Tsatsaronis v. United Airlines, Inc.

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART DENYING IN PART 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Signed by Judge Gray H Miller) Parties notified.(rkonieczny, 4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
GEORGE TSATSARONIS

Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION H-17-1437

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is defendant United Airlines, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment.
Dkt. 13. Plaintiff George Tsatsaronis responded. Dkt. 16. United replied. Dkt. 19. Having
considered the motion, response, reply, and applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion
should be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination case. Dkt. 1-2. Tsatsaronis has Multiple Sclerosis
(“MS”). Dkt. 13 at 1. In 2016, United terminated Tsatsaronis’s seventeen-year employment citing
attendance issues “caused by his MS disability.” Id. at 2. Tsatsaronis sued United in state court to
recover for: (1) disability discrimination; (2) hostile work environment; (3) failure to accommodate;
and (4) retaliation. Dkt. 1-2 Dkt. 13 at 20–37. United removed. Dkt. 1. Then, it moved for
summary judgment on all four claims arguing that its former employee could not establish a prima
facie case or pretext for any of those claims. See id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court shall grant summary judgment when a “movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
“[A] fact is genuinely in dispute only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 463 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006). “A fact is
‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Sossamon
v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). “If the
moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the
nonmovant’s response.” See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all justifiable inference in favor of
the non-movant. Envtl. Conservation Org. V. City of Dall., 529 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2008). The
Fifth Circuit has held that “conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are
inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant’s burden in a motion for summary judgement.” Ramsey v.
Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79
F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
United failed to satisfy its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact on Tsatsaronis’s first three claims.1 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. As a result, the court

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For example, United did not meet its burden on the disability discrimination claim because
it failed to show the absence of a triable fact on whether Tsatsaronis was “qualified” for the job.
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must deny United’s motion as to those claims. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. For this reason, the
instant motion (Dkt. 13) is DENIED, in part.
United also argued that it is entitled to summary judgment on Tsatsaronis’s retaliation claim
because he cannot raise a triable fact issue on causation and because he “effectively conced[ed] the
point” by failing “to make any argument to support his retaliation claim.” Dkt. 13 at 29; Dkt. 19 at 1.
Tsatsaronis failed to raise a triable issue of fact on his retaliation claim. See Dkt. 16 at 30.
While the record contains fact issues that could defeat summary judgment on a retaliation claim,
Tsatsaronis failed to raise a fact issue with respect to this retaliation claim. Compare Dkt. 1-2 at 7,
with Dkt. 16 at 30. Initially, he alleged that United retaliated against him after he filed an EEOC
charge. Dkt. 1-2 at 7. However, at summary judgment, he tied that claim to an earlier point in time.
Id. Namely, he cited his request for leave as the basis for his claim. See Dkt. 16 at 30. On this
record, Tsatsaronis cannot raise a fact issue to defeat summary judgment on the claim he first
alleged. For this reason, United’s motion is GRANTED, in part, and his retaliation claim is
DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.

Compare Dkt. 13 at 15, and Dkt. 16 at 2, and Dkt. 13-1 at 25, and id. at 28–30, and id. at 37–39, and
Dkt. 13-2 at 44, 46, and Dkt. 16-15 at 16, with Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 848, 859–61
(5th Cir. 2010) (jury could have concluded that flight attendant was qualified even though his
irregular attendance violated the airline’s written policy because evidence showed that he could have
satisfied its unwritten policy). United also failed to meet that burden on the hostile work
environment claim because fact issues exist on whether Tsatsaronis was harassed based on his
disability and whether that harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his employment.
Compare Dkt. 13 at 21, with Dkt. 13-2 at 37–38, 48. Finally, United did not meet its burden on the
failure to accommodate claim with respect to whether Tsatsaronis could perform the essential
functions of his job. Cf. Crossley v. CSC Applied Techs., 569 F. App’x 196, 199 (5th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam); compare Dkt. 13 at 21, 26, with Dkt. 13-2 at 36–38, 44, 46, 48, and Dkt. 16-15 at 14–16.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Because United failed to show an absence of a triable issue of fact on Tsatsaronis’s claims
for disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and failure to accommodate, the instant
motion is DENIED, in part. However, because Tsatsaronis failed to raise a fact issue on his
retaliation claim, the instant motion is GRANTED, in part, and that claim is DISMISSED with
PREJUDICE.
Signed at Houston, Texas on June 20, 2018.

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Gray H. Miller
United States District Judge

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