Cornett v. Boyle
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER dismissing with prejudice 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, vacating 3 Order to Answer (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 01, 2016
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
DEBORAH CORNETT,
BOP #22499-078,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
v.
MARNE BOYLE, Warden,
Federal Prison Camp,
Bryan, Texas.
Respondent.
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-1751
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Deborah
Cornett
(BOP
#22499-078)
is
a
federal
prisoner
incarcerated in the United States Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") at the
Federal Prison Camp in Bryan, Texas.
Cornett has filed a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C.
(Docket
the
Entry
sentence.
No.
1),
challenging
§
2241
("Petition")
administration
of
her
After reviewing all of the pleadings and the applicable
law, the court concludes that this case must be dismissed for the
reasons explained below.
I .
On February 17,
States
District
sentenced
to
41
2015,
Court
Cornett was convicted in the United
for
months'
Background
the
Eastern
imprisonment.
District
See
of
United
Texas
and
States
v.
Cornett,
No.
6:14-cr-30-01
(E.D.
Tex.).
With
credit
for
good
conduct, Cornett's projected release date is April 8, 2018. 1
Cornett does not
conviction.
Instead,
challenge the validity of her underlying
she has filed a boilerplate pleading which
asserts that she is entitled to placement in a Residential Reentry
Center ("RRC") for the final 12 months of her sentence pursuant to
the
Second Chance Act
2008) . 2
of
2007,
The court concludes,
Pub.
L.
however,
No.
110-199
(April
9,
that the Petition must be
dismissed for reasons below.
II.
A.
Discussion
Exhaustion of Remedies is Required
It is evident that Cornett did not attempt to present her
claim for relief in the BOP's three-tiered administrative remedy
program before filing this suit. 3
(2016).
seeking
See 28 C.F.R.
§§
542.10- 542.19
The Fifth Circuit has determined that a federal prisoner
relief under
28
U.S.C.
§
2241
"must
first
exhaust
administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons."
Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993)
Gabor,
905 F.2d 76,
78 n.2
(5th Cir.
his
Rourke v.
(citing United States v.
1990)
(citations omitted).
Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are appropriate only where
1
Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 1.
2
Id. at 2, 17-18.
3
Id. at 9-17.
-2-
"'the available administrative remedies either are unavailable or
wholly inappropriate to the relief sought, or where the attempt to
exhaust such remedies would itself be a patently futile course of
action."' Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994)
omitted).
(quotation
The petitioner bears the burden of showing the futility
of exhaustion. Id.
Cornett
Cornett does not meet that burden.
contends
that
exhaustion
would
be
futile
because
former BOP Director Harley Lappin "has taken a strong position on
the issue [of allowing prisoners more than six months in an RRC]
and has thus far been unwilling to reconsider. " 4
However,
the
comments attributed to former Director Lappin were made in 2008,
and are remote in time. 5
information
showing
The boilerplate Petition contains no
what
position,
if
any,
current
administration has taken on the subject of RRC placement.
Cornett cites several cases in support of her argument,
them involve the Second Chance Act. 6
BOP
Although
none of
Considering that she is not
projected for release until April 8, 2018, there is more than ample
time
for
Cornett
to
exhaust
the
administrative
remedy process
before she becomes eligible for placement in an RRC.
Under these
circumstances, Cornett has not established that it would be futile
for her to try.
4
Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 11.
5
ld. at 14.
6
Id. at 11.
-3-
B.
The Petition Lacks Merit
Even if Cornett had exhausted her administrative
before
bringing
this
lawsuit,
the
petition
must
be
remedies
dismissed
because it fails to state a valid claim for habeas corpus relief.
The Second Chance Act amended 18 U.S.C.
§
3624(c) to increase the
possible term of placement in an RRC from six months to a period of
no more than 12 months before a prisoner's projected release date.
The
amendment
also
requires
the
BOP
to
assess
prisoners
for
placement on an individual basis consistent with five factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C.
§
3621(b).
Those factors are:
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4)
any statement
sentence-
by
the
court
that
imposed
the
(A) concerning the purposes for which the
sentence to imprisonment was determined to be
warranted; or
(B)
recommending
a
type
of
penal
correctional facility as appropriate; and
(5)
any pertinent policy
Sentencing Commission ....
18
u.s.c.
§
3621 (b);
statement
see also 28 C.F.R.
issued
57.22
or
by
the
(dictating that
inmates will be considered for "pre-release community confinement"
in a manner consistent with 18 U.S.C.
-4-
§
3621(b)).
A prisoner's placement in any particular facility is a matter
solely within the BOP's discretionary authority.
See Moore v. U.S.
Atty. Gen., 473 F.2d 1375, 1376 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Stewart
v.
Daniels,
Sept.
30,
Civil No.
2014)
which the
no
2014 WL 4949884,
*1
(E.D.
Tex.
("The duration of RRC placement is a matter to
[Bureau of Prisons]
(citation omitted).
have
1:13-184,
retains discretionary authority.")
It is also well established that prisoners
constitutional
right
to
be
assigned
to
a
particular
institution, facility, or rehabilitative program. See, e.g., Olim
v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1745 (1983);
S. Ct. 2532, 2538-40 (1976);
U.S.
§
78,
88
n.9
(1976).
Meachum v. Fano, 96
Moody v. Daggett, 97 S. Ct. 274, 429
Nothing
in the
Second Chance Act
or
3621(b) automatically entitles a prisoner to placement in an RRC.
See Creager v. Chapman, No. 4:09-713, 2010 WL 1062610, at *3 (N.D.
Tex.
Mar.
22,
2010)
(citing various
cases).
Cornett
does
not
otherwise allege that the BOP has failed or refused to evaluate her
for placement
in an RRC or that the BOP performed an improper
assessment
her
in
case.
As
cognizable claim for review.
a
result,
the
Petition
raises
no
7
7
0ther courts in this district have consistently rejected an
identical boilerplate Petition for lack of merit.
See Barrientos
v. Boyle, Civil No. H-16-1117 (S.D. Tex. April 27, 2016); Love v.
Boyle, Civil No. H-16-1118 (S.D. Tex. April 27, 2016); Jackson v.
Boyle, Civil No. H-16-1119 (S.D. Tex. April 26, 2016); Garza v.
Boyle, Civil No. H-16-1120 (S.D. Tex. April 26, 2016);
see also
Brooks v. Chandler, No. 4:14-875, 2014 WL 5786954 (N.D. Tex. Nov.
5, 2014) (rejecting a boilerplate petition seeking relief under the
(continued ... )
-5-
III.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court ORDERS as follows:
1.
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Deborah
Cornett (Docket Entry No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2.
The Order directing the
government
to
answer
(Docket
Entry No. 3) is VACATED.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 1st
2016.
LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
( • • • continued)
Second Chance Act) .
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