Singletary v. State Of Texas et al

Filing 65

ORDER Denying 63 Motion to Alter Judgment; Denying as moot 64 Amended Motion to disqualify or recuse.(Signed by Judge Gray H Miller) Parties notified.(rkonieczny, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHARLESTON CLARK SINGLETARY,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants.

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February 02, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION H-16-3476

ORDER
Pending before the court is a motion for amendment of judgment (Dkt. 63) and an amended
motion to disqualify or recuse (Dkt. 64) filed by plaintiff Charleston Singletary. Having considered
the motions and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion for amendment of
judgment should be DENIED and the amended motion to disqualify or recuse should be DENIED
AS MOOT.
I. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In his motion for amendment of judgment, Singletary argues that the court’s previous order
(Dkt. 62) should be amended because “Judge Gary .H. Miller”1 lied and made erroneous factual
findings that will result in a manifest injustice. Dkt. 63. Particularly, Singletary argues that the court
made a factual finding that Singletary revoked his consent to proceed before Magistrate Judge Nancy
K. Johnson. Id. The court made no such finding. Rather, the court acknowledged that without
Singletary’s consent, Judge Johnson could not enter judgment in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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The court assumes Singletary refers to Judge Gray H. Miller when he mentions “Judge Gary
.H. Miller.”

Dkt. 62. But, as the court explained, Judge Johnson did not exercise any authority given under
§ 636(c). Id.
As the court has now explained in its previous two orders (Dkts. 59, 62), Judge Johnson
recommended a disposition under § 636(b)(1). Dkt. 54; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“a judge
may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to
submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition,
by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A)”). Then, this court adopted that
recommendation and entered a final judgment. Dkts. 55, 56.
The court did not need to rule on Singletary’s motion to revoke consent (Dkt. 45) before
Judge Johnson issued her recommendation because consent is not required under § 636(b)(1). Thus,
even if the court made a factual finding that Singletary revoked his consent, which the court did not,
that finding would be irrelevant because consent is not an issue under § 636(b)(1).2 Accordingly,
Singletary’s motion for amendment of judgment is DENIED.
II. SANCTIONS WARNING
For the third time in this proceeding, Singletary has argued that his rights were denied by
Judge Johnson and Judge Miller in dismissing his case despite his motion to revoke consent to
proceed before Judge Johnson. Dkts. 57, 61, 53. The court has explained that Judge Johnson acted
under the authority 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and did not need Singletary’s consent to make a
recommendation to the court on a pending motion to dismiss. Dkts. 59, 62.

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Notably, Singletary argues that his rights under § 636(c) were violated. A factual finding
that Singletary revoked his consent would actually help his case, as consent is required under that
section. However, as the court has explained multiple times, Judge Johnson did not exercise any
authority granted under § 636(c).
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In its previous order, the court informed Singletary that if he wishes to challenge the court’s
ruling, he may follow the proper procedures and appeal the case to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Dkt. 62. Singletary ignored the court’s order and filed another motion
raising repetitive claims that his rights were denied because Judge Johnson and Judge Miller did not
follow proper procedure under § 636(c). Pro se litigants have “no license to harass others, clog the
judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson
v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly, Singletary is warned that his persistent abuse of the judicial system by raising
arguments or claims that have been raised and addressed in his prior motions or proceedings before
this court will result in the imposition of sanctions against him, including, but not limited to,
monetary penalties and limitations on his ability to file further lawsuits, motions, or pleadings.
Moreover, Singletary’s continued conduct in pursuing frivolous or repetitive filings regarding the
same subject matter will subject him to additional and progressively more severe sanctions.
III. CONCLUSION
Singletary’s motion for amendment of judgment (Dkt. 63) is DENIED. Because the court
has entered final judgment and there are no other rulings to be made, the amended motion to
disqualify or recuse (Dkt. 64) is DENIED AS MOOT. The court again emphasizes that if Singletary
wishes to challenge the court’s ruling, he may follow the proper procedures and appeal the case to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Signed at Houston, Texas on February 2, 2018.

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Gray H. Miller
United States District Judge
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