Farrar & Ball, LLP et al v. Hudson et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Movants are entitled to recover from Defendant NicoleHudson attorneys fees in the amount of $11,625.00, payable within thirty (30) dayseither to Plaintiff Farrar & Ball, LLP or by deposit into the Registry of the Court(Signed by Judge Nancy F Atlas) Parties notified.(sashabranner, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
§
§
v.
§
§
NICOLE HUDSON,
§
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff, §
§
v.
§
§
WESLEY T. BALL, KYLE W.
§
FARRAR, DAVID ROMAGOSA,
§
JR., and RHONDA HERBERT,
§
Third-Party Defendants.
§

September 19, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

FARRAR & BALL, LLP,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-3341

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on the Motion to Enforce Orders for Sanctions
(“Motion”) [Doc. # 14] filed by Plaintiff Farrar & Ball, LLP (“Farrar & Ball”) and
Third-Party Defendants Wesley T. Ball, Kyle W. Farrar, David Romagosa, Jr., and
Rhonda Herbert. Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nicole Hudson filed a Response
[Doc. # 42], and Movants filed a Reply [Doc. # 44]. Having reviewed the record and
the applicable legal authorities, the Court grants the Motion, enforces the award of
attorneys’ fees ordered by Texas state court Judge Michael Gomez, and fixes the
amount of attorneys’ fees at $11,625.00.

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As noted by the Court in its Memorandum and Order [Doc. # 18] entered
April 30, 2017, Farrar & Ball is a law firm where Nicole Hudson was employed as a
paralegal. Farrar & Ball filed this lawsuit against Hudson in Texas state court alleging
that Hudson’s false claims for overtime compensation constituted theft. Hudson filed
counterclaims against Farrar & Ball, including claims for defamation and malicious
prosecution. Judge Gomez dismissed these two claims by separate orders.
With reference to the defamation claim, Texas law requires an award of
attorneys’ fees upon dismissal of the claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 27.009. Similarly, Texas law requires an award of attorneys’ fees upon the
dismissal of a malicious prosecution claim. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a(7). As a result,
Judge Gomez awarded Movants their attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined
later. The requirement in § 27.009 is for an award of “reasonable attorney’s fees” to
the successful movant. See Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016)
(citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a)(1)). “A ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee
‘is one that is not excessive or extreme, but rather moderate or fair.’” Id. (quoting
Garcia v. Gomez, 319 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tex. 2010)). “That determination rests
within the court’s sound discretion, but that discretion, under [§ 27.009], does not also
specifically include considerations of justice and equity.” Id.

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Before Judge Gomez determined the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded
to Movants, the case was removed to federal court. Movants seek enforcement of the
award of attorneys’ fees and ask that the amount of fees be fixed at $11,625.00.
Movants have provided affidavits and time records to support this fee amount.
At a hearing on July 17, 2017, the Court held that if “Hudson chooses to contest
the amount of Plaintiff’s fee request associated with the state court proceedings before
Judge Gomez,” she must do so by August 7, 2017. See Hearing Minutes and Order
[Doc. # 39]. Hudson filed a “Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Request for
Sanctions and Constest [sic] of Attorney’s Fees” [Doc. # 42]. In the Response,
Hudson challenges a sealing order that is the subject of a separate motion. Hudson
also opposes sanctions other than the attorneys’ fees awarded by Judge Gomez, but
the Court denied Movants’ request for those sanctions at the July 17 hearing. See
Hearing Minutes and Order, p. 2. Hudson in her Response again includes a lengthy
section on witness tampering, an issue completely unrelated to this lawsuit. Hudson
asserts that no fees should be imposed or, alternatively, that the Court should defer
fixing the amount of fees awarded by Judge Gomez. At no point in the Response,
however, does Hudson challenge the amount of fees requested by Movants.
The Court has carefully reviewed the evidence submitted by Movants in support
of their request for fees in the amount of $11,625.00. Based on that review, and

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absent any evidence or argument to the contrary, the Court finds the number of hours
were reasonable and necessary in connection with the defamation and the malicious
prosecution claims. The attorneys billed at hourly rates of $350 and $450 per hour.
The Court finds these hourly rates to be reasonable, indeed modest, relative to those
charged in this area by attorneys with comparable experience.
When determining whether the lodestar amount reflects a reasonable fee, Texas
law1 allows courts calculating fees under § 27.009 and Rule 91a to consider several
factors, including:
(1)

(2)

the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3)

the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;

(4)

the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5)

the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6)

1

the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal
service properly;

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;

“State law controls both the award of and the reasonableness of fees awarded where
state law supplies the rule of decision.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461
(5th Cir. 2002).

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(7)

the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and

(8)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or
uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been
rendered.

See Glass Cars, Inc. v. Ortiz, 2016 WL 4368449, *2 (Tex. App. – Dallas Aug. 16,
2016) (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818
(Tex. 1997)). The Court has considered the relevant factors, and finds that none of
them, individually or in combination, support an adjustment to the lodestar amount of
$11,625.00. The Court notes specifically that an award of fees is mandatory for the
defamation and malicious prosecution claims on which Movants were entirely
successful in obtaining dismissal. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Movants are entitled to recover from Defendant Nicole
Hudson attorneys’ fees in the amount of $11,625.00, payable within thirty (30) days
either to Plaintiff Farrar & Ball, LLP or by deposit into the Registry of the Court.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 19th day of September, 2017.

NAN Y F. ATLAS
SENIOR UNI
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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