St. Julian v. City of Baytown Texas et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 16 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint, granting in part 7 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , denying 9 MOTION for Default Judgment against Keith Dougherty, L Watkins (Signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy K. Johnson) Parties notified.(sjones, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JEREMY ST. JULIAN,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF BAYTOWN, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-819
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court1 are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 7), Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 9), and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint (Doc.
16).
The court has considered the motions, the responses, and the
applicable law.
The court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
File a Supplemental Complaint.
For the reasons set forth below,
the court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and GRANTS
IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I.
Case Background
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against a municipality, its police department, its police chief,
and a police officer for violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights under federal law and for violations of his common-law
rights under state law.
1
The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned magistrate
judge for all proceedings, including trial and final judgment, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Docs. 10-12.
A.
Factual Background
On April 2, 2012, Defendant Luzette Watkins (“Watkins”), a
Baytown police officer, initiated a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s
vehicle.2 Plaintiff stopped and turned off his car’s engine.3 When
asked, he provided Defendant Watkins with his driver’s license and
proof of insurance.4
Defendant Watkins explained that she had
stopped Plaintiff for failing to signal when making a left turn.5
Defendant Watkins asked Plaintiff if the car was his, to which he
responded, “[N]o. [I]t was a space ship.”6
Officer Brown, whose first name is not in the complaint, then
approached Plaintiff and ordered him to get out of the vehicle.7
Plaintiff asked why, but Officer Brown did not answer the question,
instead repeating his order for Plaintiff to vacate the car.8
When
Plaintiff complied, Officer Brown escorted Plaintiff to the rear of
his car and searched him, ostensibly for weapons.9
Officer Brown
arrested Plaintiff, handcuffed him, and put him in the back of
2
Doc. 1, Pl.’s Original Compl. p. 2.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. pp. 2-3.
8
Id. p. 3.
9
Id.
2
Officer Brown’s police vehicle.10
The two officers proceeded to search Plaintiff’s vehicle
without
seeking
transported
Plaintiff’s
Plaintiff
to
permission.11
the
police
A
third
officer
station,
where
he
was
processed, issued an orange jumpsuit, and placed in an area with
other arrestees.12
Plaintiff remained there until his family
arrived to post bail.13
As he was being released, Plaintiff’s
personal items were returned, and he was given a citation for
“failing to signal with turn indicator.”14
The following day, Plaintiff received another citation in the
mail for failing to maintain automobile liability insurance.15
The
subsequent prosecution of the traffic citations was terminated in
Plaintiff’s
favor.16
Defendant
Keith
Dougherty
was
chief
of
Defendant Department.17
B.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff, pro se, filed this action on March 31, 2014.18
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. p. 5, Doc. 16, Pl.’s 1st Supplemental Compl. p. 1.
17
Doc. 1, Pl.’s Original Compl. p. 2.
18
See id. p. 1.
3
Defendants Dougherty and Watkins were served on May 19, 2014, and
Defendants City of Baytown, Texas, (“City”) and Baytown Police
Department (“Department”) were served on May 23, 2014.19 Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss on June 4, 2014.20
On June 23, 2014,
Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment against all of the
defendants.21
The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned, and
the case was transferred on June 24, 2014.22
to Plaintiff’s motion on June 26, 2014.23
Defendants responded
Plaintiff requested and
was granted an extension of time to respond to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss.24
The court set a new deadline of September 2, 2014,
for Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ motion.25
On August 28, 2014, the Clerk received a letter from Plaintiff
requesting that the three attached documents be filed:
a motion
for leave to file a supplemental complaint, the supplemental
19
See Docs. 3-6, Proof of Service Forms.
20
See Doc. 7, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss.
21
See Doc. 9, Pl.’s Mot. for Default J.
22
See Doc. 12, Order Transferring Case.
23
See Doc. 13, Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Default J.
24
See Doc. 14, Pl.’s Mot. for Enlargement of Time to File a Written
Resp. & Objs. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss; Doc. 15, Order Dated Aug. 19, 2014.
25
Doc. 15, Order Dated Aug. 19, 2014.
4
complaint, and a response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.26
Plaintiff did not indicate whether his motion for leave was opposed
or unopposed and did not include a certificate of conference.27
In
the motion, Plaintiff explained that he sought leave to supplement
“to advance claims apparent from the face of the complaint as the
supplemental
pleading.”28
facts
and
claims
are
connected
to
the
original
Defendants did not file a response.29
The court now addresses the two pending dispositive motions,
beginning with Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment.
II.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(a) allows for the
entry of default as follows: “When a party against whom a judgment
for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the
clerk must enter the party’s default.”
Plaintiff argues that Defendants were properly served in May
2014 but “wholly fail[ed] to file an answer or otherwise defend[]
or appear in this matter within twenty-one (21) days after being
26
See Doc. 16-1, Letter from Plaintiff to David Bradley Dated Aug. 22,
2014. The Clerk filed all of the documents under the same docket entry number.
See Doc. 16, Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File a Supplemental Compl., Pl.’s 1st
Supplemental Compl., & Pl.’s Written Resp. & Objections to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
(“Pl.’s Resp.”).
27
See Doc. 16, Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File a Supplemental Compl.
28
Doc. 16, Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File a Supplemental Compl. p. 1.
29
The response was due September 18, 2014. The Local Rules for the
Southern District of Texas state that the “[f]ailure to respond [to a motion]
will be taken as a representation of no opposition.” L.R. 7.4.
5
served.”30
Defendants respond that they timely filed a motion to
dismiss.
Defendants Dougherty and Watkins were served on May 19, 2014,
and Defendants City and Department were served on May 23, 2014.
Defendants filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss on June 4, 2014,
within sixteen days of the date on which Defendants Dougherty and
Watkins were served and within twelve days of the date on which
Defendants City and Department were served.
A motion filed under
Rule 12 alters the time required for the filing of an answer.
Rule 12(a)(4).
See
If the court denies the motion, the answer must be
served within fourteen days of the court’s action, or, if the court
allows the filing of a more definite statement, the answer must be
served within fourteen days of the filing of the more definite
statement.
Id.
Defendants appeared in this lawsuit and defended it by filing
a motion to dismiss within twenty-one days. Their actions complied
with the plain language of both Rule 55 and Rule 12.
Other courts
within the Fifth Circuit have reached the same conclusion.
See,
e.g., Clark v. Commercial State Bank, No. MO-00-CA-140, 2001 WL
685529, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2001)(citing 5A Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1346 (1990 & Supp. 2000)).
III.
30
Plaintiff’s motion has no merit.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Doc. 9, Pl.’s Mot. for Default J. p. 2 (emphasis omitted).
6
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of an action whenever the
complaint, on its face, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the court
should construe the allegations in the complaint favorably to the
pleader and accept as true all well-pleaded facts.
Harold H.
Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 803 n.44 (5th Cir.
2011)(quoting True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)).
A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations”
but must include sufficient facts to indicate the plausibility of
the claims asserted, raising the “right to relief above the
speculative level.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Plausibility means that the factual content “allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
provide
“more
than
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678.
labels
and
conclusions”
A plaintiff must
or
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
U.S. at 555.
“a
formulaic
Twombly, 550
In other words, the factual allegations must allow
for an inference of “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678.
Defendants move for dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims
against all Defendants for the following reasons: (1) all of
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Department should be dismissed
because it is not a separate legal entity from Defendant City; (2)
7
Plaintiff’s claims under state law against Defendants Dougherty and
Watkins should be dismissed pursuant to the election-of-remedies
provision of the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”);31 (3) Plaintiff’s
claims under state law against Defendant City should be dismissed
because they do not fall within the limited waiver of immunity in
the TTCA;32 (4) the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)
should be dismissed against Defendants Dougherty and Watkins in
their official capacities because those claims are the same as the
Section 1983 claim against Defendant City; (5) the Section 1983
claim against Defendant City should be dismissed because Plaintiff
failed
to
identify
an
unconstitutional
policy
or
custom
of
Defendant City and its relation to the alleged constitutional
violations; (6) the Section 1983 claim against Defendant Dougherty
in his individual capacity should be dismissed because he cannot be
held liable for a subordinate’s constitutional violations; and (7)
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims should be dismissed because the
allegations do not state a constitutional violation.
A.
Claims Against Defendant Department
Texas law determines whether Defendant Department has the
capacity to sue or be sued.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3); Darby v.
Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991).
A
municipal police department can be sued only if a city explicitly
31
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106.
32
See id. at § 101.021.
8
granted its police department the authority to sue or be sued.
Crull v. City of New Braunfels, Tex., 267 F. App’x 338, 341 (5th
Cir. 2008)(unpublished)(quoting Darby, 939 F.2d at 313).
Defendants contend that Defendant Department is not a separate
legal entity from Defendant City and lacks the capacity to be sued.
Plaintiff supplemented his complaint to add the allegation that
Defendant City’s charter designated Defendant Department “as an
independ[e]nt entity capable of suing and being sued.”33
Plaintiff is incorrect.
Defendant City’s Charter reserves to
itself the authority to sue and be sued.
Charter art. 1, § 3.34
See Baytown, Tex.,
The Charter contains no provision granting
Defendant Department the capacity to sue and be sued.
See,
generally, Baytown, Tex., Charter.
Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain claims against Defendant
Department.
B.
Tort Claims Under State Law
A trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over suits
against certain local governmental units unless the State consents
to suit.
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 224 (Tex. 2004).
governmental units.
33
The TTCA outlines the tort liability of
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§
Doc. 16, Pl.’s 1st Supplemental Compl. p. 2.
34
Defendant
City’s
Charter
can
be
found
online
at
https://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10022&stateId=43&stateName=Te
xas.
9
101.001-101.109.
Defendants raise two arguments for dismissal in their favor on
the state-law claims.
1.
Defendants Dougherty and Watkins
The TTCA states, “If a suit is filed under this chapter
against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the
employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion
by the governmental unit.”
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
101.106(e).
Plaintiff’s complaint raised state-law claims of false arrest,
false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against Defendant
City and the individual defendants.35
As Plaintiff asserted the
claims against both the governmental unit and its employees and
Defendant City moved for dismissal, Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code § 101.106(e) (“Section 101.106(e)”) requires the
dismissal of all of these claims against Defendants Dougherty and
Watkins.36
35
See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253
See Doc. 1, Pl.’s Original Complaint p. 5.
36
Plaintiff argues that, because his claims against Defendant City are
excluded from the TTCA’s waiver, the claims against Defendants Dougherty and
Watkins should not be dismissed. Doc. 16, Pl.’s Resp. p. 4 (citing Meroney v.
City of Colleyville, 200 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. granted),
vacated and remanded by agreement). The case cited by Plaintiff is no longer
good law. The 2008 decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Mission Consol.
Indep. Sch. Dist. is the controlling law.
Plaintiff also contends that Defendants’ motion lacks the assertion as to
who is moving for the dismissal of the individual defendants; thus, he asserts,
it is the individual defendants themselves who are moving, which takes the claims
against them out of the realm of Section 101.106(e). Id. pp. 4-5. This is a
frivolous argument.
10
S.W.3d 653, 658-59 (Tex. 2008)(confirming that the bar is not
limited to cases in which the claims fit within the TTCA’s waiver
but
also
covers
those,
such
as
intentional
torts,
that
are
expressly excluded from the statute’s scope).
2.
Defendant City
A Texas city is a “governmental unit” covered by the TTCA.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001(3)(B).
Generally, the
TTCA waives immunity for property damage, personal injury and death
caused by wrongful acts of employees if arising from the use of a
motor-driven vehicle or from a condition or use of tangible
personal or real property.
101.021.
out
of
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
No waiver of immunity is available for claims “arising
assault,
intentional tort.”
battery,
false
imprisonment,
or
any
other
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057.
Plaintiff alleged state-law claims of false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution37 against Defendant City.
None of these claims fit within the TTCA’s waiver of immunity.38
37
Defendants include negligent training, negligent supervision, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress in their list of state-law claims
pled by Plaintiff. The court does not read Plaintiff’s pleading to allege those
causes of action. To the extent Plaintiff intended to allege negligent training
and negligent supervision, those claims would not fit within Defendant City’s
waiver of governmental immunity. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44
S.W.3d 575, 580-81 (Tex. 2001)(stating that claims of negligent training and
negligent supervision do not involve the condition or use of tangible personal
or real property). Intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) is an
intentional tort not subject to the waiver of governmental immunity. See Stinson
v. Fontenot, 435 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2014)(including IIED in a list of intentional
torts).
38
Plaintiff conceded as much in his response stating that “his claims
against the City of Baytown [are] excluded from the Texas Tort Claims Act’s
waiver” and that his “claims against the City of Baytown are nto [sic] ones[]
11
False
imprisonment
is
specifically
excepted from the general waiver.
Ann. § 101.057.
listed
in
the
statute
as
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
False arrest and malicious prosecution are also
intentional torts subject to governmental immunity. See Stinson v.
Fontenot, 435 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2014)(including “wrongful arrest”
and malicious prosecution in a list of intentional torts).
The TTCA requires dismissal of all of the state-law claims
against Defendant City.
C.
Constitutional Claims Under Section 1983
A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under Section
198339 for the deprivation of civil rights by establishing: (1) a
violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2)
that the violation was committed by an individual acting under the
color of state law.
Doe v. Rains Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d
1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995).
The statute creates no substantive
firmly rooted within the provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act.” Doc. 16,
Pl.’s Resp. 5.
However, Plaintiff argues that the state-law claims against Defendant City
should not be dismissed because Defendant City is subject to liability pursuant
to Section 1983. Doc. 16, Pl.’s Resp. pp. 2, 5-6. Plaintiff misapprehends the
law, confusing the waiver of immunity pursuant to Section 1983 with the TTCA’s
waiver of immunity.
39
The provision reads, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
12
rights but only provides remedies for deprivations of rights
created under federal law.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94
(1989).
In his Original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged violations of his
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures,
specifically
referring
to
false
arrest
and
false
imprisonment.40 In his supplemental pleading, he provided a partial
clarification:
Defendant Luzette Watkins violated the Plaintiff’s Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution to be free from unlawful and illegal search
and seizure[] when Defendant Luzette Watkins instituted
and conducted a search of the Plaintiff’s vehicle without
the Plaintiff’s consent, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion that an offense had been committed or that the
Plaintiff possessed contraband or items prohibited by
both State and Federal law.41
The Fourth Amendment, applied to state actors through the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
A
temporary traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of
40
See Doc. 1, Pl.’s Original Compl. pp. 4, 5. Plaintiff also mentioned
malicious prosecution in his original complaint but clearly pursuant only to
state law. See id. p. 5. However, Plaintiff advances malicious prosecution as
a constitutional claim in his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Doc.
16, Pl.’s Resp. p. 6. The court notes that the Fifth Circuit does not recognize
an independent federal cause of action for malicious prosecution. Deville v.
Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 169 (5th Cir. 2009)(citing Castellano v. Fragozo, 352
F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 2003)). Rather, violations of specific constitutional
rights occurring in relation to a “malicious prosecution” can be redressed
pursuant to those individual constitutional protections and not under the broad
category of malicious prosecution. Deville, 567 F.3d at 169.
41
Doc. 16, Pl.’s 1st Supplemental Compl. p. 2.
13
the Fourth Amendment and, thus, must meet the constitutional
imperative that it be reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 809-10 (1996). Generally, a traffic stop is reasonable if the
officer has “probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred.”
Id. at 810.
Probable cause is also the linchpin of
constitutionality for searches and arrests incident to traffic
stops.
See id. at 817 (“It is of course true that in principle
every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a ‘reasonableness’
determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.
With
rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that
balancing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon
probable cause.”).
The court understands Plaintiff’s complaint to raise three
constitutional violations, all based on the lack of probable
cause.42
He alleged that the officers did not have probable cause
to stop Plaintiff, to search his car, or to arrest him. Defendants
raise several arguments for dismissal in their favor on the Section
1983 claims.
1.
Defendants Dougherty and Watkins in Their Official
Capacities
42
In his response, Plaintiff clarified that his allegations do not
concern whether the officers had constitutional authority to arrest Plaintiff for
a minor criminal offense without a warrant. See Doc. 16, Pl.’s Resp. p. 9. That
issue was resolved by the Supreme Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318, 354 (2001), in favor of the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest
“[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed
even a very minor criminal offense in his presence.” To the contrary, Plaintiff
explained, in this instance, the officers took action when “there was no offense
committed at all.” Doc. 16, Pl.’s Resp. p. 9.
14
In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against a government actor in his
official capacity or against a governmental entity, the plaintiff
is seeking to recover compensatory damages from the government body
itself,
and
government.
the
suit
should
be
treated
as
one
against
the
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Goodman v.
Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009).
In other words,
“[t]he real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the
governmental entity and not the named official.”
Hafer, 502 U.S.
at 25.
Here, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendants Dougherty
and Watkins in their official capacities are actually claims
against Defendant City.
Because Plaintiff asserted identical
claims against Defendant City, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against
the two officers in their official capacities are unnecessary.
2.
Defendant City
A city may be held liable under Section 1983 only for its own
illegal acts, not pursuant to a theory of vicarious liability.
Connick v. Thompson,
succeed
on
a
claim
U.S.
under
, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011).
Section
1983,
the
plaintiff
To
must
demonstrate that the city “had some inadequate custom or policy
that acted as the moving force behind a constitutional violation.”
Forgan
v.
Howard
Cnty.,
Tex.,
494
F.3d
518,
522
(5th
Cir.
2007)(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978)); see also Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359.
15
“Official
municipal
policy
includes
the
decisions
of
a
government’s
lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359.
Courts have recognized that, under limited circumstances, the
failure to train or to supervise its employees may give rise to
local-government liability under Section 1983.
See id.; Zarnow v.
City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 169, 170 (5th Cir. 2010).
In failure-to-train cases, a plaintiff must prove the inadequacy of
the procedures, the policymaker’s deliberate indifference, and
causation.
Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 170.
A local government can be held liable only when its failure to
train or to supervise amounted to deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of its citizens. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359
(quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
In order to show deliberate indifference by the municipality, a
plaintiff must generally show a pattern of similar constitutional
violations by untrained employees.43
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359.
Where the question is not whether the officers received any
training
in
the
constitutional
requirements,
but
whether
the
43
In extreme circumstances, a single act by an officer may form the
basis for liability if “the ‘highly predictable’ consequence of a failure to
train would result in the specific injury suffered[] and . . . the failure to
train represented the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.”
Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295-96 (quoting Brown v. Bryan
Cnty., Okla., 219 F.3d 450, 461 (5th Cir. 2000), but distinguishing Brown as a
case in which the deputy received no training at all).
16
officers received adequate training, the plaintiff cannot rely on
proof that additional training would have created a better officer
or would have reduced the likelihood of a constitutional violation
but must prove that the “officers were so untrained as to be
unaware” of constitutional limitations. Pineda v. City of Houston,
291 F.3d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 2002); see also City of Canton, Ohio,
489
U.S.
at
391.
The
Supreme
Court
has
cautioned,
“A
municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its
most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”
Connick,
131 S. Ct. at 1359.
Here, Plaintiff alleged, based solely on the facts of his stop
and arrest, that Defendant City failed to “adequately and properly
instruct [and] train” officers “on the applicable standard of law”
regarding: (1) probable cause for arrest under the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure Ann. arts. 14.01, 14.03, and 14.0444 and the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) false imprisonment; (3)
malicious
prosecution;
Section 1983.45
and
(4)
civil
rights
violations
under
Except for malicious prosecution because it does
not implicate constitutional concerns on its own, Plaintiff’s
allegations on the training deficiencies are sufficient to meet his
burden of pleading municipal liability.
Plaintiff may be able to
prove that deficiencies in these areas of training could lead to
44
These provisions cover the authority of peace officers to make
arrests under various circumstances.
45
Doc. 1, Pl.’s Original Compl. p. 3.
17
violations of the types alleged and that Defendant City was
deliberately indifferent to that risk.
Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant City provided inadequate
supervision and failed “to adopt reasonable internal policies and
procedures to ensure that only specific violations of State law
under statutory provisions would warrant the arrest, detention, and
prosecution of a Citizen of the United States.”46
Plaintiff
provided no factual support for either of these alleged policies,
failing to identify what type(s) of policies were missing or in
what
way
supervision
was
deficient
that
would
have
impacted
Plaintiff’s encounter with Defendant City’s officers.47
Finally, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant City “ratified the
actions, omissions, and conduct of its agents, servants, employees
and representatives.”48 The complaint contained no facts suggesting
ratification of the officers’ conduct.
46
Plaintiff alleged that the
Id.
47
A failure to adopt a policy may lead to municipal liability but only
if it is deliberately indifferent, that is, “when it is obvious that the likely
consequences of not adopting a policy will be a deprivation of constitutional
rights.” Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)(citing City
of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390(discussing failure-to-train claims)). Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding Defendant City’s failure to adopt policies refer to state
statutes and do not suggest that the absence of such policies likely would give
rise to a violation of federal rights. See Doc. 1, Pl.’s Original Compl. p. 3.
48
Id. p. 4. Plaintiff states, in his response, that the policy-making
authority was delegated to Defendant Dougherty but identifies no policy or
pronouncement by Defendant Dougherty that was the moving force behind Plaintiff’s
alleged constitutional violations. See Doc. 16, Pl.’s Resp. p. 8.
18
proceedings were terminated in his favor.49
Plaintiff’s allegations of inadequate supervision, failure to
adopt policies, and ratification do not state policies on which
relief against Defendant City may be based.
See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to
state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face”).
3.
Defendant Dougherty in His Individual Capacity
Supervisors
cannot
vicarious liability.
be
held
liable
under
any
theory
of
Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287,
292 (5th Cir. 2005)(quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d
447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)).
An official may be found liable under
Section 1983 for a failure to supervise or train when the plaintiff
can show that the supervisor failed to supervise or train the
subordinate, that failure caused the violation of the plaintiff’s
rights, and that failure amounts to deliberate indifference.
Goodman, 571 F.3d at 395.
municipal liability.
liability
to
a
The standard is based on that for
See id. (applying standards for municipal
failure
to
train
and
supervise
against
an
individual); Roberts, 397 F.3d at 293 (explicitly stating that the
standard for failure-to-train allegations against supervisors is
based on that for municipal liability).
To show that an official acted with deliberate indifference,
49
In
Plaintiff were
Pl.’s Resp. p.
the absence of
his response, Plaintiff states that “[t]he charges against the
dismissed and/or terminated in favor of the Plaintiff.” Doc. 16,
9. If the charges were dismissed, that would be some evidence of
ratification.
19
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official was aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists” and that he drew that inference.
F.3d at 395.
Goodman 571
As with municipal liability, the plaintiff generally
must demonstrate a pattern of violations in order to establish
deliberate indifference.
Id.
Against Defendant Dougherty, the claims are that he failed to
supervise and train the officers.50
Plaintiff provided no factual
detail specific to Defendant Dougherty’s supervisory actions, which
is fatal to the claim that he is liable for the failure to
supervise.
Cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring “more than
labels and conclusions”).
On the other hand, Plaintiff provided more detail on Defendant
Dougherty’s alleged failure to train, listing the deficiencies
addressed in the prior section on municipal liability:
probable
cause
for
arrest
under
the
Texas
Code
of
(1)
Criminal
Procedure and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) false
imprisonment; and (3) civil rights violations under Section 1983.51
If, in fact, Defendant Dougherty failed to train officers of
50
In his response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff frames Defendant
Dougherty’s responsibility in these terms: “failure to intervene and stop such
conduct of Defendant Luzette Watkins, or properly train was an act of
supervision.” Doc. 16, Pl.’s Resp. p. 8. The allegation about the failure to
“intervene and stop” Defendant Watkins is not in Plaintiff’s complaint and is not
supported by anything in Plaintiff’s complaint. Therefore, it is not before the
court.
51
Doc. 1, Pl.’s Original Compl. p. 3. The court omitted maliciousprosecution training from this list of alleged training deficiencies for the
reasons explained in the section on municipal liability.
20
Defendant Department in these areas, Plaintiff may be able to show
that the failure to train caused the constitutional violations
alleged
and
that
Defendant
Dougherty
acted
with
deliberate
indifference to that risk.
The constitutional claim against Defendant Dougherty for
failure to train survives the pleading stage.
4.
To
capacity
Defendant Watkins in Her Individual Capacity
hold
a
under
government
Section
official
1983,
a
liable
plaintiff
in
must
her
individual
allege
facts
sufficient to show that the official violated the Constitution
through her own individual actions.
is,
either
the
officer
was
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
personally
involved
in
That
the
constitutional violation or his acts are causally connected to the
constitutional violation alleged.
Roberts, 397 F.3d at 291-92
(quoting Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Reading all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the court must
do, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Watkins was the officer who
initially stopped Plaintiff and that she participated in the search
of his car and (by inference only) the decision to arrest him.
Plaintiff further alleged that he did not commit any traffic
violation and that he provided Defendant Watkins with a copy of
valid automobile insurance.
He described no actions in his
complaint that appear to have given the officers probable cause to
stop him, search his car, or arrest him.
21
The constitutional claims against Defendant Watkins in her
individual capacity survive the pleading stage of litigation.
IV.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion
for
Default
Judgment
and
GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
IN
PART
AND
DENIES
IN
PART
The remaining claims are illegal
search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
against Defendant City based on the failure to train in the areas
of probable cause, false imprisonment, and civil rights violations;
against Defendant Dougherty for the failure to train in the same
three areas; and against Defendant Watkins for stopping, searching,
and arresting Plaintiff without probable cause.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas, this 14th day of October, 2014.
______________________________
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
22
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