Dark v. Houston Methodist San Jancinto Hospital
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 15 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4) (Main Document 29 replaced on 5/12/2016) (aboyd, 4).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JASMINE P. DARK,
Plaintiff,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
v.
HOUSTON METHODIST SAN JACINTO
HOSPITAL,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-3540
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
Jasmine
P.
Dark,
brings
this
action
against
defendant, Houston Methodist San Jacinto Hospital, for employment
discrimination based on disability in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act
("ADA"),
42 U.S.C.
§
12101,
et seq.,
based on race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C.
Title VII
of
the
amended, 42 U.S.C.
Defendant's
Civil
§
Motion
Rights Act
of
2000e-2, et seg. 1
for
Final
1964
and
1981,
and
§
("Title VII"),
as
Pending before the court is
Summary
Judgment
(Docket
Entry
No. 15), and Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence
(Docket Entry No.
defendant's
25,
motion
pp.
for
5-7).
summary
For the reasons stated below,
judgment
will
be
granted,
defendant's objections to plaintiff's summary judgment evidence
will
be
overruled
or
declared moot,
and
this
action
will
be
dismissed.
1
Plaintiff's Original Complaint and Jury Demand, Docket Entry
No. 1, pp. 3-5.
I.
Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff attended Lamar University in Beaumont, Texas, where
she received an Associate of Applied Science in Nursing degree in
2011, and a Bachelors of Science in Nursing in 2012. 2
In June of
2012, plaintiff began working for defendant as a Registered Nurse I
( " RN I " ) . 3
In October of 2012,
vaccination
as
required by
plaintiff received an influenza
defendant,
except
objects for medical or religious reasons,
adverse reaction.
4
when
an
employee
and experienced a mild
5
In July of 2013 plaintiff was promoted to the position of
Registered Nurse II
("RN II") . 6
An "RN II is a staff nurse who .
2
Plaintiff's Resume, p.
2, Exhibit 1 to Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Opposition"),
Docket Entry No. 22-1, p. 3.
3
0ral
and
Videotaped
Deposition
of
Jasmine
P.
Dark
("Plaintiff's Deposition"), p. 16:5-7, Exhibit A to Defendant's
Motion for Final Summary Judgment ("Defendant's MFSJ"), Docket
Entry No. 15-1, p. 5.
4
Id. at 75:9-12, Exhibit A to Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry
No. 15-1, p. 20.
See also Declaration of Sherri Davis-Sampson
("Davis-Sampson Declaration"), pp. 1-2, Exhibit B to Defendant's
MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-2, pp. 2-3.
5
Plaintiff's
Deposition,
pp.
75:24-76:4,
Exhibit A to
Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-1, p. 20 ("Q. And did you
have any effects from that? A. Yes. The burn that's right here on
my face still. I started itching. Q. Other than the burn, did you
have any similar complications A. No.").
6
Davis-Sampson Declaration, p. 1, Exhibit B to Defendant's
MFSJ,
Docket Entry No.
15-2, p.
2.
See also Plaintiff's
Deposition, p. 17:1-24, Exhibit A to Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry
No. 15-1, p. 6.
-2-
. . provides direct patient care . . . to a patient team which may
include patients with varied and complex needs." 7
In October of 2013 plaintiff did not object to receiving a
second influenza vaccine at work. 8
Plaintiff alleges that after
receiving the second influenza vaccine she developed a number of
symptoms, including severe swelling, pain, numbness and change of
color in her extremities that severely restricts her ability to
walk and to stand for long periods of time, and that in December of
2013 she was diagnosed with Unspecified Connective Tissue Disease,
i.e., an autoimmune disease caused by the influenza vaccine. 9
In January of 2014 plaintiff took a leave of absence due to
her personal health, and applied for short-term disability ("STD")
benefits from Cigna, the administrator of defendant's STD benefits
program. 10
In the section of the application to be completed by a
health care provider, Dr. Chandra Higginbotham stated: "[P]atient
7
Job Summary, Exhibit P to Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry
No. 15-16, p. 2.
See also Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 18: 3-21,
Exhibit A to Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-1, p. 6
(agreeing that the Job Description cited as Exhibit P to
Defendant's MFSJ accurately describes the duties of an RN II).
8
Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 31:13-15 and p. 75:9-19, Exhibit A
to Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-1, pp. 9 and 20.
9
Id. at 26:3-25, Exhibit A to Defendant's MFSJ,
No. 15-1, p. 8.
10
Docket Entry
Davis-Sampson Declaration, p. 2, Exhibit B to Defendant's
MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-2, p. 3. See also Short-Term Disability
Leave Application, Exhibit E to Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry
No. 15-5.
-3-
feeling tired a lot and weak[,] cannot perform job duties." 11
Cigna
denied plaintiff's claim for STD benefits upon finding no medical
evidence that she was not able to perform her job duties. 12
From
February to June of 2014 plaintiff appealed Cigna's denial of her
claim for STD benefits and submitted additional information from
her treating physicians to Cigna.
For example,
in February and
March of 2014, plaintiff visited Dr. Higginbotham who opined that
her symptoms and physical condition rendered her unable to work:
[Plaintiff's]
current diagnoses include unspecified
endocrine disorder, unspecified immunity deficiency,
unspecified diffuse connective tissue disease (confirmed
with Dr. Palwai[.)] . . . It is in my opinion that she is
not able to perform her stated duties and kindly request
that she be placed on short term disability. 13
On April 15, 2014, Dr. Sabeen Najam, wrote a letter stating that
plaintiff
11
Short-Term Disability Leave Application,
Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-5, p. 3.
Exhibit
E
to
12
Correspondence from Cigna, Exhibit F to Defendant's MFSJ,
Docket Entry No. 15-6, pp. 3-6 (January 24, 2014 letter from Cigna
Group Insurance to Jasmine Dark) .
13
Plaintiff' s Opposition, Docket Entry No. 22 I p. 10 en 8
(citing Exhibit 4 thereto, Medical Records Authored by Dr. Chandra
Higginbotham, Docket Entry No. 23-1, pp. 2-3). See also Physician
Reports and Notes, Exhibit G to Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry
No. 15-7, p. 5.
Defendant objects to the admissibility of
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
4
as
containing
hearsay
and
being
unauthenticated, see Defendant's Reply in Support of Its Motion for
Final Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Reply"), Docket Entry No. 25,
p. 5, but fails to mention that its own Exhibit G titled "Physician
Reports and Notes" contains much of the same evidence as contained
in Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.
Accordingly, defendant's objection to
the court's consideration of Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 for purposes of
ruling on the pending motion for summary judgment will be
overruled.
-4-
is under our care here at Houston Rheumatology Center for
diagnoses of Undifferentiated connective disease. She is
immunosuppressed due to her disease and medications. She
is therefore suggested to avoid having close contact with
actively sick patients.
She is advised to avoid
pediatric and surgical units.
Please accommodate this
14
request in her work schedule.
On May 27,
2014,
defendant sent plaintiff a letter stating
that pursuant to HR Policy 29 her allowed leave would be exhausted
on
July
1,
2014,
unless
she
returned
to
extension as a reasonable accommodation. 15
work
or
received
an
HR Policy 29 provided
that "leaves of absence of any kind when combined should not exceed
six (6) months in any rolling twelve
(12) month period, measured
backward from the date the leave begins.
. [and that] employment
will be terminated if the employee fails to return to work at the
end of the approved leave period, unless a request for extension is
granted as a reasonable accommodation for a disability. " 16
14
Exhibi t 2 to Plaintiff's Opposition, Medical Diagnoses of
Jasmine P. Dark, Docket Entry No. 23, p. 3.
See also Physician
Reports and Notes, Exhibit G to Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry
No. 15-7, p. 6.
Defendant objects to the admissibility of
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
2
as
containing
hearsay
and
being
unauthenticated, see Defendant's Reply, Docket Entry No. 25, p. 5,
but fails to mention that its own Exhibit G titled "Physician
Reports and Notes" contains much of the same evidence as contained
in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
Accordingly, defendant's objection to
the court's consideration of Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 for purposes of
ruling on the pending motion for summary judgment will be
overruled.
15
Correspondence from Methodist, Exhibit H to Defendant's MFSJ,
Docket Entry No. 15-8.
Policy HR 29, Exhibit D to Defendant's MFSJ, p. 1 ~~ I.B and
I.D, Docket Entry No. 15-4, p. 2.
16
-5-
On June 3, 2014, plaintiff sent defendant a letter "to request
an indefinite extension" of her leave of absence. 17
On June 13, 2014, defendant's Human Resources Director, Sherri
Davis-Sampson, replied to plaintiff by email stating:
I am so very sorry for everything you are going through.
I want you to know that we are reviewing your request for
extended leave.
We will not terminate your employment
with Methodist while we are in the appeal process for
disability coverage.
We will consider extending your
leave for some longer period of time. I am hopeful that
having the physicians speak will allow us to move forward
with all of this very quickly. 18
On
June
25,
2014,
Cigna
upheld
its
decision
denying
plaintiff's claim for STD benefits. 19
17
Correspondence from Jasmine Dark, Exhibit I to Defendant's
MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-9, p. 2.
18
Email from Sherri Davis-Sampson,
MFSJ, Docket Entry NO. 15-10.
19
Exhibit J to Defendant's
Correspondence from Cigna, Exhibit F to Defendant's MFSJ,
Docket Entry No. 15-6, p. 7 (February 11, 2014, letter notifying
plaintiff that "on February 5, 2014 we received Office Visit Notes
from your treating physician(s). This information was reviewed and
does not change our prior decision."); pp. 9-10 (April 2, 2014,
letter notifying plaintiff that after reviewing her claim, Cigna
decided to uphold its prior decision denying it, and that she could
seek a second appeal); pp.
11-12
(April 24,
2014,
letter
acknowledging receipt of request for second appeal) ; pp. 13-15
(June 6, 2014, letter upholding prior decision to deny plaintiff's
claim for STD); pp. 16-17 (June 25, 2014, letter notifying
plaintiff that "[i]n an effort to clarify your restrictions and
limitations, we requested that our staff Medical Director, Board
Certified
in
Occupational
Medicine,
engage
in
telephonic
discussions with your treating providers, Dr. Higgenbotham, Dr.
Legall-Johnson and Dr. Naj am.
The telephonic discussions took
place and did not change our prior determinations, as outlined in
the attached letter dated June 6, 2014.").
-6-
On June 30, 2014, Dr. Higginbotham wrote a letter stating that
plaintiff was still unable to work:
This letter is to inform you that patient Jasmine Dark is
still unable to return to work as she has been diagnosed
with multiple gastrointestinal infections to include
yeast and parasites.
Please make the proper allowances
and feel free to contact the office with any questions or
concerns regarding this matter. 20
On
July
7,
2014,
plaintiff
wrote
a
letter
to
defendant
requesting a reasonable accommodation:
The purpose of this letter is to provide written notice
[of] request for a reasonable accommodation within my
physicians' medical restrictions.
If a reasonable accommodation can't be provided, I
would like to request [] an extension to my leave of
absence due to my disabling condition.
I would request
that Houston Methodist communicate with Cigna regarding
my STD/LTD benefits as they have indicated I'm not
allowed to have any more appeals.
However, I was
informed that Cigna was told to not make a final decision
on my disability claim until after I see Dr. Desai on
July 2 at 815 a.m. as requested by Houston Methodist.
Cigna ignored my diagnoses of multiple infections even
21
after speaking to my three physicians.
On August
8,
2014,
Cigna reaffirmed its
decision to
deny
plaintiff's application for STD. 22
20
Plaintiff' s Opposition, Docket Entry No. 22, p. 11 CJ[ 9
(citing Exhibit 2, Medical Diagnoses of Jasmine P. Dark, Docket
Entry No. 23, p. 2).
21
Correspondence from Jasmine Dark, Exhibit L to Defendant's
MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-12, and Exhibit 6 to Plaintiff's
Opposition, Docket Entry No. 23-3.
22
Correspondence from Cigna,
-7-
Exhibit F to Defendant's MFSJ,
(continued ... )
On October 1, 2014, defendant sent plaintiff a letter stating
that if she did not return to work as an RN II by October 3, 2014,
her employment would be terminated because her eligible leave had
been exhausted.
In pertinent part defendant's letter stated:
According to HR 29, "All leave of absence of any kind
when combined cannot exceed six (6) months in any twelve
( 12) month period." Your absence more than exceed [ s] the
maximum amount allowed under HR 29.
To date, you have not returned to work, nor does it
appear that you will return any time soon .
. As a
result, I am writing to notify you that your request for
accommodation, as an extension of your medical leave, is
ending. We have extended your employment through Friday,
October 3, 2 014 .
If you are unable to ret urn to work
with or without a reasonable accommodation by this date,
your employment with Methodist will be terminated.
If you are unable to return to the positions of
Registered Nurse II, by October 03, 2014, you may want to
review open positions with Houston Methodist at:
Houstonmethodist. org.
Should you find a position for
which you are reasonably qualified and able to perform
with or without accommodation, and offered the position,
in the next 30 days (before October 31st), you may be
reinstated with no loss of tenure.
You will need to
apply for positions through our Methodist Internet site,
noted above. 23
On
October
3,
2014,
defendant
terminated
plaintiff's
employment because plaintiff did not return to her RN II position,
and exceeded the permissible leave under HR Policy 29. 24
22
( • • • continued)
Docket Entry No. 15-6, p. 17.
23
Correspondence from Sherri Davis-Sampson,
Defendant's MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-13.
24
Davis-Sampson Declaration,
p.
-8-
3,
Exhibit
M to
Exhibit B to Defendant's
(continued ... )
II.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is authorized if the movant establishes that
there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law
entitles it to judgment.
material
facts
are
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
"genuine"
if
the
evidence
Disputes about
is
such
that
a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986).
The
Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to
mandate the entry of summary judgment "after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion,
showing
sufficient
to
against a party who fails to make a
establish
the
existence
of
an
element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial."
Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.
A party moving for summary judgment "must
'demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but
need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case."
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
the
moving
nonmovant
party
to
depositions,
go
meets
beyond
this
the
burden,
Rule
pleadings
and
answers to interrogatories,
other admissible evidence that
Id.
requires
by
If
the
affidavits,
admissions on file,
specific facts
there is a genuine issue for trial.
(en bane).
56(c)
show
Little v.
or
exist over which
Factual controversies are
to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when . . . both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts."
24
continued)
MFSJ, Docket Entry No. 15-2, p. 4.
( •••
-9-
Id.
III.
Plaintiff's
complaint
Analysis
asserts
claims
under
the
ADA
for
disability discrimination and under § 1981 and Title VII for race
and
color
discrimination
based
on
allegations
that
defendant
wrongfully discharged her and failed to reasonably accommodate her
known disability.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment because plaintiff is unable to present evidence capable of
establishing the essential elements of her claims. 25
Plaintiff
argues that genuine issues of material fact preclude the court from
granting
defendant's
plaintiff's
motion
complaint
discharge under the ADA,
for
arguably
§
summary
judgment. 26
Although
asserts
claims
wrongful
for
1981, and Title VII, 27 in response to
defendant's motion for summary judgment plaintiff states that she
is not pursuing claims for wrongful discharge. 28
25
Defendant' s MFSJ,
Docket Entry No. 25.
26
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