U.S. Bank National Association v. Jefferson et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND AND ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS FROM FILING FUTURE NOTICES OF REMOVAL WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT granting 9 MOTION to Remand. This action is remanded to the County Court of Law No. 2 of Harris County, Texas. Case terminated on 5/21/2018. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING
AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED
AS OF MAY 1, 2006 GSAMP TRUST
2006-HE3 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-HE3,
Plaintiff,

v.
DEZRA JEFFERSON and
VINCENT JEFFERSON,
Defendants.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

May 21, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-18-0761

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND
AND ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS FROM
FILING FUTURE NOTICES OF REMOVAL WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT

On March 9,
Jefferson,

2018,

defendants,

citing 28 U.S.C.

§§

1443,

Dezra Jefferson and Vincent
1446,

and 1447(b),

removed

this action from the County Court of Law No. 2 of Harris County,
Texas, where it was pending under Cause No. 1094386. 1

On April 13,

2018, plaintiff, U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee under
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of May 1, 2006 GSAMP
Trust 2006-HE3 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-HE3,
filed

Plaintiff's

Motion

to

("Plaintiff's Motion to Remand")

Remand

and

Brief

in

Support

(Docket Entry No. 9) seeking not

only an order remanding this action but also injunctive relief.
For the reasons stated below,

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and

request for injunctive relief will be granted.

1

Defendants' Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 1.

I .

Background2

This action arises from a post-foreclosure eviction proceeding
related to a single-family residence located at 19911 Chaste Tree
Lane, Humble, Texas 77338

(the "Property").

Plaintiff filed its

Original Petition for Forcible Detainer against the defendants on
April 18,
Place 2,

2017,

in the Justice of the Peace Court,

Harris County,

Texas. 3

Precinct 4,

Defendants were served with a

Citation and copy of the plaintiff's petition on May 1,
Following

a

hearing

attended

by

both

the

plaintiff

2017. 4

and

the

defendants a judgment was granted in favor of plaintiff on May 9,
2017.

The judgment stated that "[n]o writ of possession will issue

before May 16, 2017." 5

On May 15, 2017, defendants filed their

Notice to Appeal a Judgment in an Eviction Case in the Justice of
the Peace Court,

Harris County,

Texas Precinct 4,

Place 2. 6

On

2

The background comes largely from Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand, to which defendants have not responded.
Local Rule 7.4
provides
that "[f]ailure to
respond will
be
taken as
a
representation of no opposition." S.D. Tex. R. 7.4 (2000).
The
court, therefore, takes defendants' failure to respond to the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand as a representation of no opposition
to plaintiff's evidence and version of the facts. See Eversley v.
MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988) (when a nonmovant
fails to respond, the court does not err by granting a motion when
the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law) .
3

Plaintiff' s Motion to Remand, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 2
(citing Exhibit A-1, file-stamped cover page of Plaintiff's
Original Petition, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 11).
4

Id. at 3 (citing Exhibit A-5, Constable Forcible Detainer
Return 4-2, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 24).
5

Id. at 2 (citing Exhibit A-2, Judgment for Plaintiff in Case
Number 174200193949, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 13).
6

Id. (citing Exhibit A-3, Notice to Appeal a Judgment in an
Eviction Case, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 15).
-2-

June 12,

2017,

defendants'

appeal received Case No.

Harris County Court of Law No.
removed Case No.
§§

1443,

1446,

2. 7

On July 3,

2017,

1094386 in
defendants

1094386 to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

and 1447 (b). 8

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand,

On July 11,
9

2017,

plaintiff filed

which the court granted on October

27, 2017. 10
On November 9,

2017,

defendants filed a Notice of Stay and

Notice of Bankruptcy Case filing in the state court action.u

7

Id. (citing Exhibit A-4, Docket
1094386, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 20).

Report

for

Civil

On

Action

8

Id. (citing Exhibit A-4, Docket Report for Civil Action
No. 4:17-2035, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 18; and Docket Report for
Civil Action 1094386, Docket Entry No. 9, pp. 20-22).
See also
Defendant's Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1 in Civil Action
No. 4:17-2035, p. 1 ("Defendants .
. have removed case number
1094386 filed in [] The Civil Court, Harris County .
. to the
United States District Court Southern District of Texas, Houston
. . . "),and p. 2 ("Defendants . . . give Notice that, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1446, & 1447(b), they removed this case to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.") .
Despite the parties' failure to provide instruments from Civil
Action No. 4:17-2035, this court has the right to take judicial
notice of pleadings filed in the Southern District of Texas.
See
Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Financial Group of
Texas, 645 F.2d 429, 433 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) ("A court may take
judicial notice of its own records and of those of inferior
courts.").
9

Id.
See also Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Brief in
Support, Docket Entry No. 3 in Civil Action No. 4:17-2035 filed in
the Southern District of Texas.
10

Id.
See also Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Remand,
Docket Entry No. 7 in Civil Action No. 4: 17-2035 filed in the
Southern District of Texas.
11

Id. (citing Docket Report for Civil Action 1094386 included
in Exhibit A-4, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 2 0) .
See also Vincent
-3-

January 23,

2018,

plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Stay
holds a security interest in: 19911

stating that "[m]ovant .

CHASTE TREE LANE, HUMBLE, TX 77338," 12
Movant purchased the Property on March 3, 2017 at 10:48
am at a foreclosure sale.
A copy of the recorded
foreclosure sale deed is attached hereto.
The sale was
completed when
the
foreclosure
was
conducted
in
accordance with the law and provisions of the deed of
trust.
. The lien and loan were both extinguished by
the foreclosure, and title of the Property was vested in
Movant upon completion of the foreclosure sale.
A
Substitute Trustee's Deed was
filed and recorded
March 23, 2017, providing notice of the conveyance of
title of the Property to movant. 13
On

February

22,

2018,

the

Bankruptcy

Court

entered

an

Granting In-Rem Relief from Automatic Stay After Hearing,
March

1,

2018,

No. 1094386. 15

the

County

Court

at

Law

14

reactivated

Order
and on
Case

On March 9, 2018, the defendants removed the action

to this court. 16

Jefferson's
Voluntary
Petition
for
Individuals
Filing
for
Bankruptcy, Docket Entry No. 1 in Case No. 4:17-bk-36233 in the
Southern District of Texas).
12

Motion for Relief from Stay and Co-Debtor Stay Regarding
Exempt Property, Docket Entry No. 21 in Case No. 4:17-bk-36233,
p. 1 <JI 3.
13

Id. at 2 <JI 15.
See also Substitute Trustee's Deed,
Entry No. 21-1 in Bankruptcy Case No. 4:17-bk-36233.

Docket

14

Docket Entry No. 2 6 filed in Bankruptcy Case No. 4: 17 -bk36233 ("Although a response opposing the motion was filed, the
respondent did not appear at the hearing.
[T]he response is
overruled for want of prosecution and the motion is granted.").
15

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 2. See
also
Docket
Report
for
Civil Action
1094386
included in
Exhibit A-4, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 20).
16

Defendants' Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1.
-4-

II.

Notice of Removal

Defendants removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443,
1446, and 1447(b)
on grounds that the Defendants[] obtained an order from
the United States District Court in 2012, case 04:12-cv01944, whereby the . . . plaintiff [in] the action being
removed to this Court, was a defendant in Case #04:12-cv01944. Plaintiff previously stipulated to a judgment in
favor
of defendants,
Dezra Jefferson and Vincent
Jefferson.
To date, they have never complied with the
order of the Court or stipulated agreement.
The Court
further ruled that the United States District Court shall
maintain jurisdiction of this issue to enforce the
stipulated judgment.
Additionally, plaintiff in this
action w[as] previously ordered to present original
documents showing that [it] had any standing to represent
the trust pool.
Plaintiff has ignored the order an[d]
continued to ignore that [it] ha [ s] no standing and
additionally ha[s] avoided and evaded the United States
District Court. [It] ha[s] committed not only fraudulent
actions upon the Court but also malicious prosecution,
violation of civil rights, banking fraud, mail fraud,
wire fraud, conspiracy, and violation of 15 USC 1692.
Plaintiff has repeatedly violated the order and continued
attacking defendants as to obtain an order of eviction
through the state courts of Texas. The federally secured
rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§§ 1981, 1982 and 1983
the
First,
Fifth,
Seventh,
Ninth,
and Fourteenth
Amendments to the constitution are being directly and
systematically impaired and infringed by the violation of
the order issued in unconstitutional statutory laws and
customs, practices, and policies having the force and
effect of law in the State of Texas. 17
Citing Dombrowski v.

Pfister,

85 S.

Ct.

1116

(1965),

defendants

argue that removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)
because the Justice Courts of Harris County, and of Texas
generally, have and enforce rules which are oppressive to
economically disadvantaged defendants,
as
well
as
discriminatory to pro se litigants and accordingly do not

17

Id. at 2.
-5-

equally respect or evenly enforce private rights to due
process of law, even as defined by Texas State Law,
effectively denying equal access to the Courts in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982. 18
Asserting that "28 U.S.C. § 1443[, c]ivil rights removal differs
from Federal Question or Diversity jurisdiction removal precisely
because there is NO requirement that the diversity jurisdiction be
apparent or the federal question be presented on the face of the
complaint, " 19 defendants

argue

that

"[r] emoval

injunction against civil rights violations

is

to act

as

an

in State Courts. " 20

Defendants argue that jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 21
and that

"[t] his Court

matter because

of the

is the proper
2012

forum to adjudicate this

United States

District Court

order

clearly stating that fact. " 22

18 Id. at 3.
See also id. at 11 ("The State courts deprived
defendants of fair access, equal protection of the law and due
process. The State courts are being biased and prejudiced towards
pro se litigants."); id. at 19 ("Defendants further allege that the
Texas Civil Code procedures authorizing nonjudicial foreclosures
and judicial evictions violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982, so that
Defendant[s have] a right to remove on the basis that there is a
pervasive state statutory program which both on its face and as
applied discriminates unfairly against pro se litigants and in so
doing directly violates Federal U.S. laws guaranteeing equality of
access to the courts, ability to present evidence, and to make and
enforce contracts for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining
ownership of property in particular.").
l9Id. at 4.
2o!d.
21Id. at 11.
22Id. at 20.
-6-

III.

Motion to Remand

Plaintiff seeks remand because "1) the Notice of Removal filed
. is untimely; 2) civil rights removal under 28

by Defendants

U.S.C. § 1443 is improper; and 3) diversity jurisdiction does not
exist." 23

Plaintiff also argues that "[t]his case cannot be removed

. . because Defendants are in-state citizens." 24

A.

Standard of Review

Article

III

§

2 of the

United States Constitution grants

federal courts jurisdiction over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under

this

Constitution,

the

Laws

of

the

United

States,

and

Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.

"

This Constitutional mandate is supplemented by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 1332.

Section 1331 recognizes federal question jurisdiction in

suits "arising under the Constitution,
United States."

laws,

or treaties of the

For this purpose "[a] suit arises under the law

that creates the cause of action."

Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding,

A Division of Litton Systems, Inc., 723 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th Cir.
1984)

(citations omitted).

"[W]hat

'determines jurisdiction'

is

the 'nature of the claim' asserted, and 'not the possible defenses
to

that

claim.'"

Id.

Operating Engineers,

(quoting

Cox v.

672 F.2d 421,

422

International
(5th Cir.

1982)

Union

of

(federal

question jurisdiction is not satisfied merely because "the dispute

23

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 1.

24

Id. at 6

<JI

8.
-7-

is in some way connected with a federal matter")).

Section 1332

recognizes diversity jurisdiction over civil cases in which the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and
costs,

and in which diversity of citizenship exists between the

parties.

Id.

at

1177

("The

1332(a) (1) must be complete:
or

more

defendants,

each

required

diversity

under

section

where one or more plaintiffs sue one
plaintiff

must

be

of

a

different

citizenship than each defendant.").
The general removal statute allows a defendant to remove a
case to the federal district court for the district and division
within which the action is pending,
court

possesses

original

"'Original jurisdiction,
conditions

of

28

are

courts

of

u.s.c.

in non-maritime claims,

U.S.C.

603 F.3d 290,
limited

28

jurisdiction.

§§

[diversity] are satisfied.'"
Casualty Co.,

provided that the district

1331

[federal

1441 (a).

§

lies where the

question]

or

1332

Halmekangas v. State Farm Fire and
293

(5th Cir. 2010).

jurisdiction and must

constitutional power to adjudicate a

claim.

Federal courts

have

statutory or

See Home Builders

Association of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Mississippi,
143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).

"If at any time before final

judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."

28 U.S.C.

"The

showing

removing

party

jurisdiction exists

bears

the

and that

burden

removal

of
was

proper."

§

1447(c).

that

federal

Manguno

v.

Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723
-8-

(5th Cir.

2002).

Any doubts as to the propriety of the removal

should be construed strictly in favor of remand.

Id.

The procedures by which a defendant may remove an action to
federal court are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
a

notice

of

removal

must

be

filed

within

Pursuant thereto

30

days

after

the

defendant receives the initial pleading setting forth the claim for
relief upon which the action is based, or within 30 days of service
of summons if the state's rules of procedure do not require the
defendant to be served,
§

1446 (b).

whichever period is shorter.

28

u.s.c.

The procedures following removal are set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 1447.

Pursuant thereto "[a] motion to remand the case on

the

any

basis

of

defect

other

than

lack

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the
notice of removal under section 1446(a) ."

B.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Plaintiff Has Waived Procedural Defects of Removal
1.

Timeliness of Removal

Plaintiff argues that this action should be remanded because
defendants'
detainer

removal

suits

was

cannot

untimely. 25

originally

be

Asserting
brought

in

that

forcible

county

court,

plaintiff argues that "[t]he deadline to remove began to run from
the time of service of the justice of the peace suit for forcible

25

Id. at 3.
-9-

detainer. " 26

Citing the

Service dated May 1,

Constable

2017,

Forcible

Detainer

Return

of

plaintiff argues that the thirty-day

removal period began on May 1, 2017. 27
Although plaintiff correctly asserts that removal from state
court must be effected within 30 days after the defendant receives
the summons and a copy of the initial complaint/petition or an
amended pleading from which it may first be determined that the
action is or has become removable, 28 U.S.C.

§

1446(b), an untimely

notice of removal is a procedural defect that must be raised within
30 days.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

("A motion to remand the case on the

basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction
must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of
removal under section 1446(a) .").
action on March 9,
remand

until

April

Since defendants removed this

2018, but plaintiff did not file a motion to
13,

2018,

i.e.,

more

than

30

days

later,

26

Id. Generally, justice courts in the precinct in which the
real property is located have jurisdiction over such forcible entry
and detainer actions.
See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004.
See also
McGruder v. Will, 204 F.3d 220, 221, n.l
(5th Cir. 2000)
(explaining forcible detainer actions in Texas). Forcible detainer
actions can be removed to federal courts where there is proper
subject matter jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Barnes v. Lampkin, 990
F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1993); Washington Mutual Bank FA v. McZeal, 265
F. App'x 173 (5th Cir. 2008).
27

Id. (citing Exhibit A-5, Constable Forcible Detainer Return
4-2, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 24 ("Received this Writ on 04/19/2017,
at 3:19 PM.
Executed on 05/01/2017, at 9:07 AM by delivering a
copy of this Citation together with a copy of the Petition:
To:
JEFFERSON, VINCENT
At:
19911 CHASTE TREE LANE HUMBLE, TX 77338
By:
POSTED TO DOOR AND MAILED PER RULE 510.4C
Date Signed:
May 1, 2017") .
-10-

plaintiff

has

waived

the

untimeliness

defendants' Notice of Removal.

of

the

filing

of

the

See Belser, M.D. v. St. Paul Fire

and Marine Insurance Co., 965 F.2d 5, *8 (5th Cir. 1992)

("Because

the untimely removal is not a jurisdictional defect, the procedural
imperfection
remand. ") .

is

waived

if

not

raised

in

a

timely

See also State of Louisiana v. Sparks,

233 n.11 (5th Cir. 1992)

motion

to

978 F.2d 226,

(objections to non-jurisdictional defects

in removal are waived if not timely asserted).
2.

Forum Defendant Rule

Citing ECF Document 1, p. 9, 1. 24-25, plaintiff argues that
"[t]his case cannot be removed to federal court on the basis of
diversity

of

citizens." 28

citizenship

because

Defendants

are

in-state

ECF Document 1 is Defendants' Notice of Removal, and

page 9 lines 24-25 thereof do not identify the defendants' state of
citizenship. 29

Even if defendants are citizens of the State of

Texas, plaintiff would not be entitled to remand for that reason
because plaintiff failed to object to the removal within 30 days as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Defendants removed this action on

March

filed

9,

2018,

and

plaintiff

its

Motion

to

Remand

on

April 13, 2018, more than 30 days after the action was removed from

28

Id. at 6.

29

See Defendants' Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 9
(lines 24-25) state:
"regarding the Defendant[']s need for
protection from a state judicial system in which he has no chance
of prevailing in his defense.
It is axiomatic that Federal").
-11-

state court.

Because plaintiff failed to challenge the removal in

a timely manner, plaintiff has waived its right to object to the
removal

on

defendants.

grounds

that

See U.S.

the

defendants

are

in-state

local

Rudd,

Bank National Association v.

or

Civil

Action No. 3:10-2440-L, 2011 WL 539120, *3 (N.D. Tex. February 7,
2011)

("' [T] he presence of an in-state defendant is a procedural

defect that is waived unless raised within thirty days of removal.'
Denman

v.

Snapper

Div.,

(citations omitted).

131

F.3d

546,

548

(5th

Cir.

1998)

'[A] motion for remand based on procedural

defects that is brought more than 30 days after the removal of the
action,

is

outside

of

the

district

court's

power

to

grant.'

Schexnayder v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir.
2004)
C.

(citation omitted).").
Defendants Fail to Establish Federal Question Jurisdiction
Plaintiff's

complaint

only

alleges

state-law

contains no claim arising under the Constitution,
treaties of the United States.

claims

and

statutes,

or

Nevertheless, defendants removed on

the basis of federal question jurisdiction asserting that removal
is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443, the First, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983.
Plaintiff argues that "[r]emoval under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) is
improper

because

removal." 30

30

there

exists

no

grounds

for

Civil

Rights

Plaintiff argues that

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 4 ~ 3.
-12-

[d) efendants' Notice of Removal states that they are
subject to discrimination because they are 'economically
disadvantaged' and pro se litigants [, but d) iscrimination
based upon these alleged categories is not removable
under § 1443 (1).
Rather, removal under § 1443 (1) is
strictly limited to racial discrimination and denial of
explicit federal statutory protections. 31
1.

Civil Rights Removal

Defendants

removed

this

proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

action
§

asserting

1443, the First,

Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and 42 U.S.C.
pertinent part, 28 U.S.C.

§

that

removal

Fifth,

§§

is

Seventh,

1981-1983.

In

1443 provides that

Any of the
following
civil actions
or
criminal
prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed
by the defendant to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place
wherein it is pending:
Against any person who is denied or cannot
enforce in the courts of such State a right under
any law providing for the equal civil rights of
citizens of the United States, or of all persons
within the jurisdiction thereof .
( 1)

The Supreme Court has construed 28 U.S.C.
See State of Georgia v.

Rachel,

§

86 S. Ct.

1443(1) in three cases.
1783

(1966);

City of

Greenwood, Mississippi v. Peacock, 86 S. Ct. 1800 (1966); Johnson
v. Mississippi, 95 S. Ct. 1591 (1975).
In

Rachel,

86

S.

Ct.

at

1783,

twenty

African-American

individuals were prosecuted in state court for criminal trespass
violations resulting from their attempts to obtain service at a
privately-owned restaurant in Atlanta.

31

Id.

<J[

4.
-13-

Since federal law required

such

restaurants

indi victuals

to

sought

serve
to

persons

remove

the

of

all

state

federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).

races,

court

the

arrested

prosecutions

to

The Supreme Court held

that the removal was proper upon determining that "the phrase 'any
. equal civil rights' must be construed to

law providing for .

mean any law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of
racial equality."

Id.

at 17 90.

The Court concluded that the

statute invoked by the removing defendants, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, was a statute providing for equal civil rights.

Id.

The

Court then addressed the second statutory requirement, i.e., that
the state court defendant be "denied or cannot enforce" his or her
rights in state court.

Id. at 1791.

The Court observed that in

order to sustain removal the denial of rights had traditionally
required a

formal expression of state law indicating "that all

courts in that State would disregard the federal right of equality
with which the state enactment was precisely in conflict."
1796.

The Court explained,

however,

Id. at

that given the particular

circumstances of that case, a firm prediction that the defendants
would be denied federal rights in the state court could be made
even absent a discriminatory state statute.

Id. at 1796-1797.

In Peacock, 86 S. Ct. at 1800, a case decided the same day as
Rachel, the Court emphasized the limited nature of removal under 28
U.S.C.

§

1443 by holding that the removing defendants failed to

demonstrate that they would be denied federal rights in the state
court.

Id. at 1811-1816.

In Peacock the defendants alleged that
-14-

they were being prosecuted for obstructing public streets, assault
and battery, and various other local crimes.

Id. at 1803-1804 &

nn.l-5.

The defendants also alleged that they were arrested solely

because

of

their

race

or

because

they

were

helping

African-

Americans assert their rights under various civil rights laws, that
they were completely innocent of the charges brought against them,
and that they would be unable to obtain a
court.
were

The Court held that such allegations

Id. at 1805 & n.6.

insufficient to

fair trial in state

support

removal

under §

1443 because the

defendants could not point to any federal law that conferred on
them the

right

charged,

and

to

engage

because

in the

there

was

conduct with which
no

federal

law

immunity from state prosecution on such charges.
n.25.

See also Johnson,

that

they were
conferred

Id. at 1812

&

95 S. Ct. at 1591 (holding that removal

was not appropriate under § 1443 where defendants alleged only that
the statutes underlying the charges brought against them in state
court were unconstitutional; that there was no basis in fact for
the charges; and that their arrest and prosecution otherwise denied
them their constitutional rights).
In Johnson, 95 S. Ct. 1591, the Supreme Court made clear that
a removal petition under 28 U.S.C.

§

1443(1) must satisfy a two-

pronged test:
First, it must appear that the right allegedly denied the
removal petitioner arises under a federal law "providing
for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial
equality." .
. Second, it must appear, in accordance
with the provisions of § 1443 (1), that the removal
-15-

petitioner is "denied or cannot enforce" the specified
federal rights "in the courts of (the) State."
This
provision normally requires that the "denial be manifest
in a formal expression of state law," .
. such as a
state legislative or constitutional provision, "rather
than a denial first made manifest in the trial of the
case."
Except in the unusual case where "an
equivalent basis could be shown for an equally firm
prediction that the defendant would be 'denied or cannot
enforce' the specified federal rights in the state
court," .
. it was to be expected that the protection
of federal constitutional or statutory rights could be
effected in the pending state proceedings, civil or
criminal.
Under § 1443 (1), "the vindication of the
defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts
except in the rare situations where it can be clearly
predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and
explicit state or federal law that those rights will
inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the
defendant to trial in the state court."
Id.

at 1595-1596

(quoting Rachel,

86 S.

1796, and Peacock, 86 S. Ct. at 1811-1812)
2.

Ct.

at 1790,

1794,

and

(citations omitted).

Analysis
(a)

Defendants Fail to Allege Denial of Rights Arising
Under Any Federal Law Providing for Specific Civil
Rights Stated in Terms of Racial Equality

Under the first prong of the two-part test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Rachel, Peacock, and Johnson, defendants must show
that the rights

they have allegedly been denied arise under a

federal law providing for "specific civil rights stated in terms of
racial equality."

Johnson, 95 S. Ct. at 1595 (quoting Rachel, 86

S. Ct. at 1790).

Defendants state that removal under 28 U.S.C.

§

1443 is appropriate because
[t]he federally secured rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C.
1981, 1982 and 1983 [,] the First, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the constitution are

§§§

-16-

being directly and systematically impaired and infringed
by the violation of the order issued in unconstitutional
statutory laws and customs, practices, and policies
having the force and effect of law in the State of
Texas. 32
Defendants also allege generally that they have been denied due
process and equal protection of the law by asserting:

( 1)

"The

State courts deprived defendants of fair access, equal protection
of the law and due process.
prejudiced towards

pro

se

The State courts are being biased and
litigants; 1133

( 2)

they

" [are]

being

denied and cannot enforce [their] rights of equal protection of the
discriminatory laws of the State of Texas, which facially and as
applied by the justice courts of Limited Jurisdiction.

.,

• 1134

and

[(3)]
. the Texas Civil Code procedures authorizing
nonjudicial foreclosures and judicial evictions violate
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982, so that Defendant[s have] a right
to remove on the basis that there is a pervasive state
statutory program which both on its face and as applied
discriminates unfairly against pro se litigants and in so
doing directly violates Federal U.S. laws guaranteeing
equality of access to the courts, ability to present
evidence, and to make and enforce contracts for the
purpose of acquiring and maintaining ownership of
property in particular. 35

Neither

defendants'

race

nor

any

assertions

of

race-based

discrimination are mentioned in their Notice of Removal or the
exhibits attached thereto.

32 Defendants' Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 2.
33Id. at 11.
34Id. at 15.
3sid. at 19.

-17-

Defendants fail to satisfy the first prong of the Supreme
Court's two-part test for§ 1443(1) removal because defendants fail
to allege that they have been or are being denied any right arising
under a federal law providing for specific civil rights stated in
terms of racial equality.

Defendants'

assertions that they are

being denied rights protected by the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and by
42 U.S.C. § 1983 all fail for this reason.
717 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1983)

See Smith v. Winter,

("[T]he first prong of this test

demands that the civil rights asserted arise under laws phrased
specifically in terms of racial equality rather than in general
terms of equality for all citizens comprehensively,

broad first

amendment or fourteenth amendment claims do not satisfy the test,
nor do claims arising under non-racially oriented statutes such as
42 U.S.C.
874

§

1983."); State of Louisiana v. Rouselle, 418 F.2d 873,

(5th Cir.

1969)

(per curiam)

("'the reference in § 1443 (1)

to equal civil rights
constitutional
Peacock,

86

S.

guarantees
Ct.

at

of

1811).

does not
the
See

First

Amendment'")

also

F. App'x 315, 316 (5th Cir. July 31, 2003)

include the broad

Cabello

v.

(per curiam)

(quoting
Texas,

71

(contention

that trying an action in state court "'will violate rights under
constitutional or statutory provisions of general applicability or
under statutes not protecting against racial discrimination will
not suffice

[to support

§

1443 removal]'")

-18-

(quoting Johnson,

95

S.

Ct.

at 1595);

City of Houston v.

Club Fetish,

Civil Action

No. H-13-0944, 2013 WL 1767777, at *3 (S.D. Tex. April 24, 2013)
("Sections 1983 and 1988 and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution do not provide for
specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.").
In Peacock,

however,

the Supreme Court recognized that

42

U.S.C. § 1981 qualifies under§ 1443(1) as a law providing specific
civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.
1811.

86 S.

Ct.

at

Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of all persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1982 similarly provides:

"All citizens of the

United

in

States

shall

have

the

same

right,

every

State

and

Terri tory,

as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,

purchase,

lease,

property," the

sell,

hold,

and

Fifth Circuit has

convey

held that

real
it,

and
too,

personal
is

a

law

providing specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.
See Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 488 F.2d 284, 286 & n.4
Cir.

1974).

1241-42
race

See also Akhlaghi v.

(D. Kan. 2003)

discrimination

Berry,

294 F.

Supp.

(5th

2d 1238,

(assuming without deciding that claims of

under

42

U.S. C.

§

1982

are

sufficient

to

satisfy the first prong of the test articulated by the Supreme
-19-

Court

in Rachel

U.S.C.

and Johnson) .

Nevertheless,

merely citing

42

§§ 1981 and 1982 is not sufficient to satisfy the first

prong of the Supreme Court's two-part test for§ 1443(1) removal;
removing defendants must also connect the laws to rights they claim
to be asserting.

Baylor v. Day-Petrano, 596 F. App'x 741, 742-44

(11th Cir. 2014).
Defendants cite 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, but fail either to
identify their own races or to allege facts capable of establishing
that being subject to a forcible detainer action in state court
will deny them rights protected by these federal

laws.

Nor do

defendants cite any authority recognizing a federally protected
right either to engage in the specific conduct of which plaintiff
accuses them

(i.e.,

failing to surrender possession of property

that they no longer own), or to be free from having to defend the
claims that plaintiff has brought against them in state court.
Because defendants have failed to identify any rights arising under
federal laws "providing for specific civil rights stated in terms
of racial equality," they have failed to satisfy the first prong of
the Supreme Court's test.
(b)

See Johnson, 95 S. Ct. at 1595.

Defendants Fail to Allege that They Will Be Denied
or Unable to Enforce Federal Rights in State Court

Under the second prong of the Supreme Court's test defendants
must

show that

"it can be clearly predicted by

reason of the

operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that
[federally protected] rights will inevitably be denied by the very
-20-

act

of

Johnson,
1812).
the

bringing
95 S.

the

Ct.

defendant

at 1595-1596

to

the

state
86 S.

court."
Ct.

at

This prong of the § 1443 analysis "normally requires that

'denial

[of a

federally guaranteed right]

constitutional

provision,

(quoting Rachel,

'rather

than

a

the

requirement

denial

Johnson,

86 S. Ct. at 1796 and 1794).

explained that

be manifest in a

. such as a state legislative

manifest in the trial of the case.'"

has

in

(quoting Peacock,

formal expression of state law'
or

trial

that

the

first

made

95 S. Ct. at 1595
The Supreme Court
denial

of

federal

rights in state court be manifest in a formal expression of state
law serves two purposes:

(1) it ensures that removal is available

only in cases where the predicted denial appears with relative
clarity

before

trial;

and

(2)

it

ensures

that

the

task

of

prediction does not involve a detailed analysis by a federal judge
of

the

likely

disposition

particular state courts.

of

particular

Rachel,

federal

86 S. Ct. at 1796.

claims

by

In Rachel,

however, the Supreme Court recognized that in unusual cases, a firm
prediction can be made that the defendants will be denied federal
rights in state court even absent a discriminatory state statute.
86 S. Ct. at 1796-1797.
Defendants have not alleged any facts capable of showing how
a denial of their "specific civil rights stated in terms of racial
equality" is "manifest in a formal expression of state law" or that
the very act of bringing a forcible detainer suit against them in
state court "will constitute a denial of the rights conferred by
-21-

[a] federal statute."

See 28 U.S.C.

§

1443(1).

Defendants advance

no legally cognizable argument that the Texas state courts have
denied or will deny them rights protected by 42 U.S.C.
1982.

§§

1981 or

Nor do they point to any Texas law that might preclude them

from enforcing federal rights protected by 42 U.S.C.
1982 in state court.

§§

1981 or

And defendants do not assert that this is an

unusual case in which the laws of Texas will operate to deny them
these federal rights.
assertions
§

that

Instead,

defendants make only conclusory

they are entitled to

remove

this

action under

1443(1) because
[they] obtained an order from the United States District
court in 2012, case 04:12-cv-01944, whereby the .
plaintiff [in] the action being removed to this Court,
was a defendant in Case #04: 12-cv-01944.
Plaintiff
previously stipulated to a
judgment in favor of
defendants, Dezra Jefferson and Vincent Jefferson.
To
date, they have never complied with the order of the
Court or stipulated agreement. The Court further ruled
that the United States District Court shall maintain
jurisdiction of this issue to enforce the stipulated
judgment, 36

and because
the Justice Courts of Harris County, and of Texas
generally, have and enforce rules which are oppressive to
economically disadvantaged defendants,
as well as
discriminatory to pro se litigants and accordingly do not
equally respect or evenly enforce private rights to due
process of law, even as defined by Texas State Law,
effectively denying equal access to the Courts in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982. 37

36

Defendants' Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 2.

37

Id. at 3.
-22-

Defendants'

allegations

raise

two arguments

in support

of

removal, neither of which satisfy the second prong of the§ 1443(1)
test requiring defendants to demonstrate that they have been denied
or cannot enforce specified federal rights in the state courts due
to some

formal

complied

with

expression of state law,
a

stipulated

settlement

( 1)

Plaintiff has

agreement

entered

not
in

a

previous federal action between these parties, No. 04:12-cv-1944,
in which the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement;
Texas

and

(2)

generally,

the Justice Courts of Harris County,
enforce

rules

that

and of

economically

oppress

disadvantaged defendants and discriminate against pro se litigants
and deny them equal access to the Courts in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1982.
Defendants assert that their federally protected rights cannot
be enforced in the State Court, but provide no legal or factual
support

for

their

claims

that

the

Texas

laws

of

nonjudicial

foreclosure and judicial eviction violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982.
Instead, defendants assert that the
Harris County Justice Courts in the State of Texas did
not require any proof of ownership or title to property
prior to commencing eviction proceedings, nor of any
proof of lawful compliance with Texas law regarding the
structure of nonjudicial foreclosures and the recording
of sales and transactions relating to the wrongful
foreclosure of a loan which the United States Bankruptcy
Court forced the dissolution of MILA (Mortgage Investment
Lending Associates Inc[.]).
The fraudulent actions of
the successors an[d] trustees lead to [] Dezra Jefferson
and Vincent Jefferson filing an action in the Texas State
Court for relief. The successor trustee, Bank of America
NA removed the action to the United States District Court
-23-

rather than complying with orders from the Texas State
Court.
US bank NA then stepped in and stipulated to
judgment against them.
Yet US Bank and its coven of
attorneys continue to file action in the state court to
avoid this order. This is blatant fraud and obstruction
of justice. 38
Defendants

have

not

alleged

that

the

state

courts

treat

them

differently from members of any other racial groups in forcible
entry and detainer proceedings.

Nor have defendants alleged that

any federal law expressly designed to guarantee racial equality has
been violated by the alleged breaches of laws guaranteeing equality
of access to the courts, ability to present evidence, and ability
to make and enforce contracts for the purpose of acquiring and
maintaining ownership of property in particular.

Courts regularly

hold that allegations such as these do not suffice to establish a
right to removal under§ 1443.

See, e.g., Barnes v. Lampkin, 990

F.2d 1253,

*1

1993 WL 129787,

(unpublished) .

at

(5th Cir.

1993)

(per curiam)

The court therefore concludes that defendants have

failed to satisfy the second prong of the two-part test that courts
apply to§ 1443(1) removal.
Defendants assert that "[t]his [c]ourt has jurisdiction over
this

action

pursuant

to

28

u.s.c.

1367

Supplemental

jurisdiction," 39 and argue that "[t]his Court is the proper forum
to

adjudicate

this

matter

because

38Id.
39

Id.

at 11.
-24-

of

the

2012

United

States

District

Court

fact. " 40

order clearly stating that

Defendants

appear to be referencing the Final Dismissal entered in a previous
federal action between the parties, i.e., Civil Action No. H-121944.

The Final Dismissal entered in that action was based upon

the court "[h]aving been advised by counsel that a settlement has
been reached," 41 and states "[t]his court retains jurisdiction to
enforce the settlement. " 42

The fact that another court in this

district retained jurisdiction over a prior action to enforce a
settlement

agreement

jurisdiction

over

this

does

not,

action

however,

removed

provide

from

this

state

court

court.

See

TripleS Properties Inc. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co.,
Civil

Action

No.

October 5, 2010)

3:08-796-0,

2010

WL

3911422,

*3

(N.D.

Tex.

(ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement

agreement does not extend to claims that are merely related to the
enforcement

of

a

settlement

agreement).

To

the

extent

that

defendants are arguing that they have a claim for enforcement of
the settlement agreement from a prior action, the undersigned judge
does not have jurisdiction over the claim.

Instead, if jurisdic-

tion exists, it would exist to enforce the settlement agreement in
Judge Hughes' court in the action in which the settlement agreement
was reached.

40

See Mijares v. County of El Paso, No. EP-15-CV-353-

Id. at 20.

41

Final Dismissal, Docket Entry No. 14 in
No. H-12-1944, Jefferson v. Bank of America, N.A.
42Id.

-25-

Civil

Action

KC,

2016 WL 206481,

*3

(W.O. Texas January 15, 2016).

Syngenta Crop Protection,
(2002)
in

Inc.

v.

Henson,

123 S.

Ct.

See also
366,

371

(rejecting argument that the All Writs Act either alone or

combination

with

the

doctrine

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

of

ancillary

enforcement

1367 gives a federal court the

authority to remove a state-court case in order to prevent the
frustration of orders the federal court has previously issued) .
Defendants also cite other authorities

in their Notice of

Removal, but none of them support the removal of a civil case under
the circumstances at issue here.

They are, instead, cases such as

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 85 S. Ct. 1116 (1965), which addressed the
limited authority of a federal court to grant an injunction to stay
proceedings

in

a

state

court.

Such

relief,

which

is

extraordinarily rare, may be granted in a civil action filed in
federal

court,

but the mere potential that

such relief may be

granted in a civil action does not permit removal.

Even if a civil

rights complaint were filed in this court, Younger v. Harris,
S. Ct.

746

(1971), will ordinarily require the federal court to

abstain from interfering in the state court action.
Hall,

Civil Action No.

January 4,
F.2d
No.

85,

91

2010).
86

(5th

3:16-1547-M-BH,

(W.O.

La.

See Texas v. Gulf Water Benefaction Co.,

679

Cir.

09-1811,

1982);

2010 WL 65036,

See Jacobs v.

Texas

2016 WL 3930186,

v.

at *1

Watkins,

at *2

(N.D.

Civil
Tex.

Action

June 21,

2016), report and recommendation adopted, Civil Action No. 3:161547-M-BH, 2016 WL 3926430 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2016).
-26-

Absent

reference

to

any

state

law

that

will

deny

them

federally protected rights or to any reason why the court should
conclude that removal might be justified, even in the absence of a
discriminatory state law, because a firm prediction cannot be made
that the defendants will be denied federal rights in state court
even absent a discriminatory state statute, see Rachel, 86 S. Ct.
at 1796-1797, defendants' allegations are insufficient to meet the
standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Rachel, Peacock, and
Johnson.

In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Rachel,

Peacock, and Johnson, it is apparent that defendants have failed to
meet their burden of establishing that the requirements for removal
under§ 1443(1) have been satisfied.

See Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723

(the removing party bears the burden of establishing that federal
While defendants appear to complain that

jurisdiction exists).

plaintiffs have abused the state court process by filing claims
against them, this is not the equivalent of showing that defendants
will

be

denied their

civil

rights

by the

state

court

itself.

Defendants have not alleged that they will be denied their civil
rights merely by being subject to suit in state court.
even

assuming

that

plaintiffs

brought

these

claims

Moreover,
against

defendants solely because of their race, that is still not enough
to support removal.

As the Supreme Court explained in Peacock:

It is not enough to support removal under§ 1443(1) to
allege or show that the defendant's federal equal civil
rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by [the
opposing party] in advance of trial, that the charges
against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is
unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state
-27-

court. The motives of the [opposing party] bringing the
charges may be corrupt, but that does not show that the
state trial court will find the defendant guilty if he is
innocent, or that in any other manner the defendant will
be 'denied or cannot enforce in the courts' of the State
any right under a federal law providing for equal civil
rights.
86

S.

Ct.

at

Stated

1812.

another

way,

defendants

have

no

federally conferred immunity from having to defend the claims that
plaintiff has brought against them in state court, and the civil
rights statutes upon which they rely do not confer upon them the
right to engage in the specific conduct of which plaintiffs accuse
them

(i.e.,

failing

to

surrender

possession

plaintiff contends they no longer own) .

of

property

that

Since defendants have

failed to show that there is anything about the very act of being
brought to trial in the state court that will inevitably deny them
their civil rights, they have failed to show either that removal is
proper or that this court has federal question jurisdiction over
this action.
Action

No.

See David & Taylor Custom Pools, Inc. v. Davis, Civil
H-05-3810,

2006

WL

456262,

at

*1-5

(S.D.

Tex.

February 22, 2006).
D.

Defendants

Fai~

to

Estab~ish

Diversity Jurisdiction

Plaintiff argues that this action should be remanded because
defendants are unable to establish diversity jurisdiction as the
amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00. 43

Asserting that

"[t]he object of [their] petition is possession of the Property;
43

']!']!

Plaintiff' s Motion to Remand,
9-12.
-28-

Docket Entry No.

9,

pp.

6-8

not title," 44 plaintiff argues that "[t]he 'value of the right to
be possessed'

is not the value of the property itself,

value of occupying the property.' " 45

but the

Defendants' Notice of Removal

does not cite any evidence capable of establishing that the amount
in controversy likely exceeds $75,000.

Therefore defendants have

not met their burden to establish that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
IV.

Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief

Asserting

that

"[d]efendants

Notices of Removal within the
asserting any new,
"requests

the

Court

are

same County Court Case,

valid grounds
enjoin the

indiscriminately

to do
Defendants

from

filing
without

so, " 46 plaintiff
filing

further

Notices of Removal, absent any new, valid grounds occurring within
the County Court Case that would entitle or justify removal of the
state court case. " 47

Plaintiff argues that "the removal attempt at

issue and any subsequent attempts are abusive to the spirit and
intent of the

judicial process and are

solely for purposes of

delay. " 48

44

Id. at 7 <j[ 11.

45

Id.

46

Id.

(citing Ezon v. Cornwall Equities Ltd., 540 F. Supp. 885,
889 (S.D. Tex. 1982)).
at 8.

47Id.
48Id.

-29-

Defendants have now twice removed this action from state to
federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§

1443,

1446,

and 1447 (b);

first on July 3, 2017, initiating Civil Action No. 4:17-2035,
second on March 9, 2018, initiating this action.

49

and

On July 11, 2017,

plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Brief in Support
seeking remand based on the same arguments made in the motion to
remand

addressed

herein,

i.e.,

untimeliness

of

removal,

the

impropriety of civil rights removal, the forum defendant rule, and
defendants' inability to establish diversity jurisdiction because
the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00. 50

The action

initiated by the defendants' first attempt to remove was remanded
on

October

27,

2017.

The

October

27,

2017,

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand explained that

Order

~[h]aving

Granting

considered

the Motion and any timely responses and replies thereto, the Court
determines that the Motion bears merit and should be granted." 51
Defendants'

second Notice

of

Removal

filed

in

this

action

is

virtually identical to their first Notice of Removal filed in Civil
49

See Exhibit A-4, Docket Report for Civil Action No. 4: 172035, Docket Entry No. 9, p. 18; and Docket Report for Civil Action
1094386, Docket Entry No. 9, pp. 20-22.
See also Defendant's
Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1 in Civil Action No. 4:172035, p. 1 (~Defendants
. have removed case number 1094386
filed in [] The Civil Court, Harris County
to the
United States
District Court
Southern District
of
Texas,
Houston."), and p. 2 (~Defendants
give Notice that, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1446, & 1447(b), they removed this case to
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas.").
50

See Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Brief in Support, Docket
Entry No. 3 in Civil Action No. 4:17-2035.
51

Docket Entry No. 7 in Civil Action No. 4:17-2035, U.S. Bank
National Association v. Jefferson.
-30-

Action No.

4:17-2035.

While defendants filed a response to the

Motion to Remand filed in that previous action, defendants have not
filed any response to the Motion to Remand filed in this action.
The similarity of the two removals, coupled with defendants'
failure to provide any legal support for the instant removal or any
response to the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand,

leads the court to

infer that, at minimum, the most recent removal was frivolous and
dilatory.

"[A]ll courts established by Act of Congress may issue

all writs

necessary or appropriate

in aid of their

respective

jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

Federal district courts have the power under

this statute to "enjoin litigants who are abusing the court system
by harassing their opponents."

Ganheart v. Department of Interior,

58 F.3d 636, No. 94-30652, 1995 WL 371028, at *1 (5th Cir. June 2,
1995)
114,

(unpublished)
116

(5th Cir.

(citing Harrelson v. United States,

613 F.2d

1980))

See also

(quotation marks omitted).

Villarreal v. Brown Express, Inc., 529 F.2d 1219, 1220-22 (5th Cir.
1976) (per curiam) (upholding district court's permanent injunction
against

prosecuting any future

cause of action arising out of

subject of present suit); Pickens v. Lockheed Corp., 990 F.2d 1488,
1489 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)

(forbidding appellant from filing

any further pleadings concerning transaction over which appellant
had already brought

a

series of

frivolous

cases without

approval), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 689 (1994).

court

Accordingly, the

court concludes that plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is
meritorious and will be granted.
-31-

V.
For the reasons

Conclusions and Orders
stated in §

IV,

above,

the court ENJOINS

defendants from filing any future notices of removal related to the
county court case underlying this action without first obtaining
leave from the Chief Judge of the Southern District

of Texas.

Defendants are ORDERED to attach copies of this court's Memorandum
Opinion and Order of Remand and Judge Bennett's October 27, 2017,
Order
No.

Granting
4:17-2035)

Plaintiff's
to

any

Motion

notice

to

of

Remand

removal

(in
or

permission to file a future notice of removal.

Civil

filing

Action
seeking

The court further

cautions defendants that future frivolous attempts at removal may
result in monetary sanctions.
For
subject

the

reasons

matter

stated

jurisdiction

in

§

over

III,
this

above,

the

action.

court

lacks

Accordingly,

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Docket Entry No. 9) is GRANTED.
action

is

REMANDED

to

the

County

Court

Harris County, Texas, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

of
§

Law

1447(c).

No.

This
2

of

The Clerk

will promptly deliver a copy of this Order of Remand to the County
Clerk of Harris County, Texas.
Costs will be taxed against the defendants.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 21st

UNITED

-32-

~2018.

LAKE
DISTRICT JUDGE