Watson v. Emmitt et al

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re: 72 MOTION to Amend 1 Complaint. Plaintiff Eugene Lester is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE from this action for want of prosecution. The complaint filed by Plaintiffs Loren Olds and Felton Paul Lambert lacks an arguable basis in law. It is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 USC § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The motions by Olds for leave to file an amended complaint are DENIED. Dkts 68, 72. Any other pending motions are DENIED as moot. Email sent to Manager of Three Strikes List. (Signed by Judge Charles Eskridge) Parties notified.(jengonzalez, 4)

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United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
September 03, 2021
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LORNE OLDS, et al,
(TDCJ–CID #2247273),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JUDGE ED EMMETT,
et al.,
Defendants.

§ CIVIL ACTION NO.
§ 4:18-cv-00877
§
§
§
§ JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
§
§
§
§
§

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION DISMISSING CLAIMS
Plaintiffs Darrell Wayne Watson, Corey Morris, and Gregory
Scott Richardson were previously dismissed from this action for
want of prosecution. Plaintiff Eugene Lester is now also
dismissed without prejudice on that basis.
The complaint filed by Plaintiffs Lorne Olds and Felton Paul
Lambert is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. Dkt 1.
1. Background
Watson, Morris, Richardson, Olds, Lambert, and Lester
initiated this lawsuit in March 2018. They’re all former inmates of
the Harris County Jail. They complain of deprivation of sunlight
and fresh air in violation of the Eighth Amendment, asserting
that the HCJ located at 1200 Baker Street has no windows. Dkt 1
at 3. Such deprivation began on April 15, 2017.
Plaintiffs sue the following Defendants:
o Ed Emmet, Judge of the Harris County
Commissioner’s Court, alleging that he was
negligent in adopting the blueprints of the 1200
Baker Street building;

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o

Ed Gonzalez, Sheriff of Harris County, Texas,
alleging that he failed to ensure that inmates
received Vitamin D;
o John Martin, HCJ Building Administrator, alleging
that he failed to renovate the building to ensure that
inmates received sunlight;
o S. Ward, a sergeant at the HCJ, alleging that he said
to Watson, “I don’t think they are going to tear
down a $60,000,000 building just to give you
sunlight,” but that he would schedule Watson’s
recreation when the sun was at its peak;
o Rodney Ellis, Harris County Commissioner,
without alleging what he did to violate their rights;
o Bobby Davis, HCJ Medical Director, alleging that
he failed to recognize the detrimental effects
resulting from sunlight deprivation;
o Aramark Food Services and Aramark Building
Maintenance, the HCJ Building Manager and food
supplier, alleging that they failed to take steps to
provide inmates with fresh air and to supplement
their food with Vitamin D; and
o Dr. Michael Seale, HCJ Medical Director, alleging
that he referred Watson to Dr. Nguyen who said,
“You have a legitimate complaint,” and “Do you
have a lawyer?”
Dkt 1 at 14–15.
Plaintiffs assert that deprivation of sunlight can cause
memory loss, mood swings, sleep disorders, anxiety, depression,
and increase the risk of heart disease. Plaintiffs seek $250,000,000
in actual damages and $750,000,000 in punitive damages. Dkt 1
at 5.
Norris, Richardson, and Watson were previously dismissed
for want of prosecution in September 2018 and July 2020.
Dkts 42, 65.
Olds, Lambert, and Lester are current inmates of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions
Division. They proceed here pro se and in forma pauperis. Dkts 22,
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23, 36. They were ordered to file more definite statements in July
2020. Dkts 64, 66, 67.
Lester failed to comply. As determined below, he will be
dismissed from this action for want of prosecution.
Olds complied but without much detail. He states that the
allegations concern the deprivation of sunlight, but he doesn’t
have access to the original complaint. Dkt 68. He separately seeks
permission to file an amended complaint regarding claims of
medical conditions resulting from exposure to black mold, lack
of mental health care, and an alleged use of excessive force.
Dkt 68 at 1; Dkt 72.
Lambert filed an initial response on August 6, 2020. Dkt 69.
He references deprivation of sunlight and exposure to black
mold. He didn’t remember the names of the defendants and
couldn’t say how they were personally involved, but he recalled
that his complaints were ignored. Lambert claimed that sunlight
deprivation worsened his diabetes, while also causing skin and
vision problems and headaches. He states that an HCJ doctor
told him that his condition was caused by deprivation of sunlight,
but he never received treatment for lack of sunlight. The doctor
said they didn’t prescribe Vitamin D and couldn’t cut a window
in the jail. Lambert received skin lotion, increased insulin, and a
stronger prescription for glasses.
Lambert filed a second response on August 20, 2020,
requesting that his first response be disregarded. Dkt 71 at 1. He
stated that he still doesn’t remember the defendants’ names. He
claims that they didn’t provide windows to let in sunlight and
should have transferred him to a jail with sunlight or prescribed
Vitamin D. Id at 2. He claims sunlight deprivation played a major
role in his ongoing health issues, including skin problems, hair
loss, and worsening diabetes. Id at 3. He states that his current
medical conditions are uncontrolled diabetes, loss of vision, and
skin discoloration. He has received a higher dosage of insulin, a
stronger prescription for glasses, skin lotion, increased
psychotropic medications, and pain medications. Id at 4. He
alleges that HCJ doctors said they didn’t offer Vitamin D
treatment because they would have to treat all inmates and that
was not in the budget.
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2. Legal standard
A federal court must dismiss an action in which the plaintiff
proceeds in forma pauperis on determination that the action is
frivolous or malicious. 28 USC § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is
frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” See Denton v
Hernandez, 504 US 25, 31 (1992), quoting Neitzke v Williams, 490
US 319, 325 (1989); Richardson v Spurlock, 260 F3d 495, 498 (5th
Cir 2001), citing 28 USC § 1915(e)(2). And it lacks an arguable basis
in law “if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such
as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which
clearly does not exist.” Davis v Scott, 157 F3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir
1998), quoting McCormick v Stalder, 105 F3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir
1997).
3. Analysis
The claims by Olds and Lambert will be dismissed as
frivolous. The claims by Lester will be dismissed for want of
prosecution.
a. Deprivation of sunlight
The HCJ houses both pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners awaiting transfer to the TDCJ. The Fifth Circuit has
long recognized each as a distinct group, while “look[ing] to
different constitutional provisions for their respective rights to
basic needs such as medical care and safety.” Hare v Corinth, 74
F3d 633, 639 (5th Cir 1996, en banc), citing Estelle v Gamble, 429
US 97, 104 (1976). While convicted state prisoners are protected
by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment and (to a limited degree) substantive due process,
pretrial detainees are protected by the “procedural and
substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Ibid. As such, conditions of confinement may
“constitute deprivations of liberty without due process if they
amount to punishment of the detainee.” Harris v Angelina County,
31 F3d 331, 334 (5th Cir 1994). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit holds,
“The State cannot punish a pretrial detainee.” Hare, 74 F3d
at 639, citing Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 535 (1979).
A proper determination of whether a condition of
confinement of a pretrial detainee amounts to punishment “turns
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on whether ‘the disability is imposed for the purpose of
punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other
legitimate governmental purpose.’” Harris, 31 F3d at 334, quoting
Bell, 441 US at 538. “Thus, if a particular condition or restriction
of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to
‘punishment.’” Bell, 441 US at 539. But given the heightened dueprocess protection afforded pretrial detainees, confinement
conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment assuredly violate
a pretrial detainee’s due-process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment as well. See Hare, 74 F3d at 639; Harris, 31 F3d
at 334.
When a pretrial detainee challenges “general conditions,
practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement,” the Bell
test applies—the challenged policy or condition must be
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest (such as
ensuring security). Hare, 74 F3d at 643. But when a pretrial
detainee challenges a jailor’s “episodic acts or omissions, the Bell
test is inapplicable, and the proper inquiry is whether the official
had a culpable state of mind in acting or failing to act.” Ibid.
Plaintiffs complain of deprivation of sunlight at the HCJ,
asserting that the failure to provide pretrial detainees with
sunlight amounts to an unconstitutional punishment. The
Supreme Court in Bell v Wolfish observed as follows with respect
to conditions in pretrial detention:
Not every disability imposed during pretrial
detention amounts to “punishment” in the
constitutional sense, however. Once the
Government has exercised its conceded
authority to detain a person pending trial, it
obviously is entitled to employ devices that are
calculated to effectuate this detention.
Traditionally, this has meant confinement in a
facility which, no matter how modern or how
antiquated, results in restricting the movement
of a detainee in a manner in which he would not
be restricted if he simply were free to walk the
streets pending trial. Whether it be called a jail,
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a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of
the facility is to detain. Loss of freedom of
choice and privacy are inherent incidents of
confinement in such a facility. And the fact that
such detention interferes with the detainee’s
understandable desire to live as comfortably as
possible and with as little restraint as possible
during confinement does not convert the
conditions or restrictions of detention into
“punishment.”
441 US at 520. “Detainment itself, however, requires that the
State provide for inmates’ basic human needs.” Shepherd v
Dallas County, 591 F3d 445, 453 (5th Cir 2001). To raise a dueprocess claim, a detainee must allege “a pattern of serious
deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs.” Id at 454.
In Mayfield v Ellett, the Fifth Circuit addressed complaints by
a pretrial detainee regarding the denial of outdoor recreation.
1996 WL 670432 (5th Cir). Its observations are pertinent here:
Mayfield testified that, although he was
permitted regular access to the dayroom and the
jail gymnasium, he was never afforded outdoor
recreation. Mayfield concedes that the
gymnasium had a frosted skylight, but argues,
without any indication of supporting evidence,
that this was inadequate. Chief Deputy de
Presca testified that the Panola County Jail has
no outdoor recreation facility and that the
skylight was installed in the gymnasium in 1985
to meet the state requirement that inmates be
given access to sunlight. De Presca further
testified that inmates, including Mayfield, were
given access to the gymnasium at least three
times weekly, at least one hour at a time.
Mayfield did not dispute this.
Given the physical constraints of the
Panola County Jail facility, we are convinced
that the facts alleged by Mayfield would not
even arguably suffice to sustain a finding that he
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was unconstitutionally punished within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Bell
recognized that ensuring security and order at
detention facilities is a permissible nonpunitive
objective, we cannot say that the scheme
employed at the Panola County Jail facility does
not strike a permissible balance between
meeting that permissible objective and
affording inmates needed recreation and
sunlight to the extent reasonably and practically
available. See Block v Rutherford, 104 S Ct at 3234
(stating that a federal court’s “balancing” of a
detention facility’s security measures against the
importance of family visits resulted in
impermissible substitution of the court’s views
regarding prison administration). Whatever
remains of the general language set forth in
Miller after Bell and Green, we are quite certain
that it does not confer a constitutional right to
exercise in unfiltered sunlight in an otherwise
acceptable custodial facility regardless of the
facility’s physical constraints. To hold otherwise
would fly in the face of Bell’s admonition against
becoming enmeshed in the minutiae of prison
operations.
Accordingly, we hold that the magistrate
judge did not abuse her discretion by dismissing
Mayfield’s claim regarding inadequate outdoor
recreation as frivolous.
1996 WL 670432, at *8 (footnote omitted).
With these precepts in mind, it’s clear that Plaintiffs can’t
prevail on a conditions-of-confinement theory. They complain of the
lack of windows at the HCJ and a resulting lack of sunlight. But
they don’t allege that the lack of windows at the HCJ wasn’t
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. See
Duvall v Dallas County, 631 F3d 203, 207 (5th Cir 2011). And quite
simply, construction of the HCJ was designed to ensure security
and order. This is a permissible nonpunitive objective. And it is
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jail administrators—not the courts—who “are to make the
difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.” Turner v
Safley, 482 US 78, 89 (1987) (quotations omitted). Given the
physical constraints of the HCJ, the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs
don’t suffice to sustain a finding that they were unconstitutionally
punished within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs likewise can’t prevail under an episodic-acts-oromissions theory. To do so, they must show that “the official ‘acted
or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the detainee’s
needs.’” Brown v Bolin, 500 F App’x 309, 314 (5th Cir 2012),
quoting Hare, 74 F3d at 648. To establish deliberate indifference in
this context requires the plaintiff to “establish that the official
knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of inmate health or
safety.” Brown, 500 F Appx at 314, citing Farmer v Brennan, 511 US
825, 837 (1994). This is an “extremely high standard.” Domino v
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F3d 752, 756 (5th Cir
2001), citing Johnson v Treen, 759 F2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir 1985).
The Fifth Circuit holds, “The official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Brown, 500 F Appx at 314, quoting Farmer, 511 US at 837.
Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of deliberate indifference
are insufficient to maintain this claim. The Fifth Circuit squarely
holds that “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a
motion to dismiss.” Fernandez-Montes v Allied Pilots Association,
987 F2d 278, 284 (5th Cir 1993); see also Van Cleave v
United States, 854 F2d 82, 84 (5th Cir 1988) (requiring claimant to
state specific facts and finding conclusory allegations insufficient
to maintain Section 1983 claim). To the contrary, Plaintiffs here
simply allege that deprivation of sunlight caused various adverse
health effects and worsened other conditions. This is insufficient
to plausibly infer that Defendants had actual knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee as is needed
to establish deliberate indifference. See Hare, 74 F3d at 650. This
is especially so given the existence of legitimate security reasons
for restricting Plaintiffs’ access to outdoor recreation in direct
sunlight. And the Supreme Court mandates that courts accord
broad deference to prison administrators’ “adoption and
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execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.” Bell, 441 US at 547 (1979).
Plaintiffs’ pleadings also reference the HCJ’s response to
grievances. HCJ administrators referred to security concerns
which naturally prohibited the ability of cutting windows into the
walls of the HCJ. Plaintiffs also specifically reference that
administrators indicated that they would schedule recreation at a
time when the sun was at its peak. Dkt 1 at 7. This suggests that
Plaintiffs had access to sunlight at some point, undercutting their
suggestion of deliberate indifference.
Plaintiffs state no facts which give rise to a claim that any
person, condition, or policy deprived them of a basic human
need, or that any person intended to punish them by subjecting
them to an unconstitutional condition. The claim is conclusory
and will be dismissed as frivolous.
b. Denial of adequate medical treatment
Plaintiffs were in custody at the HCJ following their arrest as
pretrial detainees. Liberally construed, they allege that they were
denied adequate medical treatment for Vitamin D deficiency.
“[P]retrial detainees have a constitutional right, under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to have
their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on
the part of the confining officials.” Thompson v Upshur County,
245 F3d 447, 457 (5th Cir 2001); see also Gibbs v Grimmette,
254 F3d 545, 548 (5th Cir 2001), citing Hare v City of Corinth,
74 F3d 633, 643 (5th Cir 1996, en banc).
Standards by which to assess deliberate indifference have
been set out above. The Supreme Court has also stated:
[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain” proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether
the indifference is manifested by prison doctors
in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or

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delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with the treatment once prescribed.
Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 104–05 (1976), quoting Gregg v Georgia,
428 US 153, 173 (1976). And again, the standard is an “extremely
high” one to meet. Domino, 239 F3d at 756. Actions and decisions
by officials as to medical treatment that are “merely inept,
erroneous, ineffective or negligent” don’t amount to deliberate
indifference. Doe v Dallas Independent School District, 153 F3d 211,
219 (5th Cir 1998); see also Farmer, 511 US at 835. This means
that neither medical malpractice nor negligent treatment present
an issue of federal constitutional dimension. Mendoza v Lynaugh,
989 F2d 191, 195 (5th Cir 1993).
Plaintiffs haven’t stated a claim for denial of adequate
medical treatment sufficient to meet this extremely high standard.
For example, Lambert by his own admission acknowledges that
he received lotion for a skin condition, a higher dosage of insulin,
a stronger prescription for glasses, increased psychotropic
medications, and pain medications. Dkt 71 at 4. This negates his
claim of deliberate indifference. For example, see Bass v Sullivan,
550 F2d 229 (5th Cir 1977); Mendoza, 989 F2d at 193–95.
As previously noted, it is clearly established that an incorrect
diagnosis by prison medical personnel doesn’t suffice to state a
claim for deliberate indifference. The plaintiff must instead show
that the officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar
conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any
serious medical needs.” Johnson, 759 F2d at 1238. Plaintiffs’
allegations don’t approach any such level of concern.
Simply put, Plaintiffs haven’t alleged facts demonstrating
that Defendants were aware of and disregarded a substantial risk
of harm to them, or that they suffered substantial harm as a result
of the alleged denial of treatment. Their claims pursuant to
Section 1983 based on deliberate indifference to their serious
medical needs will be dismissed as frivolous.
c. Claims against Aramark
Plaintiffs name Aramark as a defendant in this action. They
allege that Aramark provides meals for detainees and inmates at
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the HCJ and manages the building located at 1200 Baker Street,
Houston, Texas.
To state a claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must allege
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v
Atkins, 487 US 42, 48 (1988). “[T]he under-color-of-state-law
element of [section] 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private
conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’”
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co v Sullivan, 526 US 40,
50 (1999) (quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs alleged that Aramark violated their
constitutional rights. Claims based on deprivation of
constitutional rights must proceed under 42 USC § 1983. That
statute requires a plaintiff to present facts that, if proven, would
show the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, and that the deprivation was caused by
someone acting under color of state law. Baker v McCollan,
443 US 137 (1979).
Aramark is a corporation. Corporations can qualify as state
actors under Section 1983 in certain circumstances. See Lugar v
Edmondson Oil Co, Inc, 457 US 922, 939 (1982) (recognizing three
tests of general application for determining whether private party
may be held to be state actor). For example, a private corporation
providing medical services in a jail is considered a state actor for
purposes of Section 1983. See Bishop v Karney, 408 F App’x 846,
848 (5th Cir 2011), citing West v Atkins, 487 US 42, 49–50, 54–57
(1988); Stone v Gusman, 2017 WL 3037632, at *3 (ED La). For
present purposes, it is assumed without deciding that a private
corporation providing food services in a jail is likewise considered
a state actor because it assumed the role of providing an essential
state function. For example, see Hardin v Aramark Food Services
Corp, 2017 WL 1658812, at *4 (CD Ill); Avery v Helder, 2017 WL
776702, at *3 (WD Ark).
Still, Plaintiffs raise no viable Section 1983 claim against
Aramark. Plaintiffs contend that Aramark failed to supplement
food served at the HCJ with Vitamin D. Such complaints don’t
rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation under the
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Fourteenth Amendment. “The deprivation of food constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment only if it denies a prisoner the
‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Talib v Gilley,
138 F3d 211, 214 n 3 (5th Cir 1998), quoting Rhodes v Chapman,
452 US 337, 347 (1981). Constitutional violations in this regard
aren’t established by showing mere discomforts associated with
incarceration such as those instances where complaint centers on
minor inadequacies with respect to jail food. For example, see
Hyder v Perez, 1996 WL 255243, *1 (5th Cir) (upholding dismissal
of claims as frivolous that quantities of food were inadequate).
This allegation by Plaintiffs doesn’t indicate a denial of “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” as to Aramark’s
meal services at the HCJ. Plaintiffs simply don’t allege a
significant or sustained adverse health effect caused by the lack
of food supplemented with Vitamin D. As such, no issue of a
constitutional dimension is raised.
Plaintiffs’ allegations against Aramark will be dismissed as
legally frivolous.
d. Want of prosecution
Lester is an inmate at the TDCJ–CID. He was ordered in
July 2020 to provide a more definite statement and advised that
his complaint was otherwise subject to dismissal without
prejudice for want of prosecution. Dkt 66. He hasn’t complied.
Lester will be dismissed from this action for want of
prosecution pursuant to the inherent powers necessarily vested
in a district court to manage its own affairs. See FRCP 41(b);
Link v Wabash Railroad Co, 370 US 626, 630–31 (1962); Clofer v
Perego, 106 F3d 678, 679 (5th Cir 1997); James W. Moore, et al.,
8 Moore’s Federal Practice § 41.51(3)(b) & (e) (Matthew Bender
3d ed 2017). The Court will grant relief upon a proper showing
under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Link, 370 US at 635.
4. Motion to amend complaint
Olds seeks leave to file an amended complaint. Dkts 68, 72.
Specifically, he seeks to amend his complaint to allege exposure
to black mold and excessive force.

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A party may generally amend his original pleading as a matter
of course within twenty-one days of service. FRCP 15(a)(1).
Otherwise, a party may amend only with the opponent’s written
consent or permission of the court. FRCP 15(a)(2). “The court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Ibid. The
determination of whether justice so requires is within the sound
discretion of a district court. See Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v
Harry L Laws Co, 690 F2d 1157, 1162 (5th Cir 1982) (citations
omitted). And leave to amend should be allowed absent
substantial reason for denial. Jacobsen v Osbourne, 133 F3d 315, 318
(5th Cir 1998). Typical reasons to deny leave include situations
where the proposed amendment would cause undue delay or
prejudice to the nonmovant, if it is motivated by bad faith or
dilatory motives, if there have been repeated failures to cure
deficiencies with prior amendments, or if the amendment would
be futile. Foman v Davis, 371 US 178, 182 (1962); see also Martin’s
Herend Imports, Inc v Diamond & Gem Trading United States of
America Co, 195 F3d 765, 770 (5th Cir 1999); Wimm v Jack Eckerd
Corp, 3 F3d 137, 139 (5th Cir 1993).
Substantial reasons are present here to deny leave to amend.
The existing claims are subject to dismissal as frivolous, as
determined above. And addition of the new claims proposed by
Olds would cause undue delay and prejudice to Defendants. The
proposed amendment has no relation to the claims already filed
in this action, which focus on complaints about the deprivation
of sunlight.
Olds may attempt to bring such claims in a separate civil
action if he so desired. But he can’t at this stage add new and
completely unrelated claims to this action while bringing in new
defendants. The motions for leave to file an amended complaint
will be denied. Dkts 68, 72.
5. Conclusion
Plaintiff Eugene Lester is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
from this action for want of prosecution.
The complaint filed by Plaintiffs Loren Olds and Felton Paul
Lambert lacks an arguable basis in law. It is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE under 28 USC § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
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The motions by Olds for leave to file an amended complaint
are DENIED. Dkts 68, 72.
Any other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk of Court will send a copy of this Order to:
Manager of the Three-Strikes List
Southern District of Texas
[e-mail].
SO ORDERED.
Signed on September 3, 2021, at Houston, Texas.
________________________
Hon. Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge

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