Thoele v. Stephens
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 22 MOTION for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support. Petitioners 1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed with prejudice. No certificate of appealability shall issue.(Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) Parties notified.(mmiller, 4)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
TROY DANIEL THOELE,
Petitioner,
VS.
WILLIAM STEPHENS,
Respondent.
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April 26, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-CV-1410
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on petitioner Troy Daniel Thoele’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, and respondent William Stephens’ motion for summary judgment.
Having carefully considered the petition, the motion, all the arguments and authorities
submitted by the parties, and the entire record, the Court is of the opinion that
respondent’s motion should be granted, and Thoele’s petition should be dismissed.
I.
Background
Thoele pled guilty in the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas to 50
counts, presented in five separate cause numbers, of unlawful possession of child
pornography. That court sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment on 48 of the counts
with the sentences to run concurrently, five years imprisonment on one of the remaining
counts, and 10 years community supervision on the other count, with the latter two
sentences to run consecutively to the sentences on the other counts, and to each other.
Texas’ Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals (“TCCA”) refused Thoele’s petition for discretionary review. See Thoele v.
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State, 10-12-00171-CR to 10-12-175-CR, 2012 WL 5696428 (Tex. App. – Waco Nov.
15, 2012)(pet. ref’d).
Thoele sought state habeas corpus relief. The TCCA denied relief without written
order. SH-05 to SH-091 at action taken sheet. Thoele filed this federal petition for a writ
of habeas corpus on May 22, 2015. Respondent moved for summary judgment on
October 30, 2015.
Thoele responded on December 1, 2015, filed a supplemental
response on March 9, 2016, and amended one of his grounds for relief on February 8,
2016.
II.
The Applicable Legal Standards
A.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
This federal petition for habeas relief is governed by the applicable provisions of
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy,
521 U.S. 320, 335-36 (1997). Under the AEDPA, federal habeas relief based upon claims
that were adjudicated on the merits by the state courts cannot be granted unless the state
court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2)
“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190
F.3d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1999).
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“SH” refers to the transcripts of Thoele’s state habeas corpus proceedings.
For questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact adjudicated on the merits
in state court, this Court may grant federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
only if the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established [Supreme Court precedent].” See Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471,
475 (5th Cir. 2001). Under the “contrary to” clause, this Court may afford habeas relief
only if “‘the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by . . . [the
Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than . .
. [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” Dowthitt v.
Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 406 (2000)).
The “unreasonable application” standard permits federal habeas relief only if a
state court decision “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court]
cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. “In applying this standard, we must decide (1) what was the
decision of the state courts with regard to the questions before us and (2) whether there is
any established federal law, as explicated by the Supreme Court, with which the state
court decision conflicts.” Hoover v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1999). A
federal court’s “focus on the ‘unreasonable application’ test under Section 2254(d)
should be on the ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached and not on whether
the state court considered and discussed every angle of the evidence.” Neal v. Puckett,
239 F.3d 683, 696 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 286 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Neal v. Epps, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003). The solitary inquiry for a federal
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court under the ‘unreasonable application’ prong becomes “whether the state court’s
determination is ‘at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the
case.’” Id. (quoting Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also
Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Even though we cannot reverse
a decision merely because we would reach a different outcome, we must reverse when we
conclude that the state court decision applies the correct legal rule to a given set of facts
in a manner that is so patently incorrect as to be ‘unreasonable.’”).
The AEDPA precludes federal habeas relief on factual issues unless the state
court’s adjudication of the merits was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (d)(2); Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). The State court’s factual
determinations are presumed correct unless rebutted by “clear and convincing evidence.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Jackson v. Anderson, 112 F.3d 823, 824-25 (5th Cir.
1997).
B.
The Standard for Summary Judgment in Habeas Corpus Cases
“As a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating
to summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of habeas corpus cases.”
Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000). Insofar as they are consistent with
established habeas practice and procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to
habeas cases. See Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. In ordinary civil
cases, a district court considering a motion for summary judgment is required to construe
the facts in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v.
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Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“The evidence of the nonmovant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor”). Where a state
prisoner’s factual allegations have been adversely resolved by express or implicit
findings of the state courts, however, and the prisoner fails to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the presumption of correctness established by 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1) should not apply, it is inappropriate for the facts of a case to be resolved in the
petitioner’s favor. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432 (1983); Sumner v. Mata,
449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981); Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 777 (5th Cir. 2002); Dowthitt
v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 741 (5th Cir. 2000); Emery v. Johnson, 940 F.Supp. 1046,
1051 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff’d, 139 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997). Consequently, where facts
have been determined by the Texas state courts, this Court is bound by such findings
unless an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is shown.
III.
Analysis
Thoele’s petition raises seven claims for relief. As discussed below, however, a
number of the claims are waived.
Five of Thoele’s seven claims for relief concern challenges to the validity of the
search warrant and of a subpoena used to obtain evidence against him. As noted above,
however, Thoele pled guilty to the charges against him. A voluntary guilty plea waives
all non-jurisdictional defects that occurred prior to the plea. Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d
677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983). None of Thoele’s claims challenges the jurisdiction of the
convicting court. While Thoele argues in his seventh claim that the Texas Attorney
General lacked authority to prosecute him, this claim does not implicate the jurisdiction
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of the trial court. Therefore, as long as the plea was voluntary, Thoele waived his claims
concerning the search warrant and subpoena.
Thoele argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his counsel
erred in advising Thoele to plead guilty after stating that he did not want to challenge the
warrant.
A federal court will uphold a guilty plea challenged in a
habeas corpus proceeding if the plea was knowing, voluntary
and intelligent. Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838, 106 S.Ct. 117, 88 L.Ed.2d
95 (1985). A guilty plea is invalid if the defendant does not
understand the nature of the constitutional protection that he
is waiving or if he has such an incomplete understanding of
the charges against him that his plea cannot stand as an
admission of guilt. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645
n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257 n. 13, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). The
critical issue in determining whether a plea was voluntary and
intelligent is “whether the defendant understood the nature
and substance of the charges against him, and not necessarily
whether he understood their technical legal effect.” Taylor v.
Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 988, 112 S.Ct. 1678, 118 L.Ed.2d 395 (1992).
James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thoele does not dispute that he understood the rights he was waiving, the charges
against him, and the possible range of punishment he faced.
These were clearly
explained to him by the court during the plea colloquy, and Thoele clearly stated that he
understood his rights and the maximum possible sentence, and that he was pleading
guilty freely and without any outside pressure. He also stated that he discussed the plea
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“extensively” with his attorney, and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s performance.
4 Tr. at 43-54.
“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
Based on Thoele’s statements and an
affidavit submitted by his trial counsel, the state habeas court found that Thoele’s plea
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See 4 SH at 725-26. In light of the record,
Thoele fails to demonstrate that the state habeas court’s determination that his plea was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent was an unreasonable determination. That conclusion
is therefore entitled to deference.
Thoele argues, however, that his plea was involuntary under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. In Hill, the Court held that a plea is not voluntary if the defendant
relied on the advice of counsel, and counsel’s advice constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.
In Hill, the defendant’s decision to plead guilty was based, at least in part, on
erroneous information about parole eligibility provided by his attorney. Id. at 56-57.
Thoele, in contrast, complains that counsel was ineffective prior to the plea, in failing (in
Thoele’s opinion) to adequately seek to suppress evidence. As noted above, however, all
non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to a plea are waived by the plea. Therefore,
Thoele’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not negate the plea, and Thoele
waived his claims by his plea of guilty.
“Tr.” refers to the transcript of Thoele’s trial.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion for summary judgment is granted,
and Thoele’s petition is dismissed with prejudice.
V.
Certificate of Appealability
Thoele has not requested a certificate of appealability (“COA”), but this Court
may determine whether he is entitled to this relief in light of the foregoing rulings. See
Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (“It is perfectly lawful for
district court’s [sic] to deny COA sua sponte. The statute does not require that a
petitioner move for a COA; it merely states that an appeal may not be taken without a
certificate of appealability having been issued.”) A petitioner may obtain a COA either
from the district court or an appellate court, but an appellate court will not consider a
petitioner’s request for a COA until the district court has denied such a request. See
Whitehead v. Johnson, 157 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Hill v. Johnson, 114
F.3d 78, 82 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he district court should continue to review COA requests
before the court of appeals does.”).
“A plain reading of the AEDPA compels the
conclusion that COAs are granted on an issue-by-issue basis, thereby limiting appellate
review to those issues alone.” Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1997).
A COA may issue only if the petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also United States v.
Kimler, 150 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). A petitioner “makes a substantial showing
when he demonstrates that his application involves issues that are debatable among jurists
of reason, that another court could resolve the issues differently, or that the issues are
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suitable enough to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Hernandez v. Johnson,
213 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 966 (2000). The Supreme Court has
stated that:
Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims
on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is
straightforward:
The petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. The issue
becomes somewhat more complicated where . . . the district
court dismisses the petition based on procedural grounds. We
hold as follows: When the district court denies a habeas
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
This Court has carefully considered Thoele’s petition and concludes that Thoele
fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The court
concludes that jurists of reason would not find this Court’s ruling debatable. This Court
concludes that Thoele is not entitled to a certificate of appealability.
VI.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.
Respondent William Stephens’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No.
22) is GRANTED;
2.
Petitioner Troy Daniel Thoele’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Dkt.
No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
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3.
No certificate of appealability shall issue.
The Clerk shall notify all parties and provide them with a true copy of this
Memorandum and Order.
SIGNED on this 26th day of April, 2016.
___________________________________
Kenneth M. Hoyt
United States District Judge
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