Alvarez del Castillo v. P.M.I. Comercio Internacional, S.A. de C.V.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 17 MOTION to Dismiss Rule 12(b)6,, 26 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Remote Control Inc. and Rotork Controls Inc., 8 MOTION to Dismiss , 6 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 27 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM of Defendants Remote Control Inc. and Rotork Controls Inc. (Signed by Judge Keith P Ellison) Parties notified.(sloewe, 4)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JAVIER ALVAREZ DEL CASTILLO, et
PMI HOLDINGS NORTH AMERICA INC, §
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-3435
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
This case concerns an explosion at a natural gas refinery in Reynosa, Mexico, in
September 2012. Plaintiffs are refinery employees who were injured in the blast and the family
members of employees who were killed. Defendants are variously the owners, operators and/or
suppliers of the plant. The Court today decides motions to dismiss filed by Kinder Morgan (Doc.
No. 6), Honeywell Analytics (Doc. No. 8), Draeger Safety (Doc. No. 17), and the Rotork
Defenadnts, Rotork Controls Inc. and Remote Control Inc. (Doc. Nos. 26, 27). For the reasons
set out in this order, the Rotork Defendants’ motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds
is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The remaining motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim are GRANTED without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing an amended
complaint within 15 days of the date of this order.
This case arises from an explosion at a natural gas refinery in Reynosa, Mexico. The
refinery was owned, operated or controlled by Defendant Pemex. Defendants Draeger, FireBus,
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court takes the factual allegations pleaded in the
Second Amended Petition (Doc. No. 1-2) as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
I&C International and Honeywell provided detectors to measure the amounts of explosive gas,
smoke, fire and temperature at the plant. The roles played by the other Defendants at the refinery
is not clear from the face of the complaint.
On September 18, 2012, a large explosion at the plant fatally injured at least 22 workers
and seriously injured 15 more. Plaintiffs allege that the explosion and resulting injuries were
caused by the Defendants’ negligence in the design, construction, operation and safety measures
of the plant.
Plaintiffs initially filed this complaint in Texas state court in September 2014. The case
was removed to federal court in December, 2014, by Defendant P.M.I. Comercio Internacional,
S.A. de C.V.
After removal, a number of Defendants filed motions to dismiss the suit. (Doc. Nos. 3, 4,
6, 8, 13, 17, 26, 27.) Plaintiffs also moved to remand the suit to state court. (Doc. No. 9.) At the
parties’ request, the Court has deferred consideration of the motion to remand and the motions to
dismiss filed by the Pemex Defendants2 until all Defendants have been served. At this time, the
Court takes up only the motions filed by Kinder Morgan (Doc. No. 6), Honeywell Analytics
(Doc. No. 8), Draeger Safety (Doc. No. 17), and Rotork Controls Inc. and Remote Control Inc.
(Doc. Nos. 26, 27).
ROTORK DEFENDANTS’ 12(b)(2) MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants Rotork Controls Inc. (“Rotork USA”) and Remote Control Inc. (“Remote
Control”) (collectively, the “Rotork Defendants”) have moved for dismissal on the grounds that
this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. (Doc. No. 26.)
A. LEGAL STANDARD
Specifically, the motions filed by PMI Comercio International SA de CV (Doc. No. 3), PMI
Holdings North America, Inc. (Doc. No. 4), and Pemex (Doc. No. 13).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) asserts that the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over one or more defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “As the [parties] seeking to
invoke the power of the court, [plaintiffs] ‘bearthe burden of establishing jurisdiction but [are]
required to present only prima facie evidence.’” Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH &
Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472
F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 2006)). “In determining whether a prima facie case exists, this Court
must accept as true [the Plaintiffs’] uncontroverted allegations, and resolve in [their] favor all
conflicts between the jurisdictional facts contained in the parties’ affidavits and other
documentation.” Pervasive Software Inc., 688 F.3d at 219-220 (citation omitted).
“A federal court sitting in diversity may assert jurisdiction if (1) the state’s long-arm
statute applies, as interpreted by the state’s courts; and (2) if due process is satisfied under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.” Johnston v. Multidata Systems Intern.
Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the Texas
long-arm statute has been interpreted to extend to the limits of federal due process, the Court
only need determine whether the Constitution supports the exercise of jurisdiction here. Id.
Pursuant to the Constitution, “a State may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts with [the State]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Pervasive Software Inc., 688 F.3d at 220 (citing International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1944)).
“There are two types of ‘minimum contacts’: those that give rise to specific personal
jurisdiction and those that give rise to general personal jurisdiction.” Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d
352, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). Specific jurisdiction “focuses on the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit set forth a three-step analysis to determine whether specific
(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it
purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of
the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff’s cause of action
arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2006). If the plaintiff can
successfully establish the first two prongs of the test, then the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that exercising jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable. Id.
General jurisdiction, in contrast, does not require a relationship between the plaintiff’s
cause of action and the forum state. Instead, for a court in a particular state to take general
jurisdiction over claims against a defendant, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s
“affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in
the forum state.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). For a corporate defendant, “the place of incorporation and principal place of business”
are the “paradigm … bases for general jurisdiction.” Id. at 760 (quoting Brilmayer et al., A
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L. Rev. 721, 728 (1988)) (ellipsis in original).
“It is, therefore, incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the
place of incorporation or principal place of business.” Monkton Ins. Services, Ltd. v. Ritter, 768
F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014).
i. General and specific jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, the Court must decide whether Plaintiffs can invoke the rules
governing the Court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction in this case. Under the Seiferth test
discussed above, an essential requirement for specific jurisdiction is that “the plaintiff’s cause of
action arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related contacts.” 472 F.3d at 271.
Here, the suit arises out of the explosion of a natural gas refinery in Reynosa, Mexico — outside
of the state of Texas. Nothing in Plaintiff’s pleadings suggest that the Rotork Defendants’
activities in the state of Texas were the cause of the explosion in Mexico.3 Accordingly, the
Rotork Defendants are not susceptible to specific jurisdiction in this suit. If this Court is to have
jurisdiction over these Defendants, it must be because Plaintiffs have pleaded a prima facie case
for general jurisdiction.
ii. Rotork USA
Rotork USA is not incorporated in Texas, nor is its principal place of business here, so
lacks the “paradigm” bases for general jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that it still has
sufficient contacts with Texas to be subject to general jurisdiction. First, and most importantly,
the company acknowledges that it has an office in Houston, Texas. Decl. of Robert H. Arnold,
Doc. No. 26-2. The company has also designated an agent for service of process in Texas. 2d
Am. Pet. at ¶ 42. Second, the website and publications of the Rotork Group show that the
company has installed equipment in Corpus Christi, Texas; Ennis, Texas; and in one other
location in Texas. See Pls.’ Ex. 4-7. But as the Defendants point out in response, none of the
quoted marketing materials indicate with certainty that it was Rotork USA — as opposed to
another company in the Rotork Group — who did the work in question. If the issue of Rotork
Indeed, Plaintiff’s sole argument in support of specific jurisdiction is that “Rotork installed
several gas valve actuators at the Pemex refinery in Reynosa” — a city in Mexico, not in Texas.
(Doc. No. 49 at 6.)
USA’s commercial contacts with Texas were to be dispositive of the jurisdictional question, the
Court would need to allow discovery on this issue before a dismissal would be appropriate.
Before reaching that question, the Court first considers whether Rotork USA’s Houston
office and Texas agent for service of process constitute contact with Texas that is “so continuous
and systematic as to render it essentially at home” in the state. The Supreme Court has
previously suggested that having an office in the forum state would tend to support general
jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 411 (1984)
(declining to find general jurisdiction because, inter alia, the defendant “never has maintained an
office or establishment there”); see also Johnston, 523 F.3d at 611 (declining to find general
jurisdiction where defendant “neither maintains a place of business in Texas nor has a registered
agent for service of process in Texas”). When courts have declined to find general jurisdiction,
the cases have generally involved corporate defendants who did business with the forum state —
or sent personnel to the forum state — without having a permanent office there. See, e.g.,
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Monkton Ins. Services Co., 768 F.3d at 432-33. In other words, the
defendants were “doing business with Texas” without “doing business in Texas.” Access
Telecom Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, in
contrast, the evidence that Rotork USA had a permanent office in Houston suggests that they
intended to do business in Texas, not just with Texas. And the existence of a designated agent for
service of process in Texas indicates that they “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court”
in the state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
Rotork USA relies heavily on the recent Daimler case in arguing against general
jurisdiction. In that case, the Court found that the parent company, Daimler, was not subject to
general jurisdiction in California on the basis of its subsidiary’s California contacts. Daimler,
134 S.Ct. at 760. The subsidiary, MBUSA, was a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in New Jersey. Id. at 752. MBUSA had numerous California facilities, including a
regional office, among other contacts with the state. Id. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
MBUSA’s contacts were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over Daimler.
But Daimler does not stand for the proposition that offices alone are insufficient for
general jurisdiction: indeed, all of the parties to the case agreed that MBUSA itself was subject
to general jurisdiction in California. Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Instead, the Court concluded that MBUSA’s California business, as a share of Daimler’s overall
enterprise, was too small for Daimler to be considered “at home” in the state. Id. at 761. The
Court in Daimler was also concerned with “the risks to international comity” involved in
exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the activities of an instate subsidiary. Id.at 763. Exercising general jurisdiction over Rotork USA — itself a U.S.
corporation — raises no such risks.
The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is a demanding — even “incredibly
difficult” — one to meet. Monkton Ins. Services, Ltd., 768 F.3d at 432. Nonetheless, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs here have at least made a prima facie showing that Rotork USA had, by
virtue of its Houston office and Texas agent for service of process, “continuous and systematic”
contacts with the state that “render it essentially at home” here.
iii. Remote Control
Plaintiffs’ claim that the Court has general jurisdiction over Remote Control is somewhat
different. Plaintiffs appear to concede that Remote Control does not itself have “continuous and
systematic” contacts with Texas.4 Instead, Plaintiffs contend that Remote Control should be
subject to this Court’s jurisdiction because it is an affiliate of Rotork USA through both
companies’ association with Rotork plc, a British entity.5
Plaintiffs attempt to argue that Remote Control is an alter ego of Rotork USA, and should
be subject to general jurisdiction on this basis. Under Texas law, the alter ego doctrine “applies
when there is such unity between the parent corporation and its subsidiary that the separateness
of the two corporations has ceased and holding only the subsidiary corporation liable would
result in injustice.” See Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s evidence of alter ego status include that 1) both
Rotork and Remote Control are subsidiaries of Rotork plc and are described as part of “the
Rotork Group,” and 2) the two companies share common officers.6 The former allegation says
nothing about the relationship between Rotork USA and Remote Control. The latter allegation,
taken alone, is insufficient to find alter ego status. See Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB,
205 F.3d 208, 219 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ommonality of officers and directors [is] not alone
sufficient to establish an alter ego relationship between two corporations.”). More importantly,
all of the cases cited by Plaintiffs concern a parent company that is ostensibly subject to
jurisidiction based on the contacts of a subsidiary. None of the cases addresses the facts here: a
subsidiary of the same parent company which is arguably subject to jurisdiction based solely on
Like Rotork USA, Remote Control is not incorporated in Texas and does not have its principal
place of business here. Remote Control also has no offices or employees in Texas, does not have
a registered agent for service of process in Texas, and does not have any contracts with any
Texas entities or individuals. Decl. of Robert H. Arnold, Doc. No. 26-1.
Namely, Rotork Servo Controles de Mexico S.A. de C.V. and Rotork U.K., Ltd.
Robert H. Arnold is both the President of Rotork USA and the Vice President of Remote
Control. See Decls. of Robert H. Arnold, Doc. Nos. 26-1, 26-2.
the contacts of another subsidiary. Plaintiffs’ contention that Remote Control is the alter ego of
Rotork USA therefore fails.
Without a showing of alter ego status, the in-state contacts of Rotork USA are not enough
to establish general jurisdiction over Remote Control. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daimler, it is possible that the in-state conduct of a sister company might have been a basis for
general jurisdiction.7 But the recent decision in Daimler appears to foreclose that possibility. See
Associated Energy Group, LLC v. Air Cargo Germany GMBH, 24 F. Supp. 3d 602, 608 (S.D.
Tex. 2014) (finding no general jurisdiction over defendant based on sister company’s ties to the
forum state). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not made a prima facie
showing that this Court may assert general jurisdiction over Remote Control.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs request that they be permitted to conduct limited discovery in
order to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over Remote Control. Plaintiffs contend that discovery
would allow them to show that Remote Control is in fact an alter ego of Rotork USA. The Court
does not believe that discovery is appropriate here, as Plaintiff adduces no legal authority for the
proposition that a subsidiary may be subject to general jurisdiction because of the forum-state
contacts of another subsidiary. This defect cannot be cured by additional fact discovery.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against Remote Control will be dismissed without prejudice. See
ITL Intern., Inc. v. Café Soluble, S.A., 464 Fed. Appx. 241, 244 (5th Cir. 2012).
DEFENDANTS’ 12(b)(6) MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The Court again notes, however, that the cases cited by Plaintiffs all concern efforts to establish
jurisdiction over a parent company based on the actions of a subsidiary, rather than another
subsidiary of the same parent.
The 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss filed by Kinder Morgan (Doc. No. 6),8 Honeywell
Analytics (“Honeywell”) (Doc. No. 8), Draeger Safety (“Draeger”) (Doc. No. 17), and Rotork
USA and Remote Control (Doc. No. 27) identify many of the same problems with Plaintiffs’
pleading. Accordingly, the Court will consider the motions together.
A. LEGAL STANDARD
A court may dismiss a complaint for a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but must provide the plaintiff’s grounds for
entitlement to relief — including factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). That is, consistent with Rule
8(a), a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility
standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” though it does require more than simply a
“sheer possibility” that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. at 678. Thus, a pleading need not
contain detailed factual allegations, but must set forth more than “labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
Kinder Morgan invites the Court, in the alternative, to consider its motion and accompanying
affidavits as a motion for summary judgment. At this stage, before Plaintiffs have had any
opportunity to conduct discovery, the Court believes summary judgment is inappropriate.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contentions, a complaint originally filed in state court is subject to
the same 12(b)(6) standard as a complaint originally filed in federal court. “District courts
routinely apply Iqbal and Twombly to motions to dismiss in cases removed from state court and
in which the pleadings have not been amended.” Itzep v. Academy, Ltd., No. A-12-CV-197-LY,
2012 WL 1965669, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2012). The cases cited by Plaintiffs in which
federal courts have applied state-law pleading standards all involve improper joinder analysis.
See, e.g., Edwea, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. H-10-2970, 2010 WL 5099607 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8,
2010). The standard for improper joinder is whether there is a “reasonable basis for the district
court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant.”
Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004). To require plaintiffs to
follow federal pleading requirements to avoid removal would punish them for a properly-pleaded
state petition, particularly because the remand analysis is based on the live pleading at the time
of removal, without taking into account later-filed amendments. Edwea, 2010 WL 5099607, at
*6. In contrast, district courts typically afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure pleading
deficiencies following a successful 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Great Plains Trust Co. v.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002).
All of the 12(b)(6) motions contend that Plaintiffs have not given Defendants fair notice
of the allegations against them. This Court must agree. Defendants Kinder Morgan, Rotork USA
and Remote Control are not even mentioned in the body of the complaint, save where Plaintiffs
list information about how to serve them. The only allegations that could plausibly apply to them
are allegations directed at all 28 Defendants. See, e.g., 2d Am. Pet., Doc. No. 6 at ¶ 60
(“Defendants were negligent in the design, maintenance and upkeep of the plant, the
transportation of the natural gas, the monitoring of the pipeline, plants and valves, the
installation, maintenance and upkeep of the safety and alarm systems, the monitoring,
maintenance and design of the safety system, the relief valve systems and the alarm system.”) A
complaint does not satisfy the requirements of Iqbal and Twombly by lumping together all
defendants, while providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct. See Atuahene v. City of
Hartford, 10 Fed. Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001). Unlike the plaintiffs in Anwar v. Fairfield
Greenwich, Ltd., Plaintiffs have pleaded no facts to show the relationship of these Defendants to
the refinery, or to one another. See 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
The allegations against Honeywell and Draeger are slightly more detailed. Defendants
Honeywell and Draeger are included in the group of “Monitoring Defendants” who Plaintiff
alleges “provided detectors to determine the amount of explosive gas, smoke, fire and
temperature at said plant.” 2d Am. Pet. at ¶ 58. According to the complaint, the Monitoring
Defendants “were also responsible for upkeep of their detectors” and were under contract to
maintain the detectors. Id. The Monitoring Defendants’ are alleged to have been “negligent in
that their detectors did not alert Pemex and the Plaintiffs of the dangerous conditions that lead to
the explosion” and to have negligently conducted their subcontracting duties. Id. These
allegations come closer to satisfying the federal standard, but the complaint’s failure to
distinguish between the so-called “Monitoring Defendants” is fatal. See Pierson v. Orlando
Regional Healthcare Systems, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1273-74 (M.D. Fla. 2009). At a
minimum, Plaintiffs should endeavor to explain what role each Defendant played in the plant,
rather than grouping them together at all times.
The motions, save that filed by Kinder Morgan, also seek dismissal of some of the
Plaintiffs based on the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs Marcelino Rios Pecina, Delta Alicia
Zamora Glvan and Leticia Aguilar-Sanchez were not added to the complaint until after the
statute of limitations expired on September 18, 2014.9 Because this is a diversity case, Texas law
applies to determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the original
petition. Saenz v. Keller Ind. Of Texas, 951 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1992). In Texas, “ordinarily,
an amended pleading adding a new party does not relate back to the original pleading.”
University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio v. Bailey, 332 S.W.3d 395, 400 (Tex.
2011) (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs have not shown that an exception, such as misnomer or
misidentification, applies. Id. Regrettably, the Court concludes that the negligence claims of
these three Plaintiffs are time-barred.10
Finally, Honeywell argues that six Plaintiffs11 who are named only in the case caption,
opening paragraph and prayer of the original petition should be dismissed. In support, Honeywell
cites a number of cases in which a defendant who was named only in the caption was dismissed
from the suit. In at least one of the cases, the dismissal was for “failure to state a claim” against
that Defendant. See Kamali v. Quinn, No. 3:06-CV-1595-B, 2006 WL 3759854 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
19, 2006). That rationale does not apply when it is a plaintiff, rather than a defendant, who
appears only in the caption. Honeywell points to no rule requiring that the Plaintiff provide
additional information about himself other than that required by Rule 10. Furthermore,
The parties appear to agree that all the claims in the suit accrued on the date of the explosion,
September 18, 2012. All of the claims in Plaintiffs’ live pleading are subject to Texas’s two-year
statute of limitations for personal injuries. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 16.003. Plaintiffs Pecina
was added to the First Amended Petition filed on September 21, 2014, while Plaintiffs Zamora
Galvan and Aguilar-Sanchez were added to the Second Amended Petition filed on October 17,
Plaintiffs suggest they may add a breach of implied warranty claim to a future amended
complaint. The Court’s decision today does not affect the availability of that claim to the
Plaintiffs whose negligence claims are time-barred.
The six Plaintiffs are Anailem Mora Garcia, Irma Ferral Casados, Josue Abram Munoz, Carlos
I. Munoz, Brenda Berenice Munoz, and Evelyn Marisol Luna Santos.
Honeywell has not been harmed by not knowing more about these Plaintiffs up to this point, as
the case has largely been in abeyance pending service upon all Defendants. For those reasons,
the Court declines to dismiss the Plaintiffs from the suit, but directs Plaintiffs to further identify
them in their next amended complaint.
For the reasons set out in this order, the Rotork Defendants’ motion to dismiss on
personal jurisdiction grounds is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The
remaining motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are GRANTED without prejudice to
Plaintiffs filing an amended complaint within 15 days of the date of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on the 22nd of June, 2015.
KEITH P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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