Rollins v. Second Baptist Church et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Granting 20 Opposed MOTION to Remand. The case is REMANDED to the 127th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)....*** Case terminated on 5/3/18. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M Hoyt) Parties notified.(sanderson, 4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
GARELD DUANE ROLLINS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH, et al,
Defendants.

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May 03, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18-CV-0775

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This case is before the Court on the plaintiff’s, Gareld Duane Rollins, Jr., motion to

remand [DE 20]1 his case to the 127th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, following
removal by the defendant, Second Baptist Church of Houston (“Second Baptist”) [DE 1].
Second Baptist responded to the plaintiff’s motion for remand and has been joined by another
defendant, the Southern Baptist Convention (“SBC”). See [DEs 34 and 35, respectively]. The
Court received oral arguments on the issue of remand on April 16, 2018; and having reviewed
the documents on file, considered the arguments of counsel, determines that the motion is
meritorious and should be granted.
II.

BACKGROUND – PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Since the Notice of Removal was filed, the plaintiff has filed Fourth and Fifth Amended

Complaints. Although these Amended Complaints, particularly the Fifth, remove much of the
language relied upon by the defendants in their opposition papers, the defendants point out that

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Also pending are the SBC’s motion for summary judgment [DE 18] and the plaintiff’s opposed motion for
continuance [DE 28]. In light of this remand, SBC’s motion for summary judgment need not be addressed. The
plaintiff’s motion for continuance is addressed under separate order.

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the removal test rests in the Third Amended Complaint.2 In his Third Amended Complaint, the
plaintiff argues that H. Paul Pressler and Paige Patterson’s stated goal for the SBC is a
“Conservative Resurgence”, or a literal, anti-scientific interpretation of the Bible. The plaintiff
anticipates that testimony will show that the theological dogma that undergirds the SBC’s
Conservative Resurgence agenda is, at heart, an immoral and corrupt political power move”
designed to snare innocent young boys. The plaintiff further argues that the defendants have
entered into a Joint Enterprise whereby Pressler is permitted to use SBC doctrine and the
facilities at Second and First Baptist Churches to engage in immoral conduct that is antithetical
to true Baptist dogma. The plaintiff suggests that “but for” the institutional and individual
engagements in the Conservative Resurgence and its doctrinal agenda, the plaintiff would not
have suffered the physical and psychological injuries of which he complains.
In its removal papers, Second Baptist asserts that this Court has original jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. The defendants rely on the plaintiff’s statement of
facts and asserted causes of action in his Third Amended Petition, all of which, admittedly, assert
state common law causes of action. Second Baptist asserts that the “[p]laintiff’s claims require a
court, contrary to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, to review, interpret,
consider and make judgment on the appropriateness, correctness and/or validity of the rules,
faith, discipline, government and/or doctrine of the Baptist Church”. Therefore, Second Baptist
argues, this Court has jurisdiction because vindication of the common law claims turns on a
construction of federal law -- the First Amendment to the federal Constitution.

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After the case was removed, the plaintiff renumbered his complaints, designating what was his Third Amended
Complaint as his First Amended Complaint. See [DE ]. The Court relies on the plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint.

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III.

STATEMENT OF LAW
A defendant is permitted to remove an action from a state court to a federal court only if

the action is one over which federal courts have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(a).
Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction absent a jurisdictional granted by statute,
federal courts lack the power to adjudicate state law claims. See Stockman v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35
F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994). Hence, federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited to cases that
either “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States” or involve matters
where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest, and diversity
of citizenship exists. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
When determining whether a claim “arises under” federal law, courts are to rely on the
well-pleaded complaint doctrine. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
808 (1986) (citing Franchise Tax Board v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 -10,
103 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 - 47, 77 (1983)). An action is said to “arise under” federal law within the
meaning of § 1331, if a federal question is an ingredient of the action or when the allegations
involve a disputed question of federal law or, requires resolution of a substantial federal
question. See Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995)
(citing Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 12, 103 S. Ct. at 2848).
“[T]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically
confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813, 106 S. Ct. at 3234 (internal
citations omitted). This is so because “arising-under” jurisdiction always raises the possibility of
upsetting the state-federal line drawn by Congress. Therefore, the presence of a federal issue
must be important to the resolution of a state law claim for federal jurisdiction to attach. See

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Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314, 125 S. Ct. 2363,
2368 (2005) (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810, 106 S. Ct. at 3229). Does the state-law claim
raise a federal issue, actually disputed and substantial? Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S. Ct. at
2367 - 68. Otherwise, the federal issue does not dictate federal jurisdiction.
IV.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In the case at bar, a remand is appropriate only if the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127128 (1995). The question before the Court, therefore, is whether, under the “well-pleaded
complaint” rule, the plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint states a claim that “arises under”
federal law. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9 (internal citation omitted).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed a similar question in a recent decision.
See Singh v. Duante Morris, LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). In Singh, the Fifth Circuit
was tasked to decide “whether a state law malpractice claim met the “arising under” standard
where the alleged malpractice occurred in a prior federal trademark suit. Id. at 337. Concluding
that it did not, the Fifth Circuit held that federal question jurisdiction exists “only [in] those cases
in which a “well-pleaded compliant” establishes either that federal law creates the cause of
action or, [where] the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.” Ibid. at 337-38 (citations omitted).
The defendants assert that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the
resolution of a substantial question of federal law. However, the fact that the plaintiff “pitches”
his suit using language that is, admittedly, saturated with theological dogma does not
automatically raise a federal question. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813. There is no “automatic

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test”, and a court must look beyond “federal fact” language to determine what necessary facts a
plaintiff must plead and prove to establish his cause(s) of action.
In Grable, the Supreme Court pronounced a four-part test that courts wrestling with the
issue of federal question jurisdiction should heed. The inquiry is -- “does a state law claim
necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum
may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities. 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
This Court holds that the plaintiff’s use of “federal fact” language is merely religious
puffery and fails to present a disputed and substantial federal question. Even though the plaintiff
“teases” his pleading with the idea that the Conservative Resurgence may be a “type of
proximate cause” or require a “but for” causation analysis, reasonable minds would agree that it
is nothing more than tease language that defies credulity.
V.

CONCLUSION
Clearly, there is no substantial federal issue raised by the plaintiff’s pleading and the

resolution of his common law claims does not require even a reference to Baptist dogma.
Therefore, the case is REMANDED to the 127th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Each party is to bear his/its own costs.
It is so Ordered.
SIGNED on this 3rd day of May, 2018.
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Kenneth M. Hoyt
United States District Judge

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