Hall vs. Robinson, et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Tt is ORDERED that Defendant Harris County's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 27 ) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Michelle Hall's and Danny Hall's, Individually and as Next Friend of Minor M.S.H., claims ag ainst Harris County are DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs, within seven (7) days after the entry of this Order, shall file a response to show cause, if any exists, why Plaintiffs' remaining claims against Defendant Robert Emerson Robinson should not be dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution. If Plaintiffs choose not to file a response, Plaintiffs' claims against Robinson will be dismissed without prejudice in the Court's Final Judgment (Signed by Judge Ewing Werlein, Jr) Parties notified.(gkelner, 4)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MICHELLE HALL and DANNY HALL,
Individually and as Next
Friend of M.S.H., a Minor,
Plaintiffs,
v.

ROBERT EMERSON ROBINSON and
HARRIS COUNTY,
Defendants.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-12-3474

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending
Judgment

is

Defendant

(Document

No.

Harris

27).

County's

After

Motion

carefully

for

Summary

considering

the

motion, response, reply, and applicable law, the Court concludes
for the following reasons that the motion should be granted.
I.

Background

Plaintiffs Michelle Hall and Danny Hall, individually and as
next friend of minor M.S.H. ("Plaintiffs"), bring this suit against
Robert

Emerson

Robinson

("Robinson")

and

Harris

County

(the

"County"), arising out of Robinson's rape of M.S.H., a minor, that
occurred on May 23,

2012 while she was

in the custody of

the

County. 1

1

Document NO.6 (1st Am. Cmplt.).

-------------

-------------

Robinson was employed by the Harris County Juvenile Probation
Department
("JSO")

(the "Department")

.2

He

was

assigned

as a Juvenile Supervision Officer
to

the

juvenile

pre-adjudication

facility known as the Harris County Juvenile Detention Center (the
"Detention Center"), where M.S.H., a fifteen-year-old minor, was a
detainee in the sole custody of the Department. 3
M.S.H. was processed into the Detention Center on March 10,
2012,4 and was housed on the fourth floor in one of the two units
reserved exclusively for female detainees. 5

Robinson worked on the

fifth floor and was never assigned to work on the fourth floor
during the 76 days that M.S.H. was at the Detention Center. 6
Shortly
unaccompanied

after

M.S.H.

visits

to

arrived,

her

cell. 7

Robinson
Another

began

employee

making
at

the

Detention Center engaged or triggered a mechanism that controls and
unlocks cell doors to enable a JSO, in this instance Robinson, to
open M.S.H.'s cell door.8

Robinson visited her two to three times

2

Document No. 27-10 at 8 of 16; Document No. 29 at 2-3.

3

Document No. 27 at 2; Document No. 29, ex. 6 at 9.

4

Document No. 29, ex. 15 at 4.

5

Id. , ex. 6 at 8.

6

Id. , ex. 6 at 9.

7

Document No. 29, ex. 2 ~ 3-2.

8 Document No.
of 69.

29,

ex.

.
2 ~ 4 , id. , ex.
2

5 at 49 of 69 to 50

per week during her approximate 11 weeks at the Detention Center.9
Initially, he gave M.S.H.
engaged

in

improper

food and candy, and in later visits he

sexual

conduct. 10

M.S.H.

states

in

her

affidavit that " [d]uring at least 3 of his visits to my cell, JSO
Robinson touched my breasts, buttocks, and/or vagina and would make
sexually explicit comments like,
'I want to fuck yoU.,"ll
ask

her

to

touch

his

'I want you to sit on my face' or

Robinson would tell M.S.H. to undress or
"private

parts." 12

Robinson

would

also

describe detailed sexual acts he wanted to engage in with M.S.H.,
including sexual activities with multiple partners .13

Robinson

wrote letters to M.S.H. that include sexually explicit content,14
and he promised M.S.H. that after she finished her sentence the two
of them could be in a relationship. 15
Robinson's statutory rape of M.S.H. was committed on May 23,
2012, two days before she was transferred from the Detention Center
to State custody.16

9

Robinson opened M.S.H.'s cell door and began

Id.

10 Id. , ex 2
~ 5.
11

Id.

12 Id.
13

Id.

14 Id. , exs. 2a, 2b, 2c.
15 Id. , ex. 2
~ 5.
16 Id. , ex. 2
~ 4.
3

flirting with her.l7
ordered M. S. H.

Robinson entered just inside the cell and

to get closer to the cell door .18

He then began

touching her breasts, buttocks, and vagina with his right hand,19
while holding the cell door open with his left hand so as not to
allow the door to close and lock him inside the cell with M.S.H.20
This visit lasted approximately thirty minutes, with the last five
or

ten

minutes

being

after

"lights

out"

in

the

cells,

and

culminated with him repeatedly penetrating M.S.H.'s vagina with his
penis from behind her for approximately three minutes. 21
It was not until a

couple of months

later that detention

facility supervisory authorities learned that Robinson had engaged
in improper conduct with M.S.H.22
on

August

1,

2012,

when

JSO

The initial discovery was made
Ruthie

Coleman-Lister

found

in

17 Id., ex. 2 ~ 10.
Plaintiffs' summary judgment evidence is
that JSOs Arzelia Soniat, Allesandro Richardson, Cynthia Dipeolu,
and Derrick Coon are seen at different times either in the hallway
or in a room at the end of the hallway during the more than onehalf hour of hallway surveillance videotape exhibited in the
summary judgment evidence.
It appears that at least two of them
saw Robinson when he was in the hallway holding the door open to
M. S. H. 's cell.
Id., ex. 6 at 15.
The Internal Investigation
Report states that it "appears that [Robinson] may have been asked
to leave on two separate occasions.
" Id., ex. 8 at 1.
18 Id. , ex. 2
~ 10.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. , ex. 2
~ 11.
22 Id. , ex. 8 at 2.
4

Robinson's personal property and turned in an envelope with letters
from M. S. H.

to Robinson containing sexually explicit language. 23

Unit Supervisor Purvis Hunt brought the envelope to Superintendent
Aaron Beasley, 24 and Beasley thereupon contacted the Houston Police
Department
internal

and M. S. H. ' smother. 25

investigation,

letters belonged to him,
for

his

$200.00

brother

during

The

Department

which Robinson

conducted an

denied

that

the

claimed that he was keeping the letters

"Sonny, ,,26

and

that

Coleman-Lister

from him that was with the letters .27

had

stolen

The Department' s

internal investigation concluded that Robinson had contacts with
M.S.H. that "violated the TJJD code of ethics.,,28

Robinson later

pled guilty to sexual assault of a child under seventeen years of
age,29 and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. 3D
After the August 1, 2012 discovery of the sexually explicit
letters in Robinson's possession, it was discovered that some other
JSOs had been aware of some of Robinson's inappropriate conduct

23

rd.

24 rd.
25 rd.
26 Document No. 27-10 at 12 of 16.
27 rd.
28 rd.
29 Document No. 29, ex. 10.
3D

rd.
5

---------------

~--...

-.-,---------------------------

preceding his rape of M.S.H.

JSO Sonya Ray reported that she had

known of a possible relationship between Robinson and M.S.H. but
had made no report of such. 31
Coon

had

Robinson,

delivered

to

and M.S.H.

It was also learned that JSO Derrick

M.S.H.

a

sexually

explicit

note

from

states in her affidavit that Coon said he

wanted her to have sex with him instead of with Robinson. 32

M. S. H.

in her affidavit further states that she reported to JSO Jones, a
female guard with whom M.S.H.

says she had become friends,

that

Robinson "was touching me and coming on to me and insisting on
having sex with me,

/I

but

when JSO Jones

asked whether M. S. H.

planned to report the incidents, M. S. H. says she replied, "I didn't
want to and JSO Jones said that was okay. 1/33

There is no evidence

that any of these JSO peers reported to a unit supervisor or other
person

in

authority

their

suspicions

or

observations

about

Robinson's misconduct.
II.
Rule 56(a)

Legal Standard

provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to
matter of law.

1/

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

31

Document No. 29-17 at 1 of 2.

32

Document No. 27, ex. 2

33

Id., ex. 2

~

~

9.

7.
6

judgment as a

Once the movant carries this

burden,

the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary

judgment should not be granted.
Inc.,

144

F.3d 377,380

Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving,

(5th Cir.

1998).

A party opposing a

properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
mere allegations or denials

in a pleading,

and unsubstantiated

assertions that a fact issue exists will not suffice.

Id.

"[T]he

nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing the existence
of a

'genuine'

case."

issue concerning every essential component of its
"A party asserting

that a

fact

cannot be or is

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
particular parts of materials in the record [.

.] i

(A)

citing to

or (B) showing

that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a

genuine dispute,

or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact."

FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c) (1).

"The court need consider only the cited materials,
consider other materials in the record."

but it may

Id. 56(c) (3)

In considering a motion for summary judgment,

the district

court must view the evidence "through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden."
2505, 2513 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct.

All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.
Corp.,

106 S. Ct.

Matsushi ta Elec.
1348, 1356

(1986)

Indus.

Co.

v.

Zenith Radio

"If the record, viewed in

this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for

7

the nonmovant, then summary judgment is proper.

Kelley v. Price-

Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993).

On the other

hand, if "the factfinder could reasonably find in [the nonmovant' s]
favor,

then summary judgment

standards of Rule 56 are met,

is

Even if

improper."

the

a court has discretion to deny a

motion for summary judgment if it believes that "the better course
would be to proceed to a full trial."

Anderson,

106 S.

Ct. at

2513.
III. Analysis
A.

Section 1983 Claim
The civil Rights Act of 1866 creates a private right of action

for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under
color of state law.

42 U.S.C.

1983; Migra v. Warren City Sch.

§

Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 896 (1984).

Section 1983 is

not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a
method

for

vindicating

federal

rights

conferred

elsewhere.

Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994).
A municipality can be held liable under

§

1983 only when the

municipality itself causes a constitutional deprivation.

See City

of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989); Monell v. Dept.
of Soc. Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037-38 (1978).

This requires the

execution of an official county policy or custom which results in
the injury made the basis of the

§

8

1983 claim.

Monell, 98 S. Ct.

Proof of municipal liability sufficient to satisfy

at 2035-36.

Monell requires:

(1) an official policy or custom, of which (2) a

policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge,
and

(3)

a constitutional violation whose "moving force"

policy or custom.
(5th Cir.

2002).

Pineda v.

City of Houston,

is that

291 F.3d 325,

328

A high standard of proof is required before a

municipality can be held liable under
Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791,

796

§

1983.

See

Snyder v.

(5th Cir. 1998); see also Board of

County Com'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1394 ("Where a court fails
to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation,
municipal liability [improperly] collapses into respondeat superior
liability."); Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1208 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(Section 1983 liability should not be imposed absent a showing of
"a high degree of fault on the part of city officials") .
For purposes of municipal liability, an official policy may be
(1)

a

policy

persistent,
which r

statement,

ordinance,

or

regulation,

or

(2)

"a

widespread practice of City officials or employees,

although

not

authorized

by

officially

adopted

and

promulgated policYr is so common and well-settled as to constitute
a custom that fairly represents municipal policy."
City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001)

Piotrowski v.

(quoting Webster

v. City of Houston r 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)

(en bane)).

"The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the
underlying

constitutional

violation,

9

moreover,

cannot

be

conclusorYi it must contain specific facts."

Spiller v. City of

Texas City, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)
In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the
County

failed

Department

to

train

employees i

and

that

supervise

the

County

procedures" and at the same time,

its

Juvenile

Probation

did

not

"adequate

have

Juvenile Probation Department

staff failed "to follow procedures," which allowed Robinson "to
continue his predatory behavior"i

that "the usual and customary

practice of [the Harris County Juvenile Probation Department is] to
allow male officers effectively unlimited and unsupervised access
to the female detainees"

i

and that there were no procedures to

allow detainees such as M.S.H. "to alert authorities about unlawful
and predatory behavior without fear of retribution," all of which
"allowed the statutory rape to occur"

in violation of M. S. H. ' s

rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 34
The uncontroverted summary judgment evidence is that Harris
County's

policymaker

for

the

Harris

County Juvenile

Probation

Department ("Juvenile Probation Department") is the Harris County
Juvenile

Board

("Juvenile

Board"). 35

The

Juvenile

Board

is

comprised of the Harris County Judge and seven other judges. 36

It

is the Juvenile Board that governs and sets all procedures for the

~~

34

Document No. 6

35

Document No. 27-5

36

Id.

~~

8,

19i

10-11, 13, 23.
~

8.

TEX. HUM. RES. CODE
10

ANN.

§

152.107l.

Juvenile

Probation

Department r

and

all

rules r

policies r

and

procedures approved and adopted by the Juvenile Board are required
to

be

followed

Department. 37

by

all

employees

of

the

Juvenile

Probation

The daily operations of the Department are managed

by an Executive Director r

Chief Juvenile Probation Officer Tom

Brooks r and various deputy directors and supervisors who oversee
the Departmentrs more than 1r200 employees. 38

Among other thingsr

the Juvenile Probation Department maintains the Detention Center in
downtown Houston r where both male and female juvenile detainees are
in various stages of adjudication by the Juvenile Courts of Harris
County. 39

This is where M.S.H. was temporarily detained for eleven

weeks during her judicial proceedings.

The Detention Center has a

superintendent r assistant superintendent r more than a couple dozen
juvenile probation officers who serve either as unit supervisors or
shift

supervisors r

("JSOs rr )

r

and

numerous

juvenile

supervision

officers

one of whom was Robinson. 40

The uncontroverted summary judgment evidence establishes that
the Juvenile Board had adopted and had in place numerous rules r
policies r and procedures for the Juvenile Probation Department r
including

personnel

at

the

Detention

37

Document No. 27-5 ~~ 8 r 19.

38

rd. ~ 8.

39

Document No. 29 at 10.

40

rd.

r

ex. 16 at 6-9
11

Center

regarding

their

treatment of juveniles in custody. 41
Department's

Those policies include the

"zero tolerance policy regarding any incidents of

sexual abuse 42 and expressly prohibit staff members from using
II

"their official position to secure privileges or advantages,"43
state that staff shall not

"maintain or give the appearance of

maintaining an inappropriate relationship with a juvenile residing
in a facility,

1144

and forbid a staff member from being "designated

as a perpetrator in a Commission abuse, exploitation and neglect
investigation" conducted under state authority. 45

Plaintiffs do not

criticize these and numerous other applicable policies mandated by
the Juvenile Board.
Plaintiffs assert, however,

that the County failed to train

and supervise employees and the evidence

"demonstrates a

clear

pattern of similar incidents and prior incidents in which Harris
County's

'official'

policies

were

deliberately

disregarded

by

Harris County's employees and these actions permitted JSO Robinson
to enter M.S. Hall's cell and sexually assault her." 46

41 See Document No. 27-8.
42 rd. at 5 of 41.
43 rd. at 34 of 41.
44 rd.
45 rd.
46

Document No. 29 at 13-14.
12

To

succeed on a

claim for

failure

to

supervise or train

against either a municipality or an individual, the plaintiff must
show that: "(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train
the subordinate official i

(2)

a causal link exists between the

failure to train or supervise and the violation of
and

(3)

rights;

the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate

indifference."
2008) i

[her]

Lewis v. Pugh, 289 F. App'x 767, 771-72 (5th Cir.

Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998)

Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986).
plaintiff fails to establish deliberate indifference,

i

"Where a
the court

need not address the other two prongs of supervisor liability."
Goodman

v.

Harris

(citations omitted)

Cnty.,

571

F.3d

388,

395

(5th

Cir.

2009)

"Deliberate indifference requires a showing

of more than negligence or even gross negligence."

Estate of Davis

v. city of North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005).
"Proof of more than a single instance of the lack of training or
supervision

causing

a

violation

normally required before

such

of

constitutional

lack of

constitutes deliberate indifference.

County,

245

F.3d

447,

459

is

training or supervision

The plaintiff must generally

demonstrate at least a pattern of similar violations."
Upshur

rights

(5th

Cir.

2001)

Thompson v.
(citations

omitted) .
Plaintiffs offer no evidence of

failure by the

County to

supervise and train Robinson, and fail to controvert Defendants'

13

summary judgment evidence of the extensive training Robinson did in
fact receive,
accordance

including the following:

with

Standards. 47
Robinson as a

the

Texas

Juvenile

Robinson was trained in
Justice

Department

(TJJD)

The Texas Juvenile Probation Commission certified
Juvenile Detention Officer in 2006 after he had

completed 40 hours of training that included such mandatory topics
as Juvenile Rights, Safety and Security, Abuse, Exploitation and
Neglect,

and

Code

of

Ethics;

and

the

Commission

renewed

his

certification as a Juvenile Supervision Officer in 2010 after he
had completed 86.50 credit hours of training.

Robinson's 2010

recertification was valid through the time of his termination in
August 2012. 48

Robinson's records

show that he was trained on

Juvenile Rights on seven separate occasions during the course of
his five plus years of employment. 49

His training records show that

Robinson was presented and signed a copy of the Code of Ethics,
which includes a prohibition against employees "maintain [ing]
inappropriate
caseload,

relationship

supervised by

the

with

juveniles

assigned

to

their

juvenile probation department,

coming under the supervision of the juvenile court. 1150

an

or

Robinson's

training records also show that he completed the Juvenile Detention

47

Document No. 27-5 at 3-4.

48

Id. at 4.

49

Document 27-7 at 1 of 23 to 3 of 23.

50

Id. at 19 of 23.
14

Center Policy and Procedure Review, including a review of Juvenile
Rights on October 19,

2011, only six months before he began his

reprehensible cultivation of M.S.H. that culminated in his rape of
this minor. 51
Likewise,
evidence

of

Plaintiffs
any

have

"persistent,

not

presented

widespread

summary

practice

judgment

of

employees," Webster, 735 F.2d at 841, or of a "pattern of similar
violations,"
inferred

Thompson,

that

245

Detention

F.3d at
Center

459,

from which

supervisors

policymakers were deliberately indifferent to
supervision

of

JSOs

regarding

juvenile

or
the

rights,

it

the

can be
County's

training and
inappropriate

relationships with juveniles under supervision, and the County's
zero tolerance for sexual abuse of detainees.

"The Fifth Circuit

requires more than a list of instances of misconduct to ensure that
the jury has the necessary context to glean a pattern,

if any."

Alfaro v. City of Houston, No. H-11-1541, 2013 WL 3457060, at *13
(S.D. Tex. July 9, 2013)

(Rosenthal, J.)

(citing Peterson v. City

of Ft. Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiffs'

summary judgment evidence here is that out of

seventeen documented complaints of abuse of juveniles over a period
of five years preceding the rape,52 only two involved sexual abuse,

51 rd. at 21 of 23 to 23 of 23.
52 Document No. 29 at 16; id., ex. 6 at 12.
15

and one of those was "youth on youth.

,,53

Thus, the summary judgment

evidence establishes only one prior instance of sexual abuse having
been alleged against a Juvenile Supervision Officer during the five
years before Robinson assaulted M.S.H.

The fact that one JSO had

been accused of sexual abuse in the five years prior to Robinson's
rape of M.S.H. is not proof of a pattern or widespread practice of
JSOs having improper relationships with or committing sexual abuse
of

detainees

within

the

Detention

Center.

It

follows

that

Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that the County or the Juvenile Board was deliberately indifferent
to the proper training and supervision of JSOs employed in the
Detention Center during Robinson's employment and prior to the
commission of his crime against M.S.H.

Defendant Harris County is

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs'

53

§

1983 claims. 54

Id., ex. 6 at 12.

54 Plaintiffs offered no summary judgment evidence to support
and have therefore abandoned their remaining claim that the County
had no procedure for detainees to alert authorities to "unlawful
and predatory behavior," nor do Plaintiffs offer evidence to
controvert Defendant's documentary evidence of a "youth Grievance
Process.
In fact, included in Plaintiffs' own proof are two
"Juvenile Grievance Forms," both filled in by separate detainees
during the eleven weeks that M.S.H. was a detainee, expressing
certain complaints about two different staff members.
Id., exs.
3, 4. The summary judgment evidence is uncontroverted that M.S.H.
had an effective grievance procedure available to her, and chose
not to use it.
See Document 29.
If

16

B.

State Law Claims
Plaintiffs

allege

assault

and

battery,

and

intentional

infliction of emotional distress against Robinson, but not against
the County,
torts

of

which is immune from liability for the intentional

its

employee. 55

The

claims

against

Robinson

official capacity were dismissed by Order signed July 29,

in his
2013.

The tort claims against Robinson in his personal capacity remain,
but the case file reflects no return of service to establish that
Plaintiffs served Robinson with summons and a copy of the Amended
Complaint. 56

The action against Robinson is therefore susceptible

to being dismissed without prejudice.
IV.

See FED. R. Crv. P. 4(m).

Order

For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that Defendant Harris County's Motion for Summary
Judgment

(Document No.

27)

is GRANTED,

and Plaintiffs Michelle

Hall's and Danny Hall's, Individually and as Next Friend of Minor

55

TEX. Crv. PRAC.

&

REM. CODE ANN.

§

101. 057 (West 2011)

Plaintiffs did serve Robinson with summons and a copy of
their Original Complaint on December 3, 2012 (Document No.3).
Before Robinson's answer was due, however, Plaintiffs superseded
their Original Complaint by filing their First Amended Complaint on
December 19, 2012. There is no evidence that Plaintiffs requested
the Clerk to issue a summons or ever served Robinson with their
First Amended Complaint.
After filing their Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs evidently ceased their efforts to prosecute any claims
against Robinson, which claims in any event may now be time-barred.
56

17

M.S.H., claims against Harris County are DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs, within seven (7) days after the entry
of this Order, shall file a response to show cause, if any exists,
why Plaintiffs' remaining claims against Defendant Robert Emerson
Robinson should not be dismissed without prejudice for want of
prosecution.
Plaintiffs'

If
claims

Plaintiffs
against

choose

not

to

file

a

response,

Robinson

will

be

dismissed without

prejudice in the Court's Final Judgment.
The Clerk will enter this Order and provide a correct copy to
all parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this

Jn~of
day

~

October, 2014.

,
WERLEIN, JR.
ES DISTRICT JUDGE

18