Fernandez v. Captain Wakefield et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 48 Motion to Dismiss. All other motions, if any, are DENIED. The Clerk of Court will send a copy of this order to all parties of record.(Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified.(rhawkins)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
FERNANDO C. FERNANDEZ,
TDCJ #01569202,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CAPTAIN WAKEFIELD, et al,
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January 25, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-09
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Fernando C. Fernandez (TDCJ #01569202), is presently incarcerated at the
John M. Wynne Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions
Division (“TDCJ-CID”). Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil
rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against certain TDCJ officials and medical personnel at
the Estelle Unit for violations of his Eighth and First Amendment rights. On May 26, 2016, the
Court dismissed the claims against Warden Brewer with prejudice. See Docket Entry No. 18.
On August 24, 2016, the Court dismissed all claims against all defendants in their official
capacities and dismissed the individual capacity claims against Defendants Adeyemi, Njoroge,
and Wakefield. See Docket Entry No. 34. Pending is Defendant Georgina Thomas’s Motion to
Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 48). The Court has reviewed the motion, arguments of the parties,
applicable law, and concludes as follows.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint and more definite statement, Plaintiff alleges that at about 5:30 p.m. on
September 11, 2014, he was coming out of his cell when he was caught in the cell door.1
1
Docket Entry No. 1 at 4; Docket Entry No. 17 at 4.
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Plaintiff alleges that the cell doors are “over amped” and that the cell door closed without
warning on Plaintiff, crushing his chest under the pressure from the door.2 He alleges that he
momentarily lost consciousness, the doors were reversed and he fell forward, grabbing the cell
door to catch his fall.3 At that point, his hand and forearm were caught in the cell door for over
25 to 30 minutes.4 Plaintiff alleges further that when prison officials finally freed his hand and
sent him to the infirmary, Defendant Nurse Thomas examined and treated his injury with gauze,
gave him a cold pack and non-aspirins, gave him a medical pass for an appointment the next
morning, and told Plaintiff to “quit being a cry baby.”5 Plaintiff was treated the next day by
physicians at the hospital who allegedly remarked that Plaintiff should have been transported
immediately to the hospital after his injury.6
Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation of $80,000 because he allegedly cannot close his
hand, does not have the strength that he used to have in that hand, and cannot hold things without
dropping them.7 Defendant Georgina Thomas (“Thomas”) moves to dismiss the sole remaining
claim in this case, a claim under the Eighth Amendment against Thomas in her individual
capacity, contending that she is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff fails to state an
actionable claim against her.8
2
Docket Entry No. 1 at 4; Docket Entry No. 17 at 4.
3
Docket Entry No. 17 at 4.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 8.
6
Id. at 9.
7
Docket Entry No. 1 at 4.
8
As noted, the Court previously dismissed all claims against all of the defendants (including Thomas) in
their official capacities as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Docket Entry No. 34.
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II.
Legal Standards
A.
Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of an action for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When a district court reviews the sufficiency of
a complaint before it receives any evidence either by affidavit or admission, its task is inevitably
a limited one. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Id.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court construes the
allegations in the complaint favorably to the pleader and accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in
the complaint. La Porte Construction Co. v. Bayshore Nat’l Bank of La Porte, Tex., 805 F.2d
1254, 1255 (5th Cir. 1986). To survive dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations . . . [the] allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and internal footnote omitted).
B.
Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976). To state a claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must plead facts to show that
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“the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994); see also Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002); Cantu v. Jones,
293 F.3d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 2002). Deliberate indifference is an “extremely high standard to
meet,” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006), because it “requires a showing
that the prison official ‘knows of and disregards’ the substantial risk of serious harm facing the
inmate.” Morgan v. Hubert, 459 F. App’x 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837).
To demonstrate deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, a plaintiff must
plead facts that indicate that the defendant refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or “engaged in any similar conduct that would evince a
wanton disregard for any serious medical need.” Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239
F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir.1985)).
A delay in medical care can rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if the delay is
occasioned by deliberate indifference resulting in substantial harm. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989
F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). “[T]he ‘failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the Defendants]
should have perceived, but did not’ is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.” Domino, 239
F.3d at 756 (quoting Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1979). A violation of the Eighth Amendment must
involve “more than an ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s . . . safety.” Whitley v. Albers,
106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986).
In other words, “deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from negligent or even
a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Thompson v. Upshur County,
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Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). Rather, “[i]t is the ‘obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the [Eighth
Amendment], whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of
confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous
cellblock.’” Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1084).
“Deliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant
to the conscience of mankind.” Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Eighth Amendment
Thomas contends that Plaintiff fails to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim against her
regarding medical care because there is no indication that she “refused to treat him, ignored his
complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Docket Entry No. 48 at 6
(quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756). Plaintiff acknowledges that Thomas examined and treated
his hand, but complains that she did not provide the proper treatment and told him to “quit being
such a cry-baby.”9 Plaintiff states that Thomas cleaned blood from his hand and arm, wrapped
his arm with gauze, used extra cotton balls to address the bleeding, gave him non-aspirin pills
and an ice pack, and issued him a pass to return to the infirmary for a follow-up appointment the
next morning.10 Plaintiff was seen at the hospital that morning and received treatment for his
9
Docket Entry No. 17 at 8.
10
Id. at 8-9.
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hand.11
Taking all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true and construing his pleadings liberally in his
favor, Plaintiff does not plead facts to indicate that Thomas was subjectively aware of a risk of
serious harm to Plaintiff and consciously disregarded that risk. At most, Plaintiff has stated a
claim of negligence, malpractice, or disagreement with treatment, which are insufficient to
support a finding of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See Varnado v.
Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir.1991) (holding inmate’s “disagreement with his medical
treatment” was insufficient to show Eighth Amendment violation). In that respect, an inmate’s
dissatisfaction or disagreement with the medical treatment he received, or that the treatment was
negligent or the result of medical malpractice, does not in itself state a claim for deliberate
indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297
(1991) (assertions of inadvertent failure to provide medical care or negligent diagnosis are
insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference); Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 29192 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding an inmate’s dissatisfaction with the medical treatment he received
does not mean that he suffered deliberate indifference); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107
(5th Cir. 1979) (finding “[m]ere negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice is insufficient” to
show Eighth Amendment violation); Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2000) (“the
subjective intent to cause harm cannot be inferred from a . . . failure to act reasonably”).
Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference where, as here, Thomas
examined his injuries, treated him, and gave him a follow-up appointment for the next morning.
To the extent that Plaintiff complains asserts that Thomas delayed his medical care, a
delay in medical care can rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if the delay is
11
Id.
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occasioned by deliberate indifference resulting in substantial harm. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989
F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).
As stated, Plaintiff does not plead facts to show deliberate
indifference. Plaintiff also does not plead facts to show that the short delay in other medical
treatment he received at the hospital less than 24 hours later caused him substantial harm.
Although Plaintiff alleges that Thomas should have perceived that he was seriously hurt, he does
not plead facts to show that Thomas was subjectively aware that the treatment she did provide
placed Plaintiff at a substantial risk of serious harm and that she disregarded that risk. “[T]he
‘failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the Defendant] should have perceived, but did not’ is
insufficient to show deliberate indifference.” Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (quoting Farmer, 114 S.
Ct. at 1979). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Thomas is subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted under section 1983.
A.
Qualified Immunity
Thomas also invokes her entitlement to qualified immunity for the actions alleged in
Plaintiff’s complaint. Public officials acting within the scope of their authority generally are
shielded from civil liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). As a result, courts will
not deny qualified immunity unless “existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must show: “(1) that the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the
time of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 2080 (citation omitted). When a defendant raises the
defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden to negate the defense once it is
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properly raised. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Bazan ex rel.
Bazan v. Hildago County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001)).
As stated above, Plaintiff has not stated facts to show that Thomas violated his
constitutional rights regarding his medical care. In addition, he did not respond to her assertion
of qualified immunity, and, therefore, has failed to meet his burden to negate that defense.
Accordingly, Thomas is entitled to qualified immunity for the Eighth Amendment claim alleged
against her in her individual capacity.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
Defendant Georgina Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 48) is
GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.
2.
All other motions, if any, are DENIED.
The Clerk of Court will send a copy of this order to all parties of record.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 25th day of January, 2018.
___________________________________
MELINDA HARMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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