Butler v. Texas Health And Human Services
Filing
52
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Granting #42 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Signed by Judge Ewing Werlein, Jr) Parties notified.(gkelner, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
FLORENCE K. BUTLER,
§
§
Plaintiff,
§
§
v.
TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
COMMISSION,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-1030
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Pending
is
Defendant
Texas
Health
and
Human
Services
Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 42).
After
considering the motion, responses, reply, and applicable law, the
Court concludes as follows.
I.
In
February
2008,
pro
Background
se
Plaintiff
Florence
K.
Butler
("Plaintiff"), a black Methodist woman, began working for Defendant
Texas Health and Human Services Commission ("Defendant") as a Texas
Works Advisor ("TWA"), enrolling clients in the Medicaid program. 1
Beginning in September 2009,
Abraham,
a black woman. 2
Plaintiff was supervised by Bonnie
Abraham avers that she quickly noticed
1
Document No. 42, ex. A at Appx. 2, Appx. 7.
2
Id., ex. B
~~
2, 4.
problems
with
Plaintiff's
performance. 3
On October
14,
2009,
Abraham met with Plaintiff to discuss her performance problems. 4
Abraham explained to Plaintiff that Plaintiff was only completing
15 to 17 cases per day and that she had accumulated a large backlog
of unprocessed cases. s
Abraham informed Plaintiff that based on
her tenure, she should be processing more than 25 to 30 cases per
day.6
Abraham agreed to redistribute 50 of Plaintiff's cases to
other employees, but told Plaintiff that she would be responsible
for keeping up with her workload in the future.
7
Abraham met with
Plaintiff to discuss her performance for a second time on October
27,2009. 8
Abraham
told
Plaintiff
that
she
would once
again
redistribute some of Plaintiff's cases to help clear her backlog,
but informed Plaintiff that continued poor performance would be
grounds for corrective action. 9
On December 29, 2009, Abraham met
with Plaintiff for a third time and told her that she was still not
3
Id., ex. B
~
4.
4 Id.,
ex. B ~ 4; id., ex. B-1 (October 14, 2009 "Conference
Notes for Employee File" memo prepared by Bonnie Abraham) .
S
Id. , ex. B ~ 4' id. , ex. B-l.
,
6
Id. , ex. B ~ 4 ; id. , ex. B-l.
7
Id. , ex. B ~ 4 ; id. , ex. B-l.
8
Id. , ex. B ~ 5 .
Id. , ex. B ~ 5.
See also id. , ex. B-2 (October 27, 2009
"Coaching for Employee File" memo prepared by Bonnie Abraham) .
9
2
completing the expected 25 to 30 cases per day.10
Abraham informed
Plaintiff that Abraham would be recommending corrective action. l l
On March 171
2010 1 Abraham issued a
written notice placing
Plaintiff on First-Level Corrective Action based on her failure to
meet performance
expectations. 12
At
this
point
I
Plaintiff was
expected to complete 40 cases per daYI but was averaging only 15-17
cases
13
l
and several hundred of her cases had been redistributed to
other staff since October 2009. 14
The notice advised Plaintiff that
she would remain on First Level Corrective Action for three months
and
l
if she was unable to complete her assigned cases for three
consecutive months without redistribution
action is possible
10
II
l
"more serious corrective
up to and including dismissal."15
l
Id.
1
ex. B ~ 6; id.
Id.
I
ex. B- 3.
ex. B-3.
1
12 Id.
ex. B ~ 7; id.
ex. B-4.
First-Level Reminders are
the first level of the formal corrective action process and are
issued to "correct [) a minor offense usually when the employee
does not improve performance after coaching or counseling." Id.
ex. B-5 at Appx. 35 Appx. 40.
1
1
I
1
1
13
Id.
1
ex. B
~
8; id.
1
ex. B-4 at Appx. 32.
14
See id.
ex. B-4 at Appx. 33 ("One hundred (100) of your
assigned cases were redistributed to other staff to complete in
October 2009 1 forty (40) cases were redistributed in November 2009
and another 281 of your assigned cases were redistributed in
December 2009.
In January 2010 280 cases were redistributed and
in February 2010 105 cases were redistributed in to other workers
for completion.") .
I
1
1
15 Id.
I
ex. B-4 at Appx. 33.
3
On April
30,
2010,
Abraham once again met with Plaintiff
regarding her poor performance. 16
her
performance
had
not
Abraham informed Plaintiff that
improved,
and
that
Abraham
recommending the next level of corrective action. I?
2010,
would
be
On June 8,
Abraham issued written notice placing Plaintiff on Second-
Level Corrective Action. ls
The written notice informed Plaintiff
that she was required to complete 30 or more cases per day, but had
averaged fewer than 19 cases per day in March and April 2010,19 and
that several hundred more of her cases had been redistributed to
other staff in March, April, and May of 2010. 20
Plaintiff would
remain on the Second Level Corrective Action for six months, and
could be subject to "more serious corrective action . . . up to and
including dismissal"
if she did not complete her assigned cases
without redistribution during that time. 21
16
Id., ex. B
~
9.
17
Id., ex. B
~
9.
IS Id.,
ex. B ~ 10; id., ex. B-7. Second-Level Reminders are
"to correct a serious performance problem." Id., ex. B-5 at Appx.
41.
19 Id., ex. B-7 at Appx. 56 (Plaintiff averaged 17.73 cases per
day in March 2010 and 18.27 cases per day in April 2010).
20 Id.,
ex. B-7 at Appx. 56 ("Two hundred fifty nine (259) of
your assigned cases were redistributed to other staff to complete
in March 2010, one hundred fifty eight (192) [sic] cases were
redistributed in April 2010 and currently, one hundred ninety four
(194) cases were redistributed in May 2010.") .
21
Id., ex. B-7 at Appx. 56.
4
September
On
Plaintiff
2010,
9,
filed
Charge
a
of
Discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
hostile
("EEOC" ),
work
complaining of
environment. 22
On
"ongoing harassment"
September
14,
2010,
and a
Plaintiff
requested a transfer to an alternate location closer to her home. 23
Plaintiff
cited
the
"hostile
work
environment,
personality
conflicts amongst co-workers and supervisory biases" at her present
location,
along with her long commute,
transfer. 24
Defendant's
request was
denied because
evidence
is
she was
as reasons she wanted to
that
Plaintiff's
transfer
on Second Level Corrective
Action at the time of her transfer request. 25
On September 17, 2010, Abraham placed Plaintiff on Third-Level
Corrective Action due
to
"inappropriate outbursts
her
at
"constant behavioral
the office. ,,26
issues"
and
The written notice
provided to Plaintiff detailed several instances in June and July
of 2010 in which Plaintiff yelled at Abraham and refused to follow
22
Document No. 44-1 at 27 of 30.
23
Document No. 47, ex. Q.
24
Document No. 42, ex. B-10.
25
Id. , ex. B ~ 13; id. , ex. D ~ 4.
26
Id., ex. B ~ 11. A Third-Level Corrective Action is "the
final and most serious level of the formal corrective action
process" and "provides the employee with one last opportunity to
correct the performance problem." Id., ex. B-5 at Appx. 44.
5
her
instructions. 27
The
notice
stated
that
the
Third-Level
Corrective Action would last for twelve calendar months,
Plaintiff repeated the listed violations,
and if
or remained unable to
complete her assigned cases without redistribution,
"more serious
disciplinary action is possible, up to and including dismissal."28
On September 16,
2011,
Supervisor Charlotte Smith,
a black
woman, sent to Plaintiff a memorandum notifying her that her ThirdLevel Corrective action was inactivated, and "commended" her for
her "efforts in correcting the problem."29
On October 17,
2011,
Plaintiff once again requested to transfer to a location closer to
her
horne,
citing
environment"
mother. 30
"numerous
stress
factors
and
a
hostile
work
and a desire to be closer to her daughter and ill
Plaintiff was placed on the regional transfer list, and
remained there until the time of her termination. 31
From October 2011 until her termination in May 2012, Plaintiff
worked in the Children's Medicaid Center under the supervision of
Smi th. 32
In addition to Plaintiff,
Smith supervised twelve
to
fifteen other TWAs, all of whom were required to process 30 cases
27 Id. , ex. B-8.
28 Id. , ex. B-8 at Appx. 6l.
29 Document No. 47, ex. X· Document No. 42, ex. C
,
~ 2.
30 Document No. 42, ex. C-6.
31 Id. , ex. D
~ 5; id. , ex. D-l.
32 Id. , ex. C
~ 2.
6
per day.33
the unit,
Smith avers that Plaintiff was the lowest producer in
routinely processing fewer than 15 cases per day,
that Smith had to reassign her cases to other employees. 34
and
Smith
held several coaching sessions with Plaintiff to help her improve
her performance, but Plaintiff continued to fail to meet performance standards. 35
Smith also asserts that Plaintiff "displayed
disruptive, disrespectful, and insubordinate behavior in the office
in violation of agency rules," and that her behavior was the worst
in the unit. 36
On May 4, 2012, Smith issued Plaintiff a Notice of Possible
Disciplinary
Action. 37
The
Notice
stated
that
Plaintiff
had
"displayed very disrespectful and insubordinate behavior" toward
Smith, failed to follow instructions, and processed fewer than 15
cases per day.38
subject to
The Notice informed Plaintiff that she could be
"suspension,
demotion,
or discharge
for cause,"
and
invited her to provide any information she believed was "a defense
33 Id. , ex.
C
34 Id. , ex.
C ~
4.
35 Id. , ex.
C ~
5.
36 Id. , ex.
C ~
6.
~~ 3-4.
37 Id., ex. C ~ 9; id., ex. C-4.
Smith explains that
\\ [b] ecause Plaintiff had already been placed on a Third-Level
Reminder, I could not place her on another Third-Level Reminder."
Id., ex. C ~ 9.
38 Id., ex. C-4.
7
or which might mitigate the circumstances. 1139
on emergency leave at this time. 40
Plaintiff was placed
On May 15, 2012, Plaintiff was
terminated. 41
Plaintiff alleges that the denial of her transfer requests and
her termination were motivated by racial and religious discrimination, in violation of Title VII.42
are
Plaintiff's
claims
for
disparate
Remaining for adjudication
treatment,
discriminatory
discharge, and her claim that she was retaliated against for filing
her
2010
Charge wi th the
EEOC. 43
Defendant moves
for
summary
judgment. 44
39 Id. , ex. C-4 at Appx. 76, Appx. 78.
40 Id. , ex. C-4 at Appx. 78.
41 Id. , ex. C-7.
42 Document No. 1 (Compl.) .
43 See id.
By Order signed October 21, 2013, Plaintiff's Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claim was dismissed as barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. Document No. 19 at 5-6. That Order should
have recited the dismissal was without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction, and is hereby corrected sua sponte.
FED. R. Crv. P.
60(a).
In the same October 21, 2013 Order, the Court also
dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claim that she was retaliated
against for filing a workers' compensation claim.
The Court
conditionally dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's hostile work
environment claim, which dismissal was effective when Plaintiff
failed to amend her Complaint within the 21 days allowed to
replead.
44 Document No. 42.
8
II.
Rule 56 (a)
Legal Standard
provides that
"[t] he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
FED.
matter of law."
this
burden,
the
R.
Crv.
56
P.
burden shifts
to
Once the movant carries
(a)
the
summary judgment should not be granted.
nonmovant
to
show that
Morris v. Covan World Wide
Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
A party opposing
a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
mere allegations or denials
in a pleading,
and unsubstantiated
assertions that a fact issue exists will not suffice.
Id.
"[T]he
nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing the existence
of a
'genuine' issue concerning every essential component of its
case."
Id.
"A party asserting that a
fact
cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
particular parts of materials in the record .
(A)
citing to
., or (B) showing
that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a
genuine dispute,
or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact."
FED. R. Cry. P. 56 (c) (1).
"The court need consider only the cited materials,
consider other materials in the record."
but it may
Id. 56(c) (3)
In considering a motion for summary judgment,
the district
court must view the evidence "through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct.
9
-----------,---
. .- ..
_-----
2505, 2513 (1986).
All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.
Corp.,
106 S.
Matsushita Elec.
Ct. 1348, 1356
Indus.
Co.
v.
Zenith Radio
"If the record, viewed in
(1986).
this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for
the nonmovant, then summary judgment is proper.
Kelley v. Price-
Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993).
On the other
hand, if "the factfinder could reasonably find in [the nonmovant' s]
favor,
then summary judgment
standards of Rule 56 are met,
is
improper."
Even if
the
a court has discretion to deny a
motion for summary judgment if it believes that "the better course
would be to proceed to a full trial."
Anderson,
106 S.
Ct. at
2513.
III.
A.
Analysis
Title VII Standard
Title VII proscribes an employer from hiring, discharging, or
otherwise discriminating against any individual "with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
because of that individual's race.
Title
VII
inquiry
is
42 U.S.C.
"whether
the
discriminated against the plaintiff."
Servs. ,
373
discrimination
F.3d
can
647,
be
651
(5th
established
10
§
2000e-2(a) (1).
defendant
The
intentionally
Roberson v. Alltel Info.
Cir.
2004) .
through
either
Intentional
direct
or
circumstantial evidence.
Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F. 3d
212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001).
If no direct evidence is presented, the
claims must be analyzed using the framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
Bryan v. McKinsey
& Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004).
Under
this
framework,
a
plaintiff
must
first
create
presumption of intentional discrimination by establishing,
preponderance
the
of
discrimination.
evidence,
a
prima
See Wallace, 271 F.3d at 219.
establishes a prima
facie
case,
facie
case
a
by a
of
Once the plaintiff
the burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its actions.
facie
case
Id.
is
If the employer sustains its burden, the prima
dissolved,
and
plaintiff to establish either:
the
(1)
burden
shifts
back
to
the
that the employer's proffered
reason is not true,
but is instead a pretext for discrimination
(pretext alternative)
i
not
the
only
reason
or (2) the employer's reason, while true, is
for
its
conduct,
and
another
"motivating
factor" is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (mixed-motive
alternative).
Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc.,
482 F.3d 408, 411-12 (5th Cir. 2007).
B.
Discriminatory discharge and disparate treatment claims
Plaintiff has produced no direct evidence of discrimination,
so the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas framework.
11
See Wallace,
271 F.3d at 219.
Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by demonstrating that she: "(1) is a member of a
protected class;
(2)
was
qualified
for
the
position;
(3)
was
subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by
someone outside the protected class, or, in the case of disparate
that
treatment
treated more
Circuit
other
favorably."
defines
similarly
Bryan,
"similary
375
situated employees
F. 3d at
situated"
very
were
The
Fifth
to
360.
mean
narrowly
"employees who are treated more favorably under nearly identical
circumstances."
Houston,
Beltran v.
Univ.
837 F. Supp. 2d 635,
642
(internal quotations omitted).
a
stringent
one,
responsibilities,
and
of Tex.
Health Sci.
(S.D. Tex.
2011)
Ctr.
(Miller,
at
J.)
The "nearly identical" standard is
excludes
with
employees
different supervisors,
"different
different capabilities,
different work rule violations or different disciplinary records."
rd.
Plaintiff
has
not
demonstrated
a
prima
facie
case
of
discriminatory discharge because she has not presented evidence
that
she was
replaced by someone outside her protected class.
Plaintiff has also not demonstrated a prima facie case of disparate
treatment,
as
she
has
not
comparator
outside
her
protected
favorably.
coworkers
Plaintiff
of
a
identified
alleges
different
race
class
that
to
any
that
similarly
was
Defendant
transfer out,"
12
,---, _._..----'-'------_.._----,,---------
situated
treated more
"allowed
but
other
does
not
present evidence that those coworkers were similarly situated to
Plaintiff. 45
Furthermore,
from September 2010
the summary judgment evidence is that
to June 2012,
fourteen Children's Medicaid
staff members in addition to Plaintiff requested transfers,
twelve were approved. 46
Hispanic,
one
was
and
Of those twelve, eight were black, two were
Asian,
and
one
was
white. 47
Accordingly,
Document No. 42, ex. A at Appx. 12-13 ("Q.
. What
evidence do you have that [Defendant] discriminated against you on
the basis of your race? A. They -- they allowed other coworkers
of a different race to transfer out . . . . [T]hey allowed different
white employees to get transferred out, younger employees to get
transferred out, but didn't allow me to get transferred out.
They allowed Jennifer Rainey, which is a white female, to be
transferred out. 1/) •
Plaintiff exhibits her Rebuttal Statement
provided to the EEOC, which lists nineteen individuals that were
allowed to transfer, and includes the races, ages, and genders of
some of these employees. Document No. 44-2 at 1 of 30. However,
this list provides no information from which the Court can
determine if these individuals were similarly situated to
Plaintiff.
45
See
In her deposition, Plaintiff complained that Carol Blanchard,
a white female, was demoted to a clerk position instead of being
terminated.
Document No. 42, ex. A at Appx. 17.
However,
Plaintiff presents no evidence about Ms. Blanchard's disciplinary
record or her rule violations, so as to allow the Court to
determine if she was similarly situated to Plaintiff. Furthermore,
Plaintiff was offered a demotion in February 2011 to a Clerk
position, but refused to accept it.
Id., ex. C ~ 5.
As to her claim of religious discrimination, Plaintiff admits
that the only evidence she has that she was treated differently
than non-Christians is that Defendant denied her requests to attend
functions on Saturdays and Sundays.
See id., ex. A at Appx. 17.
She does not provide evidence that any similarly situated nonMethodists or non-Christians were allowed to take such leave.
46
Document No. 42, ex. D
47
Id., ex. D
~
~
3
3.
13
Plaintiff has not presented summary judgment evidence sufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the fourth element of
her prima facie case.
Even if Plaintiff had demonstrated a prima facie case,
her
Title VII claims would fail because Defendant has articulated a
legitimate,
non-discriminatory
reason
for
Plaintiff has not shown to be pretextual.
evidence is
that Plaintiff's first
its
actions
that
The summary judgment
transfer request was denied
because she was on Second-Level Corrective Action,48 and that her
second transfer
termination. 49
that
it
request
still pending at
the
time
of
her
As to Plaintiff's termination, Defendant's proof is
terminated
performance
was
and
her
due
to
repeated
insubordination.
instances
Defendant
has
of
under-
satisfied
its
burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
Plaintiff's termination.
was deficient. 50
Plaintiff disputes that her performance
However, "[s] imply disputing the underlying facts
of an employer's decision is not sufficient to create an issue of
48 Id., ex. B
~
13 i
49 Id., ex. D
~
5.
id., ex. D
~
4.
See, e.g., Document No. 44 at 7 of 30 (May 6, 2012 letter
from Plaintiff stating "I have always completed 15 or more
cases.") i id. at 21 of 30 (March 25, 2010 email from Plaintiff
about her First-Level Corrective Action: "In the memorandum letter
it says that I am processing 15 to 17 cases per day. From my WHIP
records it shows that I am processing 20 to 25 cases per day.") i
Document No. 44-1 at 18 of 30 to 25 of 30 (Disposition Timeliness
Reports) .
50
14
pretext."
Beltran,
Plaintiff's
claims
837
for
F.
Supp.
2d
at
discriminatory
Accordingly,
644.
discharge
and
disparate
treatment are dismissed.
C.
Retaliation claim
To state a prima facie case of retaliation,
demonstrate
(1)
she
suffered an adverse
engaged
in a
employment
Plaintiff must
protected activity,
action,
and
(3)
a
(2)
causal
she
link
existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Richards v. JRK Prop. Holdings, 405 F. App'x. 829, 831
2010) .
The
filing
of
charges
with
'protected activity' under Title VII.
the
EEOC
(5th Cir.
qualifies
See 42 U.S.C.
§
as
a
2000e-3(a)
(It is unlawful to discriminate against an employee because she has
"made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation,
proceeding,
or hearing"
under Title VII).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge in 2010, or
that she was discharged in May 2012.
However, Plaintiff presents
no evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that a causal
link existed between her protected activity and her termination.
Furthermore, given that more than twenty months passed between the
time she filed her Charge and her termination,
Plaintiff cannot
rely on temporal proximity alone to establish the causal link.
Clark Cnty.
Sch.
Dist.
v.
Breeden,
121 S.Ct.
1508,
1511
See
(2001)
(action taken twenty months after filing of EEOC charge "suggests,
15
---------------.----------------
by itself
I
no causality at all. II )
("The cases that accept mere
temporal proximity between an employerls knowledge of protected
activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of
causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the
temporal
proximity must
be
very
omitted)
(citing Richmond v.
close.
ONEOK I
120 F. 3d
1997)
(three-month period insufficient)
F.2d
1168,
1174-75
(7th
(internal
II )
i
209
(10th Cir.
205
1
Hughes v. Derwinski l 967
period
(four-month
1992)
Cir.
quotations
insufficient»
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that the denial of her
transfer request in September 2010 was in retaliation for filing
her 2010 EEOC Charge
I
such claim fails.
Plaintiff presents no
evidence that her transfer request was not purely lateral / 51 and
th~s,
has not demonstrated that its denial was a materially adverse
employment action.
App'x
866,
lateral
868
See Griffin v.
(5th Cir.
transfer
did
not
2009)
Citgo Petroleum Corp.
344 F.
I
("[A]ny purported denial
affect
Griffin's
employment
of
a
status,
benefits, or responsibilities, meaning that it did not constitute
a
materially
retaliation.")
adverse
i
employment
action
for
a
claim
of
Sabzevari v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 264 F. App'x
See Document No. 42, ex. B-10 (August 28
2010 transfer
request from Plaintiff seeking to be "relocated to an alternate
location closer to my residence. II) .
Plaintiff's second transfer
request was still pending at the time of her termination, but it
too appears to be a purely lateral transfer.
See id., ex. C- 6
(October 17, 2011 form requesting "LATERAL TRANSFERII).
51
1
16
392, 396 (5th Cir. 2008)
adverse
employment
(denial of transfer was not a materially
action,
and
could
not
support
plaintiff's
retaliation claim, where plaintiff presented no evidence that the
transfer was anything but lateral "in terms of pay,
promotional
opportunities, working conditions, and other objective factors.") .
Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate a prima facie case of
retaliation, she has not raised a genuine issue of material fact
that Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for denying
her
first
transfer
or
for
terminating
her
were
pretextual.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's retaliation claim is dismissed.
IV.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED
that
Defendant
Commission's Motion for
Texas
Health
Summary Judgment
and
Human
(Document No.
Services
42)
is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff Florence Butler's claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
The Clerk will enter this Order, providing a correct copy to
all parties of record.
~
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this
~ ~y
of May, 2014.
....
ING WERLEIN, JR.
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?