Huynh v. Harris Health Systems
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Signed by Magistrate Judge George C. Hanks, Jr) Parties notified.(jegonzalez, 4)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
HONGLINH HUYNH,
Plaintiff,
VS.
HARRIS HEALTH SYSTEMS a/k/a
HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:12-cv-3730
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Honglinh Huynh, is a pharmacist who filed suit against her employer,
Harris Health Systems a/k/a Harris County Hospital District (“Harris Health”). Huynh’s
complaint alleges that Harris Health violated her rights under the Family Medical Leave
Act (“FMLA”).
Dkt. 1.
Harris Health filed a general denial and raised several
affirmative defenses, including the defense of “governmental and sovereign immunity.”
Dkt. 5. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c). Dkt. 12.
Harris Health has now moved for summary judgment in its favor on Huynh’s
claims. Dkt. 15. Huynh has filed a response to that motion. Dkt. 16. The parties
submitted oral argument on the motion to the Court.
After considering the pleadings, the record, and the arguments of counsel, the
Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and ORDERS this case be
DISMISSED without prejudice.
1
BACKGROUND
Huynh filed suit in this Court against Harris Health, alleging that she had been
employed since 2002 by Harris Health as a full-time Staff Pharmacist at the Casa de
Amigo Clinic. Dkt. 1. For the majority of her employment period, Huynh worked a shift
that began at 8:15 or 8:30 am and ended at 5:00 or 5:30 pm. In May 2012, Huynh took
FMLA leave, requesting the leave because of “[her] own health condition.” Dkt. 1-1.
Huynh returned to work in June 2012. After she returned to work, she was notified that
she was being transferred to Lyndon B. Johnson Hospital and that her shift was being
changed to 2:00 pm-10:00 pm. Huynh alleges that, as a result of this shift change, she
experienced “physical and mental complications due to the disruption of her normal daily
routine and sleep cycle.” Huynh alleges that Harris Health “intentionally interfered with
[her] exercise of rights provided under the FMLA by its sudden and arbitrary decision to
alter her shift which had been in place for over a decade.” Accordingly, she seeks
compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Neither side specifically raises the question of subject-matter jurisdiction.
However, this Court may do so, sua sponte. See Giannakos v. M/V Bravo Trader, 762
F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985) (“United States District Courts and Courts of Appeals
have the responsibility to consider the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte if
it is not raised by the parties and to dismiss any action if such jurisdiction is lacking.”).
The Court must dismiss this case if it finds that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking.
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Such a dismissal for subject matter
jurisdiction is reviewed on appeal de novo. Musslewhite v. State Bar of Texas, 32 F.3d
942, 945 (5th Cir. 1994).
B. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, “The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XI.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Eleventh Amendment “bars an individual from
suing a state in federal court unless the state consents to suit or Congress has clearly and
validly abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity.” Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr.,
307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002). Such consent from a State must be clear and
unequivocal. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct.
900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Similarly, the Supreme Court has also required “an
unequivocal expression of congressional intent to ‘overturn the constitutionally
guaranteed immunity of the several States.’” Id. (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
342, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)). Further, “[i]t has long been settled that the
reference to actions ‘against one of the United States encompasses not only actions in
which a State is actually named as a defendant, but also certain actions against state
agents and state instrumentalities.’” Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519
U.S. 425, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997).
3
ANALYSIS
A. The FMLA: Federal and State Law
The FMLA entitles an employee to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave per
year for (A) the care of a newborn child; (B) the adoption or foster-care placement of a
child; (C) the care of a spouse, child, or parent with a serious medical condition; and (D)
the employee’s own serious health condition when the condition interferes with the
employee’s ability to perform at work. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).1 Courts often refer to
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as “the family-care provisions,” while subparagraph (D)
is referred to as “the self-care provision.” See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of
Maryland, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012). Huynh’s claims are
“self-care claims” brought under subparagraph D.
The FMLA makes it unlawful for employers to “interfere with, restrain, or deny
the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under” the Act and prohibits
employers from “discharg[ing] or in any other manner discriminat[ing] against any
individual” for exercising their FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2615(a)(2).
Essentially, “employees returning from FMLA leave are entitled to be restored to their
former position, or to a new position with equivalent benefits, pay, and other terms and
conditions of employment.” University of Texas at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192,
194 (Tex. 2010).
1
In 2008, Congress added subsection (E), which permits leave for exigencies arising from a
family member’s service in the armed forces. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(E).
4
The Texas Legislature has incorporated the FMLA leave provisions into Texas
law for state employees.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 661.912 (West 2012).
Section
661.912 provides that “to the extent required by federal law, a [qualifying] state
employee . . . is entitled to leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(28 U.S.C. Section 2601 et seq.).” Id.
B. State Sovereign Immunity under the FMLA
The FMLA generally creates a private right of action for equitable relief and
damages “against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court.” Id. § 2617(a)(2). However, States and their subdivisions still retain immunity for
some FMLA claims. In Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court
held that States were not immune from suit for violations of subparagraph C of the
FMLA.
538 U.S. 721, 730–732, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003). However,
States do retain their sovereign immunity from suits related to subparagraph D “self-care”
FMLA claims, such as Huynh’s. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, –––U.S. –––
–, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1332, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012). The Supreme Court of Texas has
reached a similar conclusion, finding that the Congress of the United States did not
abrogate Texas’ sovereign immunity against private suits for damages under the FMLA’s
self-care provision. University of Texas at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192, 201-202
(Tex. 2010) (“The State of Texas cannot be sued under the FMLA’s self-care
provision.”).
5
C. Sovereign Immunity Deprives this Court of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
In her briefing and at the summary judgment hearing, Huynh conceded that Harris
Health Systems was a political subdivision of the State of Texas and that the United
States Congress had not abrogated Texas’ sovereign immunity from suit for violations of
the FMLA’s self-care provision. Nonetheless, Huynh’s briefing contends that Texas
itself had waived its immunity under the FMLA by enacting Texas Government Code
Section 661.912.
See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Dkt. # 17, pg. 3 (“[T]he State of Texas has expressly waived its governmental
immunity from suit under the FMLA, and Defendant’s claim of such immunity must
therefore be denied.”).
At the summary judgment hearing, the Court raised the issue of its own
jurisdiction and asked counsel to address whether Huynh’s FMLA claims were barred by
sovereign immunity. Huynh’s counsel initially set out her argument regarding Section
661.912, but then, however, subsequently admitted, “To be perfectly candid with the
Court, . . . the Supreme Court of Texas has pretty much said explicitly that, in Texas you
can’t sue the State for an FMLA claim. So, if this Court were to rule otherwise, I think it
would be the first time, essentially. There’s no case that I’ve been able to find that has
held anything otherwise.”
Indeed, as conceded, Huynh’s argument that Section 661.912 abrogated Texas’
sovereign immunity under the FMLA has been considered, and soundly rejected, by other
federal courts. In Swanson v. Railroad Commission of Texas, United States District
Judge Janis Graham Jack found that Section 661.912 “merely recogniz[ed] employee’s
6
rights under federal law to take FMLA leave” and was not a valid waiver of immunity.
No. C–11–80, 2011 WL 2039601, *6 (S.D. Tex., May 24, 2011) (“Section 661.912 does
not expressly state or even imply that Texas consents to suits for violations of the FMLA,
or in any manner waives its immunity. The only implication to be drawn from the text of
the statute is that certain state employees are entitled to FMLA leave.”). Similarly, in
Jordon v. Texas Department of Aging and Disabilities Services, United States District
Court Judge Ron Clark stated, “There is no unequivocal indication in [Section 661.912]
that [Texas] has waived any immunity from suit under the FMLA, much less that it has
expressly intended to subject itself to suit in federal court.” Jordon v. Texas Dept. of
Aging and Disabilities Services, No. 9:05CV161, 2006 WL 1804619, 5 (E.D. Tex., June
28, 2006).
Accordingly, this Court finds it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Huynh’s
FMLA claims against Harris Health. See, e.g., Jackson v. Texas Southern University, No.
H–11–4092, 2014 WL 496653, *15 (S.D. Tex., February 3, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s complaint
refers to the FMLA regarding her medical leave, but a FMLA claim against TSU as an
arm of the State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Bullard v. Texas Department of
Aging & Disability Services, No. 6:12cv919, 2013 WL 6513752, *4 (E.D. Tex.
December 12, 2013) (“Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from
Plaintiff's FMLA [self-care] claim. This claim should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).”); Taylor v. Texas Southern University, No. 4:12–
CV–01975, 2013 WL 3157529, *5 (S.D. Tex., June 20, 2013) (“[T]he Court grants
7
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that it does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
FMLA self-care claim.”).
CONCLUSION
After a review of the pleadings and the record on file, as well as the briefing and
argument presented by counsel, this Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over this case.
Accordingly, this Court ORDERS that the case be
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on April 8, 2014.
_________________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?