Garcia v. State of Texas et al

Filing 142

ORDER DENYING 140 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Judgment.(Signed by Judge Gray H Miller) Parties notified.(rkonieczny, 4) Modified on 11/9/2018 (rkonieczny, 4).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
DENISE GARCIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARRIS COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION H-16-2134

ORDER
Pending before the court is defendant Harris County’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on
the pleadings or, alternatively, judgment as a matter of law. Dkt. 140. Plaintiff Denise Garcia
responded. Dkt. 141. Having considered the motion, response, and applicable law, the court is of
the opinion that Harris County’s motion (Dkt. 140) should be DENIED.
Garcia was employed as an imaging clerk at the Harris County District Attorney’s Office.
Dkt. 108 at 6. During her employment, Garcia was detained and searched by officers from the
Houston Police Department (“HPD”). Id. at 7–11. Garcia filed a complaint regarding the incident
with HPD. Dkt. 92 at 5. Shortly thereafter, Harris County District Attorney Devon Anderson fired
Garcia. Id. at 14. Garcia claims that Anderson fired her because she filed a complaint with HPD.
Id. at 12. Garcia argues that Anderson violated her First Amendment right to free speech and sued
Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
“We evaluate a motion under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings using the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” Gentilello v. Rege,
627 F.3d 540, 543–44 (5th Cir. 2010). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must
plead “‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” In re Katrina Canal

Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). “Ultimately, the question for a court to decide is whether the
complaint states a valid claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” NuVasive,
Inc. v. Renaissance Surgical Ctr., 853 F. Supp. 2d 654, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
Harris County contends that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because it is immune
from suit under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). In
order to hold a municipality accountable for the actions of its employees under § 1983, Monell
requires plaintiffs to identify “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or [officially adopted]
decision” that was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation. Id. at 690;
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009). Even if no formal policy exists,
a plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by showing a “persistent, widespread practice of city
officials or employees, which . . . is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy.” Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F. 2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984). “A
plaintiff may prove the existence of a ‘custom or policy’ in one of two ways.” Zarnow v. City of
Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 2010). First, a plaintiff may show a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct by municipal employees. Id. Second, a plaintiff may show that “a final
policymaker took a single unconstitutional action.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Harris County argues that Garcia has failed to identify a municipal policy or custom that was
the moving force behind Anderson’s alleged unconstitutional conduct. Dkt. 140 at 3–5. However,
Garcia alleges that Anderson herself committed a constitutional violation by firing Garcia. Dkt. 92
at 12–14; Dkt. 141 at 2–3. Garcia argues that Anderson was a final policymaker of Harris County
for employment purposes at the District Attorney’s Office. Dkt. 141 at 2–3. Thus, Garcia contends
that Anderson’s single constitutional action is enough to establish a municipal policy or custom. Id.
2

For the purpose of this Rule 12(c) motion, the court agrees. This court has already decided
that Garcia “has asserted enough facts to state a claim that the decision for her termination was made
by a final policymaker, and, on those grounds, represents an official policy of the municipality.”
Dkt. 67 at 20–21. Harris County had the opportunity to fully address the issue of whether Anderson
was a final policymaker, both in its previous motion to dismiss (Dkts. 37, 46) and its current motion
for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 140), but it failed to do so. Harris County’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 140) is therefore DENIED.1
Signed at Houston, Texas on November 9, 2018.

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Gray H. Miller
United States District Judge

1

Harris County’s alternative motion for judgment as a matter of law is also DENIED pending
the court’s ruling on Harris County’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 108).
3