Lotte Chemical Titan (M) Sendirian Berhad v. Wilder
Filing
20
OPINION AND ORDER denying 17 Motion for Reconsideration. (Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified.(rhawkins, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LOTTE CHEMICAL TITAN (M)
SENDIRIAN BERHAD f/k/a Titan
Petchem (M) Sendirian Berhad,
Plaintiff,
VS.
WARREN WILLIAM WILDER,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-1116
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court in the above referenced cause,
remanded to the 157th Judicial District Court in Harris County, is
Defendant William Wilder’s (“Wilder’s”) motion for reconsideration
(instrument #17) of the Court’s award of fees and costs under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c)1 to Lotte Chemical Titan (M) Sendirian Berhad
(“Titan”)
in
its
Opinion
and
Order
of
Remand
(#14)
or,
alternatively, response to attorney fee affidavit of Phillip B.
Dye, Jr. (#16) in support of Titan’s request for fees and costs.
Wilder maintains that he acted in good faith and had a
reasonable basis for the removal.
He maintains that he did not
remove this suit to delay or prolong the litigation or impose costs
on Titan, but to bring all the disputes on a single contract into
a single forum.
1
Section 1447(c) provides, “An order remanding the case may
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”
-1-
After reviewing the Opinion and Order of Remand (#14) and the
parties’ briefing on the award of costs and fees, the Court stands
by its earlier determination that the award is appropriate under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) because Wilder lacked a reasonable basis for
removal under Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34
(2002), and Energy Management Services, LLC v. City of Alexandria,
739 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 2014).
Thus the Court denies Wilder’s
motion for reconsideration and addresses the merits of Titan’s
request for fees and costs.
Jurisdiction Post-Remand
This Court retains jurisdiction over an award of fees and
costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) despite having remanded this suit.
“[T]he Supreme Court in Cooter v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396
. . . (1990)[,] held that a court which is divested of jurisdiction
over the merits of a matter does not lose jurisdiction on any
collateral issues of that matter, such as awarding of attorney
fees. Furthermore, other circuit courts have found that a district
court is not divested of jurisdiction to award attorney fees and
costs subsequent to the certification of a remand of a § 1447(c)
removal.” Coward v. AC and S., Inc., 91 Fed. Appx. 919, 921-22 (5th
Cir. Jan. 14, 2004)(citing other appellate cases). See also Bryant
v. Brit, 420 F.3d 161, 164-66 (2d Cir. 2005)(holding that a
district court has jurisdiction to resolve a motion for fees and
costs under § 1447(c) after a remand order has issued)(noting that
-2-
“[a]ll of the other circuits that have addressed the question have
reached the same conclusions” and cases cited).
Standard of Review
The United States Supreme Court established the standard for
awarding
fees
under
§
1447(c)
in
Marin
v.
Franklin
Capital
Corporation, 546 U.S. 132, 140-41 (2005):
The process of removing a case to federal court and then
having it remanded back to state court delays resolution
of the case, imposes additional costs on both parties,
and wastes judicial resources. Assessing costs and fees
on remand reduces the attractiveness of removal as a
method for delaying litigation and imposing costs on the
plaintiff. The appropriate test for awarding fees under
§ 1447(c) should recognize the desire to deter removals
sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and
imposing costs on the opposing party, while not
undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants
a right to remove as a general matter, when the statutory
criteria are satisfied.
In light of these “‘large objectives,’” . . . the
standard for awarding fees should turn on the
reasonableness of the removal.
Absent unusual
circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under §
1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.
Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists,
fees should be denied. See, e.g., Hornbuckle [v. State
Farm Lloyds, 385 F.3d 538, 541 (5th Cir. 2004)]; Valdes
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir.
2000). In applying this rule, district courts retain
discretion to consider whether unusual circumstances
warrant a departure from the rule in a given case. For
instance, a plaintiff’s delay in seeking remand or
failure to disclose facts necessary to determine
jurisdiction may affect the decision to award attorney’s
fees. When a court exercises discretion in this manner,
however, its reasons for departing from the general rule
should be “faithful to the purposes” of awarding fees
under § 1447(c).
Id., cited for this proposition, American Airlines, Inc. v. Sabre,
-3-
Inc., 694 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 2012).
“There is no automatic entitlement to an award of fees.
Indeed, the clear language of [§ 1447(c)] makes such an award
discretionary.” Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 292
(5th Cir. 2000).
A defendant’s subjective good faith belief that the removal
was proper is insufficient to demonstrate that a district court
abused its discretion in awarding fees under § 1447(c).
American
Airlines, 694 F.3d at 542 n.2, citing Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000)(“To be sure, the district
court may award fees even if removal is made in subjective good
faith.”).
An award under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is limited to those costs
and fees “incurred as a result of removal.”
The Fifth Circuit has
construed the statute as limiting the amount of the award to “fees
and costs incurred in federal court that would not have been
incurred had the case remained in state court.”
Prod. Co., 111 F.3d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1997).
Avitts v. Amoco
“By contrast, ordinary
litigation expenses that would have been incurred had the action
remained in state court are not recoverable because such expenses
are not incurred as a result of the removal.”
Id.
Applicable Law
The Fifth Circuit uses the “lodestar” method to determine what
constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee for an award of fees.
-4-
The
lodestar
is
calculated
by
multiplying
the
number
of
hours
reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate in the community
for such legal services rendered by attorneys of comparable skill,
experience, and reputation for the same type of work.
Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d
927, 936, vacated in part on other grounds, 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.
1990)(vacating its own reversal of district court’s enhancement of
the hourly rate for case undesirability and affirming as reasonable
that enhancement to attract qualified counsel); Heidtman v. County
of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1039, 1043 (5th Cir. 1999).
A reasonable
hourly rate should be in accord with rates “prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skill, experience and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-96 n.11.
“A reasonable hourly rate is determined with reference to the
prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar
work. . . . While the hourly rate must be ‘adequate to attract
competent counsel,’ the ‘measure is not the rates which lions at
the bar may command.’”
Coleman v. Houston Independent School
District, 202 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1999)(Table)(available on Westlaw),
citing Leroy v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 1068, 1079 (5th Cir.
1990).
The relevant legal community is the one in which the
district court sits, no matter how much of the work is done
elsewhere. Green v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 284
F.3d
642,
662
(5th
Cir.
2002),
-5-
abrogated
on
other
grounds,
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
In
addition to the community rate, the district court must also
consider the attorneys’ regular rates. Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 1995). There is a strong
presumption that the lodestar is a reasonable fee. Walker v. Dept.
of HUD, 99 F.3d 761, 771 (5th Cir. 1996).
To establish the reasonableness of a requested rate, the fee
applicant should produce satisfactory evidence beyond his own
affidavit
“that
the
requested
rates
are
in
line
with
those
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum, 465
U.S. at 896 n.11.
Generally
in the Fifth Circuit the
determination of a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys in a
particular
community
is
established
by
affidavits
of
other
attorneys of similar caliber practicing in that community. Watkins
v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1993); Tollett v. City of
Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002). “The evidence to support
an hourly rate entails more than an affidavit of the attorney
performing the work but must also address the rates actually billed
and paid in similar lawsuits.”
Watkins v. Input/Output, Inc., 531
F. Supp. 2d 777, 784 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
Thus a fee applicant may
demonstrate the reasonableness of his requested fee by pointing out
to the court other fee awards in the same district.
Wheeler v.
Mental Health & Mental Retardation Auth. of Harris County, 752 F.2d
-6-
1063, 1073 (5th Cir. 1985); Richardson v. Tex-Tube Co., 843 F. Supp.
2d 699, 709 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
The court may exercise its own
expertise and judgment in making an independent valuation of
appropriate attorney’s fees. Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Commissioners of
Mobil County, 526 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1976).
Compensable hours, reasonably spent, are determined from the
attorney’s time records.
(1983).
Usually
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434
courts
require
the
applicant
to
provide
contemporaneous time or billing records or other documentation
which the district court must examine to discern which hours are
compensable and which are not.
Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v.
Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 516 U.S. 862
(1995).
Counsel must “exclude from a fee request hours that are
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary . . . .”
Id.
The
fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the hours claimed
were reasonably expended.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
See also
Saizan v. Delta Concrete Products Company, 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th
Cir. 2006)(“[P]laintiffs seeking attorney’s fees are charged with
the burden of showing the reasonableness of the hours billed and,
therefore, are also charged with proving they exercised billing
judgment.
Billing judgment requires documentation of the hours
charged and of the hours written off as unproductive, excessive, or
redundant.
The proper remedy for omitting evidence of billing
judgment does not include a denial of fees, but rather a reduction
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of the award by a percentage intended to substitute for the
exercise of billing judgment. [footnotes omitted]”).
See also
Louisiana Power, 50 F.3d at 324-25 (“[T]he documentation must be
sufficient for the court to verify that the applicant has met its
burden. . . . [A] district court may reduce the number of
hours
awarded if the documentation is vague or incomplete. . . . Failing
to provide contemporaneous billing statements does not preclude an
award of fees per se as long as the evidence produced is adequate
to determine reasonable hours.”); Saizan, 488 F.3d at 799, 800
(billing judgment requires documentation of the hours charged and
of the hours written off as duplicative, unproductive or excessive;
finding that the district court did not commit clear error in
finding a failure by the applicant to produce evidence of billing
judgment nor abuse its discretion by imposing a ten percent
reduction in the lodestar because of that failure).
Furthermore, “[i]f more than one attorney is involved, the
possibility
of
duplication
of
effort
along
utilization of time should be scrutinized.
with
the
proper
The time of two or
three lawyers in a courtroom or conference when one would do may be
obviously discounted.”
Abrams, 805 F.2d at 535.
“[H]ours . . .
spent in the passive role of an observer while other attorneys
perform” are usually not billable. Flowers v. Wiley, 675 F.2d 704,
705 (5th Cir. 1982), quoted in Coleman, 202 F.3d at 264 (Table;
available
on
Westlaw).
“Litigants
-8-
take
their
chances
when
submitting fee applications” without adequate information for the
court to determine the reasonableness of the hours expended or with
vaguely
described
tasks
such
“correspondence,” or documents.
as
“review
pleadings,”
Louisiana Power, 50 F.3d at 327.
The hourly rate for attorneys should not be applied to
clerical, secretarial or administrative work, since these are part
of office overhead.
Reyes v. Spur Discount Store No. 4, Civ. A.
No. 07-2717, 2007 WL 2571905, *3 & nn.19-20 (E.D. La. Aug. 31,
2007); Abrams, 805 F.2d at 536 (court should consider whether the
work performed was “‘legal work in the strict sense,’ or was merely
clerical work that happened to be performed by a lawyer.”), quoting
Johnson
v.
Georgia
“”[Investigation,
Highway
clerical
Express,
work,
488
compilation
F.2d
of
at
717.
facts
and
statistics and other work which can often be accomplished by nonlawyers, but which a lawyer may do because he has no other help
available . . . may command a lesser rate.
enhanced just because a lawyer does it.”
Its dollar value is not
Id. at 535.
Because Titan does not seek fees enhanced or reduced by any of
the twelve Johnson factors,2 the Court does not address them.
Titan’s Request for an Award of Fees and Costs (#16)
The affidavit (#16) of Phillip B. Dye, Jr., a partner at
2
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds, Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
-9-
Vinson & Elkins and lead counsel for Titan, in support of Titan’s
request for fees and costs, states that he and junior associate
Liane Noble seek a total award of $27,345.28: $26,512.50 for fees
and $832.78 for costs. Mr. Dye represents that he has discounted
his usual hourly rate (which he does not reveal) to $700 and worked
on the removal/remand for 13.5 hours, for a total request of
$9,450, while Ms. Noble has discounted her regular hourly rate (not
identified) to $390 per hour and worked for 43.75 hours, for a
total request of $26,512.50. Mr. Dye provides a biography for both
(Exhibit A).
He further represents that he “exercised [his]
judgment to discount further the fees charged to [Titan], and
billed the client what [he] believed contemporaneously to be
reasonable charges for the work performed.” Ex. F, copy of invoice
to Titan for “fees for services performed by attorneys at Vinson &
Elkins on this case through April 30, 2014, with redactions of
information that would disclose the substance of attorney client
communications and attorney thought processes and . . . for time
billed that did not result from Wilder’s removal of the action.”
#16 at p.7.
He also submits a billing log, Ex. G, similarly
redacted, for services through June 4, 2014.
Wilder’s Response (#17)
As noted in the Court’s Opinion and Order (#14 at pp. 1-2),
Wilder first filed a suit in federal court styled William Wilder v.
Titan Chemical Corp. BHD and Lotte Chemical Titan (M) Sendirian
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Berhard
f/k/a
Titan
Petchem
(M)
Sendirian
Berhard
(“Titan
Petchem”), Civ. A. No. H-13-1277, which, after the recusal of two
judges, was re-assigned to the Honorable Kenneth M. Hoyt.
It
alleged breach of an employment contract entered into on July 10,
2008 by Wilder and Titan Petchem based on the purported failure of
Titan Petchem to pay Wilder compensation owed to him.
In the
instant action, removed from state court to the undersigned judge’s
court, although arising out of the same employment contract, Titan
Petchem
seeks
to
enforce
a
Malaysian
court
default
judgment
obtained on December 6, 2013 against Wilder under the Texas version
of the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act for
Wilder’s failure to make a required tax equalization payment to
Titan Petchem in 2010.3
Wilder’s Response (#17)
Wilder complains that more than $7,000 of Dye’s requested
attorney’s fees in this case relate to work in Judge Hoyt’s related
case, which, Dye claims, forced Titan to expend legal services
relating not only the removal in this case, but on issues of
consolidation and timing of court decisions on the two courts’
dockets before the instant case was remanded.
The requested costs
are for computer legal research and courier services.
Wilder objects to the requested $7,000 in fees that Titan
3
Wilder claims that he was never served nor did he receive
notice of that action before judgment issued in the Malaysian
case.
-11-
purportedly incurred in Judge Hoyt’s case, specifically (1) for
Titan’s own motion to hold in abeyance (#48 in H-13-1277) Wilder’s
motion to consolidate Judge Hoyt’s action and this case (#45 in H13-1277) until this Court resolved Titan’s motion to remand and (2)
for Titan’s response in opposition (#51 in H-13-1277) to the motion
to consolidate.
He emphasizes that Titan has not cited any
authority for an award of costs and fees incurred in a separate
federal litigation nor shown that such an award would be just or
reasonable.
Further, Wilder notes that in its motion to remand,
Titan only asked for “reasonable fees and costs incurred in filing
this motion for remand.”
#5, p. 11.
Wilder also argues that under § 1447(c) Titan cannot recover
costs or fees incurred in briefing related to the merits of the
parties’ disputes that are unrelated to the issues raised by
removal and remand or consolidation.
De Jongh v. State Farm
Lloyds, No. 13-20174, 2014 WL 644564, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 20,
2014)(plaintiff cannot recover ordinary litigation expenses that
would have been incurred had the action remained in state court);
Faust v. Menard, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-425 JM, 2014 WL 1259963, at *1
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2014)(disallowing time spent preparing response
to motion to dismiss and researching Rule 11 sanctions, as not
incurred in relation to removal).
Specifically, in Judge Hoyt’s
case substantial time was spent on the merits of the parties’
disputes and on enforcement of the Malaysian judgment on the
-12-
grounds that Wilder knew or should have known about the litigation,
matters which are not necessary to the Court’s remand decision and
are duplicative of other filings.
#17, Ex. A, Titan’s Response at
pp. 3-9 (approximately five pages of Titan’s 17-page response dealt
with what Wilder knew or should have known about the Malaysian
case).
Wilder accuses Titan of cutting and pasting this very
briefing with a few minor adjustments into s substantive response
to Wilder’s motion to dismiss for non-recognition (Ex. B; #10 at
pp. 4-8) and, following remand, Titan filed a revised, shortened
version of it in state court (Ex. B, First Am. Notice of Filing &
Mtn. for Recognition, pp. 3-5).
Wilder further contends that the
exhibits to Titan’s response to Wilder’s motion to consolidate
relate to service of process in the Malaysian action and to
recognition of the Malaysian judgment.
Consol., at Dye Decl. and Exs. 1-9.
Ex. A, Response to Mtn. to
He claims that Dye filed the
same documents in response to Wilder’s motion to dismiss or for
non-recognition
and
refiled
an
abbreviated
version
of
Dye’s
Declaration in state court as an attachment to its state court
First Amended Notice of Filing and Motion for Recognition of
Foreign Country Judgment.
Ex. B.
These documents relate to the
substantive merits of Titan’s enforcement action, insists Wilder.
Wilder also claims that Titan submitted impermissible block
billing
and failed to segregate the fees attributable to work on
the two actions.
He also charges that Titan fails to show that it
-13-
exercised business judgment in its documentation, i.e., showing
those hours charged and those hours written off as unproductive,
excessive,
or
redundant.
Instead
Titan
provided
a
single,
generalized time figure per day, which included tasks related to
both the consolidation dispute in Judge Hoyt’s court and the remand
dispute in this Court. Now Titan can no longer accurately identify
how much of each day was attributable to each motion, as evidenced
in Titan’s charge for two hours for a 17-page response to the
motion to consolidate, yet over 12 hours for a two-and-one-halfpage motion for abeyance and a three-page reply in support of, and
duplicative of, the original motion and the remand motion. Because
of the block billing, Titan had to retroactively redact parts of
some entries for which it seeks compensation-–and Titan decided
what degree of “adjustment” should be made for each entry without
disclosing the basis for that determination.
See Ex. F to Dye
Affid., #16-6, p. 6 (redacting .25 hours from both a 1.5 hour
charge on 4/28/14 and a 2-hour charge on f/30/14; Ex. G to Dye
Affid. (#16-7) p. 2 (redacting .25 from a .5-hour charge on 5/07/14
and 1 hour from a 1.5-hour charge on 5/19/14.
Thus it is not
possible to determine how much of their time was duplicative or how
much related to the underlying litigation rather than to the
removal.
Wilder also objects that Titan’s hourly rates are excessive
for the Houston area.
According to the State Bar of Texas,
-14-
Department of Research & Analysis, Excerpts from 2011 Hourly Fact
Sheet, the median hourly rate for an attorney with more than
twenty-five years of experience is $281, and for a one specializing
in commercial litigator, $270. A junior attorney with three to six
years of experience in the Houston area charges a median fee of
$227.
Id.
For an attorney with three to six years of experience,
such as Ms. Noble, the median hourly rate was $227.
Titan’s Response (#18)
Maintaining that Titan is entitled to fees and costs incurred
as a result of removal even if they occurred in related litigation,
Titan insists that in Judge Hoyt’s case its briefing on remand,
consolidation or abeyance discussed the underlying facts of the
case to provide background or context and to refute factual
allegations made by Wilder and it was required as a direct result
of the improper removal.
Wilder’s challenge to the documents
appended to Dye’s Declaration and Titan’s alleged failure to
segregate fees in the two actions is not supported by any authority
requiring such specificity.
The Court ordered Titan to file an
affidavit that complied with Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express
and any relevant records, as it did.
As for Wilder’s contention that Titan was charging excessive
fees,
Titan
has
provided
information
about
the
education,
experience and background of the two attorneys working on the case,
and the Court has the discretion under Johnson to decide whether
-15-
the rate requested is reasonable.
Wilder’s Reply (#19)
Wilder emphasizes that Titan has not disputed that Titan
sought more than $7,000 in fees incurred in Judge Hoyt’s action
(including over twelve hours relating to Titan’s motion to hold
Wilder’s motion to consolidate in abeyance), that Titan cannot cite
any
authority
supporting
its
contention
that
fees
and
costs
incurred in a separate litigation can be awarded under § 1447(c),
that Titan failed to segregate the fees in the two actions or
filings and issues raised in those filings, and that the hourly
rates the two attorneys charge are excessive for the fees usually
and customarily charge in the Houston area.
Titan does not try to nor could it successfully argue that
Wilder’s
purported
knowledge
of
the
Malaysian
litigation
was
relevant to any issue in the motion to remand or the motion to
consolidate.
The challenged briefing was relevant only to the
question of the Malaysian judgment.
So, too, do the nine exhibits
to Dye’s affidavit relate solely to the issue of due process, which
Titan re-filed in response to Wilder’s motion to dismiss or for
non-recognition.
Titan’s argument that the Court only ordered it to file an
affidavit that complies with Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express
ignores the fact that Titan previously never indicated it would
seek fees incurred in a separate litigation and related to filings
-16-
other than the motion to remand.
Court’s Determination
As a threshold matter, after reviewing the records in the two
related cases, this Court finds that most of the attorney’s fees
incurred in addressing the motion to hold in abeyance and in
responding to the motion to consolidate in Judge Hoyt’s case would
not have been incurred had this case remained in state court.
While Mr. Dye states, “The fees and costs were reasonable for
the services performed” and “are those customarily charged in the
same
or
similar
services
by
attorneys
with
our
experience,
reputation, and ability, considering the nature of the controversy,
the time limits imposed, and the results obtained,” he presents no
evidence, no affidavits from other attorneys in the Houston areas,
no awards in other cases, and cites no authority to support these
conclusory claims.
Vinson & Elkins’ Houston office website states that it has
“more than 250 lawyer serving the corporate and civil law needs of
[its] clients.” With respect to Wilder’s reliance on the 2011
hourly rates put out by the State Bar of Texas, this Court has
instead reviewed the 2013 Hourly Fact Sheet of the State Bar of
Texas, Department of Research & Analysis, which lists the median
hourly rate in the Houston area for firms of 201-400 attorneys at
$363.
For a partner with more than 25 years of experience like
Dye, and a specialty in jurisdictional issues, the Court finds that
-17-
it would be higher. Nevertheless, as noted, “[h]ourly rates are to
be computed according to the prevailing market rates in the
relevant legal market, not the rates that lions at the bar may
command.”
2000).
Hopwood v. State of Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir.
From its own experience practicing law and as a judge
awarding fees, the Court finds a reasonable hourly fee for Mr. Dye
to be $500 per hour.
The
2013
Hourly
Fact
Sheet
of
the
State
Bar
of
Texas,
Department of Research & Analysis, which lists the median hourly
rate for attorneys with three to six years of experience as $218
per hour.
Ms. Noble was graduated for law school and admitted to
practice in Texas in 2011. Given her excellent credentials and her
practice at Vinson & Elkins since the fall of 2013, the Court finds
that $275 per hour is a reasonable fee.
The Court agrees with Wilder that it is unclear what criteria
Titan used in redacting some hours from its records for its fee
request since it fails to explain its reasons. While the number of
hours counsel claimed they work does not appear extreme or totally
unreasonable, Titan’s failure to meet its burden of justifying all
requested fees leads the Court to reduce that number to 10 hours at
$500 per hour for Mr. Dye ($5,000) and to 35 hours at $275 for Ms.
Noble ($9,625) for a total of $14,625 as a fee award.
No
objections have been filed to Titan’s request for $832.78 in costs,
and the Court finds that amount to be reasonable and necessary for
-18-
legal services related to the remand.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court
ORDERS that Wilder’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
The Court further
ORDERS that Titan shall recover as an award of fees and costs
under § 1447(c) $14,625 in fees and $832.78 in costs.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 12th
day of
December , 2014.
___________________________
MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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