Plymouth County Retirement System v. Apache Corporation et al

Filing 178

OPINION AND ORDER re 164 Motion for Approval of Lead Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Plan of Allocation, and Supporting Memorandum of Law and 165 Motion for Attorney Fees. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew M Edison) Parties notified. (rrc3)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
IN RE APACHE CORP.
SECURITIES LITIGATION

November 25, 2024
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-cv-00575
§
§

OPINION AND ORDER
This is a securities class action brought against Apache Corp. and several of
its high-ranking officials. Lead Plaintiffs Plymouth County Retirement Association
and Trustees of the Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund allege that Defendants
made statements from September 7, 2016, through March 13, 2020, that misled
investors regarding the production capabilities and commercial viability of Alpine
High, a purported major oil and gas play in the Permian Basin.
At the outset of this matter I appointed Saxena White P.A. and Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP as Lead Counsel. I also appointed Ajamie LLP as Liaison
Counsel. As is par for the course in securities fraud cases, Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss. After the motion to dismiss was denied, discovery formally
commenced in December 2022. For a little more than a year, the parties exchanged
written discovery, participated in extensive document production, and deposed 16
fact witnesses. The parties also briefed class certification issues and participated in
a day-long class certification hearing. In March 2024, with the help of a mediator,
Lead Plaintiffs agreed to settle all claims in this action in exchange for an all-cash
payment of $65 million, subject to the court’s approval.
In orders to be issued separately today, I approve the proposed settlement
and plan of allocation of net settlement fund as fair, adequate, and reasonable. In
this Opinion and Order, I address Lead Counsel’s Motion for an Award of
Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses. Dkt. 165.
Lead Counsel asks me to approve attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$21,666,666.00, which represents 33.33% of the $65 million settlement fund.

Lead Counsel also requests an award from the settlement fund in the amount of
$1,555,388.49 for litigation expenses incurred by counsel in prosecuting this
action, and $17,014.22 in costs directly related to Lead Plaintiffs’ representation of
the settlement class.
ATTORNEYS’ FEE AWARD
A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING AN ATTORNEYS’ FEE AWARD IN
COMMON FUND CASES
Several renowned law professors have perfectly captured the dilemma I

presently face:
When a class action settles . . . , the court is faced with the job of
awarding an appropriate attorneys’ fee. The issue is important. If fees
are set too low, counsel will not receive fair compensation for their
services to the class. Worse yet, if fees are too low, then qualified
counsel will not bring these cases in the first place. Injured parties will
receive no redress, and potential wrongdoers will no longer be
deterred out of fear of potential class action liability. If fees are set too
high, attorneys will receive an unjustified windfall, and some of the
benefits that should have gone to class members will be diverted to
class counsel. Excessive class counsel fees might also induce class
counsel to bring weak cases. Setting an appropriate counsel fee is thus
crucial to the effective functioning of class action litigation.
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions: 2009–2013, 92
N.Y.U.L. REV. 937, 937–38 (2017).
So, how am I to determine the appropriate attorneys’ fee to award?
Too often, in my estimation, district courts simply rubber stamp the
attorneys’ fees requested by the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Although that is unquestionably
the easy thing to do, I am unwilling to take that route. As the trial judge handling
this class action case, I am required to act as a fiduciary for the absent class
members by ensuring, in part, that the attorneys’ fees awarded are reasonable.
See United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1330–31 (5th Cir. 1980). My
role as a fiduciary emanates directly from the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e), which requires a court to approve any class action settlement. The
purpose of this rule is “to protect the nonparty members of the class from unjust

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or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” Wilson v. Southwest Airlines,
Inc., 880 F.2d 807, 818 (5th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). Because I must act as
a fiduciary, the lack of objection to Lead Counsel’s proposed fee award is of no
consequence.
In deciding what fee to award those attorneys who have worked on the
plaintiffs’ side of this matter, I cannot simply rely, as I do in most cases, “on
adversarial

presentation

to

inform

[me]

of

the

possibilities

for

decision.” Eisenberg, supra, at 938. This is because “class counsel has a potential
conflict with their own clients because each dollar that goes to the attorneys is a
dollar that does not go to class members.” Id. And “Defendants, for their part, have
no stake in how the settlement amounts are distributed between class counsel and
class members.” Id. Understandably, all Defendants want is to pay the agreed
settlement amount and put this matter behind them. The obligation thus falls
squarely on my shoulders to ensure that the interests of both the class members
and class counsel are taken into account in determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee
to award.
Rule 23(h) permits me to award, as part of a class action settlement,
“reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by
the parties’ agreement.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). Under the common fund doctrine, a
lawyer who has secured a benefit on behalf of others is entitled to retain a
reasonable portion of the fund as attorneys’ fees and costs. See Boeing Co. v. Van
Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“[T]his Court has recognized consistently that
a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other
than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as
a whole.”). “The common fund doctrine ensures that attorneys are fairly
compensated for their efforts and encourages them to undertake risky litigation for
which no reward is guaranteed.” Celeste v. Intrusion Inc., No. 4:21-cv-307, 2022
WL 17736350, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2022).

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B.

PERCENTAGE METHOD V. LODESTAR METHOD
In common fund cases, the Fifth Circuit has endorsed two approaches for

establishing the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award:
(1) the percentage method, in which the court awards fees as a
reasonable percentage of the common fund; or (2) the lodestar
method, in which the court computes fees by multiplying the number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly
rate and, in its discretion, applying an upward or downward
multiplier.
Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 642–43 (5th Cir.
2012). District courts are given wide latitude to determine whether to utilize the
percentage method or the lodestar method. See id. at 644 (“We join the majority
of circuits in allowing our district courts the flexibility to choose between the
percentage and lodestar methods in common fund cases.”).
Both methods for calculating attorneys’ fees have their virtues and their
drawbacks. The lodestar approach “produces an award that roughly approximates
the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been
representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case.”
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010). “[T]he lodestar method
is readily administrable, . . . objective, . . . permits meaningful judicial review, and
produces reasonably predictable results.” Id. at 551–52 (quotation omitted). On
the flip side, the lodestar method has been criticized for generating avoidable
hours, discouraging early settlement, and burdening district judges with the
tedious task of auditing time records. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209
F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the lodestar approach “resurrected the
ghost of Ebenezer Scrooge, compelling district courts to engage in a gimlet-eyed
review of line-item fee audits”).
The percentage method likewise has its share of proponents and critics. On
the positive side, the percentage method has several distinct benefits. First,
because a counsel’s fee increases with the recovery of the class, the percentage
method ensures that the interests of the class are aligned with the interests of
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counsel. See 5 William B. Rubenstein, NEWBERG AND RUBENSTEIN ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 15:65 (6th ed. Nov. 2024). Second, the percentage method
disincentivizes counsel from “run[ning] up their hours to increase the fee request,”
resulting in efficient litigation. Id. Third, the percentage method is relatively easy
to administer, “sav[ing] valuable judicial and party resources.” Id. Alas, the
percentage method is not without its faults. It has been criticized for being
arbitrary and resulting in a windfall for class counsel. See id. (“The percentage
method may yield extraordinary results for class counsel—if they recover a large
sum quickly, or an enormous sum in the ordinary course of litigation.”).
Although a district court enjoys the flexibility to utilize either the lodestar
method or percentage method to calculate an attorneys’ fee award in a common
fund case, the reality is that there has been a “near-universal adoption of the
percentage method in securities cases.” Dell, 669 F.3d at 643. This stems, in large
part, from the language of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”),
the statute that places certain requirements on securities fraud class actions. The
PSLRA contemplates the percentage method, providing that “[t]otal attorneys’ fees
and expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed
a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest
actually paid to the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(6); see also In re Telik, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 576 F. Supp. 2d 570, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Congress plainly contemplated
that percentage-of-recovery

would

be

the

primary

measure

of

attorneys’ fees awards in federal securities class actions.”).
After much thought and consideration, I select the percentage method as the
means by which to award attorneys’ fees in common fund cases like this one. The
percentage method is preferable because it not only furthers Congress’s clear
intent, but it also encourages efficiency, judicial economy, and aligns the interests
of the lawyers with the class they represent.

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C.

THE APPROPRIATE BENCHMARK PERCENTAGE
Having decided to use the percentage method, I must next determine a

benchmark percentage to award. This is the hard part. There is no magic number.
The Manual for Complex Litigation states that “[a]warding attorneys 25% of a
common fund represents a typical benchmark.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 14.121 (2004). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a benchmark of 25% in
common fund cases. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935,
942 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that “courts typically calculate 25% of the fund as the
benchmark for a reasonable fee award” (quotation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit
“direct[s] district courts to view [20%–30%] as a benchmark which may be
adjusted in accordance with the individual circumstances of each case.” Waters v.
Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has never adopted a set percentage to award in common
fund cases, choosing instead to give district courts wide latitude in making that
determination. When it comes to choosing a benchmark percentage, district courts
within the Fifth Circuit are all over the map. See, e.g., Dell, 669 F.3d at 643
(affirming an 18% attorneys’ fee in a securities class action); Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-cv-1152, 2018 WL 1942227, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
25, 2018) (approving 33.33% attorneys’ fee in a securities class action); In re OCA,
Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 05-2165, 2009 WL 512081, at *20 (E.D. La. Mar.
2, 2009) (awarding 27% attorneys’ fee in a securities class action); Schwartz v.
TXU Corp., No. 3:02-cv-2243, 2005 WL 3148350, at *27 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2005)
(awarding 22.2% fee award of a common fund); Di Giacomo v. Plains All Am.
Pipeline, No. H-99-4137, 2001 WL 34633373, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2001)
(awarding 30% attorneys’ fee in securities class action); In re Harrah’s Ent., Inc.,
No. 95-3925, 1998 WL 832574, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 25, 1998) (awarding 26%
attorneys’ fee from a common fund); In re Combustion, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1116,
1156 (W.D La. 1997) (approving 36% attorneys’ fee from a common fund).

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“Particularly in extremely large recovery cases, percentage recoveries have often
been well below twenty-five percent.” Di Giacomo, 2001 WL 34633373, at *8
(collecting cases).
“District courts increasingly consider empirical studies analyzing classaction-settlement fee awards to set the appropriate percentage benchmark or to
test the reasonableness of a given benchmark. . . . Using these studies alleviates the
concern that the number selected is arbitrary.” In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1080–81 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
The most recent empirical study of attorneys’ fee awards in class actions available
is by Professors Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, and Roy Germano. See Eisenberg,
supra, at 937. They examined data from 458 common-fund settlements between
2009 and 2013, concluding that, “[o]n average, fees were 27% of gross recovery
during the 2009–2013 period, which is higher than the average fee percentage of
23% that [they] reported in [their] analyses of the 1993–2008 period.” Id. at 947.
They noted that “as recovery amount increases, the ratio of the size of the attorneys’
fee relative to the size of the recovery (i.e., the fee percentage) tends to decrease.”
Id. at 948. For those cases, like the instant one, in which class recovery was
between $23.5–$67.5 million, the average fee percentage awarded amounted to
roughly 24%. See id.
I am confident that I could easily rationalize an attorneys’ fee award of
anywhere in the 20%–35% range for securities fraud class actions. Based on the
empirical study referenced above, a thorough review of fee awards made in similar
cases, and the size of the $65 million settlement in this case, I find that a
benchmark of 25% is appropriate.
D.

THE JOHNSON FACTORS
The Fifth Circuit has held that district courts utilizing the percentage

method to calculate attorneys’ fees in common fund class actions must “crosscheck[]” those results with the so-called Johnson factors. Dell, 669 F.3d at 644. In
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., the Fifth Circuit devised a twelve-

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factor test to assess the fairness and reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award. See
488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds, Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). The so-called Johnson factors are: (1) “time and
labor required”; (2) “novelty and difficulty” of the legal issues; (3) “skill requi[red]
to perform the legal service properly”; (4) “preclusion of other employment by the
attorney” as a result of taking the case; (5) “customary fee”; (6) “[w]hether the fee
is fixed or contingent”; (7) “[t]ime limitations imposed by the client or [other]
circumstances”; (8) monetary “amount involved and the results obtained”;
(9) “experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys”; (10) whether the case is
undesirable; (11) “nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client”; and (12) “[a]wards in similar cases.” Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.
A district court is required to explain how the Johnson factors affect its fee
award. See In re High Sulfur Content Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig., 517 F3d 220,
228 (5th Cir. 2008). At the same time, the Fifth Circuit “will not require the trial
court’s findings to be so excruciatingly explicit in this area of minutiae that
decisions of fee awards consume more paper than did the cases from which they
arose.” Id. at 228–29 (quotation omitted). After considering the Johnson factors,
a district court must determine whether the benchmark percentage should be
adjusted upward or downward. See Dell, 669 F.3d at 644.
Applying the Johnson factors here, I conclude that a fee award of 25% of the
common fund is appropriate, and no upward or downward adjustment is
warranted. I will briefly address each Johnson factor.
(1) Time and Labor Required: As to this factor, “the trial judge should
weigh the hours claimed against his own knowledge, experience, and expertise of
the time required to complete similar activities.” Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717.
According to declarations submitted with the fee request, Lead Counsel spent more
than 46,000 hours on this matter. See Dkts. 166-4 at 10–11 (42 timekeepers at
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP spent a total of 21,604.70 hours on this
matter); 166-5 at 10–11 (38 timekeepers at Saxena White P.A. spent a total of

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24,948.25 hours on this matter). Liaison Counsel Ajamie LLP contends it had five
timekeepers spend an additional 323.8 hours on the case.1 See Dkt. 166-6 at 6.
Taken together, Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel contend that this amount of
labor reflects a lodestar of more than $27 million. That is a large sum. There is no
question that this case required Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel to commit
considerable resources to the prosecution of the case. But given that discovery in
this case only lasted a tad over one year, and the case did not proceed past the class
certification stage, these hours and fees are a bit on the high side.
(2) Novelty and Difficulty of Issues: I recognize that class action
securities cases are, by their very nature, “notoriously difficult and unpredictable.”
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 455 (5th Cir. 1983). Yet, the lawyers in this
case are all experienced practitioners who specialize in handling securities class
action litigation. Sure, the lawyers had to explore a myriad of legal issues to
advance their clients’ interests, but many of those issues—scienter, materiality, loss
causation, and calculation of damages—are common to all securities fraud cases.
This case was no more complex or more challenging than the other securities fraud
cases that are litigated across the country each and every day.
(3)

Skill Required to Perform the Legal Services: A securities

fraud class action is not a run-of-the-mill lawsuit. It requires lawyers who are
familiar with the legal framework surrounding such claims. As I noted early on in
this case, Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel “have substantial experience in
securities class action lawsuits and possess the resources necessary to pursue this
action.” Plymouth Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Apache Corp., 566 F. Supp. 3d 712, 721 (S.D.
Tex. 2021).

1 Also attached to the fee request are declarations from lawyers at Daniels & Tredennick

PLLC and Nix Patterson, LLP, claiming their firms spent a total of 371.5 hours on the case
(amounting to $305,350 in fees). See Dkts. 166-7 at 6, 166-8 at 7. Although I personally
know and have great admiration for the lawyers at those two firms, I do not understand
why they have sought an award of attorneys’ fees in this case when neither firm has been
appointed to represent the plaintiffs in this litigation.
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(4) Preclusion from Other Employment: This factor has always
perplexed me, mainly because I do not think it adds much to the fee equation. That
said, Lead Counsel undoubtedly spent many hours working on this matter. By
committing significant time to this case, Lead Counsel was likely precluded from
assuming other representation. The same cannot be said for Liaison Counsel given
the relatively limited number of hours (323.8) they expended on this matter.
(5) Customary Fee: I have already discussed the typical attorneys’ fee
award in securities fraud cases. The 25% benchmark is within the range for fees
awarded in similar cases.
(6) Fixed or Contingent Fee: Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel
assumed representation in this case on contingency. Although the lawyers invested
significant time and resources with no guaranteed return, the 25% benchmark
adequately compensates counsel for pursuing this matter.
(7) Time Limitations: As Lead Counsel recognizes, this factor is “not
relevant in this case.” Dkt. 165 at 16 n.7.
(8) Monetary Amount Involved and Results Obtained: According to
Plaintiffs’ expert, if Plaintiffs prevailed at trial, the maximum amount they could
obtain in damages would be roughly $1.48 billion for the entire class period. Lead
Counsel has secured a $65 million settlement, which represents approximately
4.4% of the potential estimated damages for the class period. Although the amount
at issue and the amount of the settlement are both significant, the 25% benchmark
adequately compensates Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel for their efforts.
(9) The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Lawyers: As
already noted, Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel did a good job in this case. They
are skilled, reputable, and accomplished practitioners, who zealously represented
the class throughout this litigation. It was a pleasure to preside over a case where
the lawyers on both sides focused on the core issues (as opposed to trivial matters)
and did so in a professional and dignified manner.

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(10) The Undesirability of the Case: Although there are always
substantial risks in financing and prosecuting a class action securities fraud case,
there was a fierce battle to be appointed lead plaintiff in this case. This, taken alone,
demonstrates that various lawyers, entities, and individuals viewed this case as a
desirable one. I applaud Lead Counsel for readily acknowledging that this case was
not, by any definition, “undesirable.” Dkt. 165 at 24.
(11) The Nature and Length of the Relationship with the Client:
This factor is, as Lead Counsel concedes, inapplicable to this case. See Dkt. 165 at
16 n.7.
(12) Awards in Similar Cases: As already discussed, the 25% benchmark
is within the range of typical fee awards in similar securities fraud cases.
***
After considering all the Johnson factors, I conclude that a 25% attorneys’
fee adequately compensates counsel for their efforts on behalf of the class. No
upward or downward adjustment in the benchmark percentage is warranted.
LITIGATION EXPENSES
A.

PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL’S LITIGATION EXPENSES
Lead Counsel seeks reimbursement of expenses in the amount of

$1,555,388.49. The largest component of the expenses—$1,179,914.10 or
approximately 76% of total expenses—is for experts and consultants. Other
expenses incurred by counsel include mediation fees, research, court reporting fees
and deposition transcripts, document review and production fees, and travelrelated expenses.
As a general rule, reasonable litigation expenses may be recovered from a
common fund as part of a class action settlement. This makes sense because “one
who preserves or protects a common fund works for others as well as for himself,
and the others so benefited should bear their just share of the expenses.” Hinton
v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, No. 96-21155, 1998 WL 92439, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 11,
1998) (quotation omitted). In my role as a fiduciary for the absent class members,

11

I must review the estimated expenses for which reimbursement is sought and
determine whether those sums are fair to the settlement class.
Having reviewed the declarations in support of the reimbursement of
expenses, I find that most of the expenses sought are reasonable. I am, however,
unwilling to award the $3,852.44 in expenses that Nix Patterson, LLP seeks for
travel, legal research, and PACER fees. I never appointed Nix Patterson, LLP as
counsel in this case, and I will not allow the class members’ recovery to be depleted
to pay for these unwarranted expenses—no matter how small in comparison to the
overall settlement. I thus award a total of $1,551,536.05 in expenses from the
common fund to Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel.
B.

LEAD PLAINTIFFS’ LITIGATION EXPENSES
The PSLRA provides that an “award of reasonable costs and expenses

(including lost wages) directly relating to the representation of the class” may be
made “to any representative party serving on behalf of a class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
4(a)(4). In accordance with this statutory provision, Lead Plaintiffs seek
reimbursement for the time their employees devoted to supervising this action.
The requested reimbursement totals $17,014.22—$7,234.22 for Plymouth County
Retirement Association and $9,780.00 for Trustees of the Teamsters Union No.
142 Pension Fund. These figures are based on the number of hours that each of the
Lead Plaintiffs’ employees committed to supervising this action and a reasonable
hourly rate for their time, based on their annual compensation. I find that the
requested amounts are reasonable costs and expenses directly related to Lead
Plaintiffs’ representation of the class, which should be recovered from the common
fund.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I award out of the common fund:
• $1,551,536.05 to Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel for
reasonable litigation expenses;
• $7,234.22 to Plymouth County Retirement Association and
$9,780.00 to Trustees of the Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension
12

Fund for reasonable costs and expenses directly related to Lead
Plaintiffs’ representation of the class; and
• $15,857,862.43 to Lead Plaintiff and Liaison Counsel for
attorneys’ fees.2
SIGNED this 25th day of November 2024.

______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 A percentage fee award should be calculated against “the value received from the

settlement by the members of the class”—that is, the net common fund after deduction of
litigation expenses and payments to the Lead Plaintiffs for reasonable costs and expenses
directly related to Lead Plaintiffs’ representation of the class. Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772
F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the $65 million settlement fund must be
reduced by $1,568,550.27 (the $1,551,536.05 payment to Lead Counsel and Liaison
Counsel for reasonable litigation expenses, the $7,234.22 to Plymouth County Retirement
Association for reasonable costs and expenses directly related to their representation of
the class, and the $9,780.00 to Trustees of the Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund
for reasonable costs and expenses directly related to their representation of the class),
leaving a $63,431,449.73 net common fund. Multiplying the $63,431,449.73 net common
fund times the 25% benchmark leads to an attorneys’ fee of $15,857,862.43.

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