SportStar Athletics, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods, Co.

Filing 48

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. (Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified.(rhawkins)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

ENTERED
January 30, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

SPORTSTAR ATHLETICS, INC.,

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

Plaintiff,
VS.
WILSON SPORTING GOODS CO.,
Defendant.

Civ. A. H-15-1438

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, CONSTRUCTION OF CLAIMS
The above referenced case, alleging that Defendant
Wilson Sporting Goods (“Wilson”), based on its Wilson Football
Chin

Strap,

is

liable

for

deliberately,

intentionally

and

willfully committing direct, induced, and contributory patent
infringement,1 is currently before this Court for construction of

1

Title 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) recites in relevant part,

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent. [direct
infringement]
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of
a patent shall be liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever offers or sells within the United
States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer.
The patent holder must establish direct infringement (§ 271(a)) as
-1-

disputed terms in two patents for chin guard apparatuses for
football helmets, licensed by Plaintiff Sportstar Athletics, Inc.
(“Sportstar”):

(1) U.S. Patent No. 7,735,160 (“the ‘160 Patent”

for “Chin Guard Apparatus For Use With a Helmet,” issued by the
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) on June 15, 2010),2 called by
Sportstar the “original strap splitter patent”; and (2) U.S.
Patent No. 8,621.671 (“the ‘671 Patent” for “Protective Chin
Guard,”

issued

by

the

PTO

on

January

7,

2014),3

called

by

Sportstar the “any strap splitter patent,” a continuation-in-part

a predicate for each act of indirect infringement under § 271(b)
and (c)). Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 363
F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2006)(“indirect infringement . . . can
only arise in the presence of direct infringement, though the
direct infringer is typically someone other than the defendant
accused of indirect infringement.”).“A plaintiff has the burden of
showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing
acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would
induce actual infringements,” i.e., “including that he or she knew
of the patent.” epicRealm, Licensing, LLC v. Autoflex Leasing
Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615-16 (E.D. Tex. 2007), citing DSU
Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2006)(Inducement “requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed
to encouraging another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer
had knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities.”).
2

A copy of the ‘160 patent is found at #26, Ex. 2; the
‘160 patent file history, at Exs. 3-4.
3

A copy of the ‘671 patent is found at #26, Ex. 8 (#269) and the patent file history, #26, Ex. 9 (#26-20).
-2-

(“CIP”) of the ‘160 Patent4 that serves to broaden the claims of
the ‘160 Patent.5
A Markman hearing6 was held on March 23, 2016.

4

“A ‘continuing patent application’ is an application
filed subsequently to another application, while the prior
application is pending, disclosing all or a substantial part of
the subject-matter of the prior application and containing claims
to subject-matter common to both applications, both applications
being filed by the same inventor or his legal representative.”
U.S. Water Services, Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 843 F.3d 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Where a third patent is a continuation-in-part of a
second patent, which in turn is a continuation of the first patent
[as is the case with the ‘774 Application, the 160' Patent, and
the ‘671 Patent, to be discussed], the prosecution histories of
the first and second patents apply with equal force to the
interpretation of the continuation-in-part patent claims.
ICN
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Genera Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp.,
272 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Prior art that the
inventor disclosed in a parent application need not be disclosed
again in a continuation application. Nomadix, Inc. v. Hospitality
Core Services, LLC, No. CV 14-08256 DDP (VBKx), 2015 WL 3948804,
at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015).
5

“[A] patent applicant is not precluded from filing a
continuation application with broader claims. It is recognized
that an applicant can broaden as well as restrict his claims
during the procedures of patent examination, and that continuing
applications may present broader claims than were allowed in the
parent,” but he “cannot recapture claim scope that was surrendered
or disclaimed.” Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC, 479 F.3d 1313,
1317 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 951 (2007).
6

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc, 52 F.3d 967
(Fed. Cir. 1995)(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The goal
of a Markman hearing is to determine the ordinary and customary
meaning of claim terms as seen by “a person of ordinary skill in
the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the
effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(en banc), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006). Such a person reads the claim term
not only in the context of the specific claim in which it appears,
but also in the context of the entire patent, including the
specification. Kwitek v. Pilot Corp., 516 F. Supp.2d 709, 712
(E.D. Tex. 2007), citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
“‘[T]he
specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction
analysis. Usually it is dispositive; it is the single best guide
to the meaning of a disputed term.’‘” Id., citing Phillips, 415
F.3d 1315, quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
-3-

Specifically,

the

parties

dispute

the

meaning

of

following claim terms or claim elements in the two patents:
“strap splitter” (in claims 1,8,9,12, and 13 of the ‘160 patent
and in claims 7,8,10, and 17 of the ‘671 patent); “In said second
slot” (in claims 1,9, and 12 of the ‘160 patent); “stop” (in
claims 9 and 18 of the ‘671 patent); and “greater than” (in claims
1 and 9 of the ‘160 patent).7

Sportstar contends that Wilson Hard

Cup Football chin straps, including model numbers WTF985000 and
WRF985001, infringe Claims 1 and 12 of the ‘160 Patent and Claims
7 and 10 of the ‘671 Patent.
After hearing the arguments regarding the parties’
proposed constructions of the disputed claim terms at the Markman
hearing, and after careful review of the record, including the
claim language, specifications, and prosecution histories of the
patents-in-issue, as well as of the law, the Court enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law construing the
disputed terms as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a).
Findings of Fact
Sportstar is a corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Texas and is the licensee of the rights to the ‘160
and ‘671 patents.
Wilson was incorporated under the laws of the State of
Delaware, has its principal place of business at 8750 W. Bryn Mawr

7

The term “cup” is no longer in dispute as both parties
agree that it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
#28, p.1. n.1; #25, p. 15.
-4-

Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60631, and is a major manufacturer of
sports equipment and paraphernalia.
The sole inventor of the Sportstar chin guards and the
owner of the two Patents-in-issue is Paul Schiebl, the president
of Sportstar, who has licensed the substantial rights to the ‘160
and ‘671 Patents to Sportstar.8
Before Schiebl’s invention, existing chin straps for
football helmets were made for attachment to either the high
hookup or the low hookup of a football helmet, depending on the
configuration of the player’s face and the amount of protective
performance he desires from the chin strap; if a player wanted to
be able to hook up to both high and low hookups, he had to have
separate chin straps for each kind of hookup.
There was no expert testimony, but only arguments of
counsel and the record at the Markman hearing.
Conclusions of Law
Applicable Law
This Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction under
28

U.S.C.

§§

1331

and

1338(a)

over

this

action

for

patent

infringement.
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or

8

A party may sue for patent infringement only if it
owns the patent (i.e., is the “patentee”) by issuance or
assignment.
Kothmann Enterprises, Inc. v. Trinity Industries,
Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 923, 941(S.D. Tex. 2005). “‘A party that
has been granted all substantial rights under a patent is
considered the owner and is entitled to bring an infringement
action, regardless of how the parties characterize the transaction
that conveyed those rights.’” Id.
-5-

imports into the United States any patented invention during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”

35 U.S.C. §

271.
Patent claim construction is a matter of law for the
court.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977

(Fed. Cir. 1995)(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Allen
Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
A

patent

is

a

fully

integrated

written

instrument

memorializing a grant by the government to the patentee of rights
for a limited time to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention described in the patent.
at 978.

Markman, 52 F.3d

To determine whether infringement of a patent has

occurred, the court first decides the correct scope and meaning of
each claim and then compares the “construed claim to the accused
device to determine whether all of the claim limitations are
present literally or by a substantial equivalent.”

Renishaw PLC

v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)(en banc).

The first step, the construction of the

claim, is an issue of law to be decided by the Court; the second
is a factual question.

Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. Philips Corp.,

363 F.3d 1263, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also MBO Laboratories,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson Cos., 474 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2007)(“A determination of patent infringement requires a two-step
analysis:

first the meaning of the claim language is construed,

then the facts are applied to determine if the accused device
-6-

falls within the scope of the claims as interpreted.”), citing
Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.

In other words, “claim construction is

the court’s ‘power and obligation’ in a jury case.

The court’s

construction permits the jury in the second step of the suit to
decide

the

fact

question

of

infringement,

which

requires

a

comparison of properly construed patent claims and the alleged
infringer’s device or process.”

Logan v. Hormel Foods, Inc., No.

Civ. A. H-05-0055, 2005 WL 2171893, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2005), aff’d,
217 Fed. Appx. 942 (Fed. Cir. Jan 25, 2007), cert. denied, 552
U.S. 941 (2007).
To determine the meaning of the claims one must view
them in the context of “those sources available to the public that
show what a person of skill in the art would have understood
disputed claim language to mean.”

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.

In construing the claim limitations, the court first
examines the intrinsic evidence, i.e., “the written description,
the drawings, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” Allen
Engineering,

299

F.3d

1344.

The

three

primary

sources

of

intrinsic evidence for ascertaining the meaning of patent claims
in the order of importance are (1) the words of the claims in the
patent, (2) the specification, and (3) the prosecution history
(also known as the “file wrapper”).

US Foam, Inc. v. On Site Gas

Systems, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (E.D. Tex. 2010).9

9

In Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citations omitted), the
panel observes that an invention is construed in light of the
claim language, the prosecution history in the PTO, and the
specification:
The prosecution history . . . consists of the
-7-

Different weights are imposed on different sources, with
the most relevant being the patent’s specification,10 “which is
‘the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”

MBO,

474 F.3d at 1329, quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,90
F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

Section 112 of the Patent Act,

35 U.S.C. § 112, opens with the statement that the specification
“shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the

complete record of the proceedings before the
PTO and includes the prior art cited during
the examination of the patent.
Like the
specification,
the
prosecution
history
provides evidence of how the PTO and the
inventor understood the patent. Furthermore,
like the specification, the prosecution
history was created by the patentee in
attempting to explain and obtain the patent.
The prosecution history contains “any express representations made
by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims,” B-50.com,
LLC v. Xformity, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:04-CV-0542-B, 2006 WL
6248254, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23. 2006). “‘Prosecution history
estoppel requires that the claims of a patent be interpreted in
light of the proceedings in the PTO during the application
process. Estoppel is a ‘rule of patent construction’ that ensures
that claims are interpreted by reference to those‘that have been
cancelled or rejected.’” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kyogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
“‘Prosecution
history estoppel . . . preclud[es] a patentee from regaining,
through litigation, coverage of subject matter relinquished during
prosecution of the application for the patent.’” Festo Corp., 535
U.S. at 734, 737 (2002), quoting Wang Laboratories, Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1577-78 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). Nevertheless prosecution history does not apply each
time a patent application is amended but only for limited reasons,
e.g., “to avoid the prior art, or otherwise to address a specific
concern--such as obviousness–-that arguably would have rendered
the claimed subject matter unpatentable.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1997).
10

The patent claims are “part of ‘a fully integrated
written instrument,’ consisting principally of a specification
that concludes with the claims,” so the “claims ‘must be read in
view of the specification of which they are a part.’” Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1315, quoting Markman, 52 F.3d 978-79.
-8-

manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear
concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . .”

The

second paragraph recites that the specification “shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.”

“[W]e look to the words of the claims themselves . .

. to define the scope of the patented invention.”

Vitronics, 90

F.3d at 1582. Furthermore because the claims are part of “a fully
integrated

written

instrument,”

comprised

mainly

of

the

specification, they “must be read in view of the specification.”
Markman, 52 F.3d at 978, 979.
Next in significance is the prosecution history, which
simultaneously is also part of the “‘intrinsic evidence’ that
directly

reflects

how

the

patentee

has

characterized

the

invention.” Id., citing id. at 1317. The prosecution history, if
in evidence, includes the complete record before the PTO and the
prior art cited during the examination of the patent.
415 F.3d at 1317.

Phillips,

The prosecution history “can often inform the

meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor
understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the
invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope
narrower than it otherwise would be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
It includes “all express representations made by or on behalf of
the applicant to the examiner to induce a patent grant, or . . .
to reissue a patent[,] . . . . includ[ing] amendments to the
claims and arguments made to convince the examiner that the
-9-

claimed invention meets the statutory requirements for a patent of
novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. Thus
the

prosecution

history

(or

file

wrapper)

limits

the

interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that
may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order
to obtain claim allowance.” Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

Because the prosecution

history is created by the patentee as he tries to obtain a patent,
it reflects the ongoing negotiations rather than their final
product and lacks the clarity of and is less helpful for claim
construction than the specification. Id. Yet it can also “inform
the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the
inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited
the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope
narrower than it would otherwise be.”

Id., citing Vitronics, 90

F.3d at 1582-83.
Finally extrinsic evidence, including expert testimony,
dictionaries, learned treatises, or other material not part of the
public record associated with the patent, may be helpful, but is
less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the
legally operative meaning of claim language.” Id., citing id. It
may be less reliable because it is not part of the patent, is not
created at the time of the patent prosecution, may not reflect the
understanding of a skilled practitioner in the field of the
patent, and may be created for litigation and contain bias toward
the offeror’s contentions. Id. at 1318. While claim construction
“involves consideration of primarily the intrinsic evidence, viz.,
-10-

the

claim

language,

the

specification,

and

the

prosecution

history,” underlying factual determinations made by the district
court [are] based on extrinsic evidence and are reviewed for clear
error.

Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374

(Fed. Cir.)(citing Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 842), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 569 (2015).
In sum, a court is not “barred from considering any
particular sources or required to analyze sources in any specific
sequence, as long as those sources are not used to contradict
claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic
evidence. . . .

[W]hat matters is for the court to attach the

appropriate weight to be assigned to those sources in light of the
statutes and policies that inform patent law.”

Id, at 324.

In

most cases the intrinsic evidence by itself will resolve any
ambiguity

in

the

extrinsic

evidence

ambiguity

in

the

extrinsic evidence.

disputed
would

claim
be

intrinsic

term

improper;
evidence

and

then

only

may

reliance

where

the

court

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.

on

there

is

rely

on

Vitronics, 90

F.3d at 1582.
In ascertaining the meaning of the claims, the court
views them “in the context of ‘those sources available to the
public that show what a person of skill in the art would have
understood disputed claim language to mean.’”

MBO, 474 F.3d at

1329, citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2005)(en banc)(quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006).

In Phillips, id., the appellate
-11-

court quoted Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d
1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998), to explain that
the person of ordinary skill in the field of
the invention through whose eyes the claims
are construed is deemed to read the words
used
in
patent
documents
with
an
understanding of their meaning in the field,
and to have knowledge of any special meaning
and usage in the field. The inventor’s words
that are used to describe the invention--the
inventor’s lexicography--must be understood
and interpreted by the court as they would be
understood and interpreted by a person in
that field . . . . Thus the court starts the
decisionmaking process by reviewing the same
resources as would that person, viz., the
patent specification and the prosecution
history.
Id., citing Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2005)(“We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the
term in a vacuum.
meaning

in

the

Rather, we must first look at the ordinary

context

of

the

written

description

and

the

prosecution history.”); V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA,
401 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(intrinsic record “usually
provides the technological and temporal context to enable the
court to ascertain the meaning of the claim to one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention.”); Unitherm Food
Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2005)(proper definition is the “definition that one of ordinary
skill in the court could ascertain from intrinsic evidence in the
record.”), rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006).

See also

Lexion Medical, LLC v. Northgate Tech, Inc., 641 F.3d 1352, 1356
(Fed.

Cir.

2012)(interpretation

of

a

claim

term

“should

be

harmonized, to the extent possible, with the intrinsic record as

-12-

understood within the technological field of the invention.”).
The hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art in question
at the time of the invention is presumed to be aware of all
relevant prior art.

Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan

Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
“A patentee’s decision to narrow his claims through
amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the
territory between the original claim and the amended claim.”
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740, citing Exhibit Supply Co. v. ACE
Patents Corporation, 315 U.S. 126, 136-37 (1942)(“By the amendment
[the patentee] recognized and emphasized the difference between
the two phrases and proclaimed his abandonment of all that is
embraced in that difference.”).
“cannot

reasonably

be

viewed

In some cases the amendment
as

surrendering

a

particular

equivalent” that might have been unforeseeable at the time of
application;

in

such

cases

“the

patentee

can

overcome

the

presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of
equivalence.”

Id. at 740-41.

To rebut the presumption that

prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence, the
patentee must show that at the time of amendment, one skilled in
the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim
that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.”
Id. at 741.

“The applicant having limited his claim by amendment

and accepted a patent, brings himself with the rules that if the
claim to a combination be restricted to specified elements, all
must be regarded as material, and that limitations imposed by the
inventor, especially such as were introduced into an application
-13-

after

it

had

been

persistently

rejected,

must

be

strictly

construed against the inventor and looked upon as disclaimers.”
I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Ruber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1926).
Afterward the patentee is estopped from seeking the benefit of his
rejected claim or a construction of his amended that would be an
equivalent of the rejected claim.

Id. at 444.

prosecution

patentees

disclaimer

precludes

The doctrine of
from

recapturing

through claim interpretation particular meanings disclaimed during
prosecution even if the disclaimers were not required to make the
invention patentable.

PrinterOn Inc. v. BreezyPrint Corp., 93 F.

Supp. 3d 658, 672 (S.D. Tex. 2015), citing Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d
at 1323; SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278,
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013); and Uship Intellectual Props., LLC v. U.S.,
713 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Sometimes

the

patentee

chooses

“to

be

his

own

lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary
meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is clearly
stated in the patent specification or file history.”

Vitronics,

90 F.3d at 1582, citing inter alia Hormone Research Foundation,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(“It
is a well-established axiom in patent law that a patentee is free
to be his or her own lexicographer.”).

When the definition to a

claim in the specification differs from the special definition
given to a claim term by the patentee, the latter, i.e., the
inventor’s lexicography, prevails.

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.

Nevertheless, there is a “‘heavy presumption’ that claim terms
carry

their

full

ordinary

and

customary

-14-

meaning

unless

the

patentee unequivocally imparted a novel meaning to those terms or
expressly relinquished claim scope during prosecution.”

Omega

Engineering, Inc. v. Rytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090,
1095 (Fed. Cor. 2012)(same; “Thus, when the patentee unequivocally
and unambiguously disavows a certain meaning to obtain a patent,
the doctrine of prosecution history disclaimer narrows the meaning
of

the

claim

consistent

with

the

scope

of

the

claim

surrendered.”); Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America
LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)(“There are only two
exceptions to [the] general rule [that words of a claim are
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood
by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context
of the specification and prosecution history]: 1) when a patentee
sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer [by
clearly expressing an intent to redefine the term], or 2) when the
patentee [clearly] disavows the full scope of a claim either in
the specification or during prosecution” (citing Vitronics Corp.,
90 F.3d at 1580).11

“When a patentee responds to the rejection by

11

In Biogen Idec, 713 F.3d at 1095 (citations omitted),
the Federal Circuit further explained,
Prosecution history disclaimer plays an
important role in the patent system.
It
“promotes the public notice function of the
intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s
reliance on definitive statements made during
prosecution.” Such statements can take the
form of either amendment or argument.
For
this reason, the entirety of a patent’s file
history captures the public record of the
patentee’s representations concerning the
scope and meaning of the claims. “[I]t is
-15-

narrowing his claims, this prosecution history estops him from
later arguing that the subject matter covered by the original,
broader claim was nothing more than an equivalent,” that the
broader limitation is equivalent to the narrower limit he claimed.
Festo, 535 U.S. at 727, 735.12

“Competitors may rely on the

totality of the prosecution history that must
be assessed, not just the individual segments
of the presentation made to the [PTO] by the
applicant . . . .” Competitors are entitled
to rely on those representations when
determining a course of lawful conduct, such
as launching a new product or designingaround a patented invention.
Beyond the
notice function and reliance-based aspects of
a patent’s prosecution history, it “provides
evidence of how the [PTO] and the inventor
understood the patent.”
12

The two uses of prosecution history must be
distinguished:
(1) using the contents of the prosecution to
resolve disputed language in claims and (2) the doctrine of
prosecution estoppel, which estops or restricts later expansion of
the protection given by the claim to the patent owner under the
doctrine of equivalents when the claims have deliberately been
amended or distinguished over prior art to give up scope. Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 862 (Fed. Cir.
1991); see also Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare
Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(“Just as
prosecution history estoppel may act to estop an equivalence
argument under the doctrine of equivalents, positions taken before
the PTO may bar an inconsistent position on claim construction.”);
McGill, Inc. v. John Zink, Co., 736 F.2d 666, 673 (Fed. Cir.),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)(two contexts for prosecution
history–estoppel and claim construction tool).
Trading
Technologies Intern., Inc. v. Open E Cry, LLC. 728 F.3d 1309, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2012)(“Prosecution history estoppel applies as part of
an infringement analysis to prevent a patentee from using the
doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter surrendered
from the literal scope of a claim during prosecution. Prosecution
disclaimer, on the other hand, affects claim construction and
applies where an applicant’s actions during prosecution
prospectively narrow the literal scope of an otherwise more
expansive claim limitation. Though distinct, both doctrines serve
to constrain the enforceable scope of patent claims commensurate
with any subject matter surrendered during prosecution to obtain
the patent, and a single action during prosecution can engender
both a prosecution disclaimer and prosecution history estoppel.
-16-

estoppel to ensure that their own devices will not be found to
infringe by equivalence.” Id. “‘The prosecution history (or file
wrapper) limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any
interpretation that may have been disclaimed or disallowed during
the prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance.’”

Omega

Engineering, Inc. v. Raytec Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2003), quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,
452 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
In a continuation patent, e.g., the ‘671 patent, the
inventor “has the right to refile the application and attempt to
broaden the claims” as long as he has not previously surrendered
or disclaimed the claim scope.

Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC

479 F.3d 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cor. 2007).
“A patentee’s decision to narrow his claims through
amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the
territory between the original claim and the amended claim.”
Festo, 535 U.S. at 740, citing Exhibit Supply. 315 U.S. at 136-37
(“By the amendment [the patentee] recognized and emphasized the
difference between the two phrases and proclaimed his abandonment
of all that is embraced in that difference.”).

The doctrine

applies even if the disclaimers were not needed to made the
invention patentable by overcoming a claim rejection.

Uship

Intellectual Props. 713 F.3d at 1315; Southwall Techs., Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(“Estoppel
extends beyond the basis of patentability . . . . Clear assertions

[citations omitted].”
-17-

made during prosecution in support of patentability, whether or
not actually required to secure allowance of the claim, may also
create an estoppel.”).

It does not apply to statements in which

the disavowal is ambiguous.

Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1324.

Furthermore, “[b]ecause claim terms are normally used
consistently throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one
claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other
claims.”

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.

“[A] claim term should be

construed consistently with its appearance in other places in the
same claim or in other claims of the same patent.

Rexnord Corp.

v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001), citing
Phonometrics, Inc. v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1465
(Fed. Cir. 1998)(“A word or phrase used consistently throughout a
claim should be interpreted consistently.”); CVI/Beta Ventures,
Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(“[W]e are
obliged to construe the term ‘elasticity’ consistently throughout
the claims.”); South wall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d
1570, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(holding that claim terms found in
different claims should be interpreted consistently).
A patent is not limited to the preferred embodiments, or
examples provided in the intrinsic record, even if there is only
one, “unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to
limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest
exclusion or restriction.’”

Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, 358

F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004), citing Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N.
Am.

Corp.,

299

F.3d

1313,

1327

-18-

(Fed.

Cir.

2002);

Hill-Rom

Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
“When multiple patents derive from the same initial
application, the prosecution history regarding a claim limitation
in

any

patent

that

has

issued

applies

with

equal

force

to

subsequently issued patents that contain the same limitation.”
Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir.
1999), citing Jonsson v. The Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 817-18
(Fed. Cir. 1990)(“holding that when two patents issued from
continuation-in-part

applications

derived

from

one

original

application, the prosecution history of a claim limitation in the
first patent to issue was properly applied to the same claim
limitation in the second patent to issue.”); in accord, Gemalto
S.A. v. HTC Corp., 754 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
To

prevail

on

a

claim

of

direct

infringement,

a

plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one
or more claims of the patent read on the accused device literally
or under the doctrine of equivalents.

Advanced Cardiovascular

Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).

To establish literal infringement, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “every limitation set forth in a claim must be
found in an accused product, exactly.” South wall Techs., Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
deviation

from

the

infringement finding.

literal

claim

language

bars

a

Any

literal

Telemaco Cellular Corp. v. Top Telecom,

Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

-19-

The Federal Circuit describes infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents as “requir[ing] that the accused product
contain each limitation of the claim or its equivalent.” DeMarini
Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 40 (1997)(“noting that because each limitation contained in a
patent claim is material to defining the scope of the patented
invention, a doctrine of equivalents analysis must be applied to
individual claim limitations, not to the invention as a whole.”).
To

prevail

demonstrate

on
the

an

infringement

presence

of

claim,
every

the

element

plaintiff
[for

must

literal

infringement] or its substantial equivalent [for infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents] in the accused device.”

The

Boeing Co. v. U.S., 69 Ct. Cl. 397, 426 (Fed. Cl. 2006), ruled
infringed, 86 Fed. Cl. 303 (Fed. Cl. 2009), remanded, 374 Fed.
Appx. 955 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

As the Federal Circuit has opined,

A finding of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents requires a showing that the
difference between the claimed invention and
the
accused
product
or
method
was
insubstantial or that the accused product or
method performs the substantially same
function in substantially the same way with
substantially the same result in each claim
limitations of the patented product or
method.
[AquaTex Industries, Inc. v.
Techniche Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2005)]; see also Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.
605, 608 . . . (1950).
The latter is known as the “function, way, result test.”

AquaTex

Industries, Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 479 F.3d 1320, 1326 Fed.
Cir. 2007).

“A claim limitation and an element in an accused

-20-

device are equivalents if a person of ordinary skill in the art
would find the differences to be insubstantial.”

Colucci v.

Callaway Golf Co., 748 F. Supp. 2d 629, 632 (E.D. Tex. 2010),
citing Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

The patentee bears the burden of showing

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by particularized
testimony,

typically

from

a

qualified

expert,

and

argument

regarding the insubstantiality of the differences between the
claimed invention and the accused device on a limitation-bylimitations basis.

Colucci, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 631, citing

AquaTex, 479 F.3d at 1328.
Court’s Construction
After

a

careful

review

of

the

record,

the

Court

concludes that Sportstar’s construction of the claims in the
patents-in-issue fails to follow the rules of patent construction,
while Wilson has applied them properly.
The Court agrees with Wilson that Sportstar’s proposed
constructions diverge from the required process of construing
patent terms in the light of the intrinsic evidence, especially
the

claim

history.

language,

the

specification,

and

the

prosecution

Instead Sportstar improperly tries to broaden the

patents’ claims to recapture subject matter that the patentee
Schiebl relinquished during prosecution of the patent.

Moreover,

Sportstar changes the name of the ‘160 patent (“Chin Guard
Apparatus for Use with a Helmet”) to “Original Strap Splitter
Patent,” a misnomer historically and factually because helmet

-21-

strap splitters are common in the prior art13 and because “strap
splitter” is used in both patents in issue.

Sportstar also

changed the name of the ‘671 Patent (“Protective Chin Guard”) to
”Any Strap Splitter Patent,” also a misnomer because the prevalent
prior art

anticipates each asserted claim or renders it obvious,

including the strap splinter element from the abandoned ‘774
Application.
The

Court

agrees

with

Wilson

that

the

prosecution

history of the patents in issue, which Sportstar ignores, is
essential to properly construing the terms in dispute here.14

The

‘671 Patent is a continuation in part of the ‘160 Patent, and
therefore the statements regarding the terms or elements made
during the prosecution of the ‘160 Patent also apply to the ‘671
Patent.

The two patents also claim the same filing date.

Furthermore the prosecution history of the first, the ‘160 Patent,
applies equally to the later, continuation-in-part ‘671 Patent.
Elkay, 192 F.3d at 980 (“When multiple patents derive from the
same initial application, the prosecution history regarding a
claim limitation in any patent that has issued applies with equal
force

to

subsequently

issued

patents

that

contain

the

same

limitation.”).

Moreover, the ‘160 Patent is also a continuation-

in-part

even

of

an

earlier

Schiebl

patent

application,

No.

13

See Defendant’s Preliminary Invalidity Contentions for
U.S. Patent No, 7,735,160 (Ex. B).
14

This Court disagrees with Sportstar’s contention (#29
at p. 2) that Wilson confuses prosecution history estoppel with
prosecution disclaimer. See footnote 12. The Court notes that
Sportstar discusses the difference generally, but does not point
to any specific instances of confusion by Wilson.
-22-

10,463,774 (“‘774 Application”), filed on June 17, 2003, which was
rejected three times and then abandoned.

The ‘774 Application

contained the term “strap splitter,” which Schiebl included in the
‘160 Patent Application with new claims, which Schiebl filed on
September 8, 2005 and is a continuation-in-part of the ‘774
application.

After the PTO initially rejected all the claims of

the ‘160 Patent Application, Schiebl filed an amendment deleting
all 20 of its claims and replacing them with new claims with new
language in bold in an effort to convince the examiner to allow
them:
21. A chin guard apparatus for use with a
helmet in which the helmet has a high hook-up
and a low hook-up, the chin guard apparatus
comprising:
a shell having a cup suitable for fitting
upon a human chin, said shell having an outer
peripheral edge, said shell having a single
first strap-receiving slot adjacent on one
side of said shell and a single second strapreceiving slot adjacent [o]n opposite side of
said shell:
a resilient layer received within said cup
of said shell, said resilient layer having a
periphery overlying said outer peripheral
edge of said shell;
a first strap extending through said first
strap-receiving slot of said shell and
extending outwardly therefrom, said first
strap suitable for attachment to the helmet;
a second strap extending through said
second strap-receiving slot of said shell and
extending outwardly therefrom, said second
strap suitable for attachment to the helmet;
and
a first strap splitter through which said
first strap extends, said first strap
splitter comprising a unitary body having a
first slot in spaced relationship to a second
slot, said first strap splitter having a
fixed bar formed therewith and positioned
between said first slot and said second slot,
said second slot having a length that is
greater than a length of said first slot,
-23-

said first strap having a first portion and a
second portion juxtaposed together in said
first slot and angularly diverging from each
in said second slot, said first portion and
said
second
portion
being
angularly
adjustable with respect to each other so as
to allow one of said first and second
portions to be attached to either the high
hook-up or low hook-up of the helmet.
Exhibit

G,

‘160

(WIL00555-56).

Prosecution
Schiebl

History

also

Amendment

defined

“strap

“A”,

pp.

splitter”

3-4
more

narrowly for the examiner in an effort to avoid another rejection:
strap splitter is defined as a “unitary body”
[with] a first slot in spaced relation to a
second slot. A “fixed” bar is formed with
the unitary body and positioned between the
first slot and the second slot.
It is
indicated that the second slot has a length
that is greater than the first slot.
[Emphasis added]
Exhibit G, p. 8,(WIL00560).

The examiner then allowed the ‘160

Patent based on the amendment.
Schiebl filed the ‘671 Patent Application on July 25,
2011 as a continuation-in-part of the ‘160 Patent Application,
with the same application date as the ‘160 Patent and the earlier
abandoned, rejected ‘774 Application.

In the later ‘671 Patent

Schiebl used the same term, “strap splitter,” as expressly defined
in the ‘160 Patent history.

Now that Schiebl had the narrowed

definition of “strap splitter” from that first used in the ‘160
Patent, the examiner allowed the claims of the ‘671 Patent over
the prior art.

Therefore Sportstar cannot go back and use the

broader definition that was rejected.

Festo, 535 U.S. at 737.

The parties disagree about the meaning of the following
claim terms or elements, #20-1 (Ex. A Sportstar) and 20-2 (Ex. B.

-24-

Wilson): “Strap splitter” (in claims 1,8,9,12, and 13 of the ‘160
patent (Ex C to #28) and claims 7,8,10, and 17 of the ‘671 patent
(Ex. D)); “In said second slot” (in claims 1,9, and 12 of the ‘160
patent); “stop” (in claims 9 and 18 of the ‘671 patent); and
“greater than” (in claims 1 and 9 of the ‘160 patent).

The

following are the two parties’ proposed constructions:

Disputed Term

Sportstar’s
Construction

Wilson’s Construction

strap splitter

a part of chin guard
assembly, separate from
the chin cup, through
which two portions of a
chin strap extending in
line from the chin cup
are separated at an
angle

A unitary body with a
first slot in spaced
relation to a scond
slot. A “fixed” bar
is formed with the
unitary body and
positioned between
the first slot and
the second slot, with
the second slot
having a length that
is greater than the
first slot

in said second
slot

plain and ordinary
meaning, no
construction necessary;
alternatively a slot is
a narrow opening or
slit

within the second
single continuous
opening

stop

plain and ordinary
meaning, no
construction necessary;
alternatively something
that impedes or
prevents motion

rivet or plug

greater than

plain and ordinary
meaning, no
construction necessary

longer than

The
constructions

Court
are

agrees

properly

with
based

Wilson
on

the

that
patents’

its

claim

intrinsic

evidence (claim language, specifications, and prosecution history)
-25-

and

on

the

patentee’s

claim

construction

as

his

own

lexicographer.15
With respect to “strap splitter, Wilson’s construction
comes

directly

from

prosecution history.

the

patentee’s

own

definition

in

the

See, e.g., Ex. G, ‘160 Prosecution History

Amendment “A,” pp. 3-4 (WIL00555-56)(supra at p. 26 of this
Opinion and Order; same definition used in the ‘671 Patent).

In

contrast, Sportstar has now deleted the following language from
the prosecution history: “Unitary body,” “fixed bar,” and “second
slot having a length that is greater than said first slot.”
Schiebl deliberately amended his claims to narrow the definition
of strap splitter to overcome the examiner’s rejection to and
other prior art references during the prosecution of the ‘160
Patent.

Therefore Sportstar is barred by prosecution history

estoppel from altering the definition now and expanding the
construction of the term “strap splitter.”
Nor can Sportstar use different definitions in the two
patents at issue, as it now seeks to do in order to broaden its
definition (#25, pp. 8-9).

Not only is the strap spliter of

Figure 1 of the ‘160 Patent essentially identical to Figure 7 of
the ‘671 Patent, but the specification of the ‘160 Patent and its
prosecution are binding on the continuation-in-part ‘671 Patent,
and Wilson’s construction of “strap splinter” mirrors Schiebl’s

15

Although Sportsstar claims that Wilson misunderstands
the concept of a patentee acting as his own lexicographer and
conflates embodiments mentioned in the specification with
definitions, #19 at p.4, the Court disagrees and finds Wilson
quite clear and explicit in delineating the two.
-26-

definition in the ‘671 patent application without any modification
or redefinition.

In amending and narrowing the construction of

“strap splinter” in response to an Office Action that cited as
prior art U.S. Patent No. 7,203,972 (“Pietrzak,” Ex. F, which also
disclosed a strap splitter for a helmet), Schiebl, as his own
lexicographer, emphasized and defined the term to include exactly
what Wilson now proposes as the correct construction of the term
to overcome prior art cited against his claims and which is
binding on the ‘671 continuation-in-part:
In particular, in each of these claims, the
strap splitter is defined as a “unitary body”
[with] a first slot in spaced relation to a
second slot. A “fixed” bar is formed with
the unitary body and positioned between the
first slot and the second slot.
It is
indicated that the second slot has a length
that is greater than the first slot.
Ex. G, ‘160 Prosecution History Amendment “A,” p. 8 (WIL00560);
Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. Microstrategy Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 679
(Fed. Cir. 2015)(patentee’s definition, acting as lexicographer in
the prosecution history, should be ascribed to the claim term).
Schiebl distinguished Pietrzak as follows, Ex. G, pp. 11-12
(WIL0056):
[I]t can be seen that the Pietrzak patent
does not show a “unitary body.” There is no
“fixed bar” formed with this unitary body.
Each of the slots of the Pietrzak patent
appear to be symmetrical with each other such
that there is not a “second slot having a
length that is greater than the length of the
first slot” . . . On this basis, Applicant
contends
that
the
Pietrzak
patent
in
combination with the Schiebl and Rush patents
does not show the structure, function, or
results of the present invention. . . . [Ex.
G, pp. 11-12 (WIL00563-64].

-27-

In contrast, the specification of the ‘160 Patent (Ex.
B, Col. 6, ll. 5259) discloses the “strap splinter” in manner
similar to Schiebl’s amended ‘160 Patent (with numbers referencing
those in the drawings in Ex. B, Col. 6, ll. 52-59):
The strap splitter 40 includes a body 66
formed of a polymeric material. A first slot
68 opens through the body 66. A second slot
70 is in spaced relationship to the first
slot 68 and also open through the body. A
bar 72 is formed between the slots 68 and 70.
The slots 68 and 70 are configured so as to
allow the strap portions 36 and 38 to pass
therethrough and over the bar 72. The second
slot 70 has a length that is greater than the
first slot 68.
Estoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the
patent and the amendment narrows the patent’s scope.”
U.S. at 734.

Festo, 535

“A patentee who narrows a claim as a condition for

obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader subject
matter, whether the amendment was made to avoid prior art or to
comply with § 112.”

Id. at 737.

Sportstar bears the burden of

establishing that an amendment was not made for reasons related to
patentability.

Id. at 739.

“When the patentee is unable to

explain the reason for amendment, estoppel not only applies, but
also ‘bar[s] the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to
that element.’”

Id. at 740.

Whether the patentee has rebutted

the presumption of surrender is a question of law for the Court.
Id. at 740-41.

The Court concludes that Schiebl and Sportstar

have not rebutted that presumption of surrender here.

Since

Schiebl particularly narrowed the claims of the ‘160 Patent to
overcome the PTO’s rejection of his original application, he and

-28-

Sportstar cannot deny this prosecution history and recapture the
surrendered subject matter.
Sportstar attempts to argue that “strap splitter” should
mean something different in the two continuation-in-part patents
in issue, i.e., that it is legal error to import limitations from
the ‘160 Patent into the broader ‘671 Patent. #25 at pp. 8-9, 16.
Prosecution history estoppel prevents such an effort and binds the
‘671 Patent to the specification and prosecution history
‘160 Patent.

of the

Neither patent mentions football, and the ‘160

Patent even states that the splitter is for bicycle helmets.

Ex.

B, ll. 34-36 (“The invention relates to improvements in protective
headgear such as . . . bicycle helmets, and helmets for other
activities

where

desirable.”).

protection

Nevertheless

from

head

impact

and

injury

is

because Schiebl’s disclosures were

restricted to football during the prosecution history to overcome
Pietzrak, however, Sportstar is estopped from excluding that
limitation and broadening the reach.
“strap

splitter”

is

supported

by

Wilson’s construction of

both

the

patents

and

the

prosecution history and should not be amended and expanded as
Sportstar requests.
With regard to the term “stop,” here, too, Wilson
defines the word as the ‘671 patent does and as Sportstar did a
year ago in a similar suit, but from which definition it now tries
to distance itself.

See drawing of ‘671 Patent in Figure 8, #28

at p. 11, with stops as #114, 118, 122, and 124 (Ex. D).

Wilson

contends that Sportstar should not now be permitted to avoid its
own previously asserted definition. The specification of the ‘671
-29-

Patent, “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
term,”16 written by Schiebl as his own lexicographer, uses the term
“stop” three times and expressly defines it as a “rivet” (Ex. D,
Col. 7, ll. 34-39, emphasis added by the Court):
[T]he embodiment of FIG. 8 utilizes stops in
order to allow the position of the straps 110
and 112 to be adjustably fixed.
In
particular, strap 110 has a first rivet 114
affixed to a first portion 116 adjacent to
one side of the strap-receiving slot 106.
Strap 110 has a second rivet 118 affixed to a
second portion 120 adjacent to an opposite of
the strap-receiving slot 106. Similarly, the
strap 112 has a first rivet 122 adjacent one
side of strap receiving slot 108 and a second
rivet 124 adjacent to an opposite side of the
strap-receiving slot 108.
The rivets 114,
118, 122, and 124 extend outwardly of a
surface of the receptive straps so as to have
a thickness greater than the width of the
respective strap-receiving slots 106 and 108.
As such the rivets act as stops so as to
prevent excessive movement of the shell 102
relative to the straps 110 and 112.
The use of the rivets (or stops)
unexpectedly facilitates the ability to
angularly adjust the straps 11- and 112
relative to the high and low hook-ups of the
helmet.
The rivets can be conveniently
installed subsequent to the connection of the
50 shell 102 with the straps 110 and 112.
Sportstar now proposes a definition that broadens the
term “stop” in an effort to reach the characteristics of Wilson’s
accused device:

construing “stop” as a “rivet or a plug,” or

“alternatively an article which prevents one portion of the strap
from sliding lengthwise past the other portion.”

Ex. H.

Thus

Sportstar modified and broadened its definition of “stop” to cover
the characteristics of Wilson’s accused device.

16

If the patentee

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315, to show that the patentee
intended a meaning deviating from the ordinary meaning.
-30-

redefines the plain and ordinary meaning of a term during the
prosecution history, in particular the specification, using words
that manifest exclusion or restriction, i.e., a “clear disavowal”
of claim scope, as Schiebl did here, the “inventor’s lexicography
governs.”

Kwitek, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 713, citing Phillips, 415

F.3d at 1316.

Wilson is entitled to rely on the inventor’s

statements in the specification.
Wilson construes “in said second slot” to mean “within
the second single continuous opening,” while Sportstar first
argues to give the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning, with no
construction necessary, and alternatively “a slot is a narrow
opening or slit.”

Wilson asserts that Sportstar impermissibly

urges the Court to ignore the requirement that the second slot be
one continuous slot.

Claim 1 of the ‘160 Patent teaches that the

first and second straps are folded in two and subsequently become
a low strap portion and a high strap portion as they extend from
a slot in the chin cup and enter into the strap splitter, which
has two

slots:

one shorter receiving slot through which the two

strap portions pass side by side, and a second, longer slot
through which the two straps pass while angularly diverging

from

each other “so as to allow one of the said first and second
portions to be attached to either the high hook-up or low hook-up
of the helmet.“

#25, Ex. B, Col. 9, ll. 1-2 and Figure 7.

Wilson

explains that this limitation and narrowing of the patent was in
response to a rejection and part of the narrowing amendment in
response to the Pietrzak Patent, discussed earlier with respect to
the strap splitter. Wilson maintains that neither the prosecution
-31-

history, nor the claim language, nor the specification supports
Sportstar’s construction.

Sportstar’s proposal that “in said

second slot” means a “narrow opening or slit” (“an opening that is
longer than wide”) merely describes a type of slot; the key point
of the element at issue is the angular divergence of the two strap
portions from one another within that slot.

Sportstar cannot

expand the reach of the limitation because the ‘160 Patent was
narrowed specifically to overcome a rejection.

Graham, 383 U.S.

at 33 (“claims that have been narrowed in order to obtain the
issuance of a patent by distinguishing the prior art cannot be
sustained

to

cover

that

which

was

previously

by

limitation

eliminated from the patent.”).
During his prosecution of the ‘160 Patent, Schiebl
argued that his claim elements were distinguished from Pietrzak by
the way in which the strap portions diverged within the single
second slot (#125, Ex. G, Amendment “A,” pp. 11-12, WIL0000563-64:
In particular, in each of these claims, the
strap splitter is defined as a “unitary body”
[with] a first slot in spaced relation to a
second slot. A “fixed” bar is formed with
the unitary body and positioned between the
first slot and the second slot.
It is
indicated that the second slot has a length
that is greater than the first slot.
In

the

Pietrzak

Patent,

the

slots

appear

to

be

symmetrical with each other so that there is not a “second slot
having a length greater than the length of the first slot.”

In

addition, the Pietrzak Patent does not even hint that the first
and second portions of the strap are “angularly adjustable” with
respect to each other to permit one of the first or second

-32-

portions to be hooked onto either the high hook-up or the low
hook-up of the helmet. Here again, the patent and the prosecution
history support Wilson’s construction.
Sportstar urges that “greater than” has its plain and
ordinary meaning, with no construction necessary, while Wilson
construes it as meaning “longer than,” with “greater” referring to
length rather than some other characteristic, such as weight.
Claim 1 states that “said first strap splitter having a fixed bar
formed therewith and positioned between said first slot and said
second slot, said second slot having a length that is greater than
a length of said first slot.”

#25, Ex. B, Col. 8, ll. 60-64.

The

‘160 Patent also teaches that the “strap splitter” has two slots:
the two parts of the strap go from the chin cup through the first
slot of the strap splitter juxtaposed or on top of each other, and
that leave from the longer second slot while angularly splitting
from each other.

This limitation was employed to overcome a

rejection in view of Pietrzak and therefore must be read narrowly
to distinguish it from the strap splitter structure of Pietrzak.
See drawings of the ‘160 Patent (Figure 5) and the Pietrzak Patent
(Figure 3A), #25, p. 16.

The ‘160 Patent specification supports

Wilson’s construction in noting the “relatively long length” of
the “slot,” Ex. B, Col. 7, ll. 20-31, while Figure 5 shows that
the slot is narrowed and elongated.
supports Wilson’s reading:

The prosecution history also

the Patent Office allowed the ‘160

Patent because the Pietrzak Patent had symmetrical half circle
shaped holes (#25, Ex. F, Figure 3A) and same sized slots that
were quite different from the shape of the slots of the ‘160
-33-

Patent, with, as Schiebl successfully argued, the ‘160's second
slot being longer (“greater”) than the length of the first slot”
Ex. G, p. 11 (WIL0000563).

The two were clearly distinguished:

“Relative to independent Claims 21 and 32 it can be seen that the
Pietrzak patent does not show a “unitary body.”
“fixed bar” formed with this unitary body.

There is no

Each of the slots of

the Pietzrak patent appear to be symmetrical with each other such
that there is not a “second slot having a length that is greater
than the length of the first slot.”
pp. 11-112 (WIL0000563-64).

#25, Ex. G, Amendment “A,”

In contrast, Wilson’s accused strap

splitter has three slots, all the same size and symmetrical with
each other, i.e., the configuration that Schiebl moved away from
to avoid rejection under Pietrzak.

#25, p. 2, Figure B.

Thus

Sportstar is estopped from claiming that “greater than” does not
need to mean longer in light of this patent and its prosecution
history.
To the extent that any of the Court’s findings of fact
should properly be designated conclusions of law, and vice versa,
that mischaracterization shall not affect the determination of the
Court.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this

30th

day of

January ,

2017.

___________________________
MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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