Covington v. Colvin
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION granting 13 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment ,denying 11 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy K. Johnson) Parties notified.(sjones, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
TIFFANY DANIELLE COVINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-3414
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the court1 are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment
(Doc.
11)
and
Judgment (Doc. 13).
Defendant’s
Cross-Motion
for
Summary
The court has considered the motions, the
responses, the administrative record,2 and the applicable law.
For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s
motion and GRANTS Defendant’s motion.
I. Case Background
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of an unfavorable decision by
the
Commissioner
of
the
Social
Security
Administration
(“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) regarding Plaintiff’s claim for
supplemental
security
income
under
Title
II
and
Title
XVI,
respectively, of the Social Security Act (the “SSA”).
1
The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned magistrate judge
for all proceedings, including trial and final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Doc. 9, Doc. 10.
A.
Medical History
Plaintiff was born on February 19, 1982, and was twenty-nine
years
old
on
the
date
of
the
alleged
onset
of
disability.3
Plaintiff had an electrical engineering degree and had taken
classes for one semester towards a specialization certificate.4
Plaintiff had previous work experience as a cashier, a stocking
clerk,
technical
support
representative,
field
engineer,
and
process operator.5
On October 17, 2011, Plaintiff was admitted to the emergency
room at St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital with numbness in both
thighs lasting for three days.6
John Stroh Jr., M.D., observed
that Plaintiff suffered decreased sensation in both thighs but
retained
full
radiologist
motor
who
did
control.7
not
Plaintiff
observe
abnormality, or destructive lesion.8
any
was
referred
fracture,
to
a
alignment
Visveshwar Baskaran, M.D.,
took a magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) of the lumbar spine
which showed mild lower lumbar facet arthropathy from L3-4 to L5-
3
See Doc. 6, Tr. Of the Admin. Proceedings (“Tr.”) 19.
4
See Tr. 17.
5
See Tr. 195.
6
See Tr. 238, 249.
7
See Tr. 238.
8
See Tr. 239.
2
S1 along with mild nerve compression.9
Plaintiff was prescribed
Norco and Medrol and was referred to a neurologist.10
On January 13, 2012, Plaintiff went to Ben Taub General
Hospital (“Ben Taub”) with complaints of numbness and tingling in
her arms and legs.11
She stated that the tingling in her legs
began after an epidural in August 2009.12
Plaintiff stated that
she had experienced continuous tingling for a week and a half.13
Plaintiff recounted that she had lost a dress size with no change
in diet or exercise.14
Michael Gonzalez, M.D., reported that
Plaintiff had decreased limb sensation, more severely in her
right leg.15
Plaintiff denied loss of strength but reported
feeling “unbalanced.”16
On January 27, 2012, Plaintiff had a follow-up exam at Ben
Taub.17
Larry Mortazavi, M.D., (“Dr. Mortazavi”) performed a
physical examination of Plaintiff and found decreased sensation
in both legs, particularly the left, and a slightly positive
9
See Tr. 240.
10
See Tr. 246.
11
See Tr. 261.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
See Tr. 262.
16
See id.
17
See Tr. 271.
3
Romberg
exam.18
Dr.
Mortazavi
noted
that
Plaintiff
reported
dizziness when her eyes were closed but denied anxiety related to
walking in darkness.19
loss
in
her
He noted that Plaintiff had no strength
extremities.20
Dr.
Mortazavi
recommended
Electromyography (“EMG”) testing, an MRI of the thoracic and
cervical
spine,
and
blood
serum
level
tests.21
He
instructed
Plaintiff to visit the emergency room if she experienced any new
symptoms.22
On March 5, 2012, Plaintiff was given an MRI.23
Thomas
Saadeh, M.D., (“Dr. Saadeh”) reviewed Plaintiff’s MRI and noted
cervical
cord
lesions
consistent
with
multiple
sclerosis
(“MS”).24
On
March
23,
2012,
Plaintiff
returned
complaining of progressive weight loss.25
to
Ben
Taub,
Corey Goldsmith, M.D.,
(“Dr. Goldsmith”) reported that Plaintiff’s limb numbness was
18
See Tr. 257.
19
See Tr. 256.
20
See Tr. 259.
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
See Tr. 294.
24
See Tr. 294-97.
25
See Tr. 284.
4
unchanged.26
Dr. Goldsmith opined that Plaintiff’s symptoms were
consistent with MS, vasculitis, or metastasis.27
Plaintiff was
prescribed baclofen, a muscle relaxant.28
On
April
Goldsmith.29
17,
2012,
a
brain
MRI
was
ordered
by
Dr.
Dr. Goldsmith found that Plaintiff was positive for
lesions consistent with MS.30
Dr. Goldman discussed MS with
Plaintiff and discussed possible treatments.31
Plaintiff showed
no new symptoms and it was noted that baclofen had improved her
muscle
spasticity
and
gait.32
Plaintiff
was
also
prescribed
interferon beta 1a.33
On August 10, 2012, Plaintiff returned to Ben Taub.34
Dr.
Goldsmith noted that Plaintiff was “doing quite well,” that her
gait had improved, and that she did not report fatigue.35
Goldsmith
observed
26
See Tr. 286.
29
See Tr. 279.
30
See Tr. 280.
31
See Tr. 279.
32
See Tr. 279-280.
33
See Tr. 279.
34
See Tr. 315-21.
35
was
See id.
28
there
See id.
27
that
See Tr. 318.
5
no
loss
of
strength
Dr.
in
Plaintiff’s extremities, and Plaintiff reported that the tingling
sensation
had
improved.36
Dr.
Goldsmith
renewed
Plaintiff’s
prescription for Avonex.37
On September 21, 2012, Plaintiff visited UT Physicians to
establish a treatment plan for MS.38
She was examined by Carman
Whiting, M.D., (“Dr. Whiting”) who noted that Plaintiff still
suffered from limb numbness and tingling, but reported that she
felt much better, which she attributed to her medications.39
Whiting
stated
regularly.40
that
Dr.
Plaintiff
Whiting
indicated
noted
that
she
was
Plaintiff
functional” but still experienced pain at times.41
Dr.
exercising
was
“more
Dr. Whiting
observed that Plaintiff had a slightly abnormal gait, but that
Plaintiff displayed no other symptoms.42
On October 31, 2012, Plaintiff returned to UT Physicians
where she was seen by John Lindsey, M.D., (“Dr. Lindsey”) for a
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See Tr. 358.
39
See Tr. 359.
40
See Tr. 358.
41
See id.
42
See id.
6
follow-up
exam.43
Plaintiff
complained
of
numbness
from
the
waist down and in her hands, mild urinary urgency, and headaches
that
occurred
twice
a
week
that
responded
ibuprofen.44
to
Plaintiff also complained of recent weight gain.45
Plaintiff’s
interferon prescription was renewed.46
On
November
14,
2012,
Plaintiff
visited
UT
Physicians
emergency room following a minor car crash caused by a temporary
loss of consciousness while driving.47
Dr. Lindsey opined that
the episode was caused by syncope related to medication rather
than seizure.48
On January 10, 2013 in a follow-up visit with Dr. Lindsey,
Plaintiff
complained
of
urinary
urgency
2013,
Plaintiff
and
was
prescribed
oxybutynin.49
On
January
24,
electroencephalogram (“EEG”).50
43
See id.
45
See id.
46
See id.
47
See Tr. 333.
48
See Tr. 336.
49
See Tr. 336.
50
given
an
The EEG revealed no epileptic
See Tr. 343.
44
was
See Tr. 325.
7
activity, but did reveal disturbances in the left central and
left temporal regions consistent with MS.51
On January 25, 2013, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lindsey and
complained of leg pain which affected both the feet and knees.52
On February 21, 2013, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Lindsey that she
was unable to run because of poor balance and complained of
headaches that lasted all day and were present most days.53
On March 3, 2013, Plaintiff saw Carman Whiting, M.D., (“Dr.
Whiting”)
completed
regarding
the
paperwork.54
disability
paperwork
on
March
11,
2013.55
Dr.
Dr.
Whiting
Whiting
reported Plaintiff’s symptoms as pain in hands, feet, and back,
along with tingling in the legs and feet.56
Dr. Whiting stated
that Plaintiff was in “constant” pain and that it was diffused
among the hands, legs, and feet.57
Dr. Whiting listed walking as
a precipitating factor and stated that Plaintiff’s fatigue was a
51
See Tr. 325-326.
52
See id.
53
See id.
54
See Tr. 328.
55
See Tr. 374.
56
See Tr. 368.
57
See id.
8
ten on a ten-point scale and her pain was a nine on a ten-point
scale.58
Dr. Whiting opined that Plaintiff was able to sit for one
hour and stand and walk for one hour in an eight-hour workday.59
Dr. Whiting stated Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry
between
zero
and
five
pounds.60
Dr.
Whiting
indicated
that
Plaintiff would have significant limitations reaching, handling,
fingering,
or
lifting,
but
did
not
provide
a
supporting
explanation.61
Dr. Whiting opined that Plaintiff would have to
take
fifteen-to-thirty
repeated
minute
breaks
in
a
work-like
setting and would need to miss work more than three times per
month.62
Dr. Whiting reported that these symptoms applied as of
September 21, 2012,63 the date of Plaintiff’s initial appointment
with Dr. Whiting.64
laboratory
or
Dr. Whiting noted that she did not have any
diagnostic
test
results
that
demonstrated
supported her diagnosis.65
58
See Tr. 369.
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
See Tr. 370.
62
See Tr. 372-73.
63
Dr. Whiting’s notes erroneously list the date as September 21, 2013.
64
See Tr. 373.
65
See Tr. 368.
9
or
On March 8, 2013, Dr. Lindsey completed a MS impairment
questionnaire
Plaintiff’s
suffered
Plaintiff’s
prognosis
from
problems,
as
fatigue,
sensitivity
dexterity.67
balance
on
as
behalf.66
guarded
numbness,
to
heat,
and
Dr.
noted
balance
and
Lindsey
evaluated
that
Plaintiff
problems,
impairment
bladder
of
manual
Dr. Lindsey rated fatigue, numbness, and impaired
Plaintiff’s
primary
symptoms.68
According
to
Dr.
Lindsey, Plaintiff’s symptoms and functional limitations were
reasonably consistent with her physical impairments described in
the evaluation.69
Dr. Lindsey opined that Plaintiff’s symptoms
were severe enough to interfere with attention and concentration,
that Plaintiff could work in a low-stress environment, needed to
be absent from work due to her symptoms less than once a month,
and
needed
bending,
to
and
avoid
temperature
stooping.70
Dr.
extremes,
Lindsey
heights,
further
pushing,
opined
that
Plaintiff was capable of sitting for six hours a day and standing
up to one hour in an eight-hour workday, but that Plaintiff was
66
See Tr. 360-66.
67
See Tr. 360.
68
See Tr. 361.
69
See Tr. 362.
70
See Tr. 361-65.
10
able to sit continuously in a work setting.71
Dr. Lindsey opined
that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry between fiveand-ten pounds.72
B.
Application to Social Security Administration
Plaintiff
protectively
applied
for
disability
insurance
benefits and supplemental security income benefits on February 1,
2012.73
Plaintiff
claimed
she
was
disabled
due
numbness” with an onset date of October 17, 2011.74
to
“body
Plaintiff
stated that she was taking medications for pain and numbness.75
On April 29, 2012, Plaintiff completed a function report
outlining her daily activities.76
condition
caused
hand
ability to walk.77
numbness
Plaintiff reported that her
and
affected
her
balance
and
She described her daily routine as waking up
with her daughter, getting ready for the day, eating breakfast,
and getting dressed.78
71
See Tr. 364.
72
See Tr. 365.
73
See Tr. 139, 146.
74
See Tr. 159, 163.
75
See Tr. 165.
76
See Tr. 187-94.
77
See Tr. 187.
78
She was able to prepare lunch for her
See Tr. 188.
11
daughter and take a nap, then interacted with her daughter until
it was time to prepare dinner.79
care
of
herself
and
her
Plaintiff stated that she took
two-year-old
daughter.80
explained that she had problems walking and driving.81
Plaintiff
She was
able to do laundry once a week, clean twice a week, and vacuum
thirty minutes per day.82
Plaintiff reported that she was able
to go shopping once a week.83
Plaintiff talked to others daily
by phone and attended church every week.84
Plaintiff reported
that lifting, squatting, bending, standing, sitting and kneeling
had to be done slowly because sudden movements caused leg pain.85
Plaintiff reported that she had no problems paying attention,
getting
along
with
authority
figures,
or
following
instructions.86
On April 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a work history report
that listed her previous jobs as an associate service consultant,
79
See id.
80
See id.
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
See Tr. 190.
84
See Tr. 191.
85
See Tr. 192.
86
See Tr. 193.
12
technical support associate, cashier, stock-room associate, and
worker.87
assembly-line
As
an
associate
service
consultant,
Plaintiff worked full time performing site surveys and had to
lift and walk with a bag of tools at construction sites.88
As a
technical support associate, Plaintiff sat eight hours in an
office environment documenting customer phone calls.89
position
as
a
stock
room
associate,
Plaintiff
transported delivery boxes to the sales floor.90
In her
unloaded
and
As a cashier,
Plaintiff had to stand four-to-eight hours per day and walk fourto-eight hours per day, never lifting more than ten pounds.91
Plaintiff also worked at Texas Instruments as an assembly-line
worker, loading and unloading small parts.92
Plaintiff walked
and stood twelve hours per day and never lifted more than ten
pounds.93
87
See Tr. 195.
88
See Tr. 196.
89
See Tr. 197.
90
See id.
91
See Tr. 200.
92
See Tr. 199.
93
See id.
13
On May 30, 2012, Scott Spoor, M.D., (“Dr. Spoor”) evaluated
Plaintiff’s physical residual functional capacity (“RFC”).94
Dr.
Spoor found that Plaintiff was able to occasionally lift twenty
pounds, frequently lift ten pounds, stand for at least two hours
per
day,
and
sit
for
six
hours
per
day.95
He
found
that
Plaintiff could only occasionally crawl, crouch, kneel, or climb,
but that she had no visual, communicative, environmental, or
manipulative
limitations.96
Dr.
Spoor
concluded
that
the
plaintiff’s allegations were partially supported by evidence of
record.97
Defendant denied Plaintiff’s application at the initial and
reconsideration levels.98
an
Administrative
Law
Plaintiff requested a hearing before
Judge
(“ALJ”)
of
the
SSA.99
The
ALJ
granted Plaintiff’s request and conducted a hearing on August 26,
2013.100
C.
Hearing
94
See Tr. 307-14.
95
See Tr. 308.
96
See Tr. 309-11.
97
See Tr. 314.
98
See Tr. 73-80, 85-90.
99
See Tr. 91.
100
See Tr. 25-66.
14
Plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the
hearing.101
Additionally present on Plaintiff’s behalf was a non-
attorney representative.102
Plaintiff
first
testified
about
her
work
Plaintiff worked as a stocker and cashier in 1999.104
history.103
Following
that job, Plaintiff worked as a process operator, working twelvehour shifts which required her to stand, loading and unloading a
machine that built micro-processing wafers in a clean room.105
Plaintiff testified that she worked for Ross in the stock room
and as a cashier.106
Following her work with Ross, Plaintiff
testified that she worked in tech support for almost a year.107
Plaintiff last worked as a service consultant, surveying and
measuring outdoor fields for almost two years, last working in
2008.108
101
See Tr. 25.
102
See Tr. 27.
103
See Tr. 30-34.
104
See Tr. 34.
105
See Tr. 33.
106
See Tr. 31.
107
See Tr. 31-32.
108
See Tr. 32.
15
The VE testified regarding Plaintiff’s work history.109 The
VE
stated
that
Plaintiff’s
work
as
a
customer
service
representative was sedentary and skilled, her work as a cashier
and process operator was light and unskilled, and her work as a
service consultant was light and skilled.110
Following the VE’s testimony, Plaintiff testified that she
was thirty-one years old and had an electrical engineering degree
from Prairie View A&M University.111
did
not
smoke
occasionally
or
drank
use
Plaintiff stated that she
recreational
alcohol.112
drugs,
Plaintiff
although
testified
that
she
she
received Medicaid and lived with her grandmother and four-yearold daughter.113
Plaintiff stated that she had a driver’s license
and a vehicle.114
Plaintiff testified that she was off work for a period of
time after the birth of her child and then did not return to work
after her child was diagnosed with cancer.115
109
See Tr. 34.
110
See Tr. 35.
111
See id.
112
See Tr. 36.
113
See id.
114
See id.
115
See Tr. 37-38.
16
Plaintiff stated
that she was unable to work following her daughter’s recovery due
to
Plaintiff’s
MS
diagnosis
and
body
numbness.116
Plaintiff
testified that she felt her thinking had slowed and that routine
actions took more time.117 Plaintiff stated that she took Avonex
to
treat
her
MS,
as
well
as
gabapentin,
oxybutynin,
nortriptyline, and ibuprofen.118
Plaintiff testified that she spent her day caring for her
daughter, that she did minimal housework and cooking, and allowed
her grandmother or her mother to do the majority of the cooking
and cleaning.119
Plaintiff testified that she last lived alone in
2008.120
Plaintiff stated that she did not receive child support,
and that she had not made efforts to obtain it through the
courts.121
The child’s father worked and occasionally visited.122
116
See Tr. 38.
117
See id.
118
See Tr. 38-39.
119
See Tr. 39-40.
120
See Tr. 40.
121
See id.
122
See Tr. 40-41.
17
Plaintiff said that she used her computer, read books and
magazines, and watched TV.123
Plaintiff testified that while
looking for a job she took online classes, but that she quit
after one semester.124
Plaintiff
testified
that
she
following an epidural in 2009.125
first
experienced
numbness
She stated that her neurologist
told her that the epidural could have been a trigger for MS.126
Plaintiff stated that she became disabled in October 2011 after
her numbness escalated.127
Plaintiff explained that the right
side of her body felt heavier than the left and her legs felt
like weights, although the medicine she was taking helped her
maintain balance.128
Plaintiff also said that she had issues with
weight fluctuation as she had unexpectedly lost forty pounds
which she eventually regained.129
Plaintiff testified that she
had constant numbness in her hands as well as stiffness and
123
See Tr. 41.
124
See Tr. 41-42.
125
See Tr. 43.
126
See Tr. 44.
127
See id.
128
See Tr. 45.
129
See Tr. 46.
18
tremors.130 Plaintiff estimated that she could not lift more than
five pounds and that she could not lift her daughter.131
Plaintiff
benefits.132
of
stated
that
her
daughter
received
disability
Plaintiff testified that her mother helped take care
Plaintiff,
the
house,
and
Plaintiff’s
daughter,
did
the
cooking and cleaning, and took care of Plaintiff’s grandmother.133
Plaintiff explained that her mother was paid to watch Plaintiff’s
child and grandmother.134
Plaintiff testified that she could type on a computer for
about
ten
minutes
numbness.135
driven
before
she
had
to
take
a
break
due
to
Plaintiff stated that was able to drive but had not
since
an
accident
in
January
when
she
blacked
out.136
According to Plaintiff, she was told that the blackout was caused
by not drinking enough water with medication.137
130
See Tr. 47.
131
See Tr. 48.
132
See id.
133
See Tr. 49.
134
See id.
135
See Tr. 50.
136
See Tr. 50-51.
137
See Tr. 51.
19
P l a i n t i f f
testified that she took nortriptyline every day for headaches.138
According
to
Plaintiff,
her
headaches
were
near-constant.139
Plaintiff said that during an eight-hour period, she would spend
four-to-five hours lying down.140 Plaintiff testified that before
her hospitalization, she took care of herself and did the cooking
and cleaning.141
After her hospitalization, she attempted to
continue the same tasks but had to take breaks due to leg pain.142
Plaintiff stated that she would have to take six breaks while
cleaning the living room.143
Plaintiff further stated that she could sit for fifteen to
twenty minutes before she needed to get up.144
She stated that
walking decreased the pain that she would normally experience
from standing.145 Plaintiff stated that she wanted to have another
138
See id.
139
See Tr. 51-52.
140
See id.
141
See Tr. 53.
142
See id.
143
See Tr. 53-54.
144
See Tr. 54.
145
See Tr. 54-55.
20
child in the future because she had been told that having a child
sometimes improved MS symptoms.146
The ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical individual of
the same age, education, and work history, limited to sitting six
hours, standing and walking six hours, lifting twenty pounds
occasionally could perform past work.147
The VE testified that
with these limitations, an individual would be unable to perform
any
of
Plaintiff’s
past
work.148
However,
the
VE
found
an
individual with these limitations could work as a ticket seller,
assembler,
and
packager.149
These
jobs
were
light
exertion,
unskilled jobs that existed in both the regional and national
economies.150
The ALJ asked whether a hypothetical individual would be
able to find work if she was limited to only three hours standing
per day.151
The VE responded that such an individual could still
perform the above-listed jobs.152
146
See Tr. 56.
147
See Tr. 57.
148
See id.
149
See id.
150
See id.
151
See Tr. 58.
152
See id.
21
Plaintiff’s representative asked if the same jobs could be
performed by a hypothetical individual if the individual was
limited to only lifting and carrying ten pounds occasionally, and
the
VE
responded
hypothetical
standing
was
and
that
she
amended
walking
to
two
could.153
include
hours,
However,
sitting
and
for
lifting
when
the
six
hours,
ten
pounds
occasionally, the job became classified as sedentary.154
Based on
that scenario, the individual could perform unskilled jobs of
order clerk, assembler, and surveillance monitor were available
in the regional and national economies.155
Plaintiff’s
representative
asked
if
a
hypothetical
individual would be able to find employment if the standing and
walking time was reduced from two hours to one hour, and the VE
testified that there would not be any full-time jobs at that
exertional level.156
The VE testified that sedentary work with
occasional use of hands would not change the jobs available.157
D.
Commissioner’s Decision
153
See Tr. 59.
154
See Tr. 59-60.
155
See Tr. 62.
156
See Tr. 62-63.
157
See Tr. 65.
22
On
September
decision.158
9,
2013,
the
ALJ
issued
an
unfavorable
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Act through December 31, 2011.159
The ALJ
found
gainful
that
Plaintiff
had
not
engaged
activity since October 17, 2011.160
in
substantial
The ALJ found that MS was a
severe impairment.161
Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairment was not
of a severity sufficient to meet or equal the listings of the
regulations
(“The
Listings”)162
at
any
point
of
the
alleged
disability period.163 Regarding Plaintiff’s impairment, the ALJ
specifically considered Listing 11.09.164
The ALJ then conducted an assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC
based on the objective medical record and Plaintiff’s testimony
and
conduct
at
the
hearing.165
He
determined
that
Plaintiff
retained the RFC to perform less than a full range of light work
158
See Tr. 20.
159
See Tr. 11, 13.
160
See Tr. 13.
161
See id.
162
The Listings are found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926.
163
See id.
164
See id.
165
See Tr. 14.
23
with additional limitations including only occasionally lifting
or carrying up to ten pounds, standing or walking about six hours
in
an
eight-hour
workday,
alternating
between
sitting
and
standing, sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday, and
only
occasionally
balancing,
stooping,
crawling, and climbing ramps or stairs.166
claimant
could
not
perform
kneeling,
crouching,
The ALJ found that the
production-rate-paced
jobs
due
to
medication side effects.167
The
ALJ
determined
that
while
Plaintiff’s
medically
determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce
Plaintiff’s
symptoms,
Plaintiff’s
statements
concerning
the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the symptoms were
not entirely credible.168
The
ALJ
afforded
little
Lindsey and Dr. Whiting.169
weight
to
the
opinions
of
Dr.
The ALJ noted that those opinions
were not supported by the relevant treatment records and appeared
to
be
based
Plaintiff.170
166
See Tr. 18.
170
the
See id.
169
Furthermore,
subjective
See id.
168
on
See id.
167
primarily
See id.
24
ALJ
reports
found
that
provided
Dr.
by
Whiting’s
opinion was inconsistent with treatment records and objective
observations from a few days before.171
The
perform
ALJ
any
next
past
considered
relevant
whether
work.172
Plaintiff
The
ALJ
was
able
determined
to
that
Plaintiff could not perform any of her past relevant work, but
that there were jobs available that she could perform.173
The ALJ
therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled from October 17,
2011, through the date of the ALJ’s decision.174
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision.175
While the appeal
was pending, the Appeals Council received a letter from Dr.
Whiting qualifying her earlier opinion.176
Dr. Whiting stated
that she had only seen Plaintiff on two occasions, six months
apart, that the questionnaire answers were subjective in nature,
and that she had never received Plaintiff’s medical records.177
Moreover, she stated that further questions regarding Plaintiff’s
171
See id.
172
See Tr. 19.
173
See Tr. 19-20.
174
See Tr. 20.
175
See Tr. 7.
176
See Tr. 5.
177
See Tr. 375.
25
limitations
would
be
better
answered
by
Plaintiff’s
treating
physician.178
On October 1, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review, thereby transforming the ALJ’s decision into
the final decision of the Commissioner.179
After receiving the
Appeals Council’s denial, Plaintiff timely sought judicial review
of the decision by this court.180
II.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The court’s review of a final decision by the Commissioner
denying disability benefits is limited to the determination of
whether: 1) the ALJ applied proper legal standards in evaluating
the record; and 2) substantial evidence in the record supports
the decision. Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir.
2002).
A.
Legal Standard
In order to obtain disability benefits, a claimant bears the
ultimate burden of proving she is disabled within the meaning of
the Act.
Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991).
Under the applicable legal standard, a claimant is disabled if
she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
178
See id.
179
See Tr. 1-5.
180
See Doc. 1, Pl.’s Compl.
26
reason
of
any
medically
determinable
physical
or
mental
impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”
42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(a); see also Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236
(5th Cir. 1994).
must
be
The existence of such a disabling impairment
demonstrated
laboratory
by
diagnostic”
“medically
findings.
acceptable
42
U.S.C.
clinical
§
and
423(d)(3),
(d)(5)(A); see also Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir.
1983).
To determine whether a claimant is capable of performing any
“substantial
gainful
activity,”
the
regulations
provide
that
disability claims should be evaluated according to the following
sequential five-step process: (1) a claimant who is working,
engaging in a substantial gainful activity, will not be found to
be
disabled
no
matter
what
the
medical
findings
are;
(2)
a
claimant will not be found to be disabled unless [s]he has a
“severe impairment;” (3) a claimant whose impairment meets or is
equivalent to [a Listing] will be considered disabled without the
need
to
consider
vocational
factors;
(4)
a
claimant
who
is
capable of performing work that [s]he has done in the past must
be found “not disabled;” and (5) if the claimant is unable to
perform h[er] previous work as a result of h[er] impairment, then
factors such as h[er] age, education, past work experience, and
27
[RFC] must be considered to determine whether [s]he can do other
Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994); see
work.
also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
The analysis stops at any point in the
process upon a finding that the claimant is disabled or not
disabled.
B.
Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236.
Substantial Evidence
The widely accepted definition of “substantial evidence” is
“that quantum of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000).
Carey v. Apfel, 230
It is “something more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance.”
Id.
The Commissioner
has the responsibility of deciding any conflict in the evidence.
If the findings of fact contained in the Commissioner’s
Id.
decision are supported by substantial record evidence, they are
conclusive, and this court must affirm.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990).
Only if no credible evidentiary choices of medical findings
exist to support the Commissioner’s decision should the court
overturn it.
1988).
Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir.
In applying this standard, the court is to review the
entire record, but the court may not reweigh the evidence, decide
the issues de novo, or substitute the court’s judgment for the
Commissioner’s judgment.
Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th
28
Cir. 1999).
In other words, the court is to defer to the
decision of the Commissioner as much as is possible without
making its review meaningless.
Id.
III. Analysis
Plaintiff requests judicial review of the ALJ’s decision to
deny disability benefits.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred
by failing to properly weigh to the opinions of Dr. Lindsey and
Dr.
Whiting
Plaintiff’s
decision
is
and
that
the
credibility.
legally
ALJ
failed
Defendant
sound
and
is
to
properly
maintains
that
supported
by
evaluate
the
ALJ’s
substantial
evidence.
A.
Failure to Properly Weigh Medical Opinions
Plaintiff contends that the medical opinions of Dr. Lindsey
and Dr. Whiting were entitled to controlling weight.
Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ’s decision to grant little weight to both
doctors’ opinions constitutes reversible error.
“A treating physician’s opinion on the nature and severity
of a patient’s impairment will be given controlling weight if it
is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic
techniques
substantial evidence.”
and
is
not
inconsistent
with
other
Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th
Cir. 2000)(internal quotations omitted); see SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL
374188, at *1 (July 2, 1996) (explaining the circumstances when
29
medical
opinions
by
controlling weight).
weight
to
the
treating
physicians
are
entitled
to
However, the ALJ ultimately may give less
medical
opinion
of
any
physician
when
the
statements are conclusory, unsupported, or otherwise incredible.
Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237. When deciding to do so, the ALJ must
indicate
the
specific
source’s medical opinion.
reasons
for
discounting
the
treating
See SSR 96-2p.
Here, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s treatment history with
Dr. Whiting and Dr. Lindsey.
The ALJ noted that in her initial
meeting with Dr. Whiting, Plaintiff reported that medications
improved her condition and only a slightly abnormal gait was
observed.
In
Plaintiff’s
initial
meeting
with
Dr.
Lindsey,
Plaintiff reported numbness in both legs and weakness in her
hands,
although
strength.
a
physical
examination
showed
normal
motor
Plaintiff reported decreased sensation along her right
leg and in her hands.
Plaintiff’s gait was also considered
normal.
In explaining his reasoning for affording little weight to
the March 2013 statements of Dr. Whiting and Dr. Lindsey, the ALJ
stated that the doctors’ opinions were not supported by the
relevant treatment notes and appeared to be based primarily on
Plaintiff’s subjective reports.181
181
See Tr. 18.
30
Specifically, the ALJ noted
that while treatment records reflected improved gait and that
Plaintiff
did
not
report
difficulty
walking,
both
doctors’
statements indicated that Plaintiff was capable of standing or
walking only one hour in an eight-hour workday.
Similarly, the
ALJ noted that Dr. Whiting’s opinion that Plaintiff’s pain was a
nine
on
a
ten-point-scale
was
not
supported
by
the
medical
records or Dr. Whiting’s own treatment notes, which observed only
a
slightly
abnormal
gait
and
general
improvement
due
to
medication.
Additionally,
Dr.
Whiting’s
letter
of
October
30,
2013
confirmed that Plaintiff’s questionnaire answers were largely
self-reported and subjective in nature.
Dr. Whiting noted that
Plaintiff’s
5,
sole
purpose
of
her
March
2013
visit
was
to
complete the questionnaire, and that Plaintiff had not returned
to Dr. Whiting’s office or scheduled an appointment after the
questionnaire
was
completed.
Dr.
Whiting
reported
that
Plaintiff’s medical records had been requested but were never
received.
Dr. Whiting noted that she was not the primary care
physician regarding Plaintiff’s MS.
The
opinions
ALJ
noted
regarding
the
the
discrepancies
intensity
and
found
nature
in
of
the
doctors’
Plaintiff’s
impairments, and found they were not supported by the medical
evidence of record.
The ALJ accordingly afforded these opinions
31
less than controlling weight.
The
ALJ
thus
relied
on
See Newton, 209 F.3d at 455-56.
substantial
evidence
of
record
and
properly adhered to legal procedures in determining Dr. Lindsey
and Dr. Whiting’s opinions were entitled to less than controlling
weight.
B.
Plaintiff’s Credibility
Plaintiff
also
argues
that
the
ALJ
erred
by
improperly
evaluating Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing regarding the
severity of her symptoms and their affect on her ability to work.
While an ALJ must consider a claimant’s complaints of pain,
he is permitted to examine the medical evidence to find that
claimant’s complaints are exaggerated or not credible.
v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1985).
Johnson
When an ALJ’s
opinion is supported by substantial evidence, the court must
defer to the ALJ’s assessment.
Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019,
1024 (5th Cir. 1990).
In this case, the ALJ properly recited Plaintiff’s testimony
and weighed it against both the objective medical evidence and
Plaintiff’s
report.182
previous
statements
contained
in
her
function
Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding pain and overall limitations was not supported by the
objective records.
182
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had no records
See Tr. 18-19.
32
supporting her hearing testimony regarding loss of strength or
difficulty walking or lifting.183
The ALJ assigned less weight to Plaintiff’s statements when
they were contradicted by the evidence of record.
However, the
ALJ did not completely discount Plaintiff’s testimony regarding
her condition and found her more limited than Dr. Spoor’s initial
assessment based in part on the side-effects of her medication.
Because the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible
only where it was not consistent with the objective record, the
ALJ did not err as a matter of law in assessing Plaintiff’s
credibility.
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that Defendant
satisfied her burden.
Plaintiff
not
evidence.
As a result, the ALJ’s decision finding
disabled
is
supported
by
substantial
record
The court also agrees with Defendant that the ALJ
applied proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence and in
making
his
determination.
Therefore,
the
court
GRANTS
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
IV.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion
for Summary Judgment be and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
183
See id.
33
SIGNED in Houston, Texas, this 24th
day of August, 2015.
______________________________
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
34
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