Hood v. McKizie et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, Granting in Part, Denying in Part 37 MOTION to Dismiss; GRANTED in part, insofar as Plaintiffs state constitutional claims are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim; Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim against McKinnon is DISMISSED on the merits; and all of Plaintiffs claims against Fort Bend County are DISMISSED on the merits; denying as MOOT 31 MOTION to Dismiss; denying as moot 39 MOTION to Dismiss; denying as Moot 38 MOTION to Dismiss (Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified.(jdav, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MAURICE J HOOD,
Plaintiff,
VS.
DAVID McKINNON, et al,
Defendants.

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August 17, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-1719

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Maurice J. Hood (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Texas Constitution against Fort Bend County, Detective David C. McKinnon,
and John Does 1-10 (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his
federal and state constitutional rights stemming from an investigation and prosecution for an
October 8, 2009 home invasion and aggravated robbery.
Pending are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docket Entry Nos. 31, 37, 38, 39). After
reviewing the motions, the responses, the replies, and the applicable law, the Court concludes as
follows.
I.

Background
Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)1:
On the morning of October 8, 2009, David Haye (“Haye”) heard a knock at the door and

saw through the peep-hole an individual he thought was a United Parcel Service (“UPS”)
delivery employee carrying a box and a clipboard. As soon as Haye opened the door, the man

1

See generally Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC), Docket Entry No. 33, ¶¶ 22-75. The
background facts set forth here are Plaintiff’s allegations in his pleadings, which the Court takes as true
when considering a motion to dismiss. See Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002).

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posing as a UPS employee (“Imposter” or “Second Assailant”) and his accomplice forced their
way into Haye’s home. Imposter held Haye at gunpoint in the living room while his accomplice,
later identified as Ronnie Alvarra Alfred (“Alfred”), searched the house and discovered that
Haye’s infant daughter was asleep in the next room. Alfred demanded money from Haye and
threatened to kill Haye’s daughter if Haye refused. The robbers ordered Haye to lie face-down
on the ground and pointed their handguns at Haye’s chest. Haye, believing he would be killed,
fought the robbers, causing them to bleed. The robbers again threatened to kill Haye’s infant
daughter if he kept fighting, causing Haye to surrender and give Alfred $500 cash. The robbers
fled in a 2001 Buick Century (“get-away vehicle”), and Haye called the police.
Fort Bend County Sheriff’s Deputies Christina Saucedo (“Saucedo”) and Fernando Flores
(“Flores”) arrived at the scene, entered, cleared the residence, and summoned medics for Haye.
Fort Bend County Sheriff’s Detectives David McKinnon (“McKinnon”) and Dalia Simons
(“Simons”) arrived at the scene about an hour later. Haye told the detectives and the deputies
that Alfred was a black man with medium skin, about 5'7" tall, and thin build, while the Second
Assailant, dressed like a UPS delivery employee and carrying a box and a clip board, was a black
man with dark skin, about 6'3" tall, and a muscular build. Haye also reported that the two
assailants had fled in the get-away vehicle.
Plaintiff alleges that Simons observed blood at the scene and found a windshield repair
invoice bearing identifying information about the get-away vehicle, which was believed to be the
paper the robbers used for their UPS delivery clipboard. Simons was able to identify the vehicle
and reported it to police dispatch from the information on the invoice. Crime Scene Investigators
Kimberly Oreskovich (“Oreskovich”) and James Tabares (“Tabares”) allegedly collected

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evidence at Haye’s house, but did not check Haye’s person for physical evidence left by the
robbers. Later that same afternoon, Fort Bend Sheriff’s Patrol deputies stopped the get-away
vehicle, detained the driver, searched the vehicle, and notified Simons.
Simons and Oreskovich allegedly arrived at the location of the vehicle and driver, and
Oreskovich took blood smear evidence from the interior of the vehicle. Simons impounded the
vehicle, and the next day Investigator Jeremy Goodrich (“Goodrich”) searched the vehicle for
evidence and found two latent prints on the exterior of the vehicle. Goodrich also took buccal
swab evidence from Haye.
On or around October 12-14, 2009, McKinnon and Simons learned that Alfred borrowed
the get-away vehicle shortly before the robbery. Haye identified Alfred from a photographic
line-up for eyewitness identification provided by McKinnon. Haye later confirmed that Alfred
was one of his assailants when Simons showed him two other photographs of Alfred. Haye then
filled out a “Photo Line-Up Affidavit” and hand wrote that he was 100% sure that Alfred was
one of the individuals who had robbed him. Alfred was arrested on October 15, 2009 and
charged with the Haye home invasion as well as another aggravated robbery unrelated to Haye.
Alfred did not identify who his accomplice was for the Haye home invasion.
On or around January 6, 2010, Goodrich processed the latent prints he had obtained off
the get-away vehicle, and one of them reportedly belonged to Plaintiff Maurice Hood
(“Plaintiff”).

Goodrich reported this finding to McKinnon, who located Plaintiff’s license

information, found that Plaintiff’s race, height, and build were similar to Haye’s description of
the Second Assailant, and that Plaintiff was one of Alfred’s acquaintances. Plaintiff claims that
McKinnon formed a hunch that Plaintiff might be the Second Assailant from these facts.

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Plaintiff further claims that McKinnon prepared a six-person photographic line-up for
eyewitness identification with Plaintiff’s driver’s license picture as one of the photographs, and
showed the photo line-up to Haye. Haye told McKinnon that none of the people in the line-up
was the Second Assailant. McKinnon then showed Haye another photograph of Plaintiff and
told him that Plaintiff’s palm print was found on the get-away vehicle, Plaintiff was a known
associate of Alfred, and that he was the Second Assailant.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that Haye told McKinnon that (1) he got a good look at the
robbers because they did not wear masks; (2) Plaintiff had lighter skin and was fatter than the
Second Assailant; and (3) the Second Assailant was not in the photograph provided. McKinnon
allegedly insisted that the man in the photograph [Plaintiff] was the Second Assailant. Haye
allegedly became exhausted from McKinnon’s efforts and eventually filled out a “Photo Line-Up
Affidavit” supplied by McKinnon and printed on the affidavit that Plaintiff was “the big guy who
robbed me” and printed that “number 5 [Plaintiff] looks like the big guy that robbed me” on the
Fort Bend County Sheriff’s Office Photo Spread. Plaintiff claims that McKinnon went to Haye
with the intent to convince Haye that Plaintiff was the suspect and that McKinnon refused to
accept Haye’s response that Plaintiff was not the one who robbed him.
On January 11, 2010, McKinnon wrote in his incident report that Haye had positively
identified Plaintiff as being the taller suspect who robbed and pistol-whipped Haye inside his
home. McKinnon did not include Haye’s earlier negative identification of Plaintiff. McKinnon
prepared an arrest warrant affidavit for Plaintiff for the offense of aggravated robbery and
presented this affidavit to the Honorable R.H. Bielstein, who issued Arrest Warrant #011110-1
for Plaintiff’s arrest and set the bond amount for $100,000.

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On January 13, 2010, Fort Bend County’s Investigator Michael Kulbricht (“Kulbricht”)
received the arrest warrant, and on January 22, 2010 Kulbricht and unnamed Houston Police
Department (“HPD”) officers converged on Plaintiff’s last known residence and repeatedly
knocked on the door at around 1:30 a.m. Plaintiff claims they kicked the door in and sent an
HPD officer with an HPD dog to secure Plaintiff in a bedroom. The police dog allegedly located
Plaintiff and bit him on his right thigh. Kulbricht handcuffed Plaintiff and took him into custody.
Plaintiff alleges that the handcuffs were too tight and caused him pain and temporary nerve
damage.
On June 10, 2010, while Plaintiff was awaiting trial, McKinnon met with Plaintiff and
explained that witnesses had identified him as the Second Assailant, that his palm print was
found on the get-away car, and that he should confess to the home invasion so that he could
receive a lighter sentence than he would get if they proceeded to trial. Plaintiff denied that he
was involved in the home invasion robbery and maintained that he had never been involved in
any home invasion robberies. Plaintiff alleges that on that occasion McKinnon informed him
that “I’m the detective. I can do anything I want.”
On October 24, 2012, the jury was empaneled for Plaintiff’s trial. Haye asked the
prosecutor if he could see the accused because he had never seen the person who was charged
with the crime. Upon seeing Plaintiff, Haye indicated to the prosecutor that Plaintiff was not the
Second Assailant.

The prosecutor moved to dismiss, and the case was dismissed against

Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he was in custody for 1006 days, 817 of which were in detention
while for the other 189 he was released on bond.
Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action against various defendants: (1)

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manufactured probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution through section 1983, against McKinnon and Doe defendants; (2)
malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment through section 1983, against
McKinnon and Doe defendants; (3) failure to train or supervise investigators in the collection,
testing, and suspect exoneration with DNA evidence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
through section 1983, against Fort Bend County (“County”) and Doe defendants; (4) failure to
train or supervise investigators in adequate lineups in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
through section 1983, against Fort Bend County (“County”) and Doe defendants; and (5)
manufactured probable cause in violation of the Texas Constitution against McKinnon and Doe
Defendants.2
For relief, Plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory damages against all defendants,
punitive damages against individual defendants only, damages from the County pursuant to
respondeat superior liability and joint and several liability; pre- and post-judgment interest,
attorney’s fees, costs of suit, and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.3
Defendants have moved to dismiss, contending that (1) Plaintiff’s federal and state claims
are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) there is no valid cause of action for money damages
for violations of the due course of law clause of the Texas Constitution; and (3) Plaintiff’s state
law claims are barred by governmental immunity and the election of remedies.
II.

Standards of Review
A.

Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Standard

The complaint in this case is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)
2

See SAC at ¶¶ 76-117.

3

Id. at ¶¶ 121-125.

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because Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis and was an inmate at the Brazoria County Jail at the
time he filed this complaint.4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (c). The PLRA requires that the district
court review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (a). On review, the
Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof, if the
court determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
“A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory, such as if the complaint alleges violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”
Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716,
718 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998)). A review for
failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard used to review a dismissal pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227,
231 (5th Cir. 2002). Under that standard, courts must assume that plaintiff’s factual allegations
are true, and a dismissal is proper only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set
of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations. Id. (citations omitted).
B.

Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of an action for “failure to state a claim upon which
4

See Docket Entry No. 1 (prisoner civil rights complaint); Docket Entry No. 7 (motion/application to
proceed in forma pauperis); Docket Entry No. 8 (prisoner trust fund account statement); Docket Entry
No. 9 (Order granting motion to proceed in forma pauperis).

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relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When a district court reviews the sufficiency of
a complaint before it receives any evidence either by affidavit or admission, its task is inevitably
a limited one. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Id.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court construes the
allegations in the complaint favorably to the pleader and accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in
the complaint. La Porte Construction Co. v. Bayshore Nat’l Bank of La Porte, Tex., 805 F.2d
1254, 1255 (5th Cir. 1986). To survive dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations . . . [the] allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and internal footnote omitted).
C.

Statute of Limitations

Limitations is an affirmative defense.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). “A statute of

limitations may support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiff’s
pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or the
like.” Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Clark v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986); White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1973)

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(holding that claim is “subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . when [an] affirmative
defense clearly appears on the face of the complaint.”).
“The limitations period for a claim brought under section 1983 is determined by the
general statute of limitations of the forum state.” Price v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 431 F.3d
890, 892 (5th Cir. 2005). In Texas, the applicable statute of limitations is two-years. Id. Federal
law determines when a cause of action accrues for purposes of section 1983. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).

“Under federal law, a claim accrues and ‘the limitations period

begins to run the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has
sufficient information to know that he has been injured.’” Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559,
574 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 820 (2001)).
A district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo, but its determination
that the plaintiff has not pled facts to justify equitable tolling is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 2015).
III.

Discussion
A.

Doe Defendants

Plaintiff states generally that John Does 1-10 “are individuals whose true identities are
presently unknown, who participated, facilitated, or had a duty to prevent the civil rights
violations described herein . . . .” SAC ¶ 12. The pleadings reflect that Plaintiff did not add John
Does 1-10 to this lawsuit until June 8, 2015. More than two full years after Plaintiff filed his
original complaint, Plaintiff has not named any of the Doe defendants and has not stated facts to
indicate what each of them did or how they may be personally involved in this case.

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Assuming that Plaintiff’s causes of action did not accrue until the charges against him
were dismissed on October 22, 2012, the statute of limitations expired on October 22, 2014,
several months before Plaintiff even added the Doe defendants. Further, to the extent that
Plaintiff seeks to toll the statute of limitations by asserting a discovery date in 2015, Plaintiff
filed a pro se complaint signed on June 14, 2014, wherein he states that “It was discover[ed] by
my lawyer after trial been dismiss[ed] that [Detective McKinzie, now known as McKinnon]
coerce[d] the victim to accuse and point me out in a photo line up.” Docket Entry No. 1 at 5.
Thus, by June 14, 2014 at the latest, Plaintiff was aware of facts that would have, or at least
should have, alerted him that he had suffered an injury that would lead a reasonable person to
investigate further. See King-White, 803 F.3d at 762 (citing Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576); see
also Gabelli v. S.E.C., 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1223 (2013) (quoting Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S.
633, 653, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1793 (2010)) (“In determining what a plaintiff should have known, we
ask what facts a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The pleadings indicate on their face that the statute of limitations ran for the Doe
defendants long before Plaintiff added them to the lawsuit, regardless of which legal theories for
recovery apply. See Whitt v. Stephens County, 529 F.3d 278, 282-83 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming
the dismissal on limitations grounds where John Does were not named within the limitations
period); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998) (substitution for “John Doe” did
not relate back for purposes of limitations); but see Green v. Doe, 260 F. App’x 717, 2007 WL
4561113 (5th Cir. 2007) (not selected for publication) (finding equitable tolling appropriate
where district court had abused its discretion when it denied inmate’s discovery motions that

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were filed within the limitations period). Plaintiff did not file any motions to discover the
identities of the Doe defendants within the limitations period and has not named them. Not only
has Plaintiff failed to name the John Does after two years, but also he failed to add them as
John/Jane Does within the limitations period as part of his original complaint. Where, as here, a
plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, claims that are plainly barred by the applicable statute of
limitations are subject to dismissal by the Court sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Ali v.
Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990). Because Plaintiff has failed to prosecute this case with
regard to the Doe defendants and added them to this lawsuit well after the limitations period had
run, Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe defendants are dismissed as barred by limitations.
B.

Federal Claims
1.

Legal Standard – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not grant substantive rights, but provides a vehicle for a
plaintiff to vindicate rights protected by the United States Constitution and other federal laws.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). It provides a cause of action for individuals who
have been “depriv[ed] of [their] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws” of the United States by a “person” acting under color of state law. Id. at 315.
A plaintiff seeking relief under section 1983 must establish two elements: (1) that the
conduct complained of was committed under color of law, and (2) that the conduct deprived the
plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Hernandez v.
Maxwell, 905 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th
Cir. 1998)).
Municipalities and other bodies of local government are “persons” within the meaning of

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section 1983.

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). “[A]

municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691
(emphasis in original); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). The bar on vicarious
liability means that the municipality can only be liable where the municipality itself causes the
constitutional violation at issue. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A municipality may be liable under §
1983 if the execution of one of its customs or policies deprives a plaintiff of his constitutional
rights. Id. at 690-91.
To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify (a) a
policymaker, (b) an official policy [or custom or widespread practice], and (c) a violation of
constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578
(a plaintiff must show that the unconstitutional conduct is attributable to the municipality
through some official custom or policy that is the “moving force” behind the constitutional
violation) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). The Fifth Circuit has defined an official policy for
purposes of § 1983 as “‘[a] policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision that is officially
adopted and promulgated by the municipality's law-making officials or by an official to whom
the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority.’” Okon v. Harris County Hospital
District, 426 F. App’x 312, 316 (5th Cir. 2011), quoting Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861,
862 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). When a policymaker commits
the act at issue, that act may establish the policy if the policymaker must be “unconstrained by
policies imposed from a higher authority.” Okon, 426 F. App’x at 316 (citing Hampton Co. v.
Nat'l Sur. LLC v. Tunica County, 543 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 2008)).

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It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to allege, without elaboration, a policy or a custom and
its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation; instead the plaintiff must plead specific
facts. Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
Fraire v. Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992)). “Allegations of an isolated incident
are not sufficient to show the existence of a custom or policy.” Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1278; see also
Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (“‘[I]solated
unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.’”) (quoting
Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578).
Regarding a custom or a failure to train, “[t]he governing body of the municipality or an
official to whom that body has delegated policy-making authority must have actual or
constructive knowledge of such a custom.” Okon, 426 F. App’x at 316 (citing Bennett, 735 F.2d
at 862). “Actual knowledge may be shown by such means as discussions at council meetings or
receipt of written information,” while constructive knowledge “may be attributed to the
governing body on the ground that it would have known of the violations if it had properly
exercised its responsibilities, as, for example, where the violations were so persistent and
widespread that they were the subject of prolonged public discussion or of a high degree of
publicity.” Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1016 (1985). If policymakers do not have notice that a source of training is deficient in
a specific respect, they “can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that
will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011).
2.

Federal claims against McKinnon – Counts I and II

Plaintiff alleges the following claims against McKinnon: (1) manufactured probable

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cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and (2) malicious prosecution in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested pursuant
to an arrest warrant and held for over two years in prison while the County prosecuted him for a
crime he did not commit, all based on the false or fabricated testimony and evidence provided by
McKinnon. Plaintiff alleges further that during the time he was held over for trial, McKinnon
tried to persuade him to plead guilty to receive a lighter sentence, presenting Plaintiff with the
evidence which the County had in against Plaintiff, which Plaintiff alleges was tainted by
McKinnon. Plaintiff also claims that McKinnon stated that McKinnon could do whatever he
wanted because he was the detective. Plaintiff alleges that he was held over for trial, prosecuted
wrongfully based on a false identification procured by McKinnon, and that McKinnon
participated in his prosecution after Plaintiff was held over for trial. Taken together, Plaintiff
asserts that McKinnon subjected him to an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment in connection with a malicious prosecution.
a.

“Malicious Prosecution” claims under section 1983

In 1994, the Supreme Court in Albright v. Oliver declined to recognize a substantive right
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution
except upon probable cause. 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994) (plurality decision). Albright had turned
himself in upon learning that there was a warrant for his arrest for the sale of a substance which
looked like an illegal drug. Id. Officer Oliver, a police detective, testified at a preliminary
hearing that Albright sold the look-alike substance to a police informant. Id. at 269. Albright
was charged and released after posting bond, and the case was later dismissed because Albright’s
action did not constitute a crime under Illinois law. Id. at 268-69. Albright sued Oliver and the

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city pursuant to section 1983, asserting a substantive due process right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to be free from malicious prosecution. Id.
Noting that “the extent to which a claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under §
1983 is one ‘on which there is an embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion,’” the high Court
issued a plurality opinion in which four justices agreed that “it is the Fourth Amendment, and not
substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright’s claim must be judged.” Id. at 270-71
& n.4. Albright did not elucidate the particulars of a section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim
connected to a malicious prosecution, however, leading to a variegated landscape across the
circuit courts as to the viability of such claims.
In 2003, the Fifth Circuit issued an en banc decision in which it noted the several
standards from sister circuits and concluded that “[C]ausing charges to be filed without probable
cause will not without more violate the constitution. So defined, the assertion of malicious
prosecution states no constitutional claim.” Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953 (5th Cir.
2003) (emphasis added). Castellano further held that “no such freestanding constitutional right
to be free from malicious prosecution exists” and that any pleading asserting a section 1983
claim based on malicious prosecution must clearly identify the constitutional violations asserted.
Id. at 945. Castellano did not, howevr, foreclose all section 1983 cases where a claimant alleges
that he was maliciously prosecuted, noting:
It is equally apparent that additional government acts that may attend the initiation
of a criminal charge could give rise to claims of constitutional deprivation. The
initiation of criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events that
run afoul of explicit constitutional protection—the Fourth Amendment if the
accused is seized and arrested, for example, or other constitutionally secured
rights if a case is further pursued. Such claims of lost constitutional rights are for
violation of rights locatable in constitutional text, and some such claims may be
made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Regardless, they are not claims for malicious
prosecution and labeling them as such only invites confusion.
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Id. at 953–54 (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff labels his claim as one for
“malicious prosecution” and invokes Texas state law elements for that claim, such a claim
“invites confusion” and is not properly brought under section 1983. Id. On the other hand, to
the extent that Plaintiff brings his claim regarding his prosecution pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment, he has alleged government actions that attended his prosecution that give rise to a
claim for “violation of rights locatable in the constitutional text,” as set forth below. Id.
b.

Fourth Amendment Claim

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation[.]” U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. “[A] Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S.
593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original); see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion)
(“The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth
Amendment to address it.”). Relevant here, “[p]rolonged pretrial incarceration without probable
cause . . . constitutes a cognizable deprivation of liberty under the Fourth Amendment.”
Whittington v. Maxwell, 455 F. App’x 450, 458 (5th Cir. 2011).
Post-Castellano, the Fifth Circuit has found that a claimant stated, or could state, a Fourth
Amendment section 1983 claim connected to a malicious prosecution when that alleged
wrongful prosecution was coupled with prolonged detention (an unreasonable seizure). For
example, in Whittington, the claimant was arrested pursuant to legal process and bail was set so
high that he could not pay it. 455 F. App’x at 453. As a result, Whittington spent over 50 days

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in jail. Id. The judge, prosecutor, and sheriff had engaged in improper ex parte communications
regarding the claimant’s criminal prosecution, and, after two years, the charges against
Whittington were dismissed. Id. After the charges were dismissed, Whittington sued for, among
other claims, malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, alleging that the sheriff’s
office had manufactured the charges against him to carry out a political vendetta. Id.
The Whittington defendants argued that the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
claim was barred under Castellano as a freestanding malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 457.
Rejecting that argument, the Fifth Circuit held, “[i]n connection with his malicious prosecution
claim, Whittington has alleged a Fourth Amendment claim for an illegal seizure—based on his
detention for over fifty days in jail on allegedly fabricated charges.” Id.
Similarly, in McMillan v. Richmond, the Fifth Circuit did not foreclose the claimant’s
section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim connected to a malicious prosecution, allowing McMillan
to replead that claim. 400 F. App’x 878, 881 (5th Cir. 2010). McMillan had been in a fight with
his girlfriend at the home both of them shared and she called the police. Id. at 879. When the
police arrived, McMillan explained that he resided at the home, he had a key, and could show
them where his tools were. Id. at 879-80. The officer at the scene took away McMillan’s key,
tightly handcuffed him, and arrested him for burglary with intent to commit an aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 880. Even though the girlfriend submitted an affidavit the
same morning retracting her “false allegations,” McMillan was kept in jail for 12 days. Id. Bail
was set by the magistrate on the basis of the police officer’s probable cause affidavit, which used
the girlfriend’s version of events which she had earlier retracted as false. Id. The charges were
dropped two days after McMillan posted bail and was released. Id.

17

McMillan filed his lawsuit a couple days after the statute of limitations expired for false
arrest claims but before the limitations period expired for a section 1983 Fourth Amendment
claim connected to a malicious prosecution. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
false arrest claim as barred by limitations and remanded the case to the district court “to permit
the plaintiff to amend his complaint to state his best § 1983 claim based on malicious
prosecution.” Id. The Fifth Circuit did not reject his section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim
based on malicious prosecution as a matter of law where the plaintiff alleged he was subjected to
prolonged detention without probable cause.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has rejected Fourth Amendment claims connected to
malicious prosecution where there was probable cause for the arrest, see, e.g., Travis v. City of
Grand Prairie, --- F. App’x ----, 2016 WL 3181392, at *2 (5th Cir. June 7, 2016); Cuadra v.
Houston Indep. Sch. District, 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010); Carter v. Godfrey, 108 F. App’x
850, 852 (5th Cir. 2004), or where no prolonged detention accompanied the allegedly wrongful
prosecution, see, e.g., Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 813; Bloss v. Moore, 269 F. App’x 446, 448 (5th Cir.
2008). Indeed, in Travis v. City of Grand Prairie, the Fifth Circuit recently reiterated that a
“freestanding § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law.” 2016 WL 3181392,
at *2 (citing Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 812). The Fifth Circuit also stated in Travis:
We have recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s protections extend to preclude
unreasonable seizure throughout the pretrial events of a prosecution, although we
have discussed it as a Fourth Amendment claim and have rejected the notion that
a freestanding malicious prosecution claim absent a Fourth Amendment violation
is cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at *2 n.2.5
5

The Fifth Circuit also noted in Travis that “the Supreme Court has granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 F. App’x 641 (7th Cir.
2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016), that the Fourth Amendment does not give rise to a claim for
malicious prosecution.” Id.

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In Travis, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff had not alleged facts “that, if true,
show that the officers lacked probable cause to seize and/or arrest him.” Id. at *3. There, the
assault victim had specifically named Travis as the perpetrator of the crime against her. Id. The
Fifth Circuit held that this was sufficient to establish probable cause for Travis’s arrest, even
though direct exculpatory evidence was allegedly known to the officers. Id.
Here, in contrast, Plaintiff alleges that McKinnon coerced or manipulated Haye into
changing his initial negative identification of Plaintiff to a positive identification in order to
fabricate the probable cause needed to arrest Plaintiff.

Specifically, Plaintiff claims that

McKinnon manufactured probable cause when he allegedly: (1) ignored Haye’s negative
identification of Plaintiff; (2) knew that Haye did not believe that Plaintiff was the Second
Assailant; (3) used his police authority and inside information about the investigation to weaken
Haye’s confidence in his own eyewitness memory; and (4) caused Haye to sign the ‘Photo LineUp Affidavit’ form and ‘Fort Bend County Sheriff’s Office Photo Spread’ contrary to Haye’s
negative identification of Plaintiff, all the for purpose of representing to the magistrate that there
was probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was the Second Assailant. SAC ¶¶ 58, 78. Plaintiff
also alleges that his arrest on January 22, 2010 was pursuant to an arrest warrant for which
McKinnon prepared an affidavit based on “manufactured probable cause.” SAC ¶¶ 59, 84. At
this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has alleged facts to show that McKinnon lacked probable
cause for the arrest warrant, and McKinnon does not argue otherwise in his motion to dismiss.
McKinnon relies on Cuadra to argue that Plaintiff has no section 1983 claim, but in
Cuadra, the Fifth Circuit noted that the plaintiff did not raise a fact issue on probable cause or
unreasonable seizure. 626 F.3d at 813. The Court also found that his “freestanding” malicious
prosecution claim was subject to dismissal under Castellano and his Fourteenth Amendment
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claim was foreclosed by Albright. Id. at 812-13, 814.
Unlike Cuadra, Plaintiff alleges an unreasonable seizure—a prolonged detention without
probable cause— pursuant to legal process. Plaintiff alleges that he was held for 817 days, far
longer than Whittington’s “prolonged detention” of 50 days,6 pursuant to charges that were
allegedly the result of McKinnon’s manufactured probable cause based on a false identification
by Plaintiff.

When an individual is wrongfully arrested and detained without legal process, the

United States Supreme Court has held that the cause of action so stated accrues once legal
process has been issued, analogizing the cause of action under section 1983 as similar to
common law false arrest and false imprisonment. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 384. On the other hand,
when an individual is wrongfully held pursuant to legal process—here, an arrest warrant—the
cause of action is likened to the “entirely distinct” tort of malicious prosecution. Id. at 389-90.
Plaintiff does not allege that he was held without a warrant like the claimant in Wallace.
Rather, his Fourth Amendment claim is analogous to the “entirely distinct” tort of malicious
prosecution because he was arrested pursuant to a warrant and was thus held pursuant to legal
process. Id. Unlike the plaintiff in Wallace, who abandoned his malicious prosecution-type
claim on appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff asserts that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant
based on fabricated evidence and that he was charged and held over for trial for years based on
that allegedly false legal process. Wallace by its express terms did not reach the scenario alleged
here. See id. at 390 n.2 (“We have never explored the contours of a Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution suit under § 1983 . . . and we do not do so here.”).

Therefore,

McKinnon’s reliance on Wallace for an accrual date in January 2010 for Plaintiff’s section 1983
Fourth Amendment claim connected to a malicious prosecution is unavailing.
6

See Whittington, 455 F. App’x at 458 n.7 (discussing Supreme Court holdings regarding Fourth
Amendment violations involving prolonged detention without probable cause).

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In sum, Plaintiff alleges a Fourth Amendment claim connected to his prosecution because
he complains of prolonged detention without probable cause pursuant to legal process. At the
pleading stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to survive dismissal on his Fourth Amendment
claim. Because his Fourth Amendment claim is based on being held pursuant to legal process as
the result of allegedly fabricated probable cause, it did not accrue until the charges against him
were dismissed in October 2012. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (“The
common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy to claims of
the type considered here because, unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or
imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process. . . . Just as
a cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have
terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, . . . so also a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable
to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has
been invalidated.”); accord Castellano, 352 F.3d at 659 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heck v.
Humphrey answers any question of limitation in the overwhelming percentage of cases”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim connected to his malicious prosecution is not
barred by the statute of limitations.
c.

Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff purports to bring a claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment for
“manufactured probable cause.” To the extent that Plaintiff intended to state a constitutional
claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment, clear Supreme Court
precedent in Albright constrains this Court to reject this claim. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271
(“We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which
petitioner[’s] claim must be judged.”); accord Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 814. Because the
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complained-of harm was allegedly caused by a violation of rights locatable in constitutional text,
specifically, in the Fourth Amendment, Albright forecloses his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
510 U.S. at 271.7 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment will be
dismissed.
3.

Federal Claims against Fort Bend County

Plaintiff sues Fort Bend County (“County”) and unspecified Doe defendants for the
failure to train investigators to exonerate the innocent (Count III) and to conduct proper police
line-ups (Count IV) in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. SAC ¶¶ 86-112, Counts III &
IV. He alleges that if County had trained its employees properly and the investigators had tested
the DNA in the apartment, they would have been able to exclude Plaintiff. He further alleges
that if the investigators had been trained in conducting proper line-ups the identification would
not have been tainted and he would not have been arrested.
“The first step in any [section 1983] claim is to identify the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 270. To establish liability for failure to train, a
plaintiff must show that: “(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate
official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the
plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.”
Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation

7

Cf. Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752, 764 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that plaintiff could proceed on his
Fourteenth Amendment claim where the Fourth Amendment claim was not available to him). In Cole, in
order to avoid the consequences of using deadly force against a troubled minor teenager, the police
allegedly engaged in a cover-up, fabricating evidence to frame the teen for assault on a police officer. Id.
at 755-56. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff had stated a substantive due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment based on the egregious circumstances in that case. Id. at 767. Cole is
distinguishable from this case on its facts; there is no allegation here that McKinnon made up a crime (it
is undisputed that Haye was actually robbed at gunpoint) or that McKinnon sought to deflect guilt or
liability from himself onto Plaintiff in order to avoid the consequences of his bad acts.

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omitted). To satisfy deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must “usually must demonstrate a
pattern of violations” and show that the defendant’s actions were “obviously likely to result in a
constitutional violation.” Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N Richland Hills, 406 F.3d
375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has
stressed that the pattern of violations must be of “similar incidents in which the citizens were
injured.” Id. at 382 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To support his claims against the County, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated when the County failed to train their investigators (1) to
exonerate the innocent and (2) to ensure that the photo line-ups are conducted properly. Plaintiff
fails to state valid claims against the County because (1) he states no viable constitutional
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) he does not plead facts that indicate that a
lack of specific training in these areas was due to the County’s deliberate indifference to its
citizens’ constitutional rights.
First, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims fail as a matter of law. As set forth
above, Plaintiff’s claims regarding his alleged unlawful prosecution find their moorings in the
Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271; accord Castellano, 352
F.3d at 953 (“Causing charges to be filed without probable cause will not without more violate
the Constitution.”). Furthermore, the failure to conduct a thorough investigation does not state a
constitutional claim. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (“Due process does not
require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of
convicting an innocent person.”); see also Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150-51 (5th Cir. 2004)
(allegations of an “unreasonable investigation” did not state a constitutional claim under section
1983). Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the County (and Does) did not have a continuing
23 / 26

duty to exonerate the innocent and to ensure that all investigations eliminate any and all
possibility of arresting and holding an innocent person over for trial. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145.
Second, Plaintiff does not plead facts that would show that the County failed to train its
investigators in deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens.

Without

elaboration, Plaintiff generally alleges that it is “highly predictable” that innocent citizens will be
convicted and that citizens are “frequently convicted and later determined to be innocent,” but
Plaintiff gives no specific examples where this has happened in Fort Bend County to establish a
pattern of violations. Estate of Davis, 406 F.3d at 381. Additionally, Plaintiff has alleged no
other incidents in which other citizens were similarly injured so as to support Plaintiff’s
conclusory claim that the County knew about the deficient training in investigative procedures
and did nothing. Id. at 382; Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Because Plaintiff fails to state an
underlying constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment against the County (and
Does) and fails to state facts to show deliberate indifference, his claims under section 1983
against the County (and Does) for failure to train (Counts III and IV) will be dismissed.
C.

State Law Claim under the Texas Constitution

According to Plaintiff, he asserts a “sole state law claim of manufactured probable cause
pursuant to the Texas Constitution,” and asserts no other state law claims. Docket Entry No. 41
(Response) at 11 (emphasis added); SAC ¶¶ 113-117 (Count V). He seeks money damages for
this claim against McKinnon and Does in their individual capacities. Response at 6; SAC ¶ 125.
“Generally, there is no private cause of action against a governmental entity or its
officials for money damages relating to alleged violations of Texas constitutional rights.”
Donohue v. Dominguez, 486 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. App.— San Antonio, Jan. 13, 2016, pet.
denied) (citing City of Arlington v. Randall, 301 S.W.3d 896, 906–07 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
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2009, pet. denied); Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 425 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Courtney, 946
S.W.2d 464, 468–69, 471 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied)). “[O]nly if the language
of the specific provisions involved clearly implies” a private action for damages does the Texas
Constitution create one. Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tex. 2004).
Although the Texas Supreme Court appears not to have squarely addressed whether there
is a private cause of action under the due course of law clause, numerous appellate courts,
applying the reasoning the Texas Supreme Court employed in Beaumont v. Boullion, 896 S.W.2d
143 (Tex. 1995), have concluded that the Texas Constitution does not provide a private cause of
action for money damages for violations of the due course of law clause. See Univ. of Texas Sys.
v. Courtney, 946 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (finding no
historical or textual basis to indicate that the Texas Constitution’s due process provision implies
a separate cause of action for damages) (citing Tex. Const. art. I, § 19; Arrington v. County of
Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir.1992)); Donohue, 486 S.W.3d at 56 (holding that the due
course of law, unreasonable search and seizure, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the
Texas Constitution do not “imply a private right of action for damages against the governmental
unit that would exist apart from the Texas Tort Claims Act”) (citing Courtney, 946 S.W.2d at
471; City of Webster v. Myers, 360 S.W.3d 51, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet.
denied)); Jefferson Cty. v. Nguyen, No. 09-13-00505-CV, 2015 WL 4597560, at *19 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont July 31, 2015, no pet.) (“A party may not bring a claim for money damages
under the Texas Constitution’s due process provision.”) (citing Smith v. City of League City, 338
S.W.3d 114, 127 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Courtney, 946 S.W.2d at 471).
The Court finds the above cases from the Texas intermediate appellate courts persuasive.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claim for damages for manufactured probable cause pursuant
to the Texas Constitution will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IV.

Conclusion and Order
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that:
1.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Docket
Entry No. 31) is DENIED as MOOT as superseded by Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.

2.

All claims against the unnamed Doe defendants are DISMISSED as barred by the
statute of limitations.

3.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 37) is GRANTED in part,
insofar as Plaintiff’s state constitutional claims are DISMISSED for failure to
state a claim; Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against McKinnon is
DISMISSED on the merits; and all of Plaintiff’s claims against Fort Bend County
are DISMISSED on the merits.

4.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 37) is DENIED in part
regarding Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against McKinnon under the Fourth
Amendment for unreasonable seizure in connection with his prosecution.

5.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss State Law Claims against the Individual
Defendants (Docket Entry No. 38) and to Dismiss Fort Bend County (Docket
Entry No. 39) pursuant to provisions in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code are DENIED as MOOT.
The Clerk will send a copy of this Order to all parties of record.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 16th day of August, 2016.
___________________________________
MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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