Morales v City of Sugarland

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 20 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
ARMANDO DELGADO MORALES,
Plaintiff,

v.
THE CITY OF SUGAR LAND AND
JEFFREY GLASS IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS A POLICE OFFICER
FOR THE CITY OF SUGAR LAND,
Defendants.

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§
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§
§
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§
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§
§
§

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-3575

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Armando Delgado Morales - an individual of Hispanic
origin,

brings this action against the City of Sugar Land,

Jeffrey Glass

("Officer Glass")

in his

official

and

capacity as

a

police officer for the City of Sugar Land, for claims arising from
an

allegedly

illegal

arrest.l

Pending

before

the

court

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 20).

is
For

the reasons explained below, the motion will be granted.

I.

Factual and Legal

~legations

Plaintiff alleges that on or about January 22, 2012, he was
illegally

arrested

by

Officer

Glass.

Plaintiff

alleges

that

Officer Glass negligently used equipment provided by the City to
erroneously determine that a warrant was active for him, when in

lSee Plaintiff's
Docket Entry No. 16.

First Amended Complaint

and

Jury

Demand,

truth and fact, the subject of the warrant was an individual with
Glass

had

plaintiff's drivers license and his social security number,

and

a

similar

that

before

conversations
vehicle.

Plaintiff

name.

arresting
with

him,

his

alleges

Officer

superiors

via

that

Officer

Glass
the

had

radio

a

series

in

his

of

police

Plaintiff alleges that after confirming with is superiors

that arresting plaintiff was within guidelines used by the Sugar
Land Police Department, Officer Glass arrested him in the presence
of his wife and three minor children, and that the arrest caused
him financial harm. 2
Asserting

that

he

will

"show

that

his

civil

rights

were

violated as a result of a policy of the City of Sugar Land whereby
it permits the arrest of individuals without adequate verification
of

their

identity

if

they are

of

Hispanic

origin,,,3

Plaintiff

alleges that
the fact that he is a Hispanic male was the primary
reason why the officer in question assumed that he had
commi tted a crime.
Plaintiff would show that he was
subjected to disparate treatment and that he was arrested
due to his race.
Plaintiff would also show that the
Defendants knew that Plaintiff was a member of a
protected class. 4
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U. S. C.
1988,

§§

1981,

1983,

and

asserting that his allegedly illegal arrest violated his

2Id.

at 3-4 en 6.

3Id.
4Id.

at en 7.
-2-

civil rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. s

Alleging that "GLASS used his

radio contained in his police vehicle to communicate with officials
employed by the City of Sugar Land in order to determine whether or
not Plaintiff MORALES should be arrested,"6 plaintiff also asserts
claims for violation of the Texas Tort Claims Act
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§

("TTCA"), Tex.

101.021 et seg. 7

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is authorized if the movant establishes that
there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law
entitles it to judgment.

Fed.R.Civ.P.

Corp.

106 S.

Ct.

genuine

if

v.

material

Catrett,
fact

is

verdict for the nonmovant.
2505, 2510 (1986).

2548,
a

56(c).

2552

reasonable

See also Celotex

(1986).

An

issue of

jury could return

a

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S. Ct.

In reviewing the evidence, the court must draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,

and

avoid credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110
(2000) .

SId. at 1.
6Id. at q[ 8.
7Id.

-3-

III. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on
all of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff is unable to present
evidence capable of supporting a claim under federal or state law. 8
Over three months have passed since defendants filed the pending
motion for summary judgment on January 7,

2015.

More than two

months have passed since plaintiff's response to the pending motion
was due.

But plaintiff has not responded to defendants' motion.

Local Rule 7.3 provides that: "Opposed motions will be submitted to
the judge twenty days from filing without notice from the clerk and
without appearance by counsel."

S.D. Tex. R.

7.3

(2000).

Local

Rule 7.4 provides:
Failure to respond will be taken as a representation of
no opposition. Responses to motions
A.
B.

c.
D.

Must be filed by the submission day;
Must be written;
Must include or be accompanied by authority; and
Must be accompanied by a separate form order
denying the relief sought.

S.D. Tex. R. 7.4
court

takes

(2000).

plaintiff's

In accordance with Local Rule 7.4, the
failure

to

respond

to

the

defendants'

motion for summary judgment as a representation of no opposition to
defendants' summary judgment evidence.
Although a district court may not grant summary judgment by
default simply because there is no opposition to the motion, the

8Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket Entry No. 20.
-4-

court may accept as undisputed the movant's version of the facts
and grant a motion for summary judgment when the movant has made a
prima facie showing of entitlement thereto.

See John v. State of

Louisiana

State

(Board

of

Trustees

for

the

Universities), 757 F.2d 698,708 (5th Cir. 1985)

Colleges

and

(when the movant's

summary judgment evidence establishes its right to judgment as a
matter of law,
judgment

the district court is entitled to grant summary

absent

unusual

circumstances);

and

Eversley

v.

Mbank

Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988) (when the nonmovant fails
to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the court does not err
by granting the motion when the movant's submittals make a prima
facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law).

A.

Federal Law
Alleging

Cla~s

that

the

City

of

Sugar

Land

and

Officer

Glass

violated his civil rights by arresting him because of his Hispanic
race, plaintiff asserts federal law claims against the defendants
under 42 U.S.C.
Plaintiff's

§§

First

1981,

1983,

Amended

and 1988.

Complaint

Liberally construed,

alleges

that

defendants

arrested him without probable cause in violation of the

Fourth

Amendment and violated his right to equal protection under the law
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

-5-

1.

Applicable Law

A governmental entity can be sued and subjected to monetary
damages and injunctive relief under § 1983 only if its official
policy or custom causes a person to be deprived of a federally
protected right.

Monell v. Department of Social Services of City

of New York, 98 S.

ct. 2018, 2037-38 (1978)

(§

1983).

In Jett v.

Dallas Independent School District, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2722 (1989),
the Supreme Court held that "Section 1983 provides an explicit
remedy

in

damages

which,

with

its

limitations

liability, Congress thought 'suitable to carry .
the

rights

guaranteed by

§

1981 as

against

municipality may not be held liable under
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.
2037-38.

Municipal liability under

policy maker;

(2)

§

§

on

municipal

into effect'

state actors."

A

1983 on the basis of
Monell, 98 S. Ct. at

1983 requires proof of (1) a

an official policy;

and

(3)

a violation of a

constitutional right whose moving force is the policy or custom.
Id.

See also Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas, 430 F.3d 734,

2005)

("Municipal liability under both

§

1981 and

§

(5th Cir.

1983 requires

proof of three elements in addition to the underlying claim of a
violation of rights:

'a policymaker;

an official policy;

violation of constitutional rights whose "moving force"
policy

or

custom.''').

Section

1988

allows

courts

and a
is the

to

attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in civil rights actions.
Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S.Ct. 566, 571 (1992).

-6-

award
See

2.

Application of the Law to the Undisputed Facts
(a)

Claims Asserted Against Officer Glass

Plaintiff's

action

against

Officer

Glass

in

his

official

capacity is in essence an action against the City of Sugar Land.
See Brandon v.
against

a

Holt,

public

105 S.

servant

Ct.

'in

873,

his

878

(1985)

liabili ty on the entity that he represents");

judgment

capacity'

official

("a

imposes

Goodman v.

Harris

County, 571 F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1143 and 1146

(2010)

( "official capacity suits are really suits

against the governmental entity").

Plaintiff has neither alleged

nor produced any evidence capable of showing that Officer Glass is
a final policymaker whose actions may be directly imputed to the
City

under

§

1981

or

§

1983.

See

Brooks

Mississippi, 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996)

v.

George

County,

(noting that "even a

single decision may create municipal liability i f that decision
were made by a final policymaker responsible for that activity")
(emphasis in original)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Accordingly, under Monell, 98 S. Ct. at 2018, and Jett, 109 S. Ct.
at 2702, Officer Glass's actions alone cannot form the basis for a
§

1981

or

a

§

1983

claim

against

the

City

of

Sugar

Land.

Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on the claims
asserted against Officer Glass in his official capacity because
those claims are actually claims against the City of Sugar Land,
which is also a defendant in this action.

-7-

(b)

Claims Asserted Against the City of Sugar Land
(1)

Plaintiff Has Failed to Raise a Fact Issue as
to a Cla~ for Violation of the Fourth
Amendment

Plaintiff's allegations that Officer Glass wrongfully arrested
him raises a

claim for violation of the

Fourth Amendment.

The

Fourth Amendment prohibits arrests made without probable cause.
Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1994).
Amendment

is

made

applicable

Fourteenth Amendment.

to

Severance v.

state

defendants

through

the

566 F.3d 490,

Patterson,

(citing Ker v. California,

The Fourth

501

(5th Cir.

2009)

83 S. Ct.

1623, 1628

(1963)).

"The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as the

'facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are
sufficient

to

warrant

a

prudent

person,

or

one

of

reasonable

caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.'"
Piazza v.

Mayne,

217 F.3d 239,

245-46

(5th Cir.

2000)

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632 (1979)).

(quoting

This is an

objective standard based only on the facts known by the officer at
the time of the arrest.
181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009).

Club Retro,

L.L.C. v.

Hilton,

568 F.3d

Generally, an arrest made pursuant to a

properly issued warrant does not violated rights guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
F.3d

547,

552

(5th

Cir.

Mack v.

2006) (per

McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2695 (1979)

-8-

City of Abilene,

curiam)

(quoting

Baker

461
v.

("The Constitution does not

The Fourth

guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.")).

Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause,
even if the wrong person is arrested, if the arresting officer had
a reasonable, good faith belief that he was arresting the correct
person.

Blackwell, 34 F.3d at 303 (citing Hill v. California, 91

S. Ct. 1106 (1971)).

However, in certain limited circumstances, an

arrest made pursuant to a warrant can violate the Fourth Amendment.
See

Vance

v.

Nunnery,

137

F.3d

270,

273-74

(5th

Cir.

1998)

(suggesting that an arrest made pursuant to a valid warrant may be
unconstitutional

if

the

arresting

officer

possessed

conclusive

evidence of arrestee's innocence of the crime for which the warrant
issued);
officer

Club Retro,
is

568 F. 3d at 205 n.

responsible

for

securing

20

the

(when the arresting

warrant,

courts

also

consider the warrant's validity).
The City of Sugar Land argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiff's false arrest claim because plaintiff is
unable to cite evidence capable of establishing that he suffered a
violation of his right to be free

from arrest without probable

cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

In support of this

argument the City of Sugar Land has presented evidence that the
arresting officer -

Officer Glass -

the plaintiff on January 22, 2012.

had probable cause to arrest
As evidence that Officer Glass

had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff on January 22, 2102, the

-9-

City of Sugar Land points to the offense and arrest report in which
Officer Glass wrote:
On 01/22/2012 at approximately 2114 hours I Officer Glass
was in service and on duty working as a one man patrol
unit for the city of Sugar Land Police Department.
At
that time I observed a silver Mazda 3 SUV Texas LP
TXN[***] traveling southbound on State Highway 6, in the
2800 blk, Sugar Land, Ft. Bend County, Texas, moving at
a high rate of speed. I initiated my unit's front moving
radar and observed the vehicle was traveling at 56MPH in
a posted 45MPH speed zone.
I determined to make a traffic stop for the observed
violation. As I approached Settlers Way on south bound
SH 6, the vehicle was in the left inner lane, and I
initiated my units (343) overhead flashing red/blue
lights and front wig-wags.
The driver of the vehicle
turned left and pulled over to the right curb on Old Mill
Rd in the 3700 blk of SH 6.
I approached the driver and asked for his diver's license
and proof of financial responsibility.
He identified
himself by his Texas DL# .
as:
Armando Morales W/M 10/24/1979
I had dispatch run his information through TCIC/NCIC.
Mr. Morales was found to have an outstanding TCIC/NCIC
warrant out of Bexar County as follows:
#1003927 Fail to Stop and Give
Bond: $800

Information

(Class

B)

The warrant was confirmed by Bexar County Scott Gresham
and confirmation sent at 2125 hours.
At approximately 2129 hours I
custody for the warrant.
9

took Mr.

The

points

City

of

Sugar

Land

also

declaration in which he stated:

9Docket Entry No. 20-3, pp. 2 and 3.
-10-

to

Morales
Officer

into
Glass's

3.

On January 22, 2012, while performing my duties as
a City of Sugar Land, Texas, police officer, I
observed Plaintiff Armando Morales driving a Mazda
suv traveling at a rate of speed of 56 miles per
hour on a roadway with a maximum speed limit of 45
miles per hour.
Upon observing this violation of
the Texas Traffic Code, I stopped the speeding
vehicle and asked Plaintiff Morales to produce his
driver license. Plaintiff Morales provided a Texas
driver
license
which
displayed
the
personal
identification number *****227, a name Armando
Morales, and the date of birth of 10/24/1979.

4.

I
arrested Armando Morales because a police
telecommunications
operator
informed
me
that
verified State law enforcement computer records
showed that a warrant was outstanding for his
arrest.
The information I
provided to the
telecommunications
operator
regarding Morales'
identity came directly from the Texas driver
license he handed to me.
I
provided Morales'
unique
driver
license
number
to
the
telecommunications operator and asked her to check
statewide law enforcement computer records to
determine the registered owner of the vehicle he
had been driving, the validity of the driver
license
Mo.rales
presented,
and
whether
any
warranted existed for his arrest.

5.

With my arrest report, I submitted a copy of the
records
which
show
the
queries
the
telecommunications operator performed.
She first
checked the license plate number TXN****.
Second
she checked Morales'
individual Texas driver
license number *****227.
Third, she checked
records included in my report to establish that the
police computer showed a warrant outstanding for
Armando
Morales,
date
of
birth
10/24/1979.
Additionally, before I arrested Morales, Bexar
County sent a teletype to the Sugar Land police
telecommunications operator which confirmed the
existence of an outstanding arrest warrant for
Armando Morales, date of birth 10.24.1979.
This
confirming communication is also included in my
report. After the communications operator informed
me that Bexar County confirmed the validity of the
arrest warrant, I arrested Morales based upon the

-11-

reasonable belief that he
identified in the warrant. 10

was

the

individual

Plaintiff has not cited any evidence capable of supporting a
claim that he was arrested on January 22, 2012, without probable
cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff has not

cited any evidence capable of showing that Officer Glass did not
reasonably believe that plaintiff was the individual identified in
a Bexar County warrant, or that Officer Glass knew that plaintiff
was innocent of the crime for which a Bexar County warrant had been
issued.

Moreover, plaintiff testified at his deposition that he

and the person for whom the warrant had been issued had different
middle names but shared the same first and last names and the same
date of birth.

In relevant part plaintiff testified:

Q.

And you now know that the person that they were
looking for, his name was -- let's see --

A.

Armando Silverio Morales.

Q.

Great.
And so the difference would be the middle
name was different between you and the guy they
were looking for; is that right?

A.

Correct.

Q.

But your birth date and the guy that they were
looking for, you have the identical birth date; is
that correct?

A.

I believe so. They wouldn't tell me much about his
-- about that warrant or anything like that so

Q.

Well, tell me your birth date.

lODeclaration of Officer Jeffrey Glass, Docket Entry No. 20-4,
pp. 1-2 '1I'1I 3-5.
-12-

A.
Q.

So if the guy they were looking for had the birth
date of 10-24-79, then you and he share the same
birth date and shared the same first and last name.

A.

Correct.

Q.

But what was
middle name?

A.

Correct, and our socials.

Q.

Do you know whether or not the Social Security
number was on the warrant that they had for the
other guy?

A.

Nor

10-24-79.

I do not.
that. l l

has

plaintiff

different

is

you

had

a

different

They didn't show me any information like

cited any

evidence

from

which

a

jury could

reasonable infer that the Bexar County warrant pursuant to which he
was arrested was not valid.

Accordingly, the court concludes that

the City of Sugar Land is entitled to summary judgment on any claim
that plaintiff has asserted or attempted to assert for false arrest
in violation of the Fourth Amendment because plaintiff has failed
to cite any evidence capable of establishing that his arrest on
January 22, 2012, was not made pursuant to a valid warrant or that
the arresting officer did not have a reasonable, good faith belief
that he was arresting the correct person.

Alternatively, the court

concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any
claim that plaintiff has asserted for claim for wrongful arrest

llDeposition of Armando Delgado Morales, Docket Entry No. 20-6,
pp. 33:16-34:19.
-13-

without probable cause because plaintiff has failed to allege or
cite any evidence capable of establishing that defendants violated
rights guaranteed by the

Fourth Amendment based on an official

policy or a decision made by a final policy maker.

See Monell, 98

S. Ct. at 2037-38.

(2)

Plaintiff Has Failed to Raise a Fact Issue as
to an Equal Protection Claim for Violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff's allegations that defendants discriminated against
him on the basis of his Hispanic race, raises an equal protection
claim in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

For his race-based

equal protection claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants
intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his race.
Hampton

Company

National

Surety,

LLC.

v.

Mississippi,

543 F.3d 221,

228

(5th Cir.

2008)

claim under

42

u. S. C.

1983

requires

showing

§

County,

Tunica

(equal protection
that

arresting

officer was motivated by discriminatory intent); Green v. State Bar
of Texas, 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)
under §

1981,

a

plaintiff must
(1)

allege

("To establish a claim

facts

the plaintiff is

a

in support of the

following

elements:

member

of

a

racial

minority;

(2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the

defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerns one or more of the
activities enumerated in the statute.").

-14-

Defendants have presented evidence that the arresting officer
Officer Glass -

was not aware of plaintiff's Hispanic heritage

and did not arrest him because of his race.

Defendants point to

the offense and arrest report,

in which Officer Glass identified

plaintiff as a

Defendants also point to Officer

white male. 12

Glass's declaration in which he stated
I had no intention of discriminating against Morales
because he is a racial minority.
I did not arrest him
based upon his race.
I arrested him only because I
believed a warrant existed for his arrest after the
telecommunications operator represented to me that police
computer records confirmed a valid warrant existed.
Based upon that information, I exercised legitimate law
enforcement discretion and arrested Morales in accordance
with training I had previously been provided that was
approved by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement
(TCOLE).13
Plaintiff has not cited any evidence in support his claim of
unequal treatment based on race, i.e., plaintiff has not pointed to
any evidence that he was treated differently because of his race.
Nor has plaintiff set forth any other evidence from which a jury
could reasonably infer that his arrest was not motivated by Officer
Glass's reasonable,

good faith belief that plaintiff he was the

subject of a valid arrest warrant from Bexar County but, instead,
that his arrest was motivated by discriminatory intent because
plaintiff was

Hispanic.

Moreover,

plaintiff

testified

at

his

12Docket Entry No. 20-3, pp. 2 and 3.
p. 2

13Declaration of Officer Jeffrey Glass, Docket Entry No. 20-4,
<j[ 6.
-15-

deposi tion that he had no reason to believe that Officer Glass
arrested him for any reason other than the belief that he was the
individual named in the Bexar County warrant.

Plaintiff testified:

Q.

Okay.
Did Officer Glass ever say anything to you
that made you think that he was arresting you for
some reason other than his belief you had a
warrant?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Do you have any information to suggest that Officer
Glass arrested you for some reason other than his
belief you had a warrant?

A.

No, just him believing I
warrant. 14

was the person in that

The court concludes that the City of Sugar Land is entitled to
summary

judgment

on

any

claim

that

plaintiff

has

asserted

or

attempted to assert for discriminatory arrest because plaintiff has
failed to cite any evidence capable of establishing that his arrest
on January 22, 2012, violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to be
free from discriminatory enforcement of the law based on his race.
Alternatively, the court concludes that defendants are entitled to
summary

judgment on plaintiff's

equal protection claim because

plaintiff has failed to allege or cite any evidence capable of
establishing that

defendants

violated rights

guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment based on an official policy or on a decision
made by a final policy maker.

See Monell,

98 S. Ct. at 2037-38.

14Deposi tion of Armando Delgado Morales, Docket Entry No. 20-6,
pp. 52:18-53:1.
-16-

B.

State Law

Cla~s

Municipalities and political subdivisions such as Sugar Land
have governmental immunity except where the state legislature has
waived that immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA).

See Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.21; Mission Consolidated Independent
School District v. Garcia,

253 S.W.3d 653,

655

(Tex. 2008).

The

limited waiver of governmental immunity provided by the TTCA is for
tort claims arising out of the use of publicly owned vehicles,
premises defects, and for injuries arising out of conditions or use
of property.
has

held

Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 655.

that

all

common

law

tort

The Texas Supreme Court

claims

alleged

against

a

governmental unit are assumed to be governed by the TTCA regardless
of whether the TTCA waives

immunity for

a

particular claim.

Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 379 and 385 (Tex. 2011).
TTCA

does

assault,

not

waive

battery,

false arrest.

immunity

for

intentional

torts,

such

false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.057(2).

also Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 376 & n. 35.

The
as
and
See

Moreover, if a plaintiff

sues both a governmental unit and any of its employees under the
TTCA, as plaintiff has in this case,

the claims asserted against

the employees are subject to dismissal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code

§

101.106(e) if the employee has been sued in his individual

capacity and under

§

101.106(f)

if the employee has been sued in

-17-

See Stinson v.

his official capacity.
794

(Tex. 2014)

Fontenot,

435 S.W.3d 793,

(per curiam).

Here, plaintiff sued the City of Sugar Land and its employee,
Officer Glass,

"For purposes

in his official capacity.

of the

TTCA, an employee is considered to have been sued in his official
capacity when the suit

(1)

is based on conduct within the general

scope of his employment, and (2) could have been brought under the
TTCA

against

the

Stinson,

government.

435

S.W.3d

at

794.

Plaintiff does not dispute that his suit against Officer Glass is
based on

conduct

Moreover,
Officer

wi thin

plaintiff
Glass

and

the

has
the

general

asserted
City

of

the

Sl.,lgar

scope
same

of

his

claims

Land.

employment.
against

Officer

both

Glass

is

therefore entitled to summary judgment on the TTCA claim asserted
against him under Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code § 101.106(f).

Plaintiff's TTCA claim against the City of Sugar Land fares no
better.

A Texas city is a "governmental unit" covered by the TTCA.

Tex. Civ.

Prac.

&

Rem. Code § 101. 001 (3) (B).

The TTCA expressly

does not apply to claims "arising out of assault,
imprisonment,

or any other intentional tort."

Rem. Code § 101.057(2).
Texas law.

See Stinson,

battery,

Tex.

Civ.

false

Prac.

&

False arrest is an intentional tort under
435 S.W.3d at 793

(including "wrongful

arrest" and malicious prosecution in a list of intentional torts) .
This means that plaintiff's TTCA claim against the City of Sugar
Land

does

not

fall

within

the

limited

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waiver

of

governmental

immunity provided by the TTCA, and is thus precluded by the City of
Sugar Land's immunity as a governmental entity.

Accordingly, the

City of Sugar Land is entitled to summary judgment on the TTCA
claim asserted against it.

IV. Conclusions and Order

For the reasons explained above the court concludes that the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of the federal
and state law claims asserted against in this action.

Accordingly,

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 20), is
GRANTED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this

~th

2015.

SIM LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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