Gonzales v. Five Star Quality Care-TX LLC et al
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 5 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MARTIN J. GONZALES,
§
§
Plaintiff,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
v.
SNH SE TENANT TRS, INC.
and RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-3086
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Martin J. Gonzales, filed a First Amended Complaint
on December 19, 2014 (Docket Entry No.4).
alleges
a
tortious
number of
claims,
including
interference with contract
court is Defendant SNH SE Tenant TRS,
Plaintiff's complaint
inter alia
rights.
a
claim for
Pending before the
Inc. d/b/a The Gardens of
Bellaire's Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim (Docket Entry No.5).
The motion argues that the claim for
tortious interference with contract rights asserted against The
Gardens of Bellaire should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6)
claim
for
which
relief
Response on January 29,
may
2015
be
granted.
for failure to state a
Plaintiff
(Docket Entry No.
11).
filed
his
For the
reasons explained below, the pending motion will be granted, and
the claim for tortious interference with contract rights asserted
against The Gardens of Bellaire will be dismissed with prejudice.
I.
Plaintiff
Factual Allegationsl
alleges
that
he
was
the
common
law husband of
Lillian Hester, that in August of 2014 Hester fell, broke her hip,
and required surgery, and that in early September of 2014 Hester
was admitted for rehabilitation to an assisted living facility
owned and operated by defendant SNH SE Tenant TRS, Inc. d/b/a The
Gardens
of
Bellaire
("The
Gardens").
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Hester's surgery and pre-existing heart condition prompted her to
contact her attorney to change her estate plan,
Hester's
attorney
came
testamentary wishes,
to
The
Gardens
to
and that when
carry
out
Hester's
"no less than six (6) The Gardens personnel
swarmed into [Hester's] small room and demanded that the lawyer and
[the plaintiff] vacate the premises.,,2
Gardens
threatened
him
with
criminal
Plaintiff alleges that The
trespass
charges
if
he
returned to visit Hester, contacted the Bellaire police department
and falsely represented that Texas Adult Protective Services had
issued a protective order forbidding him from having contact with
Hester.
Plaintiff alleges that The Gardens' conduct caused him to
suffer emotional strain sufficiently severe to send him to the
emergency room in a state of nervous collapse.
Plaintiff also
alleges upon information and belief that The Gardens falsely told
third parties that he was attempting to misappropriate Hester's
funds.
IFirst Amended Complaint, Docket Entry No.4, pp. 2-4
2rd. at 3 ~ 18.
-2-
~~
5-24.
II.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted tests the
formal
sufficiency of the pleadings and is
"appropriate when a
defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally
cognizable claim."
(5th Cir.
122
S.
2001),
Ct.
2665
Ramming v. United States,
cert.
281 F.3d 158,
denied sub nom Cloud v.
(2002).
The
court
must
161
United States,
accept
the
factual
allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff's favor.
Id.
When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a
complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by
affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a
limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled
to offer evidence to support the claims.
Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A.,
122 S. Ct.
992,
997
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974)).
(2002)
(quoting
To avoid dismissal
a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face."
S. Ct.
1955,
1974
"more
than
an
accusation."
(2007).
This "plausibility standard" requires
unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
III.
The
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127
Gardens
argues
that
Analysis
plaintiff's
claim
for
tortious
interference with contract rights is subj ect to dismissal with
-3-
prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12 (b) (6)
because "there is no basis for Plaintiff's claim that Defendant
tortiously interfered with a
contract
considered a contract in Texas."3
529, 540
(Tex. Civ. App. -
because marriage
is
not
Citing Gowin v. Gowin, 264 S.W.
Fort Worth 1924), aff'd, 292 S.W. 211
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1927), The Gardens argues that
[a]lthough some courts have referred to marriage as a
"civil contract," Texas courts have long recognized that
the purpose of referring to marriage as a civil contract
is to negate the idea that it is "an ecclesiastical
sacrament" and, therefore, is not subject to the control
of churches or sects.4
Citing McGinley v. McGinley, 295 S.W.2d 913,
915
(Tex. Civ. App.
1956), The Gardens stresses that in Texas, "marriage is not, in and
of itself,
PaineWebber,
a contract vesting rights in the parties."s
Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815, 824
Citing
(E.D. Tex. 2001),
The Gardens argues that Federal courts also acknowledge that Texas
regards marriage as a status, not as a contract. 6
Plaintiff responds that "[d]efendant has not cited a single
authority for the proposition that a wrongdoer may interfere with
a couple's marriage relationship with impunity."7
Citing Esparza
3Defendant SNH SE Tenant TRS, Inc. d/b/a The Gardens of
Bellaire's Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim ("Defendant's Motion to Dismiss"), Docket Entry No.5, p. 3
,
6.
4Id. at 4 , 8.
SId.
7Gonzales' Response to Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss
("Plaintiff's Response"), Docket Entry No. II, p. 7 , 25.
-4 -
v. Esparza, 382 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1964,
no writ),
for
that
court's
observation that
an element
informal marriage is an agreement of the parties,
of
an
and asserting
that he and Hester agreed to be married and considered themselves
married,
plaintiff
argues
that
his
marriage
to
Hester
"was
contract because it arose from the agreement of the parties.
a
,,8
Plaintiff argues that The Gardens wrongfully interfered with his
marital relationship with Hester by falsely telling the police that
Texas Adult Protective Services had issued an order "protecting"
Hester from him and threatening him with criminal trespass charges
if he visited Hester. 9 Plaintiff argues that The Gardens' actions
"separated a loving couple and made it impossible for [him] to have
the normal companionship of a husband with his wife,
including
keeping her company and comforting her as her health declined.
,,10
Texas courts recognize a claim for tortious interference with
contract
rights.
A party alleging
tortious
interference with
contract rights under Texas law must plead and prove four elements:
(1) that a contract subj ect to interference exists;
(2) that the alleged act of interference was willful and
intentional; (3) that the willful and intentional act
proximately caused damage; and (4) that actual damage or
loss occurred.
8Id.
~
24.
-5-
ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997)
(citing Juliette Fowler Homes v. Welch Associates, 793 S.W.2d 660,
665
(Tex. 1990)).
this
cause
of
"[I]f a plaintiff establishes the elements of
action,
a
defendant
may
still
prevail
establishing the affirmative defense of justification."
upon
Texas Beef
Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1996).
Plaintiff's attempt to base such a claim on the existence of
a marriage has no merit, however, because a marriage contract is
not a contract subject to interference under Texas law.
292 S.W.
at 214-15
(absent prayer for divorce,
cause of
action against
one
another
for
contract); Hogue v. Hogue, 242 S.W.2d 673,
Dallas 1951, no writ)
spouses have no
breach of
676
See Gowin,
a
marriage
(Tex. Civ. App. -
(a marriage contract contemplates existence
of an agreement to be married so long as the parties live,
unlike
an
ordinary
contract,
cannot
be
dissolved
by
that
mutual
consent); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.
- Corpus Christi 1976, no writ)
("Texas does not regard the marital
relationship as a contract vesting rights in the parties so as to
preclude the retroactive application of amendments to the laws
which govern that relationship.").
The
Texas
Supreme
Court
has
long
recognized
the
marital
relationship as "the primary familial interest recognized by the
courts."
Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665,
666
(Tex. 1978).
The Court has also recognized that "[t]he remedy for the negligent
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or intentional impairment of this relationship is a tort action for
loss of consortium."
Id.
In Whittlesey the Texas Supreme Court
observed that
[c] onsortium has been the subj ect of many different
definitions by the courts, but it can generally be
defined to include the mutual right of the husband and
wife to that affection, solace, comfort, companionship,
society, assistance, and sexual relations necessary to a
successful marriage.
Id.
The Court explained that
[t] he phrase "loss of consortium" is more accurately
described as an element of damage rather than a cause of
action. But courts have so frequently used the phrase to
denote those actions in which loss of consortium is the
major element of damage that "loss of consortium" has
come to be referred to as a cause of action.
Id. at n.1.
damages
Texas courts do not recognize a right of recovery for
arising
from
interferences with
familial
relationships
between a husband and wife that do not rise to the level of loss of
See Transportation Insurance Company v. Archer,
consortium.
S.W.2d 403
a
wife
In Archer
(Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1992, writ denied)
sued
her
husband's
familial interference.
workers'
compensation
832
insurer
for
Reasoning that interference with the family
relationship may occur without substantially impairing the elements
constituting
loss
of
consortium,
the
court
held
that
conduct
causing loss of consortium constitutes familial interference but
that
interference
consortium.
alone
Id. at 405.
is
not
the
equivalent
of
loss
of
See Helena Laboratories Corp. v. Snyder,
886 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. 1994)
(no cause of action for negligent
-7-
interference
with
S. W. 2d
793
786,
(recognizing
family
(Tex.
intentional
relationship);
App.
Fort
Stites
Worth
v.
1994,
Gillum,
writ
872
denied)
infliction of emotional distress as a
cause of action that might be available to a spouse seeking damages
from a third party) .
Plaintiff in the present case bases his claim for tortious
interference with contract rights on allegations that The Gardens'
actions deprived him of Hester's companionship.
In Whittlesey the
Court recognized that claims for loss of consortium are derivative
claims that do not lie absent an underlying personal injury claim
belonging to the other spouse.
Thus, in order to recover damages
for loss of consortium a spouse asserting a derivative claim for
loss of consortium must first prove that the defendant is also
liable to the injured other spouse for personal injuries causing
loss of consortium.
(Tex. 2013)
See Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 195
(describing "[l]oss of companionship [a]s a component
of loss of consortium -
a
form of personal-injury damage,
not
property damage - and something we have 'narrowly cabined' to two
building-block
child").
human
relationships:
husband-wife
and
parent-
Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract rights arising
from a contract of marriage appears to be an artful attempt to
assert a claim for loss of consortium without having to allege or
prove that The Gardens is liable for a physical injury to Hester.
Accordingly, Defendant SNH SE Tenant TRS, Inc. d/b/a The Gardens of
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Gardens of Bellaire's Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim (Docket Entry No.5)
is GRANTED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 9th day of March, 2015.
/'
SIM LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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