Antoine v. Stephens

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 17 MOTION for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support, denying 24 MOTION for Hearing, denying 16 MOTION with the courts Documents against the parole board officials, denying 22 MOTION for Evidentiary Hearing (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
December 29, 2015

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

ERIC ANTOINE REED,
TDCJ #348853,
Petitioner, 1
v.
WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice - Correctional
Institutions Division,
Respondent.

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David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-1146

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

State inmate Eric Antoine Reed

("Reed")

(TDCJ #348853)

has

filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State
Custody ("Petition") under 28 U.S.C.

§

2254 to challenge an adverse

decision by the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles
Board")

(Docket Entry No. 1).

The respondent,

(the "Parole

William Stephens,

has filed Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment With Brief in
Support

("Respondent's MSJ")

(Docket

Entry No.

17) .

replied with an Objection to the Respondent's MSJ
No. 23).

Reed has

(Docket Entry

Reed has also filed a 1st Notice Request seeking relief

(Docket Entry No. 16), a Motion Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

1

The Petition identifies the petitioner as "Reed Eric Antoine"
(Docket Entry No. 1, p. 1). In subsequent pleadings from both the
petitioner and the respondent, it is evident that the petitioner's
true name is Eric Antoine Reed.
For purposes of clarifying the
record, the court corrects the petitioner's name accordingly.

(Docket Entry No. 22), and a 2nd Motion Requesting for an Hearing
(Docket Entry No. 24).

After considering all of the pleadings and

the applicable law, the court will grant Respondent's MSJ, deny the
Motions filed by Reed,

and dismiss the Petition for the reasons

explained below.
I.

Procedural History

Reed is presently incarcerated in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ") as
the

result

of

Harris County,

a

conviction

Texas,

in

the

209th

District

in cause number 352552. 2

Court

of

On November 22,

1982, Reed entered a guilty plea to the charge of capital murder,
which was reduced (on a motion by the state) to murder. 3
court

found Reed guilty as

The trial

charged and sentenced him

to

life

imprisonment. 4
On April 27, 2015, Reed filed the pending Petition for relief
under 28 U.S.C.
conviction.

§

2254. 5

Reed does not challenge his underlying

He challenges an adverse decision by the Parole Board,

2

Judgment, State Habeas Record,
Entry No. 18-1, p. 84.
3

15,976-01,

Docket

Id. at 79, 84.

4

Writ No.

Id. at 84.

5

Petition, Docket Entry No. 1.
The undated Petition was
received for filing on May 1, 2015. The accompanying Memorandum
of Law in Support is dated April 27, 2015 (Docket Entry No. 2,
p. 2). Using the date most favorable to the petitioner, the court
uses the date found on the Memorandum of Law in Support as the
filing date.
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2013. 6

denying him release on parole on June 12,
that he was denied parole in violation of
guidelines

and

the

Protection

Fourteenth Amendment

Clauses. 7

Respondent

Parole Board policy

Due

argues

Reed contends

in

Process
his

MSJ

and Equal
that

the

Petition must be dismissed because it is barred by the governing
one-year statute of limitations on federal habeas corpus review. 8
II.
A.

Discussion

The One-Year Statute of Limitations

This federal habeas corpus proceeding is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214

(1996).

(the "AEDPA"), Pub. L.

Under the AEDPA all federal

habeas corpus petitions filed after April 24, 1996, are subject to
a one-year limitations period found in 28 U.S.C.

2244(d).

To the

extent

that Reed challenges an adverse decision by the

Parole

Board,

the one-year statute of limitations began to run on "the

date

on

which

the

factual

predicate

of

the

§

claim

or

claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence."

28 U.S.C.

§

2244 (d) (1) (D).

6

Notice of Parole Panel Decision, State Habeas Record, Writ
No. 51,976-03, Docket Entry No. 18-4, p. 29.
7

Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 6-7.

8

Respondent argues in the alternative that the Petition lacks
merit.
See Respondent's MSJ, Docket Entry No. 17, pp. 7-13.
To
the extent that Reed's claims were rejected on state habeas corpus
review, he does not show that the state court's decision was
unreasonable or that he is entitled to relief under 2 8 U.S. C.
§ 2254(d).
Because the Petition is plainly barred by the statute
of limitations, the court will not address the merits further.
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Reed knew or could have discovered with the exercise of due
diligence the facts underlying his claims upon receiving notice of
the adverse parole decision on June 12, 2013.

That date triggered

the

one

statute

of

June 12, 2014.

limitations,

which

expired

year

later

on

Reed's pending Petition, executed no sooner than

April 27, 2015, is well outside the limitations period and must be
dismissed

unless

there

is

some

basis

to

toll

the

statute

of

limitations.
B.

Statutory Tolling

A "properly filed" state habeas corpus application tolls the
AEDPA limitations period while that application is pending in state
court.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2).

Reed filed a state application

for a writ of habeas corpus on November 26, 2014,
Court

of

Criminal

Appeals

denied

on

April

9

15,

which the Texas
2015. 10

This

application does not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations because
it was filed after the limitations period expired on June 12, 2014.
See Scott v. Johnson,

227 F.3d 260,

263

(5th Cir. 2000)

(holding

that the petitioner's "state habeas application did not toll the
limitation period under§ 2244(d) (2) because it was not filed until
after the period of limitation had expired").

9

Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus .
Under Code of
Criminal Procedure, Article 11.07, State Habeas Record, Writ
No. 51,976-03, Docket Entry No. 18-4, pp. 5-22.
10

Action Taken, State Habeas Record, Writ No. 51,976-03, Docket
Entry No. 18-3, p. 1.
-4-

Reed has not alleged that he was subject to state action that
impeded him from filing his Petition in a timely manner.
U.S.C.

§

2244 (d) (1) (B).

Furthermore,

See 28

there is no showing of a

newly recognized constitutional right upon which the Petition is
based.

See 28 U.S.C.

§

2244(d) (1) (C).

Accordingly,

there is no

statutory basis to save Reed's late-filed claims.
C.

Equitable Tolling

The AEDPA statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, at
the district court's discretion,
circumstances."
1998) .

The

Davis v.

only "in rare and exceptional

Johnson,

petitioner bears

the

equitable tolling is warranted.

158 F.3d 806,
burden of

811

(5th Cir.

establishing
Quarterman,

507

(citing Alexander v. Cockrell,

294

F.3d 840, 845

(5th Cir. 2007)

F.3d 626, 629

(5th Cir. 2002)).

See Howland v.

that

The Supreme Court has clarified

that a "'[habeas] petitioner'

is 'entitled to equitable tolling'

only

he

if

he

shows

' ( 1)

that

has

been

pursuing

his

rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in
his way'

and prevented timely filing."

S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010)

Holland v.

Florida,

130

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct.

18071 1814 (2005)) •
Reed has not articulated grounds for equitable tolling, and
the court's own review of the record does not disclose any.

After

Reed was denied parole on June 12, 2013, he waited well over a year
to initiate state habeas corpus review on November 26, 2014.
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He

offers no explanation for his delay.
available where,

as here,

limitations period.

See,

Equitable tolling is not

the petitioner squanders his
~'

federal

Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 514

(5th Cir. 1999).
Although Reed proceeds pro se on federal habeas review,

his

incarceration and ignorance of the law do not otherwise excuse his
failure to file a timely petition and are not grounds for equitable
tolling.

See Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999);

see also Cousin v.

Lensing,

310

F.3d 843,

849

(5th Cir.

2002)

(noting that a petitioner's ignorance or mistake is insufficient to
warrant equitable tolling); Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Ass•n,
932 F.2d 473, 478

(5th Cir. 1991)

(finding that "lack of knowledge

of [the] filing deadlines," "lack of representation," "unfamiliarity
with

the

legal

process,"

"illiteracy,"

and

"ignorance of

legal

rights" generally do not justify equitable tolling) .
Based

on

this

record

the

court

concludes

that

Reed's

circumstances are not among those "rare and exceptional" conditions
that warrant deviation from the express rules that Congress has
provided.

See Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 2000).

Absent a valid basis for tolling the statute of limitations,
Petition will be dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C.

III.

§

the

2244(d) (1).

Certificate of Appealability

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a
district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when
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entering a

final

order that

is

adverse

to

the petitioner.

A

certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner
makes

"a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right,"

28 U.S.C.

demonstrate

"that

2253 (c) (2),

§

reasonable

would

the

wrong."

controlling

standard this

Ct.

1595,

requires

a

1604

claims

district

Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2565 (2004)
120 S.

constitutional

find

assessment

McDaniel,

the

jurists

court's

Slack v.

of

which requires a petitioner to

debatable

(2000)).

petitioner

to

or

(quoting
Under the

show

"that

reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner
or that the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'"
1039 (2003).

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029,

Where denial of relief is based on procedural grounds

the petitioner must show not only that "jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right," but also that they "would find
it

debatable

whether

procedural ruling."

the

district

court

was

correct

in

its

Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1604.

A district court may deny a

certificate of appealability,

sua sponte, without requiring further briefing or argument.

See

Alexander v.

For

reasons

set

Johnson,

211 F.3d 895,

forth above,

this

court

898

(5th Cir.

concludes

that

2000).

jurists of

reason would not debate whether any procedural ruling in this case
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was correct or whether the petitioner states a valid claim for
relief.

Therefore, a certificate of appealability will not issue.
IV.

Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Respondent William Stephens' Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket Entry No. 17) is GRANTED.

2.

Petitioner Eric Antoine Reed's 1st Notice Request
seeking relief
(Docket Entry No. 16), Motion
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing (Docket Entry
No. 22), and 2nd Motion Requesting for an Hearing
(Docket Entry No. 24) are DENIED.

3.

The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a
Person in State Custody (Docket Entry No. 1) is
DISMISSED with prejudice as barred by the statute
of limitations.

4.

A certificate of appealability is DENIED.

The Clerk shall provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 29th day of December, 2015.

7

SIM LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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