Clemons v. Stephens

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. This case is dismissed. A certificate of appealability is denied. (Signed by Judge Lee H Rosenthal) Parties notified.(amwilliams, 4)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JOHN HENRY CLEMONS, III,
(TDCJ-CID #719888)
Petitioner,
VS.
WILLIAM STEPHENS,
Respondent.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-0672

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
The petitioner, John Henry Clemons, III, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.c. § 2254,
challenging a disciplinary conviction at the Wynne Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
- Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ-CID"). Clemons is serving a life sentence for his capital
murder conviction imposed in a Texas state court in Harris County, Texas. Based on careful
consideration of the pleadings, the record, and the applicable law, the court concludes that Clemons
has not stated meritorious grounds for federal habeas relief. His federal habeas petition is therefore
denied and final judgment is entered by separate order. The reasons are explained below.
On November 12, 2014, prison officials at the Wynne Unit conducted a hearing in the
disciplinary case filed against Clemons, number 20150076582. The hearing officer found Clemons
guilty of possessing a cell phone as charged. Clemons's punishment consisted of a demotion in
custodial classification from 02 to 05, a 45-day loss of commissary privileges, a 45-day loss of
recreation privileges, a 45-day cell restriction, a reduction in good-time earning class status from
Line 1 to Line 3, and the loss of 300 days of good-time credits.

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Clemons filed a Step One Grievance, which was denied on January 22, 2015, (Docket Entry
No.1, Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, p. 6). His Step Two Grievance was denied on February
4,2015. On March 13,2015, this court received his federal habeas petition. He alleges that his
disciplinary conviction is void because his due process rights were violated. (Docket Entry No.1,
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pp. 6-7).
To the extent Clemons asserts a due process claim based on the loss of privileges and the
reduction in custodial classification, case law bars his claims. The standards governing disciplinary
proceedings depend on the sanction imposed and the consequences. WoljJv. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539,563-66 (1974). Punishments that change the conditions of confinement but do not extend the
sentence or impose atypical or significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life do not require additional due process rights. Sandin v. Connor, 512 U.S. 472 (1995). In Sandin,
the Court held that a 30-day disciplinary segregation sentence did not require additional procedural
protections because the discipline did not inevitably affect the duration of the sentence. 515 U.S.
at 484,486 n.9. The punishments Clements received changed the conditions of his confinement, but
did not give rise to a due process claim. Madison, 104 F.3d at 767-68.
To the extent Clemons asserts a due process claim based on the loss of good time, his claim
also fails. While a State may, under certain circumstances, create liberty interests that apply to
prisoners protected by the Due Process Clause, these interests are generally limited to state-created
regulations or statutes that affect the quantity, rather than the quality, of time a prisoner serves.

Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. Losing good-time credits as punishment for a disciplinary conviction must
be accompanied by certain procedural safeguards to satisfy due process if the loss increases the

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sentence beyond the time that would otherwise have resulted from state laws providing mandatory
sentence reductions for good behavior. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997).
In Texas, prisoners may become eligible for release on parole or under a mandatory
supervised release program. See Madison, 104 F.3d at 768. "Parole" is the "discretionary and
conditional release of an eligible prisoner ... [who] may serve the remainder of his sentence under
the supervision and control of the pardons and paroles division." Id. "Mandatory supervision" is
the "release of an eligible prisoner ... so that the prisoner may serve the remainder of his sentence
not on parole, but under the supervision and control of the pardons and paroles division." Id.
Clemons cannot assert a due process claim by alleging that the loss of good-time credits has
delayed his release on parole. Clemons has no constitutional right to parole, Orellana v. Kyle, 65
F.3d 29,32 (5th Cir. 1995), Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1991), and no right to be released
on parole, Madison, 104 F.3d at 768 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(a)). Because
a prisoner has "no liberty interest in obtaining parole in Texas, he cannot complain of the
constitutionality of procedural devices attendant to parole decisions." Allison v. Kyle, 66 F .3d 71,
73-74 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Orellana, 65 F.3d at 32). Any argument by Clemons that he is entitled
to be considered for release on parole at a particular time would fail.
Clemons may also complain of a delay in his release to mandatory supervision from the loss
of good-time credits. But Clemons's loss of his good-time credits does not affect his release on
mandatory supervision because his capital murder conviction makes him ineligible for such release.
(Docket Entry No.1, Federal Petition, p. 5).
There is no basis for the relief Clemons seeks. Clemons's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is denied. This case is dismissed, and any remaining pending motions are denied as moot.

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Clemons must obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal. The showing required for a
certificate of appealability is a substantial showing ofthe denial of a constitutional right. Hernandez
v. Johnson, 213 F.3d 243,248 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,483-84
(2000)). An applicant makes a substantial showing when he demonstrates that his application
involves issues that are debatable amongjurists of reason, that another court could resolve the issues
differently, or that the issues are suitable enough to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See
Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 763 (5th Cir. 2000). When a district court has rejected a prisoner's

constitutional claims on the merits, the applicant must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could find
the district court's assessment ofthe constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Slack, 529 U.S. 484.
This court denies Clemons's petition after careful consideration and denies a certificate of
appealability because he has not made the necessary showing for issuance.
SIGNED on March 30, 2015, at Houston, Texas.

Lee H. Rosenthal
United States District Judge

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