Gonzalez v. IronTiger Logistics, Inc. et al

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 58 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. Gonzalez may amend for the sole purpose of clarifying her status as the administrator of Llamas' estate. She must do so by 08/14/2020. (Signed by Judge Charles Eskridge) Parties notified.(jengonzalez, 4) (Main Document 63 replaced on 7/24/2020) (jengonzalez, 4).

Case 4:18-cv-03454 Document 63 Filed on 07/24/20 in TXSD Page 1 of 5
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 24, 2020
David J. Bradley, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
SAMANTHA
GONZALEZ,
Individually and as Heir and
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Minor X.L,
Deceased, and As Next
Friend to Plaintiff Minor
N.L., Heir to the Estate of
Rene Llamas, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IRONTIGER
LOGISTICS, INC, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
4:18-cv-03454

JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Samantha Gonzalez seeks leave to file an amended
complaint. Dkt 58. The motion is largely denied. Gonzalez may
amend only for the limited purpose of clarifying her status as the
administrator of the estate of Rene Llamas, Jr.
1. Background
Llamas and his son X.L. were fatally injured in March 2018
in a motor vehicle wreck on Interstate 10 in Colorado County,
Texas. Dkt 1-1 at ¶ 6.1. Gonzalez is the mother of Llamas’s sons,
X.L. and N.L., both of whom are minors
She sued Defendants IronTiger Logistics, Inc, Scott
Osterhout, Dealers Choice Truckaway System, Inc, and
Truckmovers International, Inc. She did so as the heir and
personal representative of the estate of X.L. and as next friend to

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N.L., heir to the estate of Llamas. Id at ¶¶ 12.1, 13.1. Gonzalez
asserts causes of action for negligence and gross negligence
against all Defendants. She additionally seeks both wrongful
death and survivor statute damages for herself and N.L.
Truckmovers was dismissed from the case in September
2018 for improper joinder. Dkt 11. A scheduling order was then
entered in November 2018. Dkt 22. The deadline for
amendments to pleadings was set for January 2019. The
discovery deadline fell in October 2019. The motions deadline
was in November 2019. The case was subsequently transferred
to this Court on October 29, 2019. Dkt 50. All deadlines in the
scheduling order remained in effect. Ibid. And by that time the
deadline to amend pleadings had already passed.
A motion by Defendants to extend pretrial deadlines was
granted in November 2019. Dkts 52, 53. The discovery deadline
was extended into January 2020, with the motions deadline falling
shortly afterwards. Gonzalez then filed in January 2020 an agreed
motion for continuance due to a trial conflict of her counsel in
an unrelated matter. Dkt 56. This, too, was granted. Dkt 57. The
motions deadline was extended into May 2020, with docket call
set in October 2020. But the discovery deadline was not further
extended.
No scheduling order entered by this Court ever extended the
deadline for amendments to pleadings that had passed in January
2019. Even so, Gonzalez now seeks to file an amended
complaint. Dkt 58.
2. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) governs
discretionary amendment of pleadings after the time has passed
for amendment “as a matter of course” under Rule 15(a)(1). Rule
15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with
the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The
court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) governs scheduling
orders. A well-respected treatise notes that “any scheduling order
issued under Rule 16(b) and the timetable it establishes will be
binding.” Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1522.2 (3d ed).

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Rule 16(b)(3) states, “The scheduling order must limit the
time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete
discovery, and file motions.” Rule 16(b)(4) then provides that
once a scheduling order has been entered, it “may be modified
only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Four factors
are relevant to the analysis of good cause:
o The explanation for the failure to timely move for
leave to amend;
o The importance of the amendment;
o Potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and
o The availability of a continuance to cure such
prejudice.
Innova Hospital San Antonio, Ltd Partnership v Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Georgia, Inc, 892 F3d 719, 735 (5th Cir 2018) (citations
omitted).
Rule 16(b)(3) specifically requires the district court to limit
the time to amend the pleadings. As such, the more “liberal
standard” of Rule 15(a) doesn’t apply until the movant
demonstrates the requisite good cause. Id at 734–35. The
scheduling order controls and leave to amend will be denied in
the absence of “some showing of why an extension is warranted.”
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure at § 1522.2; see also
S&W Enterprises, LLC v Southtrust Bank of Alabama, NA, 315 F3d
533, 535 (5th Cir 2003) (citations omitted): “It requires a party
seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be
met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.”
3. Analysis
It is now nearly two years after this action commenced and
over fourteen months after the deadline for amending pleadings
has passed. Gonzalez seeks leave to amend her complaint for
three reasons: first, to conform the pleadings to the federal rules
because the case was originally filed in state court; second, to refine
her negligence allegations; and third, to formalize her status as a
judicially appointed administrator of Llamas’ estate. Dkt 58 at 2.
Gonzalez asserts that the first two reasons seek amendments
that are “essentially housekeeping in nature.” Id at 5. Defendants
strongly object. Dkt 59 at 5–6. They argue that substantial

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discovery has been completed on the basis of her current
negligence allegations, including all depositions of her experts.
And they note that the amended-pleadings deadline has long
since passed.
There is no good explanation for the delay. Gonzalez
attempts to dispute the deadline to amend pleadings. Dkt 58 at
5–6. But the original scheduling order clearly set the deadline to
amend for January 16, 2019. Dkt 22. This was not superseded or
changed by any later amended scheduling order. She also seeks
to excuse this delay because her counsel had to attend an
unrelated trial in January 2020. Dkt 58 at 2. But that trial occurred
a full year after the deadline to amend pleadings and the
completion of substantial discovery. “Attorney neglect or
inadvertence will not constitute good cause supporting
modification.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure at
§ 1522.2 (3d ed).
The first two reasons for amendment are also apparently not
all that important. Her motion squarely states that such
amendments “are essentially housekeeping in nature. Neither of
these changes materially affects the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims
herein, and indeed, Plaintiffs could theoretically proceed to trial
without these two amendments.” Dkt 58 at 5.
The prejudice in allowing amendment at this late date is
obvious. Discovery has already closed after a substantial
investment of time and expense. A continuance could of course
be entered, but that in no way addresses the cost to this point—
particularly as balanced against the inability to show any
acceptable reason for the delay.
Gonzalez thus fails to establish good cause for her delay in
seeking amendment to conform her pleadings to federal rules and
to refine her allegations of negligence. See Squyres v Heico
Companies, LLC, 782 F3d 224, 238–39 (5th Cir 2015). Defendants
state no objection to Gonzalez filing an amendment for the
limited purpose of naming her as the administrator of Llamas’s
estate. Id at 4. Amendment will be allowed only in that respect.
4. Conclusion
The motion to amend by Gonzalez is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Dkt 58.

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Gonzalez may amend for the sole purpose of clarifying her
status as the administrator of Llamas’ estate. She must do so by
August 14, 2020.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on July 24, 2020, at Houston, Texas.

Hon. Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge

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