Jones v. Bell et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting Motions to Dismiss, 23 and 31 . The complaint is dismissed with prejudice. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M Hoyt) Parties notified. (rosaldana, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER JONES,

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Plaintiff,
VS.
OLIVER BELL, et al,
Defendants.

August 21, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-2405

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Christopher Jones filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). This Court previously dismissed a number of
defendants and claims, leaving only Jones’ claims that defendants Dr. Alex Hindmon and
Captain Baggett of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice violated his rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under the ADA. Hindmon and Baggett filed
separate motions to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Jones

responded to Hindmon’s motion, but not to Baggett’s. For the reasons stated below,
defendants’ motions are granted and plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
I.

Background

Jones contends that he was taking medication prescribed for bipolar disorder. He
alleges that Hindmon ordered a stop to the medication in violation of Jones’ Eighth
Amendment rights. He further alleges that Hindmon filed a false disciplinary charge
against him in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. He contends

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that Baggett presided over a hearing on the charge in which Jones was found not guilty,
but that Baggett nonetheless imposed punishment on Jones in violation of due process.
II.

Analysis

A.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must be
liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be
taken as true. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir.1986). The
standard of review under rule 12(b)(6) has been summarized as follows: "The question
therefore is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt
resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." 5 Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 601 (1969).
B.

Statute of Limitations

Both defendants argue that Jones’ section 1983 claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.
Because there is no federal statute of limitations for civil
rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal
court borrows the forum state's general personal injury
limitations period. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50,
109 S.Ct. 573, 581–82, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Jackson v.
Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.1992). In Texas, the
applicable limitations period is two years.
Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993).
Jones contends that Hindmon took him off his bipolar medication in October
2012. Complaint at 7. He alleges that Hindmon filed the false disciplinary charge
against him on December 20, 2013. Id. at 8. The disciplinary hearing was held on
December 30, 2013. Attachment to Complaint (Doc. # 1-2) at 1. Based on these dates,
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the limitations period for Jones’ claims expired on an unspecified date in October, 2014,
and December 20, and 30, 2015, respectively. Jones filed this federal complaint July 26,
2016. Complaint at 10. Thus, Jones filed his complaint almost two years after the
expiration of the limitations period for his Eighth Amendment claim against Hindmon,
and more than six months after the expiration of the limitations period for his due process
claims against Hindmon and Baggett. Accordingly, Jones’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 must be dismissed as time-barred.
C.

Americans With Disabilities Act

To state a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Jones must
show that he suffered a denial or discrimination because of his disability. See, e.g.,
Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Comms., 310 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2002); Delano-Pyle v.
Victoria Cty., 302 F.3d 567. 575 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, any such discrimination must
be intentional. Id. at 574.
The full extent of Jones’ ADA claim is his statement that “upon information and
belief this is a[n] ADA claim.” Complaint at 7. Even assuming that Jones is within a
class protected by the ADA, Jones fails to plead that either of the defendants intentionally
discriminated against, or otherwise targeted, him because of his disability. He therefore
fails to state a claim under the ADA.
D.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted, and the
complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

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III.

Order
It is ORDERED that:
1.

The defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 23 and 31) are GRANTED;
and

2.

The complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

SIGNED on this 21st day of August, 2017.
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Kenneth M. Hoyt
United States District Judge

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