Carranza v. Red River Oilfield Services, LLC

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Signed by Judge Nancy F Atlas) Parties notified.(sashabranner, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
HARLEY CARRANZA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RED RIVER OILFIELD SERVICES,
LLC,
Defendant.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

January 27, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-3631

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) case is before the Court on the Motion
for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) [Doc. # 19] filed by Defendant Red River Oilfield
Services, LLC (“Red River”), to which Plaintiff Harley Carranza filed a Response
[Doc. # 22], and Red River filed a Reply [Doc. # 25]. The Court has reviewed the full
record, including the transcript of Plaintiff’s Deposition, Exh. 1 to Plaintiff’s
Response. Based on that review, and the application of binding and persuasive legal
authorities, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
Red River is an Oklahoma company that provides services, including pipe

inspection, to the oil and gas industry. Plaintiff worked for Red River as an Electro
Magnetic Inspector from June 2013 to November 2015. While he was employed by
Red River, Plaintiff was paid a salary plus commission.
P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 15, 2015, alleging that he frequently
worked more than forty hours per week.1 Plaintiff alleges that Red River violated the
FLSA by failing to pay him overtime wages for the hours he worked in excess of forty
per week. Red River answers that Plaintiff is exempt from the FLSA’s overtime
requirements because, inter alia, he falls within the executive exemption and/or the
“highly-compensated employee” exception.
After the close of discovery, Red River filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for decision.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary

judgment against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of
an element essential to the party’s case for which that party will bear the burden at
trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Baton Rouge Oil and Chem.
Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 2002). In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether the movant has
shown “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
1

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit “Individually and on Behalf of All Similarly Situated
Persons.” See Plaintiff’s Original Collective Action Complaint [Doc. # 1]. Plaintiff
did not request certification of the case as a collective action and, instead, filed a First
Amended Complaint [Doc. # 15] on June 17, 2016, as a single plaintiff.

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

2

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Rodgers v. United States, 843 F.3d 181, 190 (5th Cir.
2016); Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008).
The movant “bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact . . ..” Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715,
718 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Brandon v. Sage Corp., 808 F.3d 266, 269-70 (5th Cir.
2015); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005). If the
moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must
be denied, regardless of the non-movant’s response. ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d at
375.
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go beyond the
pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. Brandon, 808 F.3d at 270; Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268
F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001). “A fact issue is ‘material’ if its resolution could affect
the outcome of the action.” Hemphill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 805 F.3d 535,
538 (5th Cir. 2015); DIRECT TV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2006).
Summary judgment “will not lie . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016).

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

3

In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been created, the facts
and inferences to be drawn from them must be reviewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. See Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 234
(5th Cir. 2016). However, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant “only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826
F.3d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). The non-movant’s
burden is not met by mere reliance on the allegations or denials in the non-movant’s
pleadings. See Diamond Offshore Co. v. A&B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531, 545 n.13
(5th Cir. 2002) (noting that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary
judgment evidence); Bistany v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 956,
961 (S.D. Tex. 2014). Likewise, “unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions that a fact
issue exists” do not meet this burden. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144
F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998). Instead, the nonmoving party must present specific
facts that show “the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential
component of its case.” Id. In the absence of any proof, the court will not assume that
the non-movant could or would prove the necessary facts. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075
(citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

4

III.

FLSA OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS
The FLSA “requires an employer to pay overtime compensation to any

employee working more than forty hours in a workweek.” Olibas v. Barclay, 838
F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Allen v. Coil Tubing Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d
279, 282 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1))). There are, however,
exemptions to the FLSA, which are construed narrowly against the employer, and on
which the employer bears the burden of proof. See id. (citing Allen, 755 F.3d at 282).
Red River asserts that Plaintiff is exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement
under the executive exemption and/or the “highly-compensated employee” exemption.
IV.

EXECUTIVE EXEMPTION
The executive exemption applies to any employee who (1) is paid at least $455

per week, (2) whose “primary duty is management . . . of a customarily recognized
department or subdivision,” (3) who “customarily and regularly directs the work” of
at least two other employees, and (4) who has hiring and firing authority, or whose
suggestions about promotion and termination are “given particular weight.” See 29
C.F.R. § 541.100; Chambers v. Sodexo, Inc., 510 F. App’x 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2013).
It is uncontroverted that Plaintiff was paid at least $455 per week.

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

5

A.

“Recognized Subdivision” and “Primary Duty”

The second executive exemption requirement is that the employee’s “primary
duty is management . . . of a customarily recognized department or subdivision.”
Plaintiff contests that his primary duty was management and argues that the “South
Texas crew” was not a recognized department or subdivision of Red River.
Recognized Department or Subdivision.–

A “customarily recognized

department or subdivision” is one with a “permanent status and function,” and not one
that is merely a “collection of employees assigned from time to time to a specific job
or series of jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.103(a). “Continuity of the same subordinate
personnel is not essential to the existence of a recognized unit with a continuing
function.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.103(d). “A recognized department or subdivision may
move from place to place and the subordinate personnel may change, as long as the
‘unit’ has a continuing function.” Allen v. Coil Tubing Servs. LLC, 846 F. Supp. 2d
678, 708 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citations omitted); see also Cobb v. Finest Foods, Inc., 755
F.2d 1148, 1150 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming district court’s ruling that the hot foods
section of several cafeterias were recognized subdivisions of the cafeterias); Sutton
v. Engineered Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 1979) (affirming district
court’s ruling that a 480-day, $700,000 construction project was a recognized unit).

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

6

Plaintiff argues, without supporting evidence, that the “South Texas crew” was
not a “recognized department or subdivision.” See Response, p. 5. Defendant has
presented evidence that “Red River organizes its inspection employees into
independent ‘crews’ [and] considers each of its crews to be a permanent unit of the
company.” See Declaration of Rick Blankenship,2 Exh. A to Motion, ¶ 3. Plaintiff
conceded in his deposition that he and the three (sometimes two) crew members were
known at the company as the “South Texas crew.” See Plaintiff’s Depo., at 68, 99.
Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that raises a genuine issue of fact regarding the
status of the South Texas crew as a recognized subdivision of Red River.
Primary Duty.– An employee’s “primary duty” is “the principal, main, major
or most important duty that the employee performs.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). To
identify an employee’s primary duty for purposes of the FLSA, the Court looks to the
job responsibilities that are “of principal value to the employer, not the collateral tasks
that [he] may also perform, even if they consume more than half [his] time.” Dalheim
v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1227 (5th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff argues that his primary duty was pipe inspection, citing to Defendant’s
Interrogatory Responses. See Plaintiff’s Response, p. 7. In the cited Interrogatory
response, however, Defendant states under oath that although Plaintiff performed

2

Rick Blankenship is the owner of Red River.

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

7

other job duties, his “primary duty was to act as a supervisor of a crew.” See
Defendant’s Interrogatory Responses, Plaintiff’s Exh. 3 to Response.
Defendant has presented evidence that Plaintiff was hired to manage an
inspection crew.

See Offer Letter dated May 21, 2014, Exh. 2 to Plaintiff’s

Deposition; Blankenship Declaration, ¶ 4. Specifically, Plaintiff was hired to “run the
South Texas crew.” See Blankenship Declaration, ¶ 4. The offer letter from Red
River to Plaintiff indicated that he was offered the position of “Lead Drill Pipe
Operator” and identified his job duties as “Inspection supervisor running crews and
jobs.” See Offer Letter.
Plaintiff’s pay stub identified him as a management employee, reflecting his
“Management PTO,” or Paid Time Off. See Direct Deposit Voucher, Exh. 16 to
Plaintiff’s Deposition.
Plaintiff has presented evidence that he performed inspection services, either
by computer or by other equipment. Plaintiff has failed, however, to present evidence
that his primary duty was anything other than managing the South Texas crew.
B.

“Directs Work”

The third requirement for the executive exemption is that the employee
“customarily and regularly directs the work” of at least two other employees.
Defendant has presented evidence that Plaintiff “customarily and regularly” directed

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

8

the work of the South Texas crew. Blankenship stated in his Declaration that Plaintiff
“was responsible for running inspection jobs and supervising the members of his
crew” and that “almost all of Mr. Carranza’s working time necessarily was devoted
to job and crew management duties.” See Blankenship Declaration, ¶ 5. Indeed,
Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he made the day-to-day decisions regarding
his crew’s work. See Plaintiff’s Depo., p. 77. There is no dispute that there were at
least two, and usually three, members of Plaintiff’s South Texas crew. See id. at 68.
C.

“Input on Hiring, Compensation, Firing or Transfer”

With reference to the fourth factor for the executive exemption, there is no
dispute that Plaintiff provided input regarding the hiring, compensation, firing or
transfer of crew members and his recommendations were considered and usually
followed by his manager. See Blankenship Declaration, ¶¶ 8-9; Plaintiff’s Depo. at
26. Indeed, shortly after Red River hired Plaintiff, he requested that he be allowed to
hire two individuals. See Blankenship Declaration, ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s request was
granted, Red River hired the two individuals, and Plaintiff later negotiated their pay
raise. See id. Plaintiff during his deposition could not remember Red River ever
denying his requests for someone to be hired for his crew. See Plaintiff’s Depo. at 25.
Similarly, Plaintiff testified that he never requested a pay raise for the members of
crew and had the request denied. See id. at 26.

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

9

Plaintiff’s input regarding termination and/or transfer of his crewmembers was
also given considerable weight. Plaintiff’s brother worked for Plaintiff on his crew
and had performance problems. See Blankenship Declaration, ¶ 9. Plaintiff warned
his brother and threatened to fire him. See id. Blankenship authorized the termination
if Plaintiff believed it was necessary. See id. Ultimately, however, Plaintiff’s brother
resigned. See Plaintiff’s Depo. at pp. 82-83. After Plaintiff’s brother resigned, his
position on Plaintiff’s crew was filled by Tarlton Carter Pittard, one of the individuals
originally hired at Plaintiff’s request. See Blankenship Declaration, ¶ 9. When
Plaintiff complained about problems with Pittard, his manager asked if he wanted to
“get rid of” Pittard. Plaintiff said yes, and Pittard was promptly transferred from
Plaintiff’s crew to another crew. See Plaintiff’s Depo. at 25.
D.

Conclusion Regarding Executive Exemption

Defendant has presented evidence that supports each of the four executive
exemption factors. Plaintiff has failed to present evidence to the contrary that raises
a genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicability of the executive exemption.
As a result, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s FLSA claim.
V.

“HIGHLY-COMPENSATED EMPLOYEE” EXEMPTION
The “highly-compensated employee” exemption applies to employees (1) who

have a “total annual compensation of at least $100,000.00” (which must include at

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

10

least $455.00 per week paid on a salary or fee basis), and (2) who regularly and
customarily perform at least one of the duties of an executive, administrative, or
professional employee. 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a), (b)(1); see also In re Novartis Wage
and Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2010); Zannikos v. Oil Inspections
(USA), Inc., 605 F. App’x 349, 359 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2015). “A high level of
compensation is a strong indicator of an employee’s exempt status, thus eliminating
the need for a detailed analysis of the employee’s job duties.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(c).
The $100,000 threshold can include commissions and certain bonuses. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.601(b)(1). The $100,000 requirement is satisfied for a year in which the
employee works less than the full year if he is paid a pro rata portion of the $100,000
based on the period of time he worked. See 29 U.S.C. § 541.601(b)(3). “An
employee may qualify as a highly compensated executive employee, for example, if
the employee customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other
employees, even though the employee does not meet all of the other requirements for
the executive exemption under § 541.100.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(c).
A.

Highly-Compensated Exemption Requirements

In this case, it is uncontroverted that Plaintiff satisfied the compensation
element of the “highly-compensated employee” exemption. In 2014, from June

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

11

through December, Plaintiff earned $74,308.63 – which equates to approximately
$127,386 per year. In 2015, from January to November, Plaintiff earned $117,225.83.
Having satisfied the compensation element of the “highly-compensated
employee” exemption, Red River must demonstrate also that Plaintiff regularly and
customarily performed at least one of the duties of an executive, administrative, or
professional employee. As discussed above, Red River has presented evidence that
Plaintiff satisfied at least one – indeed, all – of the duties of an executive employee,
and Plaintiff has failed to present evidence to the contrary that raises a genuine issue
of material fact.
B.

“Blue-Collar” Workers

Plaintiff argues that the “highly-compensated employee” exemption does not
apply because he was a “blue collar” worker performing manual work. See Plaintiff’s
Response, p. 13. The employee does not qualify for the “highly-compensated
employee” exemption unless his “primary duty” includes performing office or
non-manual work. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(d). The exemption provides specifically
that it applies:
only to employees whose primary duty includes performing office or
non-manual work. Thus, for example, non-management production-line
workers and non-management employees in maintenance, construction
and similar occupations such as carpenters, electricians, mechanics,
plumbers, iron workers, craftsmen, operating engineers, longshoremen,
construction workers, laborers and other employees who perform work
P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

12

involving repetitive operations with their hands, physical skill and
energy are not exempt under this section no matter how highly paid they
might be.
29 C.F.R. § 541.601(d) (emphasis added). As discussed above, the uncontroverted
evidence in this record demonstrates that Plaintiff’s primary duty was managing and
supervising the inspection crew, not performing manual labor. Plaintiff has presented
evidence that he performed work such as driving the crew to the assigned location,
setting up for the pipe inspections, and installing the testing units. See, e.g.,
Defendant’s Interrogatory Responses, Exh. 3 to Plaintiff’s Response. “To the extent
he performed any manual work similar to [that] of his crew members, it would
necessarily have been in connection with and support of his management duties.”
Blankenship Declaration, ¶ 7. Plaintiff’s evidence does not raise a genuine issue of
material fact that his primary duty was management and not manual labor.
C.

Conclusion Regarding “Highly-Compensated Employee” Exemption

Defendant has presented evidence supporting the application of the “highlycompensated employee” exemption, and Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that
raises a genuine fact dispute on the issue. As a result, Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment that the “highly-compensated employee” exemption applies.

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

13

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Defendant has satisfied its burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff falls within both

the executive exemption and the “highly-compensated employee” exemption to the
FLSA, and Plaintiff has failed to present evidence to the contrary that raises a genuine
issue of material fact. Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 20] is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Court will issue a separate Final Judgment.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 25th day of January, 2017.

NAN Y F. ATLAS
SENIOR UNI
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

P:\ORDERS\11-2015\3631MSJ.wpd

170127.1011

14