King-White et al v. Humble Independent School District et al
Filing
63
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 59 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings, denying as moot 58 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , dismissing with prejudice all Federal Law Claims against Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra, dismissing without prejudice all State Law Claims against Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
'J
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
A.W. and HER MOTHER
MARY KING-WHITE,
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-3551
§
§
§
§
§
AMANDA MICHELLE FEENSTRA,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
White"),
A.W.
brought
Independent
this
School
and
her mother,
action
District
Mary
against
("HISD" ),
King-White
defendants,
("King-
the
Amanda Michelle
Humble
Feenstra
("Feenstra"), Guy Sconzo, Charles Ned, Juan Melendez, Tammy McHale,
Craig Stowers, and Alicia Narcisse, for violation of civil rights
guaranteed by
§§
the
1983 and 1988
United
("§
States
1983" and
Education Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
Constitution
"§
§
1988"),
under
42
U. S. C.
and Title IX of the
1681 ("Title IX").
Plaintiffs
also asserted claims against all defendants under the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code and the common law of the State of Texas
for the failure
employees,
negligence,
distress.
to adequately train,
sexual
assault
bystander
and
recovery,
supervise,
battery,
and
and discipline
negligence
infliction
of
and
gross
emotional
Plaintiffs seek compensatory and exemplary damages, pre-
and post-judgment interest, costs of court, attorney's fees,
and
other relief available at law and in equity to which they might be
entitled.
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on June 11,
2014 (Docket Entry No. 35), the court dismissed the claims asserted
against HISD and all the individual defendants except Feenstra.
Pending before the court are Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Docket Entry No.
58),
and
Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (Docket Entry No. 59).
below,
For the reasons set forth
Feenstra's motion for judgment on the pleadings will be
granted as to all of the federal law claims that plaintiffs have
asserted
against
her,
the
court
will
decline
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'
against
Feenstra,
and
Feenstra's
motion
for
to
exercise
state law claims
partial
summary
judgment will be denied as moot.
I.
Plaintiffs' Factual Allegations
King-White is the mother of A.W. who was a minor during most
of the events giving rise to this action.
between 2009 and 2011 while A.W.
School, A.W.
was a
Plaintiffs allege that
student at Humble High
was sexually molested on multiple occasions by her
same-sex dance teacher, defendant Feenstra.
Plaintiffs allege that
the abuse began in the spring of 2009 when A.W. was 16 years old,
and continued until
School.
2011 when A. W.
Plaintiffs allege
graduated from Humble High
that when the abuse began Feenstra
-2-
instructed
A.W.
to
remain
quiet,
and
A.W.
remained
quiet.
Plaintiffs allege that while the abuse was occurring, A.W.'s grades
changed, A.W. withdrew from her classmates and dance teammates, and
that with King-White's consent, A.W.
home.
went to live in Feenstra's
Plaintiffs allege that Feenstra spent excessive amounts of
time with A.W. behind closed doors, and that Feenstra took A.W. on
personal
trips
during the
during which she and A.W.
school day and on out-of-town trips
shared a room and a bed.
Plaintiffs
allege that after A.W. graduated from Humble High School Feenstra
called A.W. on the phone and stalked A.W.l
Eventually
told
A.W.
Feenstra's actions.
a
former
dance
instructor
about
After the dance instructor reported A.W.'s
story to authorities, Feenstra was arrested.
On October 13, 2013,
Feenstra pleaded guilty to an improper relationship with a student
and was sentenced to 10 years deferred adjudication and probation. 2
II.
Feenstra's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
motion
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings
seeks
dismissal of all the claims asserted against for failure to state
a claim for which relief may be granted.
~~
lPlaintiffs' Original Complaint, Docket Entry No. I, pp. 1-15
1-82, esp. ~~ 2, 8, 19, 29, 41, 43, 46, 50, 55, 57-62, and 79.
2Id. at 15
~~
80-82.
-3-
A.
Standard of Review
Once a responsive pleading has been filed, a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim is properly filed as a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).
188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(c)
Jones v. Greninger,
(per curiam).
"'A motion brought
is designed to dispose of cases
where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the
merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings
and any judicially noticed facts.'"
In re Enron Corp. Securities,
Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation, 439 F.Supp.2d 692, 695 (S.D. Tex.
2006)
(quoting Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
& Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) and Herbert Abstract Co.
v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74,76 (5th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) ).
"A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12 (c)
is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b) (6)."
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,417 (5th Cir. 2008)
(citing Johnson v.
Johnson,
385 F.3d 503,
529
(5th Cir.
Accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations as true,
considers
relief.
whether
the
complaint
states
a
plausible
2004)).
the court
claim
for
See Young v. City of Houston, 599 F. App'x 553, 554 (5th
Cir. 2015).
-4-
B.
Analysis of Plaintiffs' Federal Law Claims
Plaintiffs assert
federal
law claims against
Feenstra for
violations of Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, and violations
of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C.
1.
§
1983. 3
Plaintiffs' Title IX Claims will Be Dismissed
Count 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts a claim pursuant to
Title IX based upon sexual harassment, rape, and abuse.
Feenstra
argues that plaintiffs' Title IX claims should be dismissed because
(1)
Title
IX
claims
are
not
actionable
against
individuals,
(2) King-White lacks standing to assert Title IX claims on her own
behalf,
and (3)
time-barred. 4
the Title IX claims asserted in this action are
Plaintiffs have not responded to any of Feenstra's
arguments that plaintiffs' Title IX claims should be dismissed.
(a)
Applicable Law
Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 provides that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
3Id. at 16-36
~~
20 U.S.C.
§
1681(a).
The
83-176.
4Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket Entry No. 59, pp. 3-4.
-5-
Supreme Court has held that Title IX is enforceable through an
implied right of private action against federal funding recipients,
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1968 (1979), and
that monetary damages are available in such actions.
Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1038 (1992).
also Gebser v.
Lago Vista I.S.D.,
118 S.
Ct.
1989,
1994
See
(1998)
(recognizing that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right
of private action against federal funding recipients)
The Court's
holding in Franklin established that a federal funding recipient
can be held liable for damages
in cases
involving a
teacher's
sexual harassment of a student.
The Court explained that
"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex,
that supervisor
'discriminate[sl' on the basis of sex." Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S. Ct. 2399,
2404, 91 L.Ed. 49 (1986).
We believe the same rule
should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses
a student.
Congress surely did not intend for federal
moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions
it sought by statute to proscribe.
Id. at 1037.
(5th
Cir.
See Rosa H. v. San Elizario I.S.D., 106 F.3d 648, 653
1997)
(acknowledging
that
under
Title
IX
"[mlinor
students who have been subj ected to a
sexual relationship with
their
of
teachers
have
a
private
cause
action
for
monetary
damages"); Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dallas I.S.D., 153 F.3d 211, 219
(5th Cir.
1998)
(recognizing that same - sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title IX) .
-6-
(b)
Application of the Law to the Alleged Facts
(1) Plaintiffs' Title IX Claims Are Not Actionable
Citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 129 S. Ct.
788
(2009),
Feenstra argues that she is entitled to dismissal of
the Title IX claims asserted against her because claims based on
Title IX are not cognizable against individual school employees. s
In Fitzgerald the Supreme Court acknowledged that Title IX applies
to "institutions and programs that receive federal funds, 20 U.S.C.
§
1681 (a) ,
but [Title IX] has consistently been interpreted
as not authorizing suit against school officials,
other individuals."
Id.
at
teachers,
See also Rowinsky' v.
796.
and
Bryan
I.S.D., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165
(1996)
Congress's
("The
fact
spending
that
power
title
IX
was
enacted
evidence
is
that
discriminatory acts only by grant recipients.
Congress's spending power,
pursuant
it
to
prohibits
As an exercise of
title IX makes funds available to a
recipient in return for the recipient's adherence to the conditions
of the grant.
While it is plausible that the condition imposed
could encompass ending discriminatory behavior by third parties,
the more probable inference is that the condition prohibits certain
behavior by the grant recipients themselves.")
State University,
820
F.
Supp.
2d
772,
("Title IX permits actions only against
-7-
778
i
Chestang v. Alcorn
(S.D.
Miss.
2011)
'programs or activities
that
receive
federal
financial
assistance'
and
not
against
individuals.").
Plaintiffs do not dispute defendants' contention
that
claims
Title
IX
actionable.
asserted
against
individuals
are
not
Therefore, Feenstra is entitled to dismissal of the
Title IX claims asserted against her in this action.
(2)
King-White's Title IX Claims Are Not Actionable
Citing Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1006, Feenstra argues that KingWhi te' s
Title
IX claims
are not actionable
for
the additional
reason that she "has no standing to assert an individual claim
under Title IX.,,6
King-White's attempt to assert a Title IX claim
against Feenstra is foreclosed by the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010 n.4, that
nothing in the statutory language provides [a parent]
with a personal claim under title IX. Even assuming that
title IX protects persons other than students and
employees, [the parent] has failed [to] assert that she
was excluded from participation, denied the benefits of,
or subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity.
Absent such a claim, the plain
language of title IX does not support a cause of action
by [the parent] .
King-White's Title IX claims are therefore foreclosed.
Nor is
King-White able to assert claims as next friend of A.W. because the
facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint show that A.W. was not
a minor when this action was filed.
Plaintiffs allege that when
the abuse began in the spring of 2009,
6Id.
-8-
A.W.
was 16 years old.
Therefore, A.W. must have reached the age of majority in the spring
of 2011, and could not have been a minor when this action was filed
over two years later on December 4, 2013.
Accordingly, the court
concludes that any Title IX claims that King-White has asserted or
attempted
to
assert
individually
on
her
own
behalf
are
not
actionable under the alleged facts.
(3)
Plaintiffs' Title IX Claims Are Time-Barred
Asserting that " [p]laintiffs brought suit on December 4,2013,
more than 2 years after the accrual of any claim under Title IX,"7
and citing Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573
(1989), Feenstra argues
that plaintiffs' Title IX claims are subject to dismissal because
they are barred by Texas's two-year statute of limitations for
general
personal
injury claims
Practices & Remedies Code
§
established by
16.003. B
the
Texas
Civil
Plaintiffs have not responded
to Feenstra's argument that their Title IX claims are time-barred,
but have responded to Feenstra's argument plaintiffs'
are
time-barred
by
asserting
that
the
§
applicable
1983 claims
statute
of
limitations is not the general two-year statute cited by defendants
but, instead, Texas's five-year statute of limitations for personal
injury
claims
arising
from
conduct
7Id. at 4.
BId.
-9-
that
violates
Texas
law
prohibiting sexual assault, Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code
§
16.0045(a).9
In Owens,
109 S.
claims arising under
governed by
that
Ct.
§
the Supreme Court held that
1983 within a particular state should be
state's
statute of limitations."
at 573,
"residual
or general
Id. at 574.
personal
inj ury
See also Piotrowski v. City
of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that
in light of the fact that Congress has not provided a statute of
limitations
in
§
1983
cases,
federal
courts
borrow
state's general personal injury limitations period,
Texas
Civil
Practices
and
Remedies
Code).
forum
and that in
Texas that period is the two-year period established by
the
the
§
16.003 of
Congre s s
has
similarly not provided a statute of limitations for claims brought
under Title IX.
Every appellate court to consider the issue has held that
Title IX claims should be treated like
§
1983 claims and governed
by state statutes of limitations for personal injury claims.
Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1205 (8th Cir. 2011)
See
("this court
has held that Title IX claims are also governed by the state's
personal injury statute of limitations"); Wilmink v. Kanawha County
Board of Education, 214 F. App'x 294, 296 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007)
curiam)
(per
("every circuit to consider the issue has held that Title
9Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Amanda Feenstra's Rule
12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Plaintiffs' Response
to Rule 12(c) Motion"), Docket Entry No. 61, pp. 5-7.
-10-
IX also borrows the relevant state's statute of limitations for
personal
injury")
i
Stanley
v.
Trustees
of
California
University, 433 F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2006)
State
("we join every
other federal circuit to consider this issue and hold that Title IX
claims are subject to the applicable state statute of limitations
for personal injury actions")
504
(2d Cir.
(2005)
2004)
i
Curto v. Edmundson,
(per curiam),
cert.
denied,
392 F.3d 502,
125 S.
Ct.
2944
(applying New York's personal injury statute of limitations
to claims asserted under Title IX)
i
M.H.D. v. Westminster Schools,
172 F.3d 797, 803 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1999)
specific
five-year
statute of
("Although Georgia has a
limitations
for
childhood sexual
abuse, we disagree with appellant that this statute, not the twoyear personal injury statute of limitations, applies to her [Title
IX] claims.")
i
Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education, 76 F.3d
716, 729 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the applicable limitations
period for Title IX claims "should be the one-year period provided
under Tennessee law for personal injury actions")
University of
Pittsburgh,
882
F.2d 74,
78
i
and Bougher v.
(3d Cir.
conclude that the most analogous statute of
1989)
limitations,
("we
as in
is Pennsylvania's two year
section 1983 and 1985 claims
statute of limitations").
Thus, for the reasons stated below in
the plaintiffs'
§
§
II.B.2 with respect to
1983 claims, the court concludes that plaintiffs'
Title IX claims are time-barred because they, too, are subject to
-11-
Texas's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries.
See
Maltbia v. Coffie, Civil Action No. H-06-843,
* 2
(S.D.
Tex.
governs
January 5,
Maltbia's
2007)
federal
2007 WL 43793,
("A two-year statute of limitations
claims
under
Title
IX
and
Section
1983. ") .
2.
Plaintiffs'
§
1983 Claims Are Time-Barred
Counts 2 and 3 of Plaintiffs' Original Complaint assert claims
under 42 U.S.C.
rights
to
§
equal
1983
for violations of A.W.'s constitutional
protection
and
due
process,
respectively. 10
Feenstra argues that "[f]or the same reasons that Plaintiffs' Title
IX claims are time barred,
claims
(Counts
II
respond that their
applicable
and III)
§
their 42 U. S. C.
are
§
1983 civil rights
likewise barred.
1111
Plaintiffs
1983 claims are not time barred because the
statute of
limitations
is
not
the
general
two-year
statute cited by defendants but, instead, Texas's five-year statute
of limitations for personal injury claims arising from conduct that
violates
Texas
law
prohibiting
Practices & Remedies Code
26,
§
sexual
16.0045(a) .12
assault,
Texas
Civil
Plaintiffs cite a number
l°Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, Docket Entry No. I, pp. 1996-134.
~~
11Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket Entry No. 59, p. 5.
12Plaintiffs'
No. 61, pp. 5-7
Response
to
Rule
-12-
12 (c)
Motion,
Docket
Entry
of cases that have applied Texas's five-year statute of limitations
to state law claims, but have not cited any case that has applied
the five-year limitations period to federal law claims asserted
under
1983.13
§
Congress has not provided a statute of limitations for civil
rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C.
that
their
§
1983
§
1983.
Plaintiffs' argument
claims are not governed by Texas's
limitations period for personal
injury claims but,
two-year
instead,
by
Texas's five-year limitations period for sexual assault claims, is
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Wilson v. Garcia,
105 S.
Ct.
28 U.S.C.
1938,
§
1941-49
(1985),
superseded on other grounds by
1658(a), as recognized in Jones v.
R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004), and in Owens, 109 S. Ct. at 573.
In Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941-49, the Supreme Court held that civil
rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C.
§
1983 within a particular
state should be governed by that state's statute of limitations for
personal
injury
claims.
In
reaching
this
holding
the
Court
reasoned that
[i]f the choice of the statute of limitations were to
depend upon the particular facts or the precise legal
theory of each claim, counsel could almost always argue,
DId.
at 6-7
(citing Stephanie M.
v.
Coptic Orthodox
Patriarchate Diocese of the Southern United States, 362 S.W.3d 656,
659-60 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th dist.] 2011, no pet.) i C.R. v.
American Institute for Foreign Study, Inc., Civil Action No. SA-12CA-1046-XR, 2013 WL 5157699 (W.D. Tex. September 12, 2013) i Doe v.
Catholic Society of Religious and Literary Education, Civil Action
No. H-09-1059, 2010 WL 345926 at * 8 (S.D. Tex. January 22, 2010)).
-13-
with considerable force, that two or more periods of
limitations should apply to each § 1983 claim. Moreover,
under such an approach different statutes of limitations
would be applied to the various § 1983 claims arising in
the same State, and multiple periods of limitations would
often apply to the same case.
There is no reason to
believe that Congress would have sanctioned this
interpretation of its statute.
Id. at 1944-46.
Cir. 2008)
§
See also Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 411 (5th
(recognizing that in Wilson "the Supreme Court held that
1983 actions are best characterized as personal injury actions
and, as such, should be subject to state statutes of limitations
for
general
personal
limitations
periods
problematic,"
and
injury
to
that
actions,"
separate
applying
actions
considerations'
'simple, broad characterization of all
In Owens, 109 S. Ct. at 582,
1983
§
'" practical
"that
§
various
had
been
supported a
1983 claims''').
the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the argument that the statute of limitations applicable to
any given
§
1983 claim should depend on the particular facts or
precise legal theories alleged.
that claims arising under
§
Instead, the Supreme Court held
1983 within a particular state should
be governed by that state's "residual or general personal injury
statute of limitations."
Id. at 574.
See also Piotrowski, 51 F.3d
at 514 n.5 (holding that in light of the fact that Congress has not
provided a statute of limitations in
borrow
period)
the
forum
Thus,
state's
general
merely because
predicated on sexual
abuse
§
1983 cases, federal courts
personal
plaintiffs'
does
-14 -
not
mean
injury
§
that
1983
the
limitations
claims
are
applicable
statute of limitations is Texas's special limitations statute for
sexual assault claims.
See Nunley v. Pioneer Pleasant Vale School
District No. 56, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1265 n.1 (W.D. Okla. 2002)
(rejecting a similar argument regarding
asserted in Oklahoma which,
§
1983 and Title IX claims
like Texas, has a special statute of
limitations for sexual assault claims).
See also Maltbia, 2007 WL
* 2 ("A two-year statute of limitations governs Maltbia's
43793,
federal
claims
under
Title
IX
and
Section
1983.").
Because
plaintiffs have not cited any case that has applied Texas's special
statute of limitations for sexual assault claims,
as opposed to
Texas's general statute of limitations for personal injury claims,
to claims asserted under 42 U.S.C.
the
§
§
1983, the court concludes that
1983 claims asserted here are governed by Texas's two-year
limitations period for general personal injury claims.
Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint on December 4, 2013.
Applying the Texas general statute of
injury claims,
Texas Civil Practices
plaintiffs cannot prevail on their
§
limitations
&
for personal
Remedies Code
§
16.003,
1983 claims if those claims
accrued more than two years earlier, i.e., before December 4,2011.
The question of when a cause of action accrues is a question of
federal law.
The Fifth Circuit has held that in civil rights cases
a cause of action accrues,
and the limitations period begins to
run, "'the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered
an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been
-15-
injured.'"
Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (quoting Russell v. Board
of Trustees of Firemen, Policemen and Fire Alarm Operators' Pension
Fund of Dallas, 968 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1992)).
A plaintiff's
awareness encompasses both knowledge of the injury and knowledge of
the
causal
link
between
the
injury
and
the
defendant.
The
plaintiff need not know that a legal cause of action exists; he
need only know facts that would support a claim.
rd.
When the
claim accrues, the limitations period begins to run unless tolling
applies.
Under Texas law, however, plaintiffs who are younger than
eighteen when their claim accrues are considered to be under a
legal disability.
The statute of limitations is tolled until such
a plaintiff turns eighteen, when the disability ends.
Prac. & Rem. Code
Plaintiffs
§
Tex. Civ.
16.001.
allege
that
the
abuse
underlying
asserted in this action occurred from 2009 to 2011.
the
claims
Plaintiffs
allege that A.W. was a freshman during the 2007-2008 school year,
that A.W. was 16 years old when Feenstra began abusing her in the
spring of 2009, and that the abuse continued until A.W. graduated
in 2011.14
Asserting that "[p]laintiffs do not dispute that the
abuse described in the
complaint occurred more
than two years
before suit was filed,"15 Feenstra argues that "since A.W. turned
14See Plaintiffs'
pp. 5-6 ~~ 22, 25-29.
Original
Complaint,
Docket
Entry No.1,
15Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for
(continued ... )
-16-
18 in the spring of 2011, more than two years passed before suit
was filed."16
Even though the limitations period on A.W.'s claims
could not have
started to
run before A. W.
reached the
age of
majority, since plaintiffs allege that A.W. was 16 years old in the
spring of 2009, A.W. must have been 18 in the spring of 2011, which
was more than two years before this action was filed on December 4,
2013. 17
C.
Therefore plaintiffs'
1983 claims are time-barred.
§
The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over
Plaintiffs' State Law Claims
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court pursuant to the
statutes governing federal question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C.
and 28 U. S. C.
§
1343
governing
jurisdiction for
federal
§
1331,
civil
rights claims arising from actions taken under color of state law. 18
In addition to
§
1983,
including
the
plaintiffs
Feenstra,
federal
claims asserted under Title
asserted
based on
claims
state
against
law
for
all
failure
IX and
defendants,
to
train,
supervise, and discipline, sexual assault and battery, negligence
15 ( ... continued)
Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket Entry No. 59, p. 4 (citing A.W. v.
Humble Independent School District, 25 F.Supp.3d 973, 989 (S.D.
Tex. 2014))
~
17See Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, Docket Entry No.1, p. 6
25-29.
18Id. at 2
~
5.
-17-
and
gross
negligence,
emotional distress.
asserted
against
bystander
recovery,
Feenstra argues
her
by
A.W.'s
and
infliction
of
that the bystander claims
mother,
King-White
are
not
actionable, and that the remaining state law claims are all barred
by Texas' two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. 19
Federal
courts
are
courts
of
limited
jurisdiction.
They
adjudicate claims arising from violations of federal law, including
the United States Constitution,
claims in which diversity of the
parties is present,
and pendent state law claims over which the
court
supplemental
§
may
1367 (a)
exercise
("Except as
jurisdiction.
[otherwise]
See
provided
28
U. S. C.
the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
Since the
under Article III of the United States Constitution.")
court has concluded that the plaintiff's only federal claims are
subject to dismissal, no federal question remains before the court.
Although this fact alone does not divest the court of jurisdiction,
the court must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over
§
the
remaining,
1367 (c) (3)
("The
pendent
district
state
law claims.
courts
may
See
decline
to
28
U. S. C.
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . .
19Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket Entry No. 59, pp. 5-7.
-18-
· (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.").
In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 619
n.7 (1988), the Supreme Court recognized that "in the usual case in
which all
federal-law
claims
are
eliminated before
trial,
the
balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity -will
point
toward declining
to
remaining state-law claims."
Gibbs,
exercise
jurisdiction over the
See also United Mine Workers v.
86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1966)
(recognizing that ordinarily,
when the federal claims are dismissed before trial,
state claims should be dismissed as well).
the pendent
Moreover, the general
rule in the Fifth Circuit is to dismiss state law claims when the
federal claims they supplement are dismissed.
Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries,
1992)
(citing Wong v.
1989) )
See
also
Products,
Inc.,
Stripling,
Brookshire
554 F.3d 595,
972 F.2d 580,
881
F.2d
Brothers
602
See Parker & Parsley
200,
204
Holding,
(5th Cir.
585
(5th Cir.
Inc.
2009)
(5th Cir.
v.
Dayco
("The general
rule is that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over
remaining
state-law
claims
eliminated before trial . . . ")
law claims
when
all
federal
law
claims
are
The dismissal of the pendent state
should expressly be
without
prejudice
so
that
the
plaintiff may refile those claims in the appropriate state court.
See Bass v. Parkwood Hospital, 180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir. 1999).
-19-
See also 28 U.S.C.
§
1367(d)
("The period of limitations for any
claim asserted under subsection (a)
. shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed
unless State law provides for a longer tOlling period.").
In Parker & Parsley, 972 F.2d at 582, the Fifth Circuit held
that
a
district
court
abused
its
discretion
in
failing
relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state law claims.
to
In that
case, which like this case was originally filed in federal court,
the sole federal claim was dismissed after nine months of trial
preparation and one month before the scheduled trial date.
district
court
contract,
and
retained
tort
additional months.
jurisdiction
claims,
and
over
continued
state
the
law
case
for
The
fraud,
three
Before the dismissal of the federal claim,
there had been "'a serious attack upon the propriety of venue,'
'rigorous
deposition schedules,'
'ungodly amounts
documents,' and a hearing on discovery disputes."
refusing
to
surrender
jurisdiction over
the
of
discovery
Id. at 584.
pendent
state
In
law
claims, the district court had concluded that "'the equities weigh
heavily in favor of maintenance of the case, '" and went on to hold
a full trial and render judgment on the state law claims.
Id. at
584-85.
"After considering and weighing all the factors present in
th[e]
case," id. at 590, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court, finding that the failure to relinquish the state law claims
-20-
was an abuse of discretion.
The Fifth Circuit carefully
analyzed the Carnegie-Mellon factors, expressly stating that "[n]o
single
factor
is
dispositive."
Id.
at
587.
In
its
consideration, the court noted a number of facts and circumstances
weighing in favor of relinquishing jurisdiction:
"only nine months" old;
(ii)
(i) the case was
trial was "still a few weeks away;"
(iii) "discovery had not been completed;"
(iv) "the case was at an
earlier stage than the parties and the court previously might have
thought" due to an amended complaint that changed the theories of
the
(v)
case;
the
district
judge
did
not
have
"substantial
familiarity with the merits of the case;" (vi) the remaining state
law issues were "difficult ones;"
did
not
"prevent [
(vii) remaining in federal court
redundancy
[or]
conserve [
substantial
judicial resources;" (viii) there would be no "undue inconvenience"
such as a "tremendous financial drain" or a necessity for new legal
research;
(ix) the already completed discovery "was largely usable
in the state proceeding;"
by remand;
and
(xi)
the
(x) the parties would not be prejudiced
"important interests of federalism and
comity" heavily favored remand.
Id. at 587-89.
Careful examination shows that the circumstances in this case
are similar to those in Parker & Parsley.
two years old.
This case is less than
Although discovery was completed three months ago
in April of 2015, no hearings or trial dates have been scheduled,
this court has not yet familiarized itself with any of the state
-21-
law issues,
the
already completed discovery
should be
largely
usable in the state proceeding, the remaining state law issues are
difficult ones, and no prejudice will be suffered by either party
if the state law claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling
in state court.
Because the court has concluded that the federal
claims
in
asserted
this
action are
subj ect
to
dismissal,
and
because this action is still at an early stage, the court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining, pendent
state law claims.
Accordingly, the court concludes that the state
law claims asserted in this action are subject to dismissal without
prejudice to refiling in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction.
III.
Conclusions and Order
For the reasons stated in
§
II.B above,
the court concludes
that the claims plaintiffs have asserted against defendant Amanda
Michelle Feenstra based on Title IX are subject to dismissal with
prejudice because they are not actionable and are time-barred, and
that the claims plaintiffs have asserted against Amanda Michelle
Feenstra based on 42 U.S.C.
§
1983 are subject to dismissal with
prejudice because they are time-barred.
§
II.C
above,
the
court
declines
For the reasons stated in
to
exercise
supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims which will be
dismissed
without
prejudice
appropriate jurisdiction.
to
refiling
in
a
state
court
of
Accordingly, Defendant Amanda Michelle
Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket
-22-
Entry No. 59) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART, and Defendant
Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Docket Entry No. 58) is DENIED as MOOT.
on federal
All of the claims based
law that plaintiffs have asserted against defendant
Amanda Michelle Feenstra will be dismissed with prejudice, and all
of the claims based on state law that plaintiffs have asserted
against
Amanda
Michelle
Feenstra
will
be
dismissed
without
prejudice.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this
2015.
,
SIM LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-23-
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