Romero v. Carpenter

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 16 MOTION to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified.(gclair, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ALFREDO ROMERO,
TDCJ #01054039,

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Plaintiff,
VS.
CLINT CARPENTER,

June 26, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-3017

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Windham School District has a policy that excludes all
inmates with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detainers from attending
educational and rehabilitative programs offered by Windham School District and no longer
offers English as a second language. See Docket Entry No. 1. Plaintiff alleges further that this
practice prejudices inmates with ICE detainers, such as Plaintiff, because it denies them the
opportunity to obtain point deductions for completion of educational and rehabilitative programs
in parole assessment. See id. at 4. Per the Court’s request, Plaintiff has filed a More Definite
Statement. See Docket Entry No. 11.
Defendant Clint Carpenter has filed a Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), contending that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies. See Docket Entry No. 16. The Court has considered the motion, pleadings, and
arguments of the parties, and concludes that this case must be dismissed for the reasons that
follow.

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD
This case is governed by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Under the

PLRA, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, an inmate is required to exhaust
administrative remedies for all “action[s] . . . brought with respect to prison conditions” before
filing a civil rights suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or “any other Federal law.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 1997e(a)-(c). The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that § 1997e(a) requires
exhaustion of all administrative procedures before an inmate can sue in federal court. See Booth
v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002)
(holding that the PLRA requires exhaustion of all claims concerning prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong). Exhaustion is mandatory.

See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. The PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement mandates “proper exhaustion,” which demands compliance with all
procedural rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). As the Supreme Court has
recognized, “Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of
prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to
address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Porter, 534 U.S.
at 524-25.
By requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, Congress hoped that “corrective
action taken in response to an inmate’s grievance might improve prison administration and
satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation.” Id. (citation omitted). In addition
to filtering out potentially frivolous claims, Congress also believed that internal review would
facilitate adjudication of cases ultimately brought to court by giving prison officials an
opportunity to develop an administrative record that clarifies the contours of the controversy. Id.
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(citations omitted).

Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit has also

mandated that a prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies by complying with applicable
prison grievance procedures before filing a suit related to prison conditions. Johnson v. Johnson,
385 F.3d 503, 515 (5th Cir. 2004).
II.

DISCUSSION
In both Plaintiff’s Complaint and his More Definite Statement, he admits that he has not

exhausted state administrative remedies. See Docket Entry No. 1 at 3; Docket Entry No. 11 at 12. Plaintiff contends that he need not exhaust administrative remedies in his case because “an
offender is not allowed to file a grievance against written policy that has been mandated for the
departments to follow” and that “it would have been futile to file a grievance.” Docket Entry
No. 11 at 2.
As Defendant points out, Plaintiff cites no authority for his position that he would not be
permitted to file a Step 1 and Step 2 grievance regarding the policy that he alleges is
unconstitutional. Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s assertion that he has failed to exhaust his
state remedies. Nor does Plaintiff controvert Defendant’s contention that he has no basis to
assert that exhaustion would be futile. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that exhaustion is
mandatory and “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.”

Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. Accordingly, this case must be dismissed for failure to

exhaust remedies as required by the PLRA.

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III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 16) is GRANTED.

2.

Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies.

3.

All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as MOOT.

The Clerk shall send a copy of this Order to all parties of record.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 26th day of June, 2017.
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MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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