Carthel v. Jacobs et al

Filing 5

ORDER OF DISMISSAL and denying as moot 2 APPLICATION to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Case terminated on 7/11/2017. Email sent to Manager of Three Strikes List. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M Hoyt) Parties notified.(gclair, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
WAYNE DAVID CARTHEL,

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Petitioner,
VS.
BETTY JACOBS, et al,
Defendants.

July 11, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-2103

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Wayne David Carthel is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(“TDCJ”). He filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his rights by
several TDCJ officials and employees.

The defendants are Betty Jacobs, a phlebotomist

employed by the University of Texas Medical Branch, which provides medical services to TDCJ
inmates, Anitra Lindley, a Senior Practice Manager at a TDCJ unit and, apparently, Jacobs’
supervisor, and William Collier, the Executive Director of TDCJ. Carthel alleges that Jacobs
poked him numerous times with a needle while trying to draw blood.
Section 1915A of title 28 of the United States Code requires a federal district court to
“review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” If the complaint presents no cognizable
claims, the court must dismiss the complaint.
The Eighth Amendment “establish[es] the government's obligation to provide medical
care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976). To rise to the level of a constitutional violation, however, prison officials must exhibit
deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 828 (1994). “Deliberate indifference” is more than mere negligence, Gamble, 429 U.S. at

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104-06, but “something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Rather, deliberate indifference
requires that the defendant be subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to the
inmate and recklessly disregard that risk. Id. at 829, 836.
Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet . . .
[T]he plaintiff must show that the officials “refused to treat him,
ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or
engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton
disregard for any serious medical needs.”
Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)(quoting Johnson v.
Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Carthel’s allegations against defendant Jacobs, at most, assert that she was negligent in
her attempt to draw blood from Carthel. Mere negligence, however, does not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation. Therefore, Carthel fails to state a claim against Jacobs under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Carthel’s claims against defendants Lindley and Collier merely assert liability based on
their alleged failure, as the Senior Practice Manager and Executive Director, respectively, to
correct or respond to the alleged wrongdoing of their employee. It is well established that
supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts of their
subordinates on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dept’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
692 (1978). Rather, to prevail on his claims, Carthel must demonstrate that each defendant was
personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation, or that the defendant committed
wrongful acts that were causally connected to a constitutional deprivation. See Jones v. Lowndes
County, Mississippi, 678 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2012).

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Because Carthel asserts no personal

involvement by Lindley or Collier in any alleged wrongdoing, but rather alleges liability based
only on their supervisory roles, he fails to state a claim for relief against them.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Carthel’s motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.
This dismissal shall count as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk
shall forward a copy of this Order to: [e-mail].
SIGNED on this 11th day of July, 2017.
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Kenneth M. Hoyt
United States District Judge

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