Renfro v. Davis et al
Filing
3
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER dismissing with prejudice 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Certificate of Appealability is denied. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
RASHARD ESAW RENFRO,
TDCJ #01463328,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
v.
LORIE DAVIS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division,
Respondent.
1
ENTERED
July 28, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-2226
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The petitioner,
Rashard Esaw Renfro
(TDCJ #01463328),
has
filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State
Custody
prison
("Petition")
disciplinary
(Docket Entry No.
conviction
for
1)
seeking relief from a
assaulting
another
inmate.
After considering the pleadings and the applicable law, the court
will dismiss this action for the reasons explained below.
I .
Background
Renfro is currently incarcerated at the Stiles Unit as the
result of a conviction for aggravated robbery that was entered
1
The Petition names "D. H. 0. D. Miller" as the respondent.
Because the petitioner is in custody of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ"),
Director Lorie Davis is substituted as the proper respondent
pursuant to Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts.
against him on September 9,
1073122. 2
2007,
in Harris County cause number
Renfro received a 25-year prison sentence in that case. 3
In the pending Petition Renfro seeks relief from a prison
disciplinary case that were entered against him at the Jester III
Unit on April 29,
2016. 4
In particular,
Renfro challenges his
conviction for violating prison rules by assaulting another inmate
in
disciplinary
case
#20160250992. 5
As
a
result
of
this
disciplinary conviction,
Renfro forfeited 30 days of previously
earned good-time
and
credit
he
lost
commissary and
recreation
privileges for 45 days. 6
Renfro was also reduced in custodial and
classification status. 7
Renfro filed grievances to challenge the
conviction, but his appeal was unsuccessful. 8
Renfro now contends that he is entitled to relief because the
challenged disciplinary
conviction
was
entered
against
him
in
"violation of due process" and the "right to equal protection." 9
For reasons explained below, the court concludes that Renfro fails
2
See
Texas
Department
of
Criminal
Justice,
Offender
Information, at https://offender.tdcj.texas.gov/Offender Search
(last visited July 27, 2016).
4
Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 5.
5
TDCJ Hearing Report and Record,
Entry No. 1, p. 11.
Case #20160250992,
6
Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 5.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 5-6.
9
Id.
at 6-7.
-2-
Docket
to state an actionable claim under the legal standard that governs
disciplinary proceedings in the prison context.
II.
Prison Disciplinary Proceedings
An inmate's rights
in the prison disciplinary setting are
governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. 10
2963, 2974-75 (1974).
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct.
Prisoners charged with institutional rules
violations are entitled to rights under the Due Process Clause only
when the disciplinary action may result in a sanction that will
infringe upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1995).
See
Liberty interests
emanate from either the Due Process Clause itself or from state
law.
See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v.
1904,
1908
(1989)
(citation omitted).
Thompson,
109 S. Ct.
To the extent that
the
disciplinary conviction may affect the petitioner's eligibility for
early release from prison, the Due Process Clause does not include
a right to conditional release before the expiration of a valid
sentence.
See Greenhol tz v.
Correctional Complex,
99 S.
Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Ct.
2100,
2104
(1979).
Under these
circumstances, the petitioner's claims depend on the existence of
10
Although Renfro references the "right to equal protection"
in his Petition, he does not allege facts showing that he was
treated differently from other similarly situated offenders.
See
Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 6. Accordingly, he does not state
a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Cleburne v.
Cleburn Living Ctr., 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985) (stating that the
Equal Protection Clause essentially directs that "all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike").
-3-
a constitutionally protected liberty interest created by state law.
The Supreme Court has decided that only those state-created
substantive interests that "inevitably affect the duration of [a
prisoner's]
sentence" may qualify for constitutional protection
Sandin,
under the Due Process Clause.
115 S. Ct. at 2302.
also Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995).
In Texas
only those inmates who are eligible for the form of parole known as
mandatory supervision have a constitutional expectancy of early
release.
See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 956 (5th Cir. 2000)
(addressing the mandatory supervision scheme in place prior to
September 1,
(5th Cir.
1996); see also Teague v.
2007)
Quarterman,
(addressing the mandatory supervision scheme in
place before and after September 1, 1996).
prisoner
cannot
482 F.3d 769
demonstrate
a
As a result, a Texas
constitutional
violation
in
the
prison disciplinary context without first satisfying the following
criteria:
(1) he must be eligible for early release on mandatory
supervision; and (2) the disciplinary conviction at issue must have
resulted in a loss of previously earned good-time credit.
Malchi,
211
F. 3d at
957-58
(explaining
that
only
those
See
Texas
inmates who are eligible for early release on mandatory supervision
have a protected liberty interest in their previously earned goodtime credit) .
Renfro cannot demonstrate a constitutional violation in this
case.
Although Renfro lost good-time credit as the result of the
challenged
disciplinary
conviction,
-4-
he
is
not
eligible
for
supervision
mandatory
because
of
aggravated
robbery.
See
Tex.
(excluding
prisoners
convicted
his
Gov't
of
conviction
prior
Code
508.149 (a) (12)
§
robbery
aggravated
eligibility for mandatory supervision).
for
from
Likewise, Renfro concedes
that the judgment in connection with that conviction included an
affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited
during the offense, which also excludes him from eligibility for
mandatory
supervision. 11
See
Tex.
Gov't
Code
508.149(a) (1)
§
(excluding from mandatory supervision prisoners convicted of an
offense with an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used
to commit the offense) .
claims.
This
is
fatal
to Renfro's
due process
See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957-58.
Although the disciplinary convictions at issue also resulted
in a loss of privileges and affected his classification status, the
Fifth Circuit has recognized that sanctions such as these, which
are
"merely
changes
in
the
conditions
of
[an
confinement," do not implicate due process concerns.
Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997).
inmate's]
Madison v.
Limitations imposed on
privileges are the type of sanctions that do not pose an atypical
or significant hardship beyond the ordinary incidents of prison
life.
See id.
Likewise,
reductions in a prisoner's custodial
classification and the potential impact on good-time credit earning
ability are too attenuated to be protected by the
11
Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 5,
-5-
CJI
15.
Due
Process
Clause.
See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958; Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192,
193 (5th Cir. 1995); Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir.
Under these circumstances,
1995) .
Renfro cannot demonstrate a
violation of the Due Process Clause, and his pending federal habeas
corpus Petition will be denied.
III.
Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases now requires
a district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability
when entering a final order that is adverse to the petitioner.
A
certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner
makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right," 28 U.S.C.
demonstrate
"that
§
2253(c) (2),
reasonable
would
the
wrong."
Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2565 (2004)
controlling
120
S.
standard this
constitutional
find
assessment
McDaniel,
the
jurists
court's
Slack v.
of
which requires a petitioner to
Ct.
1595,
requires
1604
a
claims
debatable
(2000)).
petitioner
district
to
or
(quoting
Under the
show
"that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner
or
that
the
issues
presented
encouragement to proceed further.'"
Where
denial
of
relief
is
based
were
'adequate
to
deserve
Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1039.
on
procedural
grounds
the
petitioner must show not only that "jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
-6-
of a
constitutional
right," but also that
they "would find
it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling."
Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1604.
A district court may deny a
certificate of appealability,
sua sponte, without requiring further briefing or argument.
See
Alexander v.
For
Johnson,
211
F.3d 895,
898
(5th Cir.
2000).
reasons set forth above, the court concludes that jurists of reason
would not debate whether the petitioner states a valid claim or
that
the
Petition
should
be
resolved
in
a
different
manner.
Therefore, a certificate of appealability will not issue.
IV.
Conclusion and Order
Based on the foregoing, the court ORDERS as follows:
1.
The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a
Person in State Custody filed by Rashard Esaw
Renfro (Docket Entry No. 1) is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
2.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
The Clerk shall provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this '~h day of ~ly
UNITED
-7-
, 2016.
DISTRICT JUDGE
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