Henderson v. BP Products North America

Filing 18

OPINION & ORDER granting 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified.(jdav, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
WILLIAM L HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA,
Defendant.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

April 08, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-01120

OPINION & ORDER
Pending in the above-referenced cause, alleging employment discrimination on the basis
of race and age, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Acts of 1991, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), is Defendant, BP Products North America Inc.’s (“BP”) Motion for
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff William L. Henderson
(“Henderson”) filed a Motion, Memorandum, and Response in Opposition (Doc. 14),1 and BP
responded by filing its Reply and Objections to Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 15). After considering
the parties submissions, documents attached thereto, and the relevant standard, the Court is of the
opinion that Defendant’s motion should be GRANTED.
I. Background
This case arises from claims of a former BP employee that he was the victim of
workplace discrimination. Plaintiff Henderson is a fifty-three year old African American male
who began his employment with BP in September 1980. (Doc. 1 at p. 3, ¶ 7; Doc. 13-1 at p. 31,
lines 14–16.) Although initially employed as a warehouseman, Henderson held a variety of
1

Although Henderson styles this document a “motion,” nowhere does Henderson request any relief
besides that the Court “deny BP’s Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety, and permit this case to
proceed to trial on the merits before the requested trier of fact, the jury.” (See Doc. 14 at p. 33.)

1/6

positions over the course of his employment with BP. (Doc. 13-1 at p. 11, lines 14–19.) In
February 2010, he was appointed to the position of Permanent Shift Director, a position he held
when he earned a “below expectations” performance rating in February 2012. (Id. at p. 57, line
17 – p. 58, line 12; pp. 42–54.) Shortly after this review, in the spring/early summer of 2012,
Henderson was transitioned to a new role, known as “Pride Team Lead.” (Id. at p. 63, lines 14–
23; p. 66, line 4 – p. 67, line 21.) Despite the transition, Henderson maintained his seniority level
and experienced no change in base salary or benefits. (Id. at p. 67, line 25 – p. 68, line 10.)
Nevertheless, on April 12, 2012, Henderson lodged a complaint against BP with the EEOC
alleging that his removal from the Permanent Shift Director position was the result of
discrimination on the basis of race and age. (Id. at p. 73, line 3 – p. 74, line 7; see also Doc. 1 at
17.) He never told anyone at BP about this charge. (Doc. 13-1 at p. 73, lines 22–25.)
On February 1, 2013, Marathon took sole possession of the refinery pursuant to BP’s sale
of the refinery to Marathon. (Id. at p. 13, lines 14–16.) Henderson then automatically became an
employee with Marathon. (Id. at p. 13, lines 17–20.) In the transition, Henderson experienced no
gap in his employment, his pay remained “right around” the same, and his negative performance
review did not follow him. (Id. at p. 13, line 21 – p. 16, line 2; see also Doc. 13-2.)
On January 23, 2014, the EEOC dismissed Henderson’s charge against BP and issued
Henderson a notice-of-right-to-sue letter. (See Doc. 1 at p. 16.) Three months later, Henderson
filed his Complaint in this Court, alleging race and age discrimination, hostile work environment,
and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. (Id. at pp. 11–12, ¶¶ 41–47.) BP
responded with its Motion for Summary Judgment, which is now ripe for adjudication. (Doc.
13.)

2/6

II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate when,
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the court determines that “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1996)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the nonmovant bears the
burden of proof at trial, the movant must offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant’s claim
or point out the absence of evidence supporting essential elements of the nonmovant’s claim; the
movant may, but does not have to, negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case to prevail on
summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998).
If the movant meets its burden and points out an absence of evidence to prove an
essential element of the nonmovant’s case on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at
trial, the nonmovant must then present competent summary judgment evidence to support the
essential elements of its claim and to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994). “[A]
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The nonmovant may not
rely merely on allegations, denials in a pleading, or unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions that
a fact issue exists, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact concerning every element of its cause(s) of action. Morris v. Covan World Wide
Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
3/6

Allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint are not evidence. See, e.g., Wallace v. Texas Tech
Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[P]leadings are not summary judgment evidence.”);
Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Solo Serve Corp. v.
Westtown Assoc., 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1991)) (for the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment, “ ‘only evidence—not argument, not facts in the complaint—will satisfy’
the burden.”). The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 493
(5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
must consider all evidence and draw all inferences from the factual record in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant, but the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). There is no genuine issue
for trial if a rational trier could not find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence
presented. Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps., 40 F.3d at 712–13 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584–88 (1986)).
Moreover, the district court does not have a duty to “sift through the record in search of
evidence” to support the nonmovant’s opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Ragas v.
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco
Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If
the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to its case, and on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must
be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In the absence of any proof, the Court will not assume that
4/6

the nonmoving party could or would prove the essential facts necessary to support a judgment in
favor of the nonmovant. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam).
III. Analysis
In this case, BP’s motion for summary judgment pointed out an absence of evidence to
prove a number of essential elements of Henderson’s case on which he bears the burden of proof
at trial. Accordingly, in order to survive summary judgment, Henderson was required to present
competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of his claims and to
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps., 40
F.3d at 712. Moreover, under the Local Rules, if Henderson wanted the Court to consider
evidence not appearing of record, he was required to file documentary evidence with his
response. See Local Rule 7.7. Henderson failed to do so.
Instead, Henderson relies on “allegations . . . [and] unsubstantiated and conclusory
assertions that a fact issue exists” without “set[ting] forth specific facts showing the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact concerning every element of [his] cause(s) of action.”2 Morris,
144 F.3d at 380. Rather than provide any competent summary judgment evidence to support his
contention that genuine issues of material fact exist, Henderson states “Plaintiff did not conduct
costly depositions of witnesses, but has provided an extensive list of witnesses who have
committed to testify truthfully at trial, and whose testimony will clearly evidence truthfully and

2

For example, Henderson states “Plaintiff makes a prima facie case for discrimination . . . . Plaintiff is 1)
member of the protected classes (race and age); 2) Plaintiff is and was at all times qualified for his
positions, the positions/promotions to which he aspired and/or was denied or treated less favorably than
his white counterparts; 3) Plaintiff Henderson suffered adverse employment actions; 4) Plaintiff was
subjected to less favorable treatment than his white and/or younger counterparts; Plaintiff suffered as a
result. Thus, summary judgment should be denied, this case should proceed to trial on the merits for all
claims.” (Doc. 14 at pp. 22–23, ¶ 49). Henderson makes this claim without citation to any evidence in
support.

5/6

convincingly to the jury that BP unlawfully subjected Plaintiff to discrimination, retaliation, and
hostile work environment as alleged, and for which BP should be held liable with appropriate
damages awarded to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 14 at p. 12, ¶ 14.) Henderson renews this claim—that
“credible witnesses are scheduled to testify”—throughout the Response to support his conclusory
assertions that fact issues exist. (See id. at pp. 3–4, ¶ 10; pp. 9–11, ¶¶ 3, 5, 9; pp. 13–18, ¶¶ 17–
21, 23–24, 39–43; p. 30, ¶¶ 58–59.)
Finally, Henderson “implores this [C]ourt to question and reject until trial the credibility
of BP’s ‘evidence’ and its testimony regarding the same . . . .” (Doc. 14 at p. 21, ¶ 47.) This
statement, Henderson’s reliance on conclusory assertions, and his promises to provide support
for his claims by unnamed “witnesses” at trial demonstrates that Henderson misunderstands the
nonmovant’s burden in opposing summary judgment. Because Henderson failed to meet his
burden, his claims must be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that BP’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support
(Doc. 13) is GRANTED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 8th day of April, 2016.

___________________________________
MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6/6