Alcantara v. University of Houston
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 17 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's § 1981 and § 1983 claims are dismissed with prejudice.(Signed by Judge Nancy F Atlas) Parties notified.(TDR, 4)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ADRIANA ALCANTARA,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON,
Defendant.
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July 28, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-0463
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 17] filed by
Defendant University of Houston (“UH”), to which Plaintiff Adriana Alcantara filed
a Response [Doc. # 20], and UH filed a Reply [Doc. # 21]. UH argues that Plaintiff’s
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.1
Having reviewed the record and applicable legal authorities, the Court grants UH’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a Hispanic female, began working for UH as a visiting professor in
2007. She later became an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology.
Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed on the basis of her sex, race, and national
1
UH argued also in its Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be
dismissed because she failed to file this lawsuit within ninety (90) days after she
received the Notice of Right to Sue. In its Reply, UH withdraws its Motion to
Dismiss the Title VII claim. See Reply, p. 7.
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origin, by Dr. Leigh Leasure, a younger female professor who participated in
evaluating Plaintiff for tenure. Plaintiff alleges also that she was denied mentoring
opportunities and was not provided detailed annual faculty reviews.
Plaintiff was initially advised in May 2012 that she would not be granted tenure.
Following a grievance process, Plaintiff was advised in May 2013 that the denial of
tenure was a final decision. Plaintiff’s last date of employment with UH was May 31,
2013.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against UH on February 25, 2014. Plaintiff alleged
that UH discriminated against her in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”). On March 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint [Doc. # 3], abandoning her ADEA claim.
At a pretrial conference on July 21, 2014, the Court noted that Alcantara filed
her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) on March 8, 2013, prior to the final tenure decision in May 2013. The
Court administratively closed this case to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her
EEOC charge to include claims relating to the tenure decision.
Plaintiff did not amend her EEOC charge. Instead, on May 12, 2016, Plaintiff
filed a Second Amended Complaint [Doc. # 11], asserting that UH violated § 1981
and § 1983 by denying her request for tenure. By Order [Doc. # 12] entered May 16,
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2016, the Court reinstated the case on its active docket. UH filed its Motion to
Dismiss, which has been fully briefed and is now ripe for decision.
II.
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
UH, identified by Plaintiff in her Second Amended Complaint as a “state
university,” argues that it is entitled to immunity from the § 1981 and § 1983 claims
under the Eleventh Amendment. Absent an express abrogation by Congress or a
waiver by the state, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from exercising
jurisdiction over lawsuits against non-consenting states and state agencies. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983); Lewis v. Univ.
of Tex. Med. Branch, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2011).
UH is a state university, created and funded by the Texas legislature. See TEX.
EDUC. CODE § 61.003(3). Plaintiff attempts to characterize UH as a local school
board. See Response, pp. 4-5 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 463 U.S. 658
(1978), and its progeny). Plaintiff’s argument that UH is a local school board is
unsupported by either the record or applicable legal authority. See, e.g., Liu v.
Jackson, 2010 WL 342251, *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2010) (“Plaintiff offers no support
for his contention that the [University of North Texas] System is more analogous to
a school board or local government entity”). Similarly, Plaintiff’s reliance on cases
from the Tenth Circuit that allowed § 1983 claims against a local school district is
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misplaced. UH is not a local school district, it is a state university.2 As a state
university, UH is a state agency for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with UH’s
argument that “it enjoys immunity from unconsented-to suit in federal court under the
Eleventh Amendment”); Shoecraft v. Univ. of Houston - Victoria, 2006 WL 870432,
*6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006); Cochran v. Univ. of Houston, 1990 WL 151298, *2
(Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 11, 1990); see also Jackson v. Tex. Forest Serv.,
194 F. Supp. 2d 566, 570 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (Texas Forest Service, as part of Texas
A&M University, is a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity);
Wetherbe v. Texas Tech Univ., 2016 WL 1273471, *3 (N.D. Tex. March 31, 2016)
(holding that institutions of higher education are considered arms of the state that are
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); Adrian v. Bd. of Supervisors
for La. State Univ., 2016 WL 1056576, *3 (M.D. La. Mar. 16, 2016); Dear v. Jackson
State Univ., 2008 WL 4225766, *4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 10, 2008) (state university is
protected under the Eleventh Amendment and immune from claims under § 1981 and
§ 1983).
2
Plaintiff asserts as the title of a section in her Response that “Plaintiff may sue a state
actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1981.” See Response, p. 4. Plaintiff in this case,
however, has not sued a state actor. Instead, the only Defendant in this lawsuit is UH,
a state agency.
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Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for
§ 1981 or § 1983 claims, and Texas has not consented to lawsuits asserting those two
claims. See Lewis, 665 F.3d at 630; Hines v. Miss. Dept. of Corrections, 239 F.3d
366, *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2000). Absent abrogation or consent, Plaintiff cannot
maintain her § 1981 and § 1983 claims against UH.
“In Laxey v. Louisiana Board of Trustees, the Fifth Circuit compared the
Eleventh Amendment to a defensive lineman in football ‘barring all suits in law or
equity against an unconsenting state’ from continuing down field towards trial.”
Jackson, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (quoting Laxey v. La. Bd. of Trustees, 22 F.3d 621,
623 (5th Cir. 1994)). UH is a state agency entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment from Plaintiff’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims. As a result, UH’s Motion to
Dismiss these two claims is granted and the claims are dismissed with prejudice.
III.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiff’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims against UH, a Texas state agency, are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As a result, it is hereby
ORDERED that UH’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 17] is GRANTED and
Plaintiff’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims (Counts Two and Three in the Second Amended
Complaint) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The case remains scheduled for a pretrial conference on August 29, 2016.
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SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 28th day of July, 2016.
NAN Y F. ATLAS
SENIOR UNI
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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