Garza v. City of La Porte

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment, granting 31 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

EVERARDO GARZA,

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF LA PORTE,
Defendant.

February 04, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-0767

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Everardo Garza
City

of

La

Porte,

Texas

("Plaintiff" or "Garza")

("Defendant"

or

"La

sued the

Porte")

seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating a La Porte ordinance
governing commercial truck routes and parking. 1

Pending before the

court

Summary

are

Plaintiff's

("Plaintiff's Motion")

Motion

for

Final

Judgment

(Docket Entry No. 30) and Defendant City of

La Porte, Texas' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion")
(Docket Entry No. 31).
I.

Garza is

a

Background

licensed commercial

truck

driver. 2

routes run through the La Porte, Texas, area. 3

His

daily

Garza drives these

1

See Plaintiff's Original Complaint and Request for Declaratory
Relief ("Complaint"), Docket Entry No. 1, p. 4 ~~ 24-25.
2

See Oral Deposition of Everardo Garza ("Garza Deposition"),
Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-3, p. 18 at 70.
3

See id. p. 4 at 14-16; p. 7 at 27-28; p. 13 at 49-51. Garza
testified that "I just cut through town, don't ever stop in
(continued ... )

routes from 7:00a.m., when the Port of Houston opens, until 5:00
or 6:00p.m., as a driver for Gulf Winds International. 4

He has

driven for Gulf Winds International for twelve years and almost
exclusively in La Porte for the two years before this action. 5
La Porte is a small city with heavy commercial truck traffic due to
its location as the only municipality between the Port of Houston's
two high-capacity container terminals. 6

La Porte has

certain roadways as the "designated truck routes"

selected

in the city. 7

Garza received training from Gulf Winds International regarding the
designated

3

truck

routes

in

La

Porte,

and

signs

are

posted

continued)
Baytown." Id. p. 13 at 50, but also testified that on the day he
received his citation, he left the terminal in Seabrook and "was
going back to pick up another container from Baytown, Walmart
distribution, to bring back to our terminal."
Id. p. 7 at 27.
( •••

4

See id. p. 3 at 12; p. 4 at 13, 15.

5

See id. p. 4 at 13; p. 18 at 70-71.

6

See Affidavit of Corby D. Alexander ("Alexander Affidavit"),
Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-4, p. 2 ~ 3.
"Based on statistics provided by the Port of Houston, the port is
ranked first in the United States in foreign waterborne tonnage
(for 19 consecutive years); first in U.S. imports (for 23
consecutive years); first in U.S. export tonnage (for 6 consecutive
years) and second in the U.S. in total tonnage (for 23 consecutive
years); and the Port of Houston reports that it currently handles
approximately 66 percent of all the containerized cargo in the U.S.
Gulf of Mexico. For statistics relating to the Port of Houston and
its container terminals, see http://www.portofhouston.com and
http://www.portofhouston.com/container-terminals.
Id.
7

See La Porte City Ordinance No.
2015-3579
("Amended
Ordinance") § 70-231, Appendix A to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-14, p. 5.
-2-

indicating those routes. 8
include

Highway

225

Designated truck routes

(including

frontage

in La Porte

roads),

Highway

146

(including frontage roads), Underwood Road, and parts of Barbours
Cut Boulevard,

16th Street,

Fairmont Parkway,

West Main Street,

Powell Road, Export Drive, South 16th Street, North Broadway, North
"L" Street, North "J" Street, and North 8th Street. 9

Some of these

roads,

part

including

Highways

225

and

146,

are

also

of

the

federally designated "National Network of highways" (the "National
Network") . 10

La

Porte voluntarily designated any non-National

Network roads as truck routes within the city, and Garza does not
challenge the truck routes themselves. 11
On January 25,

2014,

Officer Boles of the La Porte Police

Department issued a citation to Garza for driving his truck tractor
(without

a

trailer

attached)

off

the

city's

designated

truck

8

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 4 at 16; p. 5 at 17-20; p. 6 at 21-22.
9

See Amended Ordinance, § 70-231, Appendix A to Plaintiff's
Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-14, p. 5 (listing "those streets and
thoroughfares within the corporate limits of the city . . . hereby
designated as truck routes") . Garza testified that Spencer Highway
and Bay Area Boulevard are also designated truck routes. See Garza
Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-3,
p. 5 at 19.
10

See National Highway System: Houston, TX, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Appendix F to
Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-19.
As discussed below,
federal law generally requires states to allow commercial motor
vehicles (of certain dimensions and weight) to use the National
Network.
11

Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30, p. 12.
-3-

route . 12

Garza was traveling north on Highway 146 through La Porte

from the Gulf Winds International terminal in Seabrook and had
taken the exit ramp towards Spencer Highway. 13

He was on his way

to pick up a container from Baytown to bring back to the terminal
and had

decided

to

stop

at

Whataburger. 14

After

exiting

and

traveling along the feeder road briefly, Garza made a right turn
onto West A Street, past a "no trucks through" sign. 15

Garza then

turned left off of West A Street onto South 8th Street in an
attempt to access the Whataburger parking lot. 16

Garza testified

12

See La Porte Police Department Citation Issued to Everardo
Garza ("Citation"), Exhibit D to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry
No. 30-4.
Under VIOLATIONS, the Citation states: "(TRUCK) Truck
Off Designated Route."
13

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 7 at 26-28; p. 8 at 29; Map of Route from
Terminal to Whataburger, Exhibit K to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-11; Garza Deposition Exhibits 2 and 3, Exhibit A to
Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-3, pp. 63, 64 (maps of
Garza's route).
14

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 7 at 26-28.
See id. p. 7 at 27; p. 8 at 29-30.
The feeder road of
Highway 146 is called South 9th Street at this location.
15

16

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 8 at 29-32; see also Garza Deposition, attached
to Bickley Affidavit, Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry
No. 31-3, p. 64. It is unclear from the maps and Garza's testimony
whether he actually turned on S. 8th Street or went directly into
the parking lot, but the distinction is immaterial. Garza provided
a transcription of the video taken of the traffic stop from Officer
Boles' car.
La Porte challenges this document as inadmissible
hearsay.
See Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Summary
Judgment Evidence, Appendix A to Defendant City of La Porte, Texas'
(continued ... )
-4-

that he wanted to enter through the back entrance to the lot,
rather than continuing along the feeder to Highway 146 and turning
right into the lot from the feeder.

17

He believed it would be

easier to maneuver the tractor back out of the parking lot from
that direction. 18
When Garza was exiting from Highway 146,

he passed Officer

Boles, who was parked on the shoulder of the exit ramp. 19

Officer

Boles cited Garza for driving off the designated truck route. 20
Garza was not cited for a parking violation. 21

The Citation against

Garza is pending in La Porte municipal court. 22
La

Porte's

ordinance

governing

"traffic

and

vehicles,"

Sections 70-212, 70-232, 70-233, 70-235, and 70-237, as amended by
16

( • • • continued)
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Objections
to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence ("Defendant's Response"),
Docket Entry No. 33-1, p. 2.
The court need not rely on this
transcript, as the portions of Garza's deposition testimony
submitted by both parties describe the stop and citation
sufficiently for purposes of summary judgment.
17

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 8 at 30-31.
18

See id.

19

See id. p. 8 at 31-32.

20

See id. p. 6 at 24; Garza Deposition, attached to Bickley
Affidavit, Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-3,
p. 62; Citation, Exhibit D to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry
No. 30-4.
21

See Citation, Exhibit D to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry
No. 30-4.
22

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 7 at 26.
-5-

the city council in May of 2015, is at issue in this case. 23

The

Ordinance regulates various activities, but at issue here are its
applications to commercial truck routes and parking. 24

Commercial

truck drivers are allowed to park at limited places in La Porte and
may

generally only use

the

designated

destinations in the city limits. 25
the Lion King Travel Plaza,
Travel Plaza. 26

truck

routes

to

access

Available truck stops include

La Porte Travel Center,

and Moody

Each of these locations has a convenience store and

fuel, and one has a hotel. 27

Dining options include Cafe La Porte,

23

See La Porte,
Texas,
Code of Ordinances
("Original
Ordinance") , Appendix I to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Response"), Docket Entry
No. 35-1; Amended Ordinance, Appendix A to Plaintiff's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 30-14.
Alexander Affidavit, Exhibit B to
Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-4, pp. 2-3 ~ 4 (discussing
the review and amendment of the Original Ordinance) .
24

The Complaint only mentions § 70-179 of the Original
Ordinance.
See Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 2, 3, 4, 5.
Plaintiff's
Motion challenges §§ 70-212, 70-232, 70-233, 70-235, and 70-237 of
the Amended Ordinance. Since the ordinance was amended after the
Complaint was filed and La Porte does not object to the expanded
challenge, the court will consider Garza's challenge to the
relevant sections of the Amended Ordinance.
25

See Amended Ordinance §§ 70-212, 70-232, 70-233, 70-235, and
70-237, Appendix A to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-14.
26

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, pp. 11-12; Map of La Porte with truck stops marked,
Garza Deposition Exhibit 6, Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 31-3, p. 73.
27

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, pp. 11-12.
Oral Deposition of Corby Alexander
("Alexander Deposition"), Exhibit H to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-8, pp. 22-23; Alexander Affidavit, Exhibit B to
Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-4, p. 4 ~ 6.
-6-

a Subway,

a Chester's Chicken,

a Taqueria,

and the Port Cafe. 28

There is also another hotel available to truck drivers. 29
Garza filed the action on March 25, 2014. 30

He sought leave

to amend his Complaint after the amendment deadline, but leave was
denied for failure to show good cause for the delay and to allege
facts

that would support his

extensions,

new claim. 31

both parties filed motions

After several

time

for summary judgment on

June 15, 2015. 32
28

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 11-12; see Affidavit of Chief Kenith Adcox
("Adcox Affidavit"), Exhibit C to Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry
No. 31-5, pp. 2-3.
See also Affidavits of business owners and
managers, Exhibits E(l)-E(6), Docket Entry Nos. 31-7 through 31-12.
29

See Alexander Affidavit, Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 31-4, p. 4 ~ 6(c); Oral Deposition of Chief Ken
Adcox ("Adcox Deposition"), Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-1, p. 6 at 23-24. Corby Alexander, the La Porte City
Manager, testified that commercial trucks can park along the side
of the road on Fairmont Parkway without violating the Ordinance and
access a Jack in the Box, taco stand, Popeye's, and a Waffle House
within walking distance.
See Alexander Deposition, Exhibit H to
Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-8, pp. 17; 36-38.
He
testified that the Ordinance does not prohibit trucks parking along
the shoulder of designated truck routes to access restaurants. See
id.
3

°Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1.

31

See Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Pleading,
Docket Entry No. 15.
Garza sought leave to include "additional
allegations" regarding the Ordinance's validity.
Id. at 1 ~ 4.
"Specifically, that the Ordinance infringes upon Mr. Garza's
fundamental right to travel, and the Privilege and Immunities
clause of the 14th Amendment."
Id.
See also Order (denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Pleading) , Docket
Entry No. 21.
32

See Order Granting Agreed Motion for Continuance, Docket
Entry No. 24; Agreed Order Extending Dispositive Motion Deadline,
Docket Entry No. 27; Agreed Order Extending Dispositive Motion
Deadline, Docket Entry No. 29.
-7-

II.
A.

Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant establishes that
there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Disputes about material facts are genuine "if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party."

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby,

Inc.,

106 S. Ct.

2505,

2510

(1986) .

The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law if "the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing
on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has
the burden of proof."

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548,

2552 (1986).
A party moving for summary judgment "must

'demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate
the elements of the nonmovant' s case."
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2553).

Little v. Liquid Air Corp. ,

(en bane)

(per curiam)

(quoting

"If the moving party fails to meet

this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the
nonmovant's response."
this burden,

Id.

If, however,

the moving party meets

"the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings"

and

produce evidence of specific facts demonstrating that there is a
genuine

issue

2553-54).

for

trial.

Id.

(citing Celotex,

106

S.

Ct.

at

The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there

-8-

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."

Matsushita

Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct.
1348, 1356 (1986).
"In order

to

avoid

summary

judgment,

the

nonmovant

must

identify specific facts within the record that demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact."
Mining Co., L.P.,

565 F.3d 268, 273

CO.

Inc. v. TXU

(5th Cir. 2009).

"The party

must also articulate the precise manner in which the submitted or
identified evidence supports his or her claim."
quotation

marks

and

citation

summary judgment evidence."

omitted).

Id.

(internal

" [P] leadings

are

not

Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d

1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996).
In reviewing the evidence "the court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
credibility determinations

or weigh the

and it may not make

evidence."

Reeves

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000).

v.
The

court resolves factual controversies in favor of the nonmovant,
"but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts."
37 F.3d at 1075.

Little,

If the movant bears the burden of proof on an

issue at trial,

"that party must support its motion [for summary

judgment]

credible

with

evidence

that

directed verdict if not controverted at

would

trial."

Corp., 299 F. App'x 426, 428 (5th Cir. 2008)
U.S. at 331).
-9-

entitle

it

McKee v.

to

a

CBF

(citing Celotex, 477

B.

Analysis

(1)
La

Which Claims Are Properly Before the Court
Porte

challenges

Garza's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

because it contains claims not alleged in the Complaint. 33

Garza

responds that he has complied with the pleading requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a),

which does not "require a

plaintiff to set forth all laws which defendant may be violating." 34
The live pleading before the court, Plaintiff's Original Complaint,
alleges

that

the

Original

Ordinance

"is

invalid because

[sic]

unreasonably restricts access to food, rest, or repairs and is thus
preempted by 23 C.F.R. 658.19(a) ." 35

Under "RELIEF REQUESTED" the

Complaint states:
24.
Plaintiff requests this court declare that La Porte
Ordinances, Article V, Subpart A - General Ordinances,
Chapter 70 - Traffic and Vehicles, § 70-179 is invalid
because it is preempted by federal law.
25.
Plaintiff further requests this court enjoin the
City of La Porte or agents acting on behalf of the City
of La Porte from enforcing this ordinance. 36

33

See Defendant's Response, Docket Entry No. 33, pp. 1, 11, 13;
Defendant City of La Porte, Texas' Sur-Reply to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment, Docket Entry No. 37, pp. 1-6.
34

Plaintiff' s Reply to La Porte's Response to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Reply") , Docket Entry
No. 34, p. 6.
35

See Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 4

~

22.

Id. ~~ 24-25. Even Garza's proposed First Amended Complaint
did not contain the claims that he advances in his Motion for
Summary Judgment.
See supra note 31.
See also Exhibit A to
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Pleading, Docket Entry
No. 15-1.
36

-10-

Although Garza's Complaint does not allege any state law claims,
his Motion for Summary Judgment argues that "The State of Texas
expressly prohibits

cities

from

regulating

parking

on private

nonresidential property" and "La Porte has exceeded its authority"
under Texas law to regulate "stopping, standing, and parking." 37
Even under the "liberal pleading standard" of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 (a),

a party cannot use a

judgment to raise new claims.

motion for summary

See U.S. ex rel DeKort v. Integrated

Coast Guard Systems, 475 F. App'x 521, 522 (5th Cir. 2012)

("[T]he

Supreme Court has mandated a liberal pleading standard for civil
complaints

This

standard

however

does

not

afford

plaintiffs with an opportunity to raise new claims at the summary
At the summary judgment stage, the proper

judgment stage.

procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the
complaint

in accordance with Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

15(a) ."

(quoting

Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (11th
Cir.

2004)));

WL 203859,

at

In
*14

re

Idearc,

(Bankr.

Inc.,

N.D.

Tex.

No.

09-31828-BJH-11,

Jan.

21,

2011)

2011

("However,

'there is a crucial difference in timing when the sufficiency of a
complaint arises at the summary judgment stage after a plaintiff
has had an opportunity for discovery.'"

37

(quoting Carter v.

See Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30, pp.
also Plaintiff's Reply, Docket Entry No. 34, pp. 1-5.
-11-

Ford

8-9. See

Motor Co., 561 F.3d 562, 567 (6th Cir. 2009)))

Garza's state law

claims are therefore not before the court. 38
(2)

Whether Summary Judgment is Appropriate For Either Party
On the Remaining Federal Preemption Claim

Garza claims that La Porte's Ordinance is preempted by 23
C.F.R.

§

658.19 because it "unreasonably restricted Mr.

Garza's

rights to reasonable access to facilities for food, fuel, rest, and
repairs." 39

23 C.F.R. Part 658 was promulgated by the FHWA pursuant

to its authority under the STAA40 to "identify a National Network
[NN] of highways available to vehicles authorized by provisions of
the

[STAA]

as amended,

and to prescribe national policies that

38

Garza refers to another statute, 23 U.S. C. § 127 (b) , in
Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 35, pp. 3-4.
He did not
refer to this statute in the Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, or
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket Entry No. 30.
"A
claim which is not raised in the complaint, but, rather, is raised
only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly
before the court."
Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana
State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Fisher v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th Cir. 1990).
39

See Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 3 0, p. 2; Complaint,
Docket Entry No. 1, p. 4 ~ 22.
40

The STAA was enacted in 1983 and is now codified at 49 U.S.C.
31101 et ~ See Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1983); New Hampshire Motor
Transport Association v. Town of Plaistow, 67 F.3d 326, 328 (1st
Cir. 1995). The STAA has been amended multiple times, including by
the Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984. See Town of Plaistow, 67 F.3d
at 329.
49 U.S.C. § 31114 is the STAA's statutory "reasonable
access" section.
§

-12-

govern truck and bus size and weight."
23 C.F.R. § 658.19,

See 23 C.F.R.

§ 658.1. 41

"Reasonable access," states in relevant part:

(a) No State may enact or enforce any law denying
reasonable access to vehicles with dimensions authorized
by the STAA between the NN and terminals and facilities
for food, fuel, repairs, and rest.

(d) No State may enact or enforce any law denying access
within 1 road-mile from the National Network using the
most reasonable and practicable route available except
for specific safety reasons on individual routes.
Garza argues that the FHWA has advised that restrictions on
access

must

considerations,

be

based

on

either

safety

or

engineering

and La Porte's Ordinance is not based on these

specific considerations. 42

La Porte argues that (1) a justiciable

controversy no longer exists in light of the substantial amendments
to the Ordinance;

(2)

Garza was not operating an STAA-regulated

vehicle when he received the Citation; and (3) both the Original

41

See also 23 C.F.R. § 658.5 Definitions: the National Network
is "[t]he composite of the individual network of highways from each
State on which vehicles authorized by the provisions of the STAA
are allowed to operate.
The network in each State includes the
Interstate System, exclusive of those portions excepted under
§ 658.11(f) or deleted under§ 658.11(d), and those portions of the
Federal-aid Primary System in existence on June 1, 1991, set out by
the FHWA in appendix A to this part."
42

Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30, p. 2 (citing U.S.
Dep't of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Freight
Management and Operations - Questions and Answers about Vehicle
Size and Weight, 23 CFR 658.19 Reasonable Access ("FHWA - 23 CFR
658.19 Reasonable Access Q&A"), Appendix B to Plaintiff's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 30-15, p. 2.
The same document is attached as
Appendix A to Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-1.).
-13-

Ordinance and the Amended Ordinance provide the "reasonable access"
required by the STAA. 43
a.

Standing

Garza argues that he has standing to challenge the
route and parking ordinances." 44
in fact;

(2)

Standing requires:

( 1) an injury

a causal connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of; and (3)

likelihood that a favorable decision will

redress the injury.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

2130,

Garza was cited for

2136

route." 45

"truck

(1992).

112 S.

Ct.

"truck off designated

The proceeding against him in La Porte Municipal Court

is directly traceable to the "designated truck route" portion of
the Ordinance, and a favorable decision by the court invalidating

43

Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31, pp. 1-2. La Porte
also argues that under Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971), the
court should abstain from hearing this dispute because Garza could
raise his preemption claims as a defense in the pending municipal
court action based on his Citation.
Defendant's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 31, p. 2. Abstention is appropriate in three classes of
exceptional cases: state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement
proceedings, and civil proceedings involving certain orders that
are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform
their judicial functions.
Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs,
134 s. Ct. 584, 588 (2013). Although the proceeding against Garza
in La Porte municipal court is pending,
this is not an
"exceptional" case, and the court declines to abstain.
See
id. (noting the general rule that "[t]he pendency of an action in
[a] state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter
in the Federal court having jurisdiction") (quotations omitted).
44

Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30, p. 3.

45

See Citation, Exhibit D to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry
No. 30-4.
-14-

the

Ordinance

would

redress

his

injury.

Garza

therefore

has

standing to contest the "designated truck route" portion of the
Ordinance.
The truck route limitations and the parking limitations are
interrelated parts of the Amended Ordinance.

Officer Boles told

Garza that he could not park in the Whataburger parking lot. 46
Garza was therefore not able to eat at the Whataburger because of
the parking portion of the Ordinance.

City Manager Corby Alexander

testified that no La Porte business has ever applied for approval
of a parking plan to his knowledge. 47

There is no evidence that

under the Amended Ordinance Garza can now park his
Whataburger in order to get food,

or that Garza would not have

received the Citation under the Amended Ordinance. 48
Houston, Texas v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 2508 n.7
tiff's

showing

of

"'a

genuine

tractor at

threat

of

See City of

(1987)

enforcement'

(plainof

the

ordinance against his future activities" was sufficient to confer
standing to challenge the facial validity of the ordinance) .

Since

46

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 9 at 35.
47

See Alexander Deposition, Exhibit H to Plaintiff's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 30-8, p. 7 at 26-27. Amended Ordinance § 70-237
"Parking Plan for Accommodation of Commercial Motor Vehicles,"
Appendix A to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-14.
48

See Adcox Affidavit, Exhibit C to Defendant's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 31-5, pp. 2-3 (indicating that truck drivers have access
to "at least" the same five restaurants under the Original
Ordinance and the Amended Ordinance);
Alexander Affidavit,
Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-4, pp. 3-4.
-15-

Garza continues to drive his commercial motor vehicle in La Porte,
there is a threat of future enforcement should he drive or park in
locations forbidden by the Amended Ordinance.
has

standing to challenge

Ordinance.
(1988)

Garza therefore also

the parking portions of

the Amended

See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 855

("The

likelihood

of

enforcement,

with

the

concomitant

probability that a landlord's rent will be reduced below what he or
she

would otherwise

Ordinance,

is a

be

able

sufficient

to

obtain

in

the

threat of actual

absence

of

the

injury to satisfy

Art. III's requirement that '[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute
must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury
as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.'").
Garza also challenges Section 70-235 of the Amended Ordinance,
which designates hazardous material routes. 49

There is no evidence

that Garza has ever driven or will drive a "placarded" (hazardous)
load through La Porte, much less been denied access to food, fuel,
rest, or repairs because of driving such a load.

Garza therefore

lacks standing to challenge this section of the Amended Ordinance.
b.
Four

The 2015 Amended Ordinance

sections

of

the

Amended

Ordinance

are

at

issue.

Section 70-212 imposes a fine on persons who fail to comply with
the provisions of this article.

Section 70-232 of the Amended

Ordinance, "Use required generally," states:

49

See Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30, pp. 13-14.
-16-

No person shall operate a commercial motor vehicle upon
any roads, avenues, streets or thoroughfares within the
corporate limits of the city except on those which are
designated as truck routes in Section 70-231 of this
Code, and subject to the gross weight limits established
by Division 3 of this article.
Section 70-233,

"Exception to Section 70-232:

point of origin;

parking of commercial motor vehicles," states:
(a)
The provisions of Section 70-232 of this Code
notwithstanding, in those instances where any commercial
motor vehicles originating within the corporate limits of
the city, shall have as its point of origin a point
located off a designated truck route, it shall proceed to
the nearest point on a designated truck route by the most
direct route possible. If such commercial motor vehicles
shall originate outside the corporate limits of the city
and enter the city at a point which is not on a
designated truck route, it shall proceed to the nearest
point on a designated truck route by the most direct
route possible.
(b)
In those cases where commercial motor vehicles
originate off a designated truck route, whether inside or
outside the corporate limits of the city, and the
destination of the commercial motor vehicle is nearer the
origin or point of entering the corporate limits of the
city than is the nearest point on a designated truck
route by the most direct route possible, it shall not be
necessary to proceed to the nearest designated truck
route.
(c)
Commercial motor vehicles not in combination with a
trailer .
. may travel to and park at locations off a
designated truck route by taking the most direct route
possible, regardless of whether the operator of the
commercial motor vehicle is loading or unloading cargo,
providing services, or seeking repairs at a legitimate
repair facility, provided that the location is not in a
residentially zoned area and is at a site physically
capable of accommodating customer commercial motor
vehicle parking by means of a parking facility striping
plan 1) configured to allow for the safe parking of
commercial motor vehicles, and 2) approved by the
Planning Department of the City in accordance with the
requirements of Section 70-237 of this Chapter.
-17-

(d)
Combination commercial motor vehicles
may
travel to and park at locations contiguous to and
fronting a designated truck route, regardless of whether
the operator of the commercial motor vehicle is loading
or unloading cargo, or seeking repairs at a legitimate
repair facility, provided that the location is at a site
physically capable of accommodating customer commercial
motor vehicle parking specific to commercial motor
vehicles in combination with a trailer, by means of a
parking striping plan 1) configured to allow for the safe
parking of combination commercial motor vehicles, and
2) approved by the Planning Department of the City in
accordance with the requirements of Section 70-237 of
this Chapter.
Section 70-237 allows businesses to create a

"Parking Plan for

Accommodation of Commercial Motor Vehicles:"
The owner or operator of any existing or proposed
site in which parking is sought for accommodation of
customer commercial motor vehicles, including combination
commercial motor vehicles, where the site is physically
capable of safely accommodating such vehicles, shall be
required to submit to the Planning Department for approval
a parking facility striping plan as a component of a
proposed site plan, or as an amending document to a
previously approved (if one exists) site plan.
The
applicant for the site plan or amended site plan shall be
allowed the option of striping up to 15% of the required
automobile parking as dual use parking spots for the
accommodation of commercial motor vehicle parking, and
shall be so striped and labeled.
Such allocation shall
generally be located within the parking spaces least used.
La

Porte

substantial

argues

changes

that

that
make

the

Amended

Garza's

Ordinance

claim moot. 50

contains
The

city

council appointed a committee to conduct a comprehensive review of
the

Original

Ordinance

and

retained

50

Nichols

and

Freese,

See Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31, pp. 2, 4, 6
8-9; Defendant's Response, Docket Entry No. 33, p. 2 ~~ f, g.
-18-

~

a

e,

consulting firm, to assist the committee. 51
not provided any evidence

that

the

However, La Porte has

amendments

have materially

changed Garza's situationi his Citation is still pending and he has
limited access to businesses in La Porte while driving his truck. 52
Even when driving only the
Whataburger

or

many

other

truck tractor Garza cannot park at
restaurants

in

La

Porte.

See

Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors
of America v.

City of Jacksonville,

2300-01 (1993)

(holding that respondents' claims were not moot even

though

the

original

ordinance

had

Florida,

been

113 S.

repealed

and

Ct.

replaced

because "[t] he new ordinance may disadvantage them to a
degree than the old one
same fundamental way").
c.

[but]

2297,

lesser

it disadvantages them in the

Garza's claim, therefore, is not moot.

Federal Preemption
i.

The STAA's Applicability

23 C.F.R. § 658.19{a) prohibits states from denying reasonable
access to "vehicles with dimensions authorized by the STAA between
the [National Network] and terminals and facilities for food, fuel,

51

See Alexander Affidavit, Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 31-4, pp. 2-4 ~~ 4, 5.
Affidavit of Timothy
Tietjens ("Tietjens Affidavit"), Exhibit D to Defendant's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 31-6, pp. 1-2.
52

Compare Alexander Deposition, Exhibit H to Plaintiff's
Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-8, pp. 7-8 at 25-29 (describing the
process for a business to obtain city approval to accommodate
parking for commercial motor vehicles under the Original Ordinance)
with Amended Ordinance§ 70-237, Appendix A to Plaintiff's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 30-14, p. 8.
-19-

repairs, and rest."
apply

because

La Porte argues that this provision does not

Garza's

vehicle under the

truck

tractor

not

FHWA interpretation and

'commercial motor vehicle'

However,

an

STAA-regulated

"is not otherwise a

as defined therein." 53

cited by La Porte states that a
vehicle. " 54

is

The Q&A page

"truck tractor is not an STAA

that statement is made in the context of

clarifying that states are not required to allow drivers to park
their truck tractors at their homes. 55
The STAA statutory definition of "commercial motor vehicle" is
"a self -propelled or towed vehicle used on the highways in commerce
principally to transport passengers or cargo,

if the vehicle -

(A) has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of at
1 0 , 0 01

least
§

31101 (1) (A) . 56

pounds ,

whichever

is

greater."

49

u.s.c.

"Gross vehicle weight rating" is defined by the

Department of Transportation regulations as "the value specified by
the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single motor vehicle."

53

Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31, pp. 7-8.

54

See FHWA - 23 CFR 658 .19 Reasonable Access Q&A, Appendix B
to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-15 and Appendix A to
Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-1.
55

See FHWA - 23 CFR 658.19 Reasonable Access Q&A, Appendix A
to Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-1.
56

See Montgomery v. Administrative Review Board, 348 F. App'x
915, 916 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that the STAA is codified at
49 U.S.C. §§ 31101-31107).
Provisions of the STAA were formerly
found at 49 App.
U.S.C.A.
§§
2301-2316.
See Hollan v.
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, No. 1:13-CV-1857, 2014
WL 255727, at *2 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (describing it as currently
codified at 49 u.s.c. §§ 31101-31115)
-20-

See Albanil v. Coast 2 Coast, Inc., 444 F. App'x 788, 796 (5th Cir.
2011)

(citing 49 C.F.R.

judgment,

§

390.5).

As the party moving for summary

La Porte has the burden of establishing that Garza's

tractor is not an STAA regulated vehicle.

Since La Porte has

offered no summary judgment evidence on this issue, the court will
not grant summary judgment based on this argument.
ii.

Reasonable Access

Garza argues that under the "reasonable access provisions"
(which he defines as 23 C.F.R.
right to eat,
also cites

sleep,

23

C.F.R.

refuel,
§

658.19(a)), he is guaranteed the

§

and seek repairs in La Porte. 57

658.19{d),

which prohibits

states

He
from

enacting or enforcing any law "denying access within 1 road-mile
from the National Network using the most reasonable and practicable
route available except for specific safety reasons on individual
routes. " 58

Garza seeks summary judgment because "La Porte has no

evidence that its ordinances restricting a professional driver's
access to food,

fuel,

rest,

and repairs is based on safety or

engineering considerations." 59

57

See Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30, p. 10.

58

See id.

{citing 23 C.F.R.

§

658.19{d)).

See id. at 6 ~ 3; 10-12. Garza also frames the Ordinance as
"segregation" and "discrimination," citing Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 {1954), and arguing that "separate but
equal" is no longer tolerated.
Id. at 18-20. The court will not
seriously consider this extreme rhetoric.
59

-21-

La Porte argues that the Amended Ordinance provides commercial
truck drivers with reasonable access, that access restrictions are
not limited to safety and engineering considerations, and that the
Amended Ordinance's restrictions are safety-based. 60

Rather than

reasonable access, La Porte argues that Garza is seeking access to
a restaurant of his preference, a burden not imposed by the STAA. 61
(A)

Does the STAA require that the city base
restrictions on access on safety or
engineering concerns?

Garza cites three cases 62 to support his contention that access
may

only

be

denied

considerations.

on

the

basis

of

safety

or

engineering

In New York State Motor Truck Association, Inc. v.

City of New York,

654 F.

Supp.

1521,

1539

(S.D.N.Y.

1987),

the

court held that "States may not impose unreasonable restrictions
pursuant

to

§

412(b)

[of

the

STAA] ,

nor

may

they

impose

restrictions that are not based on safety considerations, nor may
they impose restrictions

that

interfere with tandem operators'

rights to reasonable access to the facilities in question."

In

Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Larson, 647 F. Supp.
1479, 1492 (M.D. Penn. 1986), reversed on other grounds, 827 F.2d

60

See Defendant's Response, Docket Entry No. 33, pp. 3, 8i
Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Reply"), Docket Entry No. 36, p. 3.
61

See Defendant's Response, Docket Entry No. 33, p. 2.

62

He also cites the FHWA - 23 CFR 658.19 Reasonable Access,
Appendix B to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-15, discussed
supra.
-22-

916

(3d. Cir. 1987),

the court held that "a denial of an access

route must be for safety reasons and must be related to a safety or
operating characteristic of the STAA vehicle in relation to the
proposed route.
reasonable
Finally,

Otherwise,

access

in

the denial amounts

contravention

in A.B.F. Freight System,

of

denial of

federal

the

to a

statute."

Inc. v. Suthard,

681 F. Supp.

334, 340-41 (E.D. Va. 1988), the court held that "in order to be
valid and to survive under the federal

statute,

any state law

restricting the local access of single pup trailers must satisfy
these

criteria:

( 1)

the

law

may

impose

only

reasonable

restrictions, and the resulting access allowed must be reasonable
access in fact; and (2) the state restrictions must be based solely
on valid considerations of safety and not on any other, extraneous
factors."

For the reasons explained below, the court finds these

cases unpersuasive in light of the statutory language and other
authority.

Also, as will be explained further in the next section,

the state ordinances in these cases are distinguishable from La
Porte's Amended Ordinance.
La

Porte

argues

that

by

declining

to

define

"reasonable

access," Congress recognized that the requisite degree of access
will vary and that a state has power to validly regulate access for
reasons other than safety. 63
Plaistow, 67 F.3d at 326, and

63

La Porte relies on two cases, Town of
Aux Sable Liquid Products v. Murphy,

See Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31, pp. 9-10.
-23-

526 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 2008), where the courts were less limiting
in their interpretation of the STAA' s prohibition on denial of
access.

Both of

these

cases post-date and discuss

the

three

district court cases Garza relies on.
In Town of Plaistow, 67 F.3d at 327, the town limited nighttime access to and from a local trucking terminal.

The district

court held that the STAA did not preempt the town's injunction,
citing 49 U.S.C.
Id.

at

§

328-31.

31114 (the STAA's reasonable access provision).
On

appeal

the

truckers

argued

that

state

restrictions on "reasonable access" must be based on safety.
at

329.

discussed

In

affirming

the

history

the

district

of

the

court,

STAA

and

the
its

First

Id.

Circuit

amendments

and

acknowledged the three district court cases that Garza relies on,
but concluded that "[s]afety is obviously a paramount reason for
limiting access;

but,

in our view,

permitted by Congress."

Id.

specific one.

Circuit

is not

at 329-31.

the only reason

The review is a fact-

See id. at 331.

The

it

Seventh

reasoning.
considered

See Aux
"to

what

later

Sable,
degree"

526
the

adopted

the

First

Circuit's

F.3d

1036

n.4.

The

at

STAA

preempts

local

weight

restrictions on local roads bordering the National Network.
id. at 1030.

case

See

There were two routes from plaintiff Aux Sable Liquid

Products' propane loading terminal to the Interstate.

Id. at 1031.

One route could be used by unloaded trucks, and the other, slightly

-24-

longer route could be used by trucks weighing up to 80, 000 pounds. 64
In 2005 the new highway commissioner informed Aux Sable that he
intended to restrict truck traffic on Ridgeland Avenue, the second
route, due to damage caused by the heavy trucks.
Aux Sable sued,
restrictions.

Id. at 1031-32.

alleging that the STAA preempted the new weight
Id.

at 1032.

The district court agreed in its

ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment.

Id.

On appeal Aux Sable Liquid Products, like Garza, argued that
states'

regulatory

authority

was

limited

mandated to provide reasonable access,
state authority must be done
public safety. '"
14 84) .

Id.

"in

that

states

are

and that any exercise of

'reasonably and in the interest of

at 1034

(quoting Larson,

647 F.

Supp.

at

The township argued that by declining to define "reasonable

access" more specifically when it amended the STAA in 1984, despite
awareness

of

the

lack of

uniformity

from

state

to

state with

respect to the degree of access provided to the National Network,
Congress intended that states be permitted to define "reasonable
access" "on their own."

Id. at 1035.

The Seventh Circuit held that "Congress's primary objective in
passing the STAA was to create uniform standards for commercial
motor

vehicles

highways.

utilizing
Thus,

§

the

Interstate

31114 prohibits

64

and

other

states

federal

from denying

This is the maximum vehicle gross weight permitted on the
Interstate System under 23 C.F.R. § 658.17(b).
Id. at 1031.
-25-

commercial motor vehicles
Interstate. " 65

'reasonable access'

Id. at 103 6.

to and from

the

However, Congress's decision not to

define "reasonable access" more specifically recognizes that the
"manner and degree of access to and from the Interstate necessary
to protect Congress's overarching goal of uniformity for commercial
motor vehicles utilizing the Interstate will vary across the county
depending on factors such as whether the Interstate is cutting
across rural or metro areas, traffic density on the road, and other
considerations.

Under this framework, states are still free

to exercise their police powers over state highways and local
roads,
access'

so

long as

for

these

commercial

regulations do not
motor

vehicles

Interstate and places such as terminals." 66
In a

footnote

impede

traveling

'reasonable
between

the

Id.

the court also discussed the one road-mile

provision in 23 C.F.R. § 658.19(d):
As discussed by the First Circuit, there is no reason to
think that§ 31114(b), which provides an exception from
the "reasonable access" provision in § 31114 (a) for
reasonable restrictions on certain truck tractor-

65

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
because, as applied, the ordinance denied all access to the
National Network (the other potential route was already unavailable
to the loaded trucks).
Id. at 1037.
"[T]he denial of all access
cannot constitute reasonable access." Id.
66

In a footnote, the court acknowledged that some courts have
held that safety concerns are the only reason a state or local
government could restrict access to and from the National Network.
Id. at 1036 n.4.
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected that
holding and expressly agreed with the First Circuit's analysis of
§ 31114(a) in Town of Plaistow.
-26-

semitrailer combinations imposed by state or local
governments for safety reasons, serves to limit any state
restriction to one based on safety considerations.
Instead, a more proper reading of § 31114 (a) is that
states may exercise their police powers for any number of
reasons, so long as reasonable access is provided.
Although the federal regulations provide an exception in
that "access within 1 road-mile from the National Network
must us [e] the most reasonable and practicable route
available
except
for
specific
safety reasons
on
individual routes," 23 C.F.R. § 658.19(d)
(emphasis
added) , these extra qualifications do not apply beyond
the 1 road-mile mark.
Id.

at n.4

The Seventh Circuit

(internal citations omitted).

recognized that there is an exception when access is denied within
1 road-mile of the National Network "using the most reasonable and
practicable route available."

Id.

In that situation states may

only deny access for specific safety reasons on individual routes. 67

The court reads
holding

that

states

this

less-than-clear body of

cannot

arbitrarily

deny

case

law as

commercial

motor

vehicles reasonable access to facilities for food, fuel, rest, and
repairs and satisfy the STAA.
and

the

"reasonable

access"

Based on the language in the STAA
regulation,

the

reasoning of the First and Seventh Circuits.

court

adopts

the

"'Reasonable' is a

comprehensive term and nothing in language or common-sense makes
reasonableness turn solely on safety considerations."
Plaistow, 67 F.3d at 329-30 (citations omitted).

The state must be

able to justify denial of access as an articulable,

67

Town of

reasonable

See Defendant's Response, Docket Entry No. 33, p. 3.
-27-

exercise

of

its

police

"reasonable access,"

powers.

but

Denial

of

"reasonable access"

all

access

is

not

may vary based on

factors such as whether the Interstate is cutting across rural or
metro areas, traffic density on the road, and other considerations.
See Aux Sable, at 1036-37.

Specifically, access "using the most

reasonable and practicable route available"

may only be denied

based on "specific safety reasons on individual routes" within one
road-mile of the National Network. 68
(B)

La

Porte

argues

Does
the
Amended
Ordinance
provide
reasonable access to facilities for food,
fuel, rest, and repairs?
that

the

Amended

required reasonable access and that,
restrictions

are

characterizes

based

Garza's

on

valid

Complaint

provides

the

although not required,

its

safety
as

rather than "reasonable access." 70

Ordinance

concerns. 69

seeking

"preferred

La

Porte

access"

In Town of Plaistow, 67 F.3d at

330-31, the First Circuit distinguished the three cases that Garza
relies on as follows:
cases

were

"[T]he state restrictions with which those

concerned were

wholly different

from

and

68

far

more

See also The Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Steudle, 761
F. Supp. 2d 611, 625 (E.D. Mich. 2011) ("The statute focuses on
'law[s]' and regulations and has been construed to permit states to
'exercise their police powers over state highways and local roads, '
over matters beyond just 'safety considerations.'") (citing Aux
Sable and Town of Plaistow)).
69

See Defendant's Reply, Docket Entry No. 36, p. 3.

70

See id. at 2.
-28-

intrusive than the Plaistow ordinance and order, including blanket
limitations on the distance vehicles could freely travel off the
national network and burdensome prior approval provisions for the
use of

local

roads."

This

court

likewise

concludes

that

the

Amended Ordinance is distinguishable from the laws in those cases,
briefly discussed supra under the correct analysis.
In the first case, New York Trucking Association, 654 F. Supp.
at 1539, the city required a single-use permit, upon application to
the commissioner, before certain trucks could use certain routes to
access their city destinations.

The ordinance also imposed time-

of -day

using

restrictions

National

Network

facilities

for

trucks

within

for food,

the

fuel,

city.

rest,

certain portions
Id.

at

of

Access

1535.

the
to

and repairs was restricted to

anything within a distance of 750 feet off the designated routes.
Id.

at 1539.

restriction
Network.

on

distances

La Porte has not imposed a blanket
trucks

can

travel

off

the

National

There are no time-of-day restrictions in the challenged

sections of
businesses

In contrast,

the Amended Ordinance.
to

submit

a

parking

A process
facility

is provided for

striping

plan

to

demonstrate that they can safely accommodate truck parking, and a
business must submit a parking plan to the Planning Department only
once, as opposed to seeking a single-use permit.
In A.B.F.
Virginia

Freight System,

statute

and

Inc.,

regulations

-29-

681

allowed

F.

Supp.
102"

at 340,

wide

the

trailers

("pups") to access points of loading and unloading off the National
Network only after approval of an access route, unless the point of
loading or unloading was within one-half mile of
Network.

the National

A.B. F. Freight complained that this process was extremely

burdensome as "the customer points of loading and unloading vary
daily and

sometimes

more

often."

Id.

at

344.

In

contrast,

La Porte's Amended Ordinance does not restrict access to points of
loading or unloading or to truck terminals.

Garza can also freely

access facilities for food, fuel, rest, and repair within the city
without applying for pre-approval,

if such facility can safely

accommodate commercial motor vehicles.
In Larson,

647 F.

Supp.

at 1484,

Pennsylvania only allowed

certain longer commercial vehicles to access facilities for food,
fuel,

rest,

and repair that were two-tenths of a mile from the

nearest ramp or intersection leading to a National Network highway,
and then only over highways having lanes at least twelve feet wide.
Consolidated Freight argued those restrictions were unreasonable
"because

most

highways

have

facilities

are

highways
lane

widths

located

national network highway.
reasonable access,

that

intersect
less

of

with

twelve

feet,

of

mile

beyond

than

two-tenths

Id. at 1488.

national

a

network
and most
from

the

In concluding this was not

the court considered that only 11 out of 137

vendors for maintenance and repair in Pennsylvania were accessible
under the statute.

Id. at 1490.

-30-

Only two facilities for food,

fuel, rest, or repair were available along Interstate 80 on a 300mile stretch of highway, approximately four hours apart.
1490-91.

The court "[took]

Id. at

into consideration availability as a

factor in determining reasonableness.

Id.

La Porte, in contrast

is only 18.6 square miles total. 71

to the state of Pennsylvania,

There are available facilities for food,

fuel,

rest, and repairs

minutes apart and no evidence in the record that Garza has been
unable to access any of these while driving through La Porte. 72

The

Amended Ordinance is thus distinguishable from the laws in each of
the cases cited by Garza where the courts found STAA preemption.
Citing sections of the depositions of Police Chief Ken Adcox
and City Manager Corby Alexander in support,

Garza argues that

La Porte has no evidence that the Ordinance was ever based on
safety or engineering concerns. 73
concerns
(assuming

are

not

the

compliance

discussed above),

only
with

reason
the

one

While safety and engineering
a

state

road-mile

might
route

deny

access

requirement

the affidavit of the Director of Planning and

Development for La Porte states:

71

See Alexander Affidavit, Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 31-4, p. 2 ~ 3.
72

Although La Porte experiences heavy truck traffic daily,
Garza has not provided evidence that the truck stops are
overwhelmed or that truck drivers have been denied necessary
facilities.
See, ~' Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30, p. 12,
citing Adcox Deposition, Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-1, p. 7 at 26; Alexander Deposition, Exhibit H to
Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-8, p. 9 at 33-35. See also
Plaintiff's Response, Docket Entry No. 35, p. 5.
73

-31-

Under Ordinance No. 2015-3579, any owner or operator of
any existing or proposed site who wants to accommodate
on-site commercial motor vehicle ("CMV") parking will be
approved to do so without delay once he or she files a
scaled striping plan complying with the ordinance with
the Planning Department showing that they can physically
accommodate such vehicles with safety. The key issue for
purposes of approval is safety alone.
This process is not lengthy or cumbersome, does not
require a fee to be paid to the City, and does not
necessarily require a property owner to hire an engineer
or professional to provide the information needed to
obtain the City's commercial truck parking approval.
Commercial motor vehicles, including tractor trailer
combinations and tractors operating without an attached
trailer, are significantly larger and higher than noncommercial
automobiles
and
trucks,
and are
less
maneuverable.
For this reason, while the City cannot
force private property owners to make their property
available for commercial vehicle parking, when private
property owners want to do so, the City does have a
legitimate public interest in making sure that commercial
motor vehicles are parked so that they do not cause a
safety hazard for the public, and that such vehicles have
enough space to safely maneuver. 74
The Amended Ordinance also refers to safety:
of accommodating such vehicles"

§

"physically capable

70-237; "site physically capable

of accommodating customer commercial motor vehicle parking"
233(c),

(d).

and,

70-

City Manager Corby Alexander noted "the truck traffic

emanating from
dense

§

[the Port of Houston high-capacity]

therefore,

presents

both

tremendous

terminals is
commercial

opportunities and serious public safety, quality of life, safety,
road maintenance, pollution, and other infrastructure concerns for

74

Tietjens Affidavit, Exhibit D to Defendant's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 31-6, pp. 1-2 ~ 3. See also note 93, supra.
-32-

officials." 75

City

Garza

acknowledged

the

difficulties

in

maneuvering just his tractor in a parking lot like Whataburger's:
"As my perspective, since I sit a little higher in my truck, it was
a lot easier to come in the back way.
of cars parked in the front.

There was a few cars, a lot

It would have been a lot easier to

come in the back way and easier to exit the front,

instead of

making aU-turn inside the parking lot and getting out the front." 76
The STAA "reflects a congressional interest in establishing
uniform regulations governing the size, weight, and arrangements of
trucks used in interstate commerce."

United States v.

State of

Connecticut, 566 F. Supp. 571, 576 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d
1443 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Connecticut v. United States,
104 S. Ct. 1263

(Mem)

( 1984)

(holding that Congress acted within

its authority under the Commerce Clause when enacting the STAA) .
Under

the

Amended

Ordinance,

commercial

motor

vehicles

are

permitted to leave the designated truck routes to load or unload
cargo,

provide services,

or seek repairs. 77

La Porte does not

75

See Alexander Affidavit, Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion,
Docket Entry No. 31-4, p. 2 ~ 3.
76

See Garza Deposition, Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Motion, Docket
Entry No. 30-3, p. 8 at 30-31. Garza does not challenge the truck
routes themselves, or argue that the residentially zoned streets he
drove on before receiving his Citation should be designated truck
routes.
77

See Amended Ordinance § 70-234,
Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-14, p. 7.
-33-

Appendix A to Plaintiff's

restrict access to any truck terminals. 78

Truck tractors may travel

to and park at any location off the designated truck routes taking
the most direct route possible,

as long as the location is not

zoned as residential and has been demonstrated to be physically
capable of safely accommodating commercial motor vehicle parking. 79
Combination commercial motor vehicles not transporting a hazardous
load can travel to and park at locations contiguous to and fronting
the

designated

truck

routes,

as

long

as

the

site

has

been

demonstrated to be physically capable of safely accommodating such
parking. 80

Not every hotel or restaurant within 1 road-mile of the

National Network roads is truck-accessible, but there are multiple
facilities for food, fuel, rest, and repair that these vehicles can
safely access while not traveling on residential streets.

The

78

See generally Alexander Affidavit, Exhibit B to Defendant's
Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-4; Amended Ordinance, Appendix A to
Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-14.
79

See Amended Ordinance §§ 70-233 (c), 70-234, Appendix
Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-14, p. 6.
See
Alexander Affidavit, Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion, Docket
No. 31-4, pp. 3-4 ~~ 5-6; Tietjens Affidavit, Exhibit
Defendant's Motion, Docket Entry No. 31-6, pp. 1-2 ~~ 2-3.
80

A to
also
Entry
D to

See Amended Ordinance §§ 7-233 (d)
70-234, Appendix A to
Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30-14, p. 6.
The Amended
Ordinance limits the number and location of commercial motor
vehicle accessible spots a business can create, but nothing in the
STAA or regulations indicate that a city must allow commercial
motor vehicles to park in every spot at every facility or deny
reasonable access.
The qualifier of "reasonable" indicates that
the state can impose reasonable limitations, as discussed at length
supra.
I

-34-

Amended Ordinance does not "require a permit" or impose a "blanket
restriction" on access, as Garza asserts. 81
The

STAA does

not

require

cities

like

La

Porte

to

grant

unfettered access to commercial motor vehicles to any restaurant,
gas station, or hotel within the city.

La Porte has a legitimate

interest

of

in protecting

infrastructure.

the

interests

its

citizens

and

its

La Porte's Amended Ordinance satisfies the STAA's

requirement that commercial motor vehicles have reasonable access
to facilities for food, fuel, rest, and repairs.
III.

Conclusions and Order

Because the summary judgment evidence shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact regarding reasonable access under
La Porte's Amended Ordinance,
before the court,

which is the only claim properly

summary judgment for La Porte is appropriate.

Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 30)
is therefore DENIED, and Defendant City of La Porte, Texas' Motion
for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 31) is GRANTED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 4th day of February, 2016.

SIM LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
81

See Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Entry No. 30, p. 7
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~~

6-7.