Van Overdam v. Texas A&M University

Filing 76

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 73 MOTION for Protective Order (Signed by Judge Keith P Ellison) Parties notified.(arrivera, 4)

Case 4:18-cv-02011 Document 76 Filed on 03/30/20 in TXSD Page 1 of 2
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
AUSTIN VAN OVERDAM,
Plaintiff,
VS.
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, et al,
Defendants.

March 30, 2020
David J. Bradley, Clerk

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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18-CV-2011
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 73). Defendant
Texas A&M University is seeking an order that would protect its President, Michael K. Young,
from deposition. Plaintiff Austin Van Overdam has unilaterally noticed President Young’s
deposition for March 30, 2020. (Doc. No. 74, at 6). After considering the Motion and all applicable
law, the Court determines that Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order must be GRANTED.
Under Rule 26, parties may obtain discovery that is “relevant to any party’s claim” and
“proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Court must limit discovery
where “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Id. at
26(b)(2)(C)(i). The Court may also issue a protective order to protect an individual from whom
discovery is sought from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”
Id. at 26(c)(1).
After the Court’s previous ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s only
remaining claim is one of selective enforcement. Accordingly, the only relevant question in this
case is whether Defendant initiated its investigation or punished Plaintiff because of his gender.
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Case 4:18-cv-02011 Document 76 Filed on 03/30/20 in TXSD Page 2 of 2

See Klocke v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 938 F.3d 204, 2010 (5th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff fails to
explain how President Young’s deposition is relevant to his selective enforcement claim. In his
Response, Plaintiff primarily relies on President Young’s role in changing sexual assault policies
on campus in 2018, in response to activism by Plaintiff’s victim and other women on campus.
(Doc. No. 74, at 12–17). However, Plaintiff does not explain how President Young’s actions in
2018 evidence selective enforcement against Plaintiff in 2016, during which Plaintiff was charged,
sanctioned, and served his suspension. (Doc. No. 73, at 7–8). Plaintiff also argues that President
Young generally supported sexual assault policies on campus during his tenure as university
president, for example, by stating that collecting data through a sexual assault survey was
“important.” (Doc. No. 74, at 16). Again, Plaintiff does not explain how general support for the
university’s sexual assault policies relates to Plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim. Additionally,
even if such a generalized statement were relevant, Plaintiff could seek out such statements from
depositions of other university officials or written discovery, making President Young’s deposition
cumulative.
Because everything Plaintiff seeks from President Young’s deposition is either irrelevant
to his remaining selective enforcement claim or cumulative of other discovery accessible to
Plaintiff, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion pursuant to its power under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
to limit discovery.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on this the 30th day of March, 2020.

KEITH P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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