Gonzales v. Five Star Quality Care-TX LLC et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 5 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION MARTIN J. GONZALES, § § Plaintiff, § § § § § § § § v. SNH SE TENANT TRS, INC. and RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-3086 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff, Martin J. Gonzales, filed a First Amended Complaint on December 19, 2014 (Docket Entry No.4). alleges a tortious number of claims, including interference with contract court is Defendant SNH SE Tenant TRS, Plaintiff's complaint inter alia rights. a claim for Pending before the Inc. d/b/a The Gardens of Bellaire's Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Docket Entry No.5). The motion argues that the claim for tortious interference with contract rights asserted against The Gardens of Bellaire should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) claim for which relief Response on January 29, may 2015 be granted. for failure to state a Plaintiff (Docket Entry No. 11). filed his For the reasons explained below, the pending motion will be granted, and the claim for tortious interference with contract rights asserted against The Gardens of Bellaire will be dismissed with prejudice. I. Plaintiff Factual Allegationsl alleges that he was the common law husband of Lillian Hester, that in August of 2014 Hester fell, broke her hip, and required surgery, and that in early September of 2014 Hester was admitted for rehabilitation to an assisted living facility owned and operated by defendant SNH SE Tenant TRS, Inc. d/b/a The Gardens of Bellaire ("The Gardens"). Plaintiff alleges that Hester's surgery and pre-existing heart condition prompted her to contact her attorney to change her estate plan, Hester's attorney came testamentary wishes, to The Gardens to and that when carry out Hester's "no less than six (6) The Gardens personnel swarmed into [Hester's] small room and demanded that the lawyer and [the plaintiff] vacate the premises.,,2 Gardens threatened him with criminal Plaintiff alleges that The trespass charges if he returned to visit Hester, contacted the Bellaire police department and falsely represented that Texas Adult Protective Services had issued a protective order forbidding him from having contact with Hester. Plaintiff alleges that The Gardens' conduct caused him to suffer emotional strain sufficiently severe to send him to the emergency room in a state of nervous collapse. Plaintiff also alleges upon information and belief that The Gardens falsely told third parties that he was attempting to misappropriate Hester's funds. IFirst Amended Complaint, Docket Entry No.4, pp. 2-4 2rd. at 3 ~ 18. -2- ~~ 5-24. II. Standard of Review A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted tests the formal sufficiency of the pleadings and is "appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim." (5th Cir. 122 S. 2001), Ct. 2665 Ramming v. United States, cert. 281 F.3d 158, denied sub nom Cloud v. (2002). The court must 161 United States, accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 122 S. Ct. 992, 997 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974)). (2002) (quoting To avoid dismissal a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." S. Ct. 1955, 1974 "more than an accusation." (2007). This "plausibility standard" requires unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). III. The Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 Gardens argues that Analysis plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with contract rights is subj ect to dismissal with -3- prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6) because "there is no basis for Plaintiff's claim that Defendant tortiously interfered with a contract considered a contract in Texas."3 529, 540 (Tex. Civ. App. - because marriage is not Citing Gowin v. Gowin, 264 S.W. Fort Worth 1924), aff'd, 292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927), The Gardens argues that [a]lthough some courts have referred to marriage as a "civil contract," Texas courts have long recognized that the purpose of referring to marriage as a civil contract is to negate the idea that it is "an ecclesiastical sacrament" and, therefore, is not subject to the control of churches or sects.4 Citing McGinley v. McGinley, 295 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), The Gardens stresses that in Texas, "marriage is not, in and of itself, PaineWebber, a contract vesting rights in the parties."s Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815, 824 Citing (E.D. Tex. 2001), The Gardens argues that Federal courts also acknowledge that Texas regards marriage as a status, not as a contract. 6 Plaintiff responds that "[d]efendant has not cited a single authority for the proposition that a wrongdoer may interfere with a couple's marriage relationship with impunity."7 Citing Esparza 3Defendant SNH SE Tenant TRS, Inc. d/b/a The Gardens of Bellaire's Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim ("Defendant's Motion to Dismiss"), Docket Entry No.5, p. 3 , 6. 4Id. at 4 , 8. SId. 7Gonzales' Response to Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiff's Response"), Docket Entry No. II, p. 7 , 25. -4 - v. Esparza, 382 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1964, no writ), for that court's observation that an element informal marriage is an agreement of the parties, of an and asserting that he and Hester agreed to be married and considered themselves married, plaintiff argues that his marriage to Hester "was contract because it arose from the agreement of the parties. a ,,8 Plaintiff argues that The Gardens wrongfully interfered with his marital relationship with Hester by falsely telling the police that Texas Adult Protective Services had issued an order "protecting" Hester from him and threatening him with criminal trespass charges if he visited Hester. 9 Plaintiff argues that The Gardens' actions "separated a loving couple and made it impossible for [him] to have the normal companionship of a husband with his wife, including keeping her company and comforting her as her health declined. ,,10 Texas courts recognize a claim for tortious interference with contract rights. A party alleging tortious interference with contract rights under Texas law must plead and prove four elements: (1) that a contract subj ect to interference exists; (2) that the alleged act of interference was willful and intentional; (3) that the willful and intentional act proximately caused damage; and (4) that actual damage or loss occurred. 8Id. ~ 24. -5- ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997) (citing Juliette Fowler Homes v. Welch Associates, 793 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tex. 1990)). this cause of "[I]f a plaintiff establishes the elements of action, a defendant may still prevail establishing the affirmative defense of justification." upon Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1996). Plaintiff's attempt to base such a claim on the existence of a marriage has no merit, however, because a marriage contract is not a contract subject to interference under Texas law. 292 S.W. at 214-15 (absent prayer for divorce, cause of action against one another for contract); Hogue v. Hogue, 242 S.W.2d 673, Dallas 1951, no writ) spouses have no breach of 676 See Gowin, a marriage (Tex. Civ. App. - (a marriage contract contemplates existence of an agreement to be married so long as the parties live, unlike an ordinary contract, cannot be dissolved by that mutual consent); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1976, no writ) ("Texas does not regard the marital relationship as a contract vesting rights in the parties so as to preclude the retroactive application of amendments to the laws which govern that relationship."). The Texas Supreme Court has long recognized the marital relationship as "the primary familial interest recognized by the courts." Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978). The Court has also recognized that "[t]he remedy for the negligent -6- or intentional impairment of this relationship is a tort action for loss of consortium." Id. In Whittlesey the Texas Supreme Court observed that [c] onsortium has been the subj ect of many different definitions by the courts, but it can generally be defined to include the mutual right of the husband and wife to that affection, solace, comfort, companionship, society, assistance, and sexual relations necessary to a successful marriage. Id. The Court explained that [t] he phrase "loss of consortium" is more accurately described as an element of damage rather than a cause of action. But courts have so frequently used the phrase to denote those actions in which loss of consortium is the major element of damage that "loss of consortium" has come to be referred to as a cause of action. Id. at n.1. damages Texas courts do not recognize a right of recovery for arising from interferences with familial relationships between a husband and wife that do not rise to the level of loss of See Transportation Insurance Company v. Archer, consortium. S.W.2d 403 a wife In Archer (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) sued her husband's familial interference. workers' compensation 832 insurer for Reasoning that interference with the family relationship may occur without substantially impairing the elements constituting loss of consortium, the court held that conduct causing loss of consortium constitutes familial interference but that interference consortium. alone Id. at 405. is not the equivalent of loss of See Helena Laboratories Corp. v. Snyder, 886 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. 1994) (no cause of action for negligent -7- interference with S. W. 2d 793 786, (recognizing family (Tex. intentional relationship); App. Fort Stites Worth v. 1994, Gillum, writ 872 denied) infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action that might be available to a spouse seeking damages from a third party) . Plaintiff in the present case bases his claim for tortious interference with contract rights on allegations that The Gardens' actions deprived him of Hester's companionship. In Whittlesey the Court recognized that claims for loss of consortium are derivative claims that do not lie absent an underlying personal injury claim belonging to the other spouse. Thus, in order to recover damages for loss of consortium a spouse asserting a derivative claim for loss of consortium must first prove that the defendant is also liable to the injured other spouse for personal injuries causing loss of consortium. (Tex. 2013) See Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 195 (describing "[l]oss of companionship [a]s a component of loss of consortium - a form of personal-injury damage, not property damage - and something we have 'narrowly cabined' to two building-block child"). human relationships: husband-wife and parent- Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract rights arising from a contract of marriage appears to be an artful attempt to assert a claim for loss of consortium without having to allege or prove that The Gardens is liable for a physical injury to Hester. Accordingly, Defendant SNH SE Tenant TRS, Inc. d/b/a The Gardens of -8- Gardens of Bellaire's Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Docket Entry No.5) is GRANTED. SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 9th day of March, 2015. /' SIM LAKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -9-

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