Boudreaux v. Mehls et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment . This action is dismissed with prejudice. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ALBERT BOUDREAUX III,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
v.
SHERIFF TROY E. NEHLS,
et al.,
Defendants.
January 27, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-0283
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Albert Boudreaux III (Inmate No. 00182409), has
filed
a
Complaint
("Complaint") ,
Under
42
U.S.C.
alleging violations
Fort Bend County Jail.
§
of
1983,
his
Civil
civil
Rights
rights
at
the
The court requested an answer from two
defendants,
Corporal Edwin Williams and Deputy Diego Leal,
(Order
Service
for
Act
of
Process,
Docket
Entry No.
11) .
Jr.
These
defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ( "MSJ") (Docket
Entry
No.
19),
arguing
Boudreaux has not
expired.
that
filed a
this
case
should
response and his
be
dismissed.
time to do so has
After considering all of the pleadings, the exhibits, and
the applicable law, the court will grant the Defendants' Motion and
will dismiss this case for the reasons explained below.
I.
Background
At the time the Complaint was filed,
custody
of
the
Fort
Bend
County
Boudreaux was in the
Sheriff's
Department
at
the
(the "Jail") as a pretrial detainee. 1
The
Corporal Edwin Williams and Deputy Diego Leal,
Jr.,
Fort Bend County Jail
defendants,
were employed by the Fort Bend County Sheriff's Department at the
Jail. 2
On July 18, 2014, Boudreaux was moved from a "step down unit
for mental health offenders" at the Jail and placed in cell block
2-A. 3
On October 17, 2014, there was a fight involving two inmates
in the 2-A cell block. 4
Corporal Williams investigated the fight,
questioning Boudreaux and other inmates who were present in an
attempt to identify the aggressor. 5
questioned
would
provide
any
None of the inmates who were
information
about
the
fight.
6
Subsequently, Boudreaux was moved from the 2-A cell block to the
2-H cell block at the Jail. 7
1
Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 3; Plaintiff's More
Definite Statement ("More Definite Statement"), Docket Entry
No. 10, p. 3.
Boudreaux has been released and is no longer in
custody. Change of Address, Docket Entry No. 20.
Defendants' Original Answer, Docket Entry No. 18, p. 1.
Deputy Leal is now retired.
Affidavit of Diego Leal, Jr. ("Leal
Affidavit"), Exhibit C to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-3, p. 2.
2
10, p.
9;
More Definite Statement,
Docket Entry No.
Classification Record, Exhibit A to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-1,
p. 11.
3
4
Affidavit of Edwin Williams ("Williams Affidavit"), Exhibit B
to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-2, p. 3.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Affidavit of Kim Pokluda ("Pokluda Affidavit"), Exhibit A to
MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-1, p. 3.
-2-
On November 5, 2014, Boudreaux was attacked by three offenders
in the 2-H cell block. 8
The assault took place after the evening
meal was served, during a period of time when the cell doors are
unlocked to allow inmates access
to
the TV area and showers. 9
Boudreaux sustained a broken jaw that required oral surgery as a
result of the assault. 10
Boudreaux contends that Corporal Williams retaliated against
him
by
transferring
him
to
cell
block
2-H,
which
Boudreaux
describes as a "trouble dorm," because Boudreaux would not give
Williams information about the fight
other offenders on October 17. 11
that occurred between two
Boudreaux also contends that
Deputy Leal failed to protect him from harm when he was assaulted
in the 2-H cell block on November 5, 2014, because Leal left the
door to his cell open and left his post for an extended period of
time. 12
Boudreaux seeks $150,000.00 in compensatory damages for the
violation of his civil rights. 13
The
rights
8
defendants
and
move
Statement
No. 1-1, p . 2 .
deny
for
of
summary
Facts
Leal Affidavit,
pp. 4, 5.
9
violating
I
Boudreaux's
judgment,
attached
to
constitutional
arguing
Complaint
Exhibit C to MSJ,
that
they
are
Docket
Entry
Docket Entry No.
19-3,
I
10
More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. 10, pp. 2, 6.
11
Correction of Statement of Facts, Docket Entry No. 16, p. 1.
12
More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. 10, p. 1.
13
Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 4.
-3-
entitled to qualified immunity from Boudreaux's claims against them
in their individual capacities . 14 The defendants argue further that
Boudreaux
fails
to
establish
liability
against
them
in
their
official capacities . 15
II.
The Defendants'
Standard of Review
Motion for Summary Judgment is governed by
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under this rule,
a reviewing court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552
(1986).
A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one
party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).
An
issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable
jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
In deciding a summary judgment motion,
Id.
the reviewing court
must "construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party."
Cir.
2010)
However,
(internal
Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th
citation
and
quotation
marks
omitted).
the non-movant cannot avoid summary judgment simply by
14
MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19, pp. 7-9.
15
Id. at 15.
-4-
presenting
"conclusory
allegations
and
denials,
speculation,
improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
argumentation."
Jones v.
344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012)
Lowndes County,
Mississippi,
67 8 F. 3d
(quoting TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of
Washington, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en bane)
(a
non-movant cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with
conclusory
allegations,
scintilla of evidence) .
a
genuine
issue
of
unsubstantiated
assertions,
or
only
a
If the movant demonstrates the absence of
material
fact,
the
burden
shifts
to
the
non-movant to provide "specific facts showing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
As noted above, the plaintiff has not filed a response to the
MSJ.
Notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to respond, summary
judgment may not be awarded by default "simply because there is no
opposition, even if the failure to oppose violated a local rule."
Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Administracion Central Sociedad Anonima, 776
F.2d 1277, 1279
(5th Cir. 1985).
"However, a court may grant an
unopposed summary judgment motion if the undisputed facts show that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
(citation omitted);
768 F.3d 435,
see also Eversley v.
172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988)
-5-
435
Day v.
(5th Cir.
MBank Dallas,
2014)
843 F.2d
III.
A.
Discussion
Qualified Immunity
Public officials acting within the scope of their authority
generally are shielded from civil liability by the doctrine of
qualified immunity.
2738 (1982).
See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,
102 S. Ct.
2727,
"Qualified immunity shields government officials from
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct."
(2015)
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044
(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)).
In doing
so,
"[q] ualified
immunity
gives
government
officials
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open
legal questions."
(2011).
Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd,
131 S.
Ct.
2074,
2085
Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity "protects all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
Id.
(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986)).
To
determine
qualified
whether
immunity
for
a
an
public
official
alleged
129 S.
Ct.
808,
analysis asks whether,
party
asserting
official's
the
conduct
815
(2009).
of
the
to
violation,
See Pearson v.
The first prong of the
taken in the light most favorable to the
injury,
violated
the
a
analysis
asks
facts
alleged
constitutional
"clearly established" at that time.
prong
entitled
constitutional
reviewing courts engage in a two-prong inquiry.
Callahan,
is
right
Id. at 815-16.
whether
-6-
show
qualified
that
the
that
was
The second
immunity
is
appropriate,
defendant's
notwithstanding an alleged violation,
actions
were
objectively
reasonable
because
"in
light
the
of
clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question."
Hampton Company National Surety, LLC v. Tunica County, Mississippi,
543 F.3d 221,
225
(5th Cir.
2008)
F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007)).
these prongs in any sequence.
also Tolan v.
Cotton,
134
(quoting Freeman v. Gore,
483
A reviewing court may consider
See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818; see
S.
Ct.
1861,
1866
(2014).
In this
instance the court begins and ends its qualified immunity analysis
with the first prong because Boudreaux does not demonstrate that
either defendant violated the Constitution.
B.
Retaliation
Boudreaux contends that Corporal Williams retaliated against
him in violation of his constitutional rights by transferring him
from cell block 2-A to cell block 2-H on October 17, 2014, because
of Boudreaux's failure to provide information about a fight between
two other inmates. 16
Williams denies taking any action to retaliate
against Boudreaux and notes
that he had no
involvement
in the
decision to transfer Boudreaux from cell block 2-A to another cell
block. 17
Williams provides records confirming that the decision to
move Boudreaux from the 2-A cell block to the 2-H cell block was
16
Correction of Statement of Facts, Docket Entry No. 16, p. 1.
17
Williams Affidavit, Exhibit B to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-2,
pp. 3-4.
-7-
made by Deputy D. Hedrick of the Classification and Release Unit at
the Jail. 18
Williams adds that, without "extensive documentation
and support," he had no authority to override decisions made by the
Classification and Release Unit and that he had
"no reason or
desire to select the location of any housing" for Boudreaux on this
occasion. 19
"To
prevail
on
a
claim
of
retaliation,
establish (1) a specific constitutional right,
a
prisoner
must
(2) the defendant's
intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of
that right,
( 3)
a
retaliatory adverse act,
McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225,
Morris v. Powell,
449 F.3d 682,
231
684
and
( 4)
causation."
(5th Cir. 1998); see also
(5th Cir. 2006)
A prisoner
must allege more than his personal belief that he is the victim of
retaliation.
1997) .
enough
See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir.
Mere conclusory allegations of retaliation will not be
to
judgment.
withstand
a
properly
supported
motion
for
summary
See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995).
Boudreaux has not filed a response to the motion for summary
judgment and he does not refute the evidence showing that Williams
had no involvement in the decision to transfer Boudreaux to the 2-H
cell block.
Boudreaux's conclusory allegations of retaliation are
18
Pokluda Affidavit, Exhibit A to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-1,
p.3; Classification Record, Exhibit 1 to Pokluda Affidavit, Docket
Entry No. 19-1, p. 12.
19
Williams Affidavit, Exhibit B to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-2,
p. 4.
-8-
not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
Woods,
60 F.3d at 1166.
See
Absent a showing that Corporal Williams
had any involvement in the decision to transfer Boudreaux to the
2-H cell block, Boudreaux fails to make a claim of retaliation or
to demonstrate a constitutional violation.
Accordingly, Corporal
Williams is entitled to qualified immunity.
C.
Failure to Protect
Boudreaux contends that Deputy Leal failed to protect him from
harm when he was assaulted on November 5, 2014, because Leal left
the door to his cell open and left his post for an extended time. 20
Pretrial detainees have a constitutional right under the Due
Process Clause to protection from harm during their confinement.
See Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 2008)
Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi,
1996)
(en bane)).
74 F.3d 633, 650
(citing
(5th Cir.
The duty to protect pretrial detainees from harm
under the Due Process Clause is the same as the one afforded under
the Eighth Amendment.
See Hare, 74 F.3d at 650 ("[T]he State owes
the same duty under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment
to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic
human needs,
including
. protection from harm, during their
confinement . . . ").
Because the Complaint against Leal concerns an
isolated
Boudreaux
20
episode,
"is
required
to
prove
intent
More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. 10, p. 1.
-9-
specifically, that one or more jail officials 'acted or failed to
act with deliberate indifference to
[his]
needs.'"
Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009)
Shepherd v.
(quoting Hare, 74
F.3d at 648).
The deliberate indifference standard is an "extremely high"
one to meet.
752,
756
Domino v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d
(5th Cir.
2001).
Mere negligent failure to protect an
inmate from attack does not justify liability under
Neals v. Norwood,
acts
59 F.3d 530, 533
with deliberate
indifference
(5th Cir. 1995).
"only if
he
1983.
§
See
An official
knows
that
the
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."
Farmer
v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994).
Deputy Leal acknowledges that he was assigned to work in the
"Pickett"
and
provide
supervision
Boudreaux was assigned on November 5,
for
the
2014. 21
cell
block
where
On the evening of
November 5 Leal conducted regular security checks by periodically
leaving the Pickett and walking through the "Pod" or cell block. 22
Leal states that each inspection took no more than five minutes and
that he did not leave the Pickett for any longer period of time. 23
Likewise, Leal did not observe any behavior among the inmates that
21
Leal Affidavit,
22
Id.
Exhibit C to MSJ,
p. 3.
at 4.
23Id.
-10-
Docket Entry No.
19-3,
indicated a problem. 24
When Leal returned to the Pickett at one
point, Boudreaux advised Leal that he had been assaulted. 25
Leal
immediately called for assistance and numerous staff responded. 26
Prior to the incident Leal was not aware of any problems between
any of the inmates housed in either of the Pods adjacent to the
Pickett where he was assigned. 27
Boudreaux does
not
allege
or
show that
Leal
knew of
but
disregarded a serious risk to his health or safety on the night he
was attacked in cell block 2-H.
he
had
"no
problems"
with
In fact, Boudreaux concedes that
his
assailants
before
occurred and that he had "absolutely no idea that
would happen. " 28
the
assault
[the attack]
Based on this record, Boudreaux does not establish
that Leal was subjectively aware of an excessive risk of harm but
deliberately indifferent to that risk.
Because Boudreaux does not
demonstrate a constitutional violation on Deputy Leal's part, Leal
is entitled to qualified immunity.
D.
Official Capacity Claims
Boudreaux does not indicate whether he sues the defendants in
their individual capacities only or if he also sues them in their
24Id.
25 Id. at 5.
26Id.
27Id.
28 More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. 10, pp. 3-4.
-11-
official capacities as Fort Bend County employees.
Defendants
argue that they are also entitled to summary judgment on any claim
against
them
employees
in
their
because
official
Boudreaux
capacity
does
not
as
allege
Fort
or
Bend
show
County
that
an
official policy or custom caused any of the alleged constitutional
violations in this case. 29
Assuming
that
a
constitutional
violation has
occurred,
municipality such as Fort Bend County is only liable under
for
acts
that
are
"directly attributable
official action or imprimatur.'"
612, 617
(5th Cir. 2009)
to
it
a
§
1983
'through
some
James v. Harris County, 577 F.3d
(quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston,
237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001))
For liability to attach "the
municipality must cause the constitutional tort, which occurs 'when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent
official
policy,
inflicts
the
injury.'"
Bolton v.
City of Dallas, Texas, 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting
Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New York, 98 S. Ct.
2018, 2037-38 (1978))
For reasons set forth above, Boudreaux has not demonstrated
that a constitutional violation occurred in this case.
He does not
otherwise attempt to establish that he was harmed as the result of
29
MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19, p. 15.
-12-
any deficient policy or custom of the Fort Bend County Sheriff's
Department.
Accordingly, the defendants cannot be held liable in
their official capacities and they are entitled to summary judgment
on this issue.
E.
Remaining Defendants
In addition to the claims against Corporal Williams and Deputy
Leal, the Complaint lists Fort Bend County Sheriff Troy E. Nehls,
Lieutenant J. Cardenas, and Sergeant D. Marin as defendants. 30
court did not
request an answer
from
The
these defendants because
Boudreaux has not alleged facts showing that these defendants had
any personal involvement with a constitutional violation.
Personal
involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of
action.
See Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992).
Because Boudreaux has not specified any personal involvement on the
part of Sheriff Nehls, Lieutenant Cardenas, or Sergeant Marin, the
Complaint against these defendants
is dismissed for
failure
to
state a claim.
IV.
Conclusion and Order
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
Entry No. 19)
is GRANTED, and this action will be dismissed with
prejudice.
3
°Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 1, 3.
-13-
The Clerk shall provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 27th day of January, 2016.
SIM LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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