Singleton v. Veolia North America Regeneration Services, LLC

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 10 MOTION to Remand; denying as moot 11 MOTION to Dismiss, 12 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, 13 MOTION to Dismiss RULE 12(b)(2). The Clerk is directed to REMAND this case to the 113th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. (Signed by Judge Keith P Ellison) Parties notified. (jm4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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VS.
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VEOLIA NORTH AMERICA
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REGENERATION SERVICES, LLC, et al., §
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Defendants.
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May 08, 2024
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

BRANDON SINGLETON,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-00575

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff Brandon Singleton brings various tort claims against Defendants Veolia North
America Regeneration Services, LLC (“Veolia”); Premier Chemicals & Services, LLC
(“Premier”); and Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC and the Mosaic Company (collectively, “Mosaic”).
Before the Court are Singleton’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 10; Veolia’s Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state a claim, ECF No. 11; Mosaic’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
ECF No. 12; and Premier’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, ECF No. 13. For
the reason that follows, the Court finds that the Motion to Remand should be GRANTED, and the
Motions to Dismiss should be DENIED AS MOOT.
I.

BACKGROUND
Singleton regularly made chemical deliveries on behalf of Premier, Veolia, and Mosaic.

On or about October 6, 2023, Singleton embarked on a chemical delivery job that involved picking
up a load of chemicals from a Veolia plant in Darrow, Louisiana and transporting them to the
Mosaic Faustina Plant. He completed this job using a truck, personal protective equipment, and
other materials provided by Premier.
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When Singleton arrived at the Mosaic Faustina Plant, he began unloading the chemicals.
As part of this process, he used a Mosaic bucket to catch chemicals dripping from the connection
to the plant. When the transfer was complete, Singleton emptied the bucket into a sump at the
facility. However, the sump allegedly contained volatile materials which mixed with the chemicals
from the bucket and caused an explosion. Singleton sustained severe burns to his face, arm, chest,
stomach, and other parts of this body.
Singleton then brought suit in Texas state court for negligence and gross negligence. ECF
No. 1-2. Initially, Singleton brought claims against only Veolia. Id. Veolia removed on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Singleton then amended his pleadings to add claims against
Premier and Mosaic. ECF No. 3. Singleton is a Louisiana resident. Id. ¶ 2. Likewise, Premier’s
principal place of business is in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and all of its members are Louisiana
residents. Id. ¶ 4. Veolia is alleged to be a Delaware company with a principal place of business
in Houston, Texas. Id. ¶ 3. Both Mosaic entities are Delaware companies with principal places of
business in Tampa, Florida. Id. ¶ 5-6.
II.

ANALYSIS
The pending Motions present competing jurisdictional issues. Singleton argues for remand

on the basis that Premier’s presence destroys diversity. Premier argues for dismissal on the grounds
that it has insufficient contacts with Texas to confer personal jurisdiction. The parties dispute
which jurisdictional issue should be given priority.
A district court presiding over a removal action is not necessarily obligated to assess
subject matter jurisdiction before personal jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil, 526 U.S.
574, 587-88 (1999); Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 2000).
However, “in most instances subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry.” Ruhrgas

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AG, 526 U.S. at 587. “In such cases, both expedition and sensitivity to state courts’ coequal stature
should impel the federal court to dispose of that issue first.” Id. at 587-88; see also id. (“[A] court
disposing of a case on personal jurisdiction grounds ‘should be convinced that the challenge to the
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is not easily resolved.’” (quoting Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P, v.
Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1996))). Here, the subject matter jurisdiction inquiry is
straightforward, requiring a simple application of the rules of diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, the
Court finds it appropriate to begin its analysis with subject matter jurisdiction.
This case was removed pursuant to the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332. See ECF No. 1. No party contests that both Singleton and Premier are Louisiana citizens.
However, Veolia, the only party to file a Response to the Motion to Remand, argues that Premier
was improperly joined. A party is improperly joined if “there is no reasonable basis for the district
court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant.” Smallwood
v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004). “The party seeking removal bears a
heavy burden of proving that the joinder of the in-state party was improper.” Id. at 574.
Singleton brings claims for negligence and gross negligence against Premier, alleging that
the protective equipment Premier provided him with to perform the chemical transfer job was
inadequate to protect him from the chemical explosion. ECF No. 3 ¶ 19. He also alleges that
Premier’s instructions for completing the chemical transfer were inadequate. Id. As a result, he
suffered severe physical injuries from the explosion. Id.
Veolia argues, in a conclusory fashion, that Singleton doesn’t allege with sufficient
specificity how the protective equipment was inadequate. Having cited no authority, Veolia fails
to meet its high burden of showing that there is no reasonable basis for predicting that Singleton
might be able to recover against Premier for negligence, and the Court cannot conclude that

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Premier was improperly joined. Because Premier’s presence destroys diversity, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Singleton’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED. The Motions

to Dismiss are DENIED AS MOOT.
The Clerk is directed to REMAND this case to the 113th Judicial District Court of Harris
County, Texas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed at Houston, Texas on May 7, 2024.
_______________________________
Keith P. Ellison
United States District Judge

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