Green v. William et al

Filing 7

ORDER OF DISMISSAL. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. All pending motions in this case, if any, are DENIED. (Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified. (wbostic, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LOWELL QUINCY GREEN,
TDCJ #518622,
Plaintiff,
VS.
WILLIAM STEPHENS and RESSIE
OWENS,
Defendants.

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November 06, 2015
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-3257

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Lowell Quincy Green (TDCJ #518622) is an inmate in custody of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice – Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ-CID”). Plaintiff has
filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants William
Stephens, the Director of TDCJ-CID, and Ressie Owens, the Chairperson of the Texas
Department of Paroles. He has also requested to proceed in forma pauperis and attached a copy
of his prisoner trust fund account. (Docket Entry No. 3). After reviewing the pleadings as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court concludes that this case must be dismissed for the
reasons that follow.
I.

Background
Plaintiff is currently serving a life sentence at the Coffield Unit as the result of a

conviction in McClennan County, Waco, Texas for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon.
(Docket Entry No. 1). Plaintiff challenges the calculation of his parole eligibility date because
he contends that neither the jury nor the trial judge made an affirmative finding on the issue of
whether he used or exhibited a deadly weapon. Id. at 2-5. Plaintiff maintains that the defendants
have unlawfully engaged in an “unauthorized punishment scheme” that violated his due process
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and due course of law rights. Id. at 6. He also alleges that defendants’ actions amount to
malicious prosecution and that it is cruel and unusual punishment to impose a punishment that
the Legislature did not intend. Id. at 6-8.
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that defendants’ acts in calculating his parole eligibility date
violated plaintiff’s rights under the Constitution and compensatory damages unauthorized
deprivation of liberty interest, violations of due process, and malicious prosecution. Id. at 13.
II.

Standard of Review
Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(PLRA), which requires a district court to scrutinize claims in a civil action brought in forma
pauperis by a prisoner and dismiss the complaint, in whole or in part, if it “is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;” or “seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A reviewing court
may dismiss a complaint for these reasons “at any time” “on its own motion or on the motion of
a party” where the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B) (mandating dismissal where the complaint is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief”).
Pleadings filed by pro se litigants must be construed under a less stringent standard of
review. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Under this standard, a court liberally
construes a pro se litigant’s complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “Nevertheless, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
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A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages and equitable relief are barred under the
Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Heck bars any
cause of action under § 1983, regardless of the type of relief sought, that would necessarily imply
the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction or sentence, unless the conviction has previously been
invalidated through proper channels. Id.; Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 340
(5th Cir. 2002). Thus, before a plaintiff can pursue a claim for damages arising from allegedly
unlawful actions which, if proven, would also show the plaintiff's conviction or sentence to be
invalid, the plaintiff must first show that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal,
expunged by executive order, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s claims are inextricably linked to the legality of his present sentence and
confinement. The gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint is that the TDCJ-CID and Parole Board
calculated his parole eligibility date incorrectly because the judgment allegedly did not make an
express finding that he used a deadly weapon in the robbery. Thus, it is apparent that a judgment
favorable to Plaintiff on his present civil rights claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction and sentence. Plaintiff does not allege and has not otherwise shown that his
conviction has already been overturned or invalidated through proper channels, and therefore his
present civil rights claims are barred by Heck.1
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The Court declines to recharacterize the case as a habeas corpus proceeding because Green has at least
one pending habeas petition asserting many of the same claims as he has articulated here. See, e.g.,

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IV. Conclusion and Order
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that:
1.

Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

2.

All pending motions in this case, if any, are DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this order to Plaintiff. The Clerk will also send

a copy by regular mail, facsimile transmission, or e-mail to the District Clerk for the Eastern
District of Texas, Tyler Division, 211 West Ferguson, Tyler, Texas, 75702, Attention: Manager
of the Three–Strikes List.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 5th day of November, 2015.

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MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Green v. Stephens, Civil No. 6:15-00285-WSS (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2015) (Smith, J.).

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