Longoria v. Stephens
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. This case is dismissed. Motion for Leave to Proceed as a Pauper 4 is GRANTED. Motion for Counsel 5 , Motion for Order to Show Cause 6 , and Motion for Preliminary Injunction 6 are DENIED as moot. A Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. (Signed by Judge Vanessa D Gilmore) Parties notified.(amwilliams, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
FERNANDO LONGORIA,
§
(TDCJ-CID #1904130)
§
§
Petitioner,
§
§
VS.
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-2922
§
WILLIAM STEPHENS,
§
§
Respondent.
§
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
Petitioner, Fernando Longoria, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
challenging a disciplinary conviction at the Beto I Unit ofthe Texas Department of Criminal JusticeCorrectional Institutions Division ("TDCJ-CID"). He is currently serving a sentence imposed by a
Texas state court.
The threshold issue is whether Longoria has stated meritorious grounds for federal habeas
relief. This court finds that he has not, and this petition should be dismissed. l
I.
Background
On April 28, 2014, prison officials at the Beto I Unit conducted a disciplinary hearing in
disciplinary case 20140242286. The hearing officer found Longoria guilty of possession of a cell
phone and charger. (Docket Entry No. 2, Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 1). Longoria's punishment
I A district court may examine habeas petitions before an answer or other responsive pleading is filed.
Kiser v. Johnson, 163 FJd 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999). Such a review is based on "the duty of the court to
screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by
ordering an unnecessary answer." 28 U.S.c. § 2254, Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes.
O:\RAO\vDG\201.1\1~~2922
aOI wpd
consisted ofa restriction for forty-five days; special cell restriction for forty-five days; placement in
solitary confinement for fourteen days; a reduction in custodial status from G4 to G5; and a reduction
in good time earning class status from Line 1 to Line 3.
On July 28,2014, this court received Longoria's federal petition. Longoria contends that his
conviction in disciplinary case 20140242286 is void. (Docket Entry No.1, Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, pp. 6-7).
II.
Analysis
Procedural protections in the context of prison discipline is not the same as due process in
the criminal law context because "[p ]rison discipline proceedings are not a part of a criminal
prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a criminal defendant does not apply." WolfJ v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,556 (1974). The Supreme Court has historically held that the Due Process
Clause is applicable to disciplinary proceedings where a prisoner is threatened with a loss of goodtime or the imposition of solitary confinement. Id. The Court held that inmates must be afforded
written notice of the claimed violation at least twenty-four hours before a disciplinary hearing, a
written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons, and the right to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence where such would not be unduly hazardous to
institutional safety or correctional goals.
The Supreme Court subsequently limited challenges to disciplinary cases in Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The Court referred to its discussion in WolfJv. McDonnell, regarding
solitary confinement as "dicta." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold that when discipline, even
segregated confinement, did not "present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state
O:IRAO\VDG\201..t\14-21J22.aOl.wpd
2
might conceivably create a liberty interest," there was no "protected liberty interest" that would
entitle the inmate to the procedural protections set forth in Wolff. ld. at 486.
The Fifth Circuit has applied Sandin to a number of situations. Punishment consisting of
placement in administrative segregation or the loss of the opportunity to earn good-time is not
enough to trigger the protection of the Constitution. Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1995). The
loss of the opportunity to earn good-time will not trigger the protection of the Constitution even
when an inmate is eligible for mandatory supervision. Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953 (5th Cir.
2000). The imposition of commissary and cell restrictions likewise will not trigger the protection
of the Constitution. Madison v. Parker, 104 FJd 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997). The loss of good-time
will not support relief to the extent that it adversely affects parole eligibility. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487.
However, the loss of good-time will trigger the protection of the Constitution if, and only if, a
prisoner is eligible for release on mandatory supervision. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d at 769.
Longoria's punishment consisted of a loss of privileges and placement in solitary
confinement. The restrictions on Longoria's privileges are merely changes in the conditions of his
confinement, which do not implicate due process concerns. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768
(5th Cir. 1997). They are not penalties that would be considered "the type of atypical, significant
deprivation" that would be actionable. Id. See also Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953,958 (5th Cir.
2000); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F .3d 612, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1996). The loss of the opportunity to earn
good-time as a result of the reduction in good time earning class status is not enough to trigger the
protection of the Constitution. Longoria did not. lose good time credits.
Longoria's federal petition does not present grounds warranting habeas relief.
O"\RAO\VDG\2014\1..J.-2922.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?