Ryans v. Houston NFL Holdings, L.P. dba Houston Texans et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 11 MOTION to Remand. This case is REMANDED to the 133rd Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. REMANDED/ CLOSED flag set. Case terminated on May 2, 2017.(Signed by Judge Kenneth M Hoyt) Parties notified.(chorace)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
DEMECO RYANS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
HOUSTON NFL HOLDINGS, L.P. d/b/a
HOUSTON TEXANS, et al,
Defendants.

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May 02, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-3554

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is the plaintiff’s, Demeco Ryans (the “plaintiff”), motion to

remand.

(Dkt. No.11).

In response, Houston NFL Holdings, L.P. dba Houston Texans

(“Texans”), SMG, Harris County Sports & Convention Corporation (“Harris”), and Strathayr
Turf Systems Pty Ltd (“Strathayr”) (collectively, the “defendants”) filed a response in
opposition. (Dkt. No. 20). The plaintiff has filed a reply (Dkt. No. 23), to which the defendants
have filed a surreply (Dkt. No. 27). After having carefully considered the motion, the response,
the replies, the record and the applicable law, the Court determines that the plaintiff’s motion to
remand should be GRANTED.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to this action, the plaintiff was a professional football player for the

Philadelphia Eagles, one of the member clubs of the National Football League (“NFL”). On
November 2, 2014, the plaintiff played in a football game against the Texans at NRG Stadium
(“NRG”) in Houston, Texas. The plaintiff alleges that he suffered a non-contact injury to his
Achilles tendon as a result of a dangerous condition on the field at NRG. (Dkt. No. 11 at 7). It is

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undisputed that the plaintiff sustained the injury on the field while playing in the game. It also
undisputed that the plaintiff and the Texans are both bound by the collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) governing the terms and conditions of the relationship between the NFL and
its players.
On or around October 21, 2016, the plaintiff filed suit in state court against the
defendants. The plaintiff’s petition asserts Texas state law tort claims of premises liability
against the Texans. 1 The Texans removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction, claiming that all of the plaintiff’s claims and causes of action are preempted by
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”); asserting that the resolution of
the plaintiff’s claims would require the interpretation of the CBA. (Dkt. No. 20 at 8). On
December 30, 2016, the plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand, claiming that the matter
should be handled in state court because his claims are not preempted by LMRA.
III.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
A.

The Plaintiff’s Contentions

The plaintiff moves to remand, asserting that the defendants cannot show that his state
law tort claims are completely preempted by the LMRA. The plaintiff alleges that his claims are
not dependent on an interpretation of the CBA and are not inextricably intertwined with
consideration of the CBA. The plaintiff further argues that his claims are not based on any
provision of the CBA nor is the CBA the source of any of his claims. Accordingly, the plaintiff
avers that the defendants have failed to meet their burden and this case should be remanded to
the state court in which it was originally filed.
B.
1

The Defendants’ Contentions

In addition to the premises liability claims against the Texans, the plaintiff also alleges state law negligence and
products liability claims against the other defendants.

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The defendants argue that removal was proper because federal question jurisdiction exists
making this Court the proper venue to hear this case. The defendants argue that the CBA
represents the complete understanding of the parties involved. The defendants assert that player
safety on the field of play during the game is among the subjects included in the CBA. The
defendants further argue that the CBA addresses compensation to be received by a player should
he be injured in circumstances similar to the plaintiff. Thus, the defendants assert that the
plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined with, necessarily require an interpretation of the
CBA and are completely preempted by the LMRA. The defendants ask that the Court thereby
deny the plaintiff’s motion to remand.
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicable statute provides two grounds for remand:

procedure; and (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

(1) a defect in removal

See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Things

Remembered, Inc. v. Petarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 - 28, 116 S. Ct. 494, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995).
A remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is permissible at any time before final judgment,
with or without a motion. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant is permitted to remove an action from a
state court to a federal court only if the action is one over which the federal court has original
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
absent jurisdiction granted by statute, federal courts lack the power to adjudicate claims. See
Stockman v. Federal Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Veldhoen v.
United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994)). Thus, “[i]t is incumbent on all
federal courts to dismiss an action whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking.” Stockman, 138 F.3d at 151. Further, the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a

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federal court carries the burden of establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction. Id. Any
doubt as to the district court’s jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. Bosky v. Kroger
Tex., L.P., 288 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 2002).
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited to cases that either “aris[e] under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States” or involve matters where the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest, and diversity of citizenship exists.
28 U.S.C. § § 1331, 1332. The type of original jurisdiction at issue here is federal question
jurisdiction.
When determining whether a claim “arises under” federal law, courts are to reference the
well-pleaded complaint. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S.
Ct. 3229, 3232 (1986) (citing Franchise Tax Board v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 9 -10, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 - 47, 77 L. Ed.2d 420 (1983)). In this regard, an action is said to
“arise under” federal law within the meaning of § 1331, if a federal question is an ingredient of
the action or when the allegations involve a disputed question of federal law or requires
resolution of a substantial federal question. See Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44
F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 12, 103 S. Ct. at 2848).
A narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule exists, however, when Congress
has so completely preempted a particular area of law “that any civil complaint raising this select
group of claims is necessarily federal in character.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). Thus, the Supreme Court has construed
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act to authorize removal of proceedings that relied
only on state law. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S. Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d
126 (1968).

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V.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Section 301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
The Fifth Circuit has stated that “[i]f the resolution of [the plaintiff’s] claims will require
‘interpretation’ of the CBA, then the state-law remedies upon which [the plaintiff] relies are
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.” Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 79 F.3d 485, 487
(5th Cir. 1996); See also Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Preemption
occurs when a decision on the state claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the
terms of the labor contract or when the application of state law to a dispute requires
interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.”) “However, the [Supreme] Court has also
established that Section 301 does not preempt state law claims merely because the parties
involved are subject to a CBA and the events underlying the claim occurred on the job.” AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985). Thus,
the narrow issue for review is whether (1) the plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined”
with the CBA, in which case the Court should deny the plaintiff’s motion to remand, or (2)
whether the plaintiff’s claims are based on independent, non-negotiable state law rights, in which
case the Court would not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. McKnight v. Dresser, Inc.,
676 F.3d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 2012).
“To determine if adjudicating the claim requires interpreting the terms of a CBA, a court
is required first to analyze the elements of the tort at issue.” Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor

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Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1996). Under Texas law, a claim of negligence requires the
plaintiff to prove the following elements: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant;
(2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. See Guerra v.
Regions Bank, 188 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. App. 2006) (citing IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of
DeSoto, Texas, Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex.2004)).

Because the plaintiff’s

negligence claim is one of premises liability, the plaintiff must also establish: (1) the defendants
had knowledge of an unreasonable dangerous condition; (2) which posed an unreasonable risk of
harm; and (3) the defendants failed to reduce or eliminate the dangerous condition. See Forester
v. El Paso Elec. Co., 329 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Tex. App. 2010). The plaintiff alleges that his
claims are exclusive of any rights governed by the CBA, but are instead based on violations of
common law duties owed by a premises owner or lessee to invitees. (Dkt. No. 11 at 12).
The Court now must evaluate whether the CBA is the source of the plaintiff’s claims, or
whether his claims are independent, non-negotiable state law rights substantially dependent upon
an interpretation of the CBA. The defendants argue that an analysis of the CBA and its
incorporated documents is necessary to determine the scope of the above duty.
Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s claims against
the defendants are not preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA because the resolution of his
claims do not require an interpretation of the CBA. While the Court acknowledges that the CBA
governs certain aspects of the plaintiff’s contractual agreement with the NFL, the Court is of the
opinion that the terms contained therein would not be implicated in the course of the plaintiff’s
presentation of his negligence claims. As held by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff’s claims do
not automatically require an interpretation of the CBA, but should instead focus on the conduct
of the involved parties. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252, 114 S. Ct.

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2239, 2243, 129 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1994). As mentioned above, a negligence claim requires the
Court to examine the state common law elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. It is
clear to the Court that an analysis of these elements does not require an interpretation of the
CBA, which prompts the Court to return this matter to its proper jurisdiction.
In summary, the Court holds that the plaintiff’s premises liability claim under Texas state
law is not inextricably intertwined with consideration of the CBA because the plaintiff has not
invoked the CBA to satisfy any of the elements of his claim. Accordingly, the defendants have
neither met their burden of showing that Section 301 of the LMRA preempt the plaintiff’s
claims, nor have they met the burden of showing the existence of this Court’s removal
jurisdiction.
VI.

CONCLUSION
Because the findings contained herein eliminate any basis for subject matter jurisdiction

in the instant case, the Court is obligated, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), to remand this case to
the court from which it was removed. The plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is thus GRANTED. It
is ORDERED that the present suit is hereby remanded to the 133rd Judicial District Court of
Harris County, Texas.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on this 2nd day of May, 2017.
___________________________________
Kenneth M. Hoyt
United States District Judge

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