Athreya v. Texas A&M University
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part 24 MOTION for Summary Judgment . Athreyas retaliation claim is DISMISSED, and the Motion (Dkt. 24) is otherwise DENIED.(Signed by Judge George C Hanks, Jr) Parties notified. (knp4)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 27, 2025
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
SHEELA ATHREYA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-02478
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Texas A&M University’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24). After carefully considering the motion, the response, the
reply, 1 and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the Motion (Dkt. 24) IN PART.
Accordingly, Plaintiff Sheela Athreya’s claim for retaliation is DISMISSED.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sheela Athreya (“Athreya”) is a professor at Defendant Texas A&M
University’s (“TAMU”) main campus who was recruited to teach Anthropology in
Education City at TAMU-Qatar, beginning in the fall of 2020. (Dkt. 24 at p. 13). Athreya
Defendant further requests in its reply that the Court strike Plaintiff’s allegation—
proffered in her response—that the Liberal Arts Program Chair was removed in
retaliation for his reporting of sex discrimination. (Dkt. 29 at p. 13); see (Dkt. 28 at p. 24
– 25). The Court ultimately finds that Plaintiff did not suffer a retaliatory adverse
employment action, rendering the issue of whether Plaintiff engaged in protected activity
moot. Additionally, Defendant requests that the Court strike the hearsay found in Exhibit
H of Plaintiff’s response. (Dkt. 29 at p. 13); see (Dkt. 28-8). However, “[a]t the summary
judgment stage, evidence need not be … presented in an admissible form.” Maurer v.
Indep. Town, 870 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, both of Defendant’s
requests are DENIED.
1
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agreed to a two-year appointment at TAMU-Qatar and served in a “joint-faculty
appointment,” “meaning she was still employed by and had tenure at TAMU.” (Id. at pp.
13 – 14). In August of 2021, the Dean of TAMU-Qatar, César Malavé (“Malavé”), notified
the Liberal Arts Program Chair that he did not intend to renew Athreya’s appointment. (Id.
at p. 14). While TAMU-Qatar employed multiple professors from the main campus,
“Athreya was the only female, and the only one whose contract was not renewed by Dean
César Malavé.” (Dkt. 28 at p. 5).
After her non-renewal, Athreya allegedly participated in a Title IX investigation
against Malavé, assisted the Liberal Arts Program Chair in “authoring a sex discrimination
complaint against Malavé,” requested her own formal investigation into Malavé’s sex
discrimination against Athreya, and “was interviewed by the Title IX office based on the
sex discrimination complaint.” (Dkt. 28 at p. 10). Within two months of this alleged
activity, Malavé held a meeting for the faculty members. (Id. at p. 9). During this meeting,
Malavé demonstrated “aggressive, hostile behavior.” (Id. at p. 10). Specifically, Malavé
was angry, had a red face, stared angrily at the faculty, glared at the faculty, slammed a
notebook on his desk, and spoke aggressively. (Id. at pp. 27 – 28).
Athreya brings two claims under Title VII against TAMU—one for sex
discrimination and one for retaliation. (Dkt. 1 at pp. 11 – 12). Athreya alleges that TAMU
declined to renew her joint-faculty appointment at TAMU-Qatar because she is a woman.
(Dkt. 28 at p. 5). Further, Athreya alleges that Malavé’s aggressive behavior in the faculty
meeting was in retaliation for her various roles in investigating Malavé for sex
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discrimination. (Id. at p. 24). TAMU disputes both claims and moves for summary
judgment. (Dkt. 24).
II.
A.
LEGAL STANDARD AND APPLICABLE LAW
Summary Judgment
Rule 56 provides that summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the
suit, and a factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of Miranda v. Navistar, Inc., 23 F.4th
500, 503 (5th Cir. 2022). To survive summary judgment, the nonmovant must “present
competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of its claim.”
Cephus v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 146 F. Supp. 3d 818, 826 (S.D. Tex.
2015).
The nonmovant’s “burden will not be satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by
only a scintilla of evidence.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th
Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Rather, the “nonmovant must identify specific evidence
in the record and articulate how that evidence supports that party’s claim.” Brooks v.
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 3d 577, 584 (S.D. Tex. 2015). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe “the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020).
B.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII prohibits discrimination “against any individual with respect to [their]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). Notably, “[a] party must be an employer to be liable under Title VII.” Stewart v.
BrownGreer PLC, No. 14–1980, 2015 WL 6159127, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 20, 2015), aff’d
sub nom. Stewart v. BrownGreer, P.L.C., 655 F. App’x 1029 (5th Cir. 2016).
“Both discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII are subject to the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.” Jones v. Gulf Coast Rest. Grp., Inc., 8
F.4th 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2021). Under this framework, if the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, “they establish a presumption of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the
employer to provide a ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its employment action.
The plaintiff must then respond with evidence showing the employer’s proffered
explanation as a mere pretext for discrimination.” See DeVries v. Harris Cty., 643 F. Supp.
3d 696, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)) (internal citations omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
The Court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate for Athreya’s
discrimination claim under Title VII because genuine issues of material fact exist
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including, but not limited to, whether TAMU’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
declining to renew Athreya’s joint-faculty appointment is pretextual. However, the Court
holds that there is no genuine issue as to Athreya’s retaliation claim under Title VII because
Athreya fails to demonstrate an adverse employment action. Accordingly, TAMU is
entitled to summary judgment on Athreya’s retaliation claim.
A.
Discrimination Claim
The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist for Athreya’s
discrimination claim against TAMU under Title VII. Taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to Athreya, the Court finds that the fact issues include, but are not limited to,
whether TAMU’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for declining to renew Athreya’s
joint-faculty appointment is pretextual.
B.
Retaliation Claim
The Court holds that TAMU is entitled to summary judgment on Athreya’s
retaliation claim under Title VII. To establish a prima facie retaliation claim under Title
VII, Athreya must show that: “(1) she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) she
was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d
314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 319
(5th Cir. 2004)). The Supreme Court has explained that the adverse action in a retaliation
claim “must be harmful to the point that [it] could well dissuade a reasonable worker from”
engaging in an activity protected by Title VII. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57. Simply put,
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Title VII does not protect from “trivial harms” or a “simple lack of good manners.” Id. at
68.
Athreya argues that Malavé’s “berating and aggressive behavior” at the faculty
meeting qualifies as an adverse employment action under Title VII. (Dkt. 28 at p. 26). In
support of this contention, Athreya describes Malavé as, among other things, speaking with
anger, staring at Athreya with anger, having a red face, pacing the room, and slamming his
folder on the desk. (Id. at pp. 27 – 28). The Court disagrees that this behavior transcends a
petty slight and finds that such behavior in a faculty meeting would not dissuade a
reasonable worker from engaging in activity protected by Title VII. See Lindsley v. TRT
Holdings, Inc., 984 F.3d 460, 470 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Breaux v. City of Garland, 205
F.3d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 2000)) (“criticism, such as [a supervisor’s] oral threats or abusive
remarks, does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action”). As such, no genuine
issue exists as to whether Athreya suffered an adverse employment action in retaliation for
protected behavior, and the Court grants TAMU’s motion for summary judgment as to
Athreya’s retaliation claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Athreya’s
discrimination claim under Title VII against TAMU; however, the Court finds that no
genuine issue exists as to Athreya’s retaliation claim under Title VII against TAMU.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS TAMU’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24) IN
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PART as to Athreya’s claim for retaliation under Title VII. Athreya’s retaliation claim is
DISMISSED, and the Motion (Dkt. 24) is otherwise DENIED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on January 27, 2025.
_______________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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