX, 768 F.2d at 717 (declining to extend the § 365 stay to non-debtor guarantors
after one guarantor declared bankruptcy; the guarantors had independent contractual
guaranty obligations); Reliant Energy Servs., 349 F.3d at 825 (declining to extend the
§ 365 stay to a non-debtor corporate affiliate facing similar allegations of breaches of
contract). Again, this Court does not reach the substantive issues of validity,
applicability or enforceability of those indemnities.
The Court, alternatively, exercises its limited discretion “in the interests of
justice and in control of [its] docket[]” under the Fifth Circuit’s teachings in
Wedgeworth to grant the Individual Mud King Defendants’ request for a stay at this
time, to allow for the Bankruptcy Court to conduct a fulsome investigation of the facts
and the law as to the indemnities purportedly created by the Amended Bylaws. See
Wedgeworth, 706 F.2d at 545-46.
B.
Defendants Humiston, SMC and Murray
The Court reaches a different conclusion as to Defendants Humiston, SMC and
Murray. These Defendants have not met their substantial burden to show “an identity
between the debtor and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the
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real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in
effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor.’” Reliant Energy Servs., 349 F.3d
at 825 (quoting A.H. Robins Co., 788 F.2d at 999). Moreover, these Defendants have
not shown any formal or contractual relationship between Mud King and themselves
“such that a judgment against one would in effect be a judgment against the other.”
Beran, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (citing Garlock, 278 F.3d at 436; GATX, 768 F.2d at
717; and Reliant Energy Servs., 349 F.3d at 825). While there are many allegations
against Humiston, SMC and Murray that are identical to those against Debtor Mud
King and its employees or officers, this situation is insufficient basis to extend the stay
to these non-Mud King Defendants. There simply is not an actual identity of interests.
Indeed, Humiston has made it clear in conferences in this case that he is adverse to the
Mud King Defendants. SMC and Murray are in a unique posture also because they
do not appear to be aligned with the Mud King Defendants in many respects and are
named by NOV in a separate count for breach of contract. These Defendants have not
established that a judgment against them would in fact be a judgment against Mud
King, the bankrupt party.
The Court also declines the invitation to issue a blanket discretionary stay
regarding Humiston, SMC and Murray. The Court, however, will stage discovery in
this case to permit NOV to move forward against these Defendants to the extent that
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the discovery does not impair the interests of the Debtor or Mud King Defendants.14
The parties are invited to obtain clarification promptly from the Bankruptcy Court
regarding the appropriate scope of the § 365 stay as to Debtor Mud King (and, as
noted above, the Individual Mud King Defendants) and their participation in the
continuing litigation before this Court. It is unclear to the undersigned whether
Debtor Mud King and the Individual Mud King Defendants currently are permitted
under § 365 to participate in the litigation to some extent and whether an order
partially lifting the § 365 stay to permit the Mud King Defendants to participate in this
discovery would be warranted.15 Finally, the Court will revisit the issue of a
discretionary stay as to Humiston, SMC and Murray as needed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)(1) that
covers Defendant and Debtor Mud King Products, Inc., is temporarily extended to
Defendants Brassington, Rubiano, Clayton, Cougot and Rodriguez pending the
14
It appears that discovery of the non-Mud King Defendants should be able to proceed
without adversely affecting the interests of the Mud King Defendants. These issues
will need to be fleshed out as the litigation proceeds.
15
It is noted that, given Plaintiff NOV’s articulated primary goal of information
gathering to prevent future misuse of improperly obtained drawings [Doc. # 107, at 2]
and its access to a full copy of the data from all of Mud King and its pertinent
employees’ computers, the staging of discovery should not harm Plaintiff.
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Bankruptcy Court’s determination of the legal viability of the indemnity obligations
of Debtor Mud King to these individuals. The Court also exercises its discretion to
stay the pending proceedings to permit the inquiries noted above. It is further
ORDERED that automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)(1) is not
extended to Defendants Humiston, SMC and Murray. The Court declines to exercise
its discretion to stay this action as to these Defendants, and orders the parties to stage
discovery to first focus on NOV’s claims against these Defendants, while the scope
of the § 365 stay is clarified regarding the Debtor and Individual Mud King
Defendants. It is further
ORDERED that there is no stay of this civil case as to the Manufacturing
Defendants and any other named Defendants who have not appeared.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 9th day of May, 2013.
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