Goffney v. Koomer et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. All pending motions in this case, if any, are DENIED. The Clerk is directed t o provide a copy of this order to Plaintiff. The Clerk will also send a copy by regular mail, facsimile transmission, or e-mail to the District Clerk for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, 211 West Ferguson, Tyler, Texas, 75702, Attention: Manager of the Three-Strikes List. Case terminated on 2/5/2015(Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified.(rhawkins, 4) (Main Document 14 replaced on 2/6/2015) (rhawkins, 4).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
NIKITA VAN GOFFNEY,
Plaintiff,
VS.
MARTHA D. KOOMER, et al,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-733

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Nikita Van Goffney, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(TDCJ), filed pro se this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1.)
Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Docket No.
9.) This case is before the Court for screening of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e). Based on its review of the complaint and supporting materials, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed as time-barred and failing to state a claim on which relief
can be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s ninety-page, typed complaint names eighteen individual defendants, including
various state judges, assistant district attorneys, court-appointed attorneys, court reporters, police
officers, parole officers and former Texas Governor Rick Perry. The verbose and convoluted
complaint describes a vague conspiracy going back more than a decade, involving multiple
branches and levels of state government, to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights and falsely imprison
him.
Plaintiff states that he was targeted by Montgomery County officials because of a federal
civil rights lawsuit he filed in this district in 2002 alleging that City of Conroe police officers-1/7

including Officer Sauceda, the lead defendant here, assaulted and severely injured Plaintiff
during a traffic stop in 2000. See Goffney v. J. Sauceda, Case No. 4:02-cv-2638 (S.D. Tex.Houston, filed July 9, 2002.) The procedural history of that case has been extremely complicated
and it remains pending to this day. In 2008, while facing indictment in Montgomery County on
drug distribution and gun possession charges, Plaintiff filed a motion for injunctive relief in his
2002 civil suit, seeking to enjoin Montgomery County officials from bringing further criminal
charges against Plaintiff on the ground that he was being maliciously prosecuted because of his
civil rights lawsuit.

(Cause No. 4:02-cv-2638, Docket No. 103.)

Plaintiff’s motion for

injunctive relief was denied (Cause No. 4:02-cv-2638, Docket No. 106) and Plaintiff was
subsequently indicted and convicted on the drug distribution and gun charges. Plaintiff’s present
lawsuit appears to be based on the same theories raised in his 2008 motion for injunctive relief in
case number 4:02-cv-2638, namely, that he was the target of a conspiracy by Montgomery
County law enforcement and other officials.
Plaintiff’s present lawsuit begins by chronicling various mundane interactions with
Montgomery County law enforcement officials subsequent to Plaintiff filing his 2002 civil suit.
Plaintiff asserts that his problems with law enforcement escalated in 2005 when a police report
was filed accusing Plaintiff of assaulting his wife while on parole. (Docket No. 1 at 18, ¶ 29)
Plaintiff alleges that although no domestic violence charges resulted from this incident, it
resulted in heightened scrutiny from various law enforcement agencies which eventually led to
other criminal charges being wrongly brought against him, culminating in his prosecution on
drug distribution and gun possession charges in 2008. (Id. at 24-30, ¶¶ 49-69.)
Plaintiff’s present claims stem primarily from his 2008 prosecution for possession with
intent to deliver or manufacture a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a felon.
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(Id. at 30-61, ¶¶ 70-129.) Plaintiff was convicted in 2009 following a jury trial and was
sentenced to ninety-nine years imprisonment on each charge.1 Plaintiff’s present civil rights suit
essentially alleges that everyone involved with this prosecution, including various state judges,
assistant district attorneys, court-appointed attorneys, court reporters, police officers and parole
officers, conspired to falsely convict Plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleges that the state appellate
courts and former Texas Governor Rick Perry wrongfully refused to intervene in the malicious
criminal prosecution. (Id. at 68-84, ¶¶ 146-187.) According to state court records, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals refused Plaintiff’s petition for discretionary review of his 2008
criminal conviction on December 9, 2011. See Texas Courts Website.2
Plaintiff’s present civil rights Complaint identifies five federal causes of action including
conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights, retaliation for exercising constitutional rights,
denial of due process and equal protection of the laws, and denial of access to the courts.
(Docket No. 1 at 85-88.) Plaintiff also alleges a state law cause of action for tortious interference
with business relationships. The essence of Plaintiff’s complaint is that he was harassed and
mistreated by law enforcement, deprived of due process, falsely convicted, wrongly denied relief
on appeal, and hindered in his efforts to obtain post-conviction relief in the state courts. Plaintiff
seeks a broad range of declaratory and injunctive relief, including invalidation of his conviction
and confinement, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 89.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), which requires a district court to scrutinize claims in a civil action brought in forma
pauperis by a prisoner and dismiss the complaint, in whole or in part, if it “is frivolous,

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2

http://www.search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=PD-1143-11&coa=coscca (viewed Nov. 7, 2014).
Id.

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malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;” or “seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A(b). A reviewing court
may dismiss a complaint for these reasons “at any time” “on its own motion or on the motion of
a party” where the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (mandating dismissal where the complaint is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief”). A district court may also review on its own motion a civil action
brought by a prisoner in forma pauperis for compliance with the relevant statute of limitations.
Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999).
Pleadings filed by pro se litigants must be construed under a less stringent standard of
review. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Under this standard, “[a] document filed
pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ Estelle [v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)], and ‘a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (observing that courts “are not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). The Supreme Court has clarified that
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, at
678.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Statute of Limitations
In cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the forum state’s general
personal injury limitations period, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 386 (2007), and its coordinate
tolling provisions. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989). In Texas, the limitations period for
personal injury claims is two years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon
2002). The accrual of a cause of action under § 1983, however, is determined by reference to
federal law. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. Under federal standards, accrual occurs “when the
plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Id. A plaintiff has “a complete and present
cause of action” when “the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id.
A review of the Complaint in this case shows that Plaintiff knew or should have known
of the relevant facts supporting his present claims well over two years before this lawsuit was
filed. Plaintiff’s Complaint was signed on March 18, 2014, and filed on March 21, 2014.
(Docket No. 1.) However, the core of Plaintiff’s complaint is an alleged conspiracy dating back
to at least 2002 to wrongfully prosecute and convict Plaintiff on drug and weapons charges. (Id.)
Public records show that Plaintiff was indicted on the allegedly trumped-up charges in 2008 and
was convicted and sentenced in 2009. See Texas Courts website.3 Moreover, Plaintiff’s direct
appeals from that conviction were completed in 2011 when his petition for discretionary review
was refused. Id. Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations show that, at the very latest, he became aware of
the alleged conspiracy against him on July 23, 2010, when he received the court reporters’
records from his criminal case and discovered discrepancies which he alleges “had been
knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately done.” (Docket No. 1 at 46.) Thus, Plaintiff cannot

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Id.

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possibly show that he only became aware of the facts supporting his present claims less than two
years before filing his complaint in this case. (Id.)
Because Plaintiff’s allegations show that he had sufficient information to know that he
had a complete and present cause of action on which he could have filed suit and obtained relief
by 2011 at the latest, his claims are now untimely under the applicable two-year limitations
period. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed as time-barred under the two-year limitations
period applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought in the State of Texas.
B. Heck Bar
In addition to being time-barred, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages and equitable
relief are also barred under the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486-87 (1994). Heck bars any cause of action under § 1983, regardless of the type of relief
sought, that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence,
unless the conviction has previously been invalidated through proper channels. Id.; Kutzner v.
Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2002). Thus, before a plaintiff can pursue a
claim for damages arising from allegedly unlawful actions which, if proven, would also show the
plaintiff’s conviction or sentence to be invalid, the plaintiff must first show that his conviction or
sentence has been reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s claims are inextricably linked to the legality of his present sentence and
confinement. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s entire ninety-page complaint is that his conviction and
sentence for drug distribution and gun possession resulted from a conspiracy among law
enforcement, prosecutors, judges and others to wrongly convicting and imprison him. Plaintiff
further contends that the state courts participated in this conspiracy by falsifying trial records and
failing to overturn his conviction or sentence through the appeals and post-conviction writ
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process. Thus, it is apparent that a judgment favorable to Plaintiff on his present civil rights
claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence. However, because
Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction has already been overturned or invalidated through
proper channels, his present civil rights claims are barred by Heck.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that:
1.

Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

2.

All pending motions in this case, if any, are DENIED.

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this order to Plaintiff. The Clerk will also send
a copy by regular mail, facsimile transmission, or e-mail to the District Clerk for the Eastern
District of Texas, Tyler Division, 211 West Ferguson, Tyler, Texas, 75702, Attention: Manager
of the Three-Strikes List.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 5th day of February, 2015.

___________________________________
MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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