Bellard v. Frank Aguillera et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. The stay previously imposed on Bellard's claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution is LIFTED. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Juan Tzaquitzal and Steven Castaneda, (Dkt. 34 ), is GRANTED. Bellard's civil-rights action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The defendants' request for an award of attorney's fees is DENIED. Final judgment will be separately entered. (Signed by Judge David Hittner) Parties notified. (jww4)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 27, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
REGINALD WHITFIELD BELLARD,
a/k/aREGINALD DeWAYNE
WHITFIELD a/k/a REGINALD
DeWAYNEBELLARD,
(Inmate# 01839127),
§
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FRANK
AGUILAR, 1 et al.,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-1076
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Reginald Whitfield Bellard a/k/a Reginald DeWayne Whitfield a/k/a
Reginald DeWayne Bellard, (Inmate# 1839127), proceeding prose and informa
pauperis, filed a prisoner civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of his constitutional rights by Harris County District Judge Frank Aguilar,
Harris County Sheriffs Officers J. Tzaquitzal and Steven Castaneda, and one
Dianne Colar Coleman. (Dkt. 1). At the Court's request, Bellard filed a more
definite statement of his claims. (Dkt. 24). After judicial screening under 28 U.S.C.
1
Bellard's complaint identifies one of the defendants as "Frank Aguillera," who he
says is the judge of the 228th District Court in Harris County. (Dkt. 1). The correct name
of the judge is "Frank Aguilar." The Court will use the judge's correct name in this Order.
§ 1915A, the Court dismissed Bellard's claims against Judge Aguilar and Coleman
with prejudice, stayed Bellard's claims against Tzaquitzal and Castaneda for false
arrest and malicious prosecution, and allowed Bellard' s excessive force claims
against Tzaquitzal and Castaneda to proceed. (Dkt. 25). Tzaquitzal and Castaneda
answered the complaint, (Dkts. 29, 31 ), and filed a joint motion for summary
judgment supported by various documents. (Dkt. 34). Bellard has not responded to
the motion, and his time to do so has now expired.
Based on the Court's review of the motion, the pleadings, all matters of record,
and the law, the· Court •lifts the stay on the false arrest and malicious prosecution
claims, grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and dismisses this
action with prejudice. The reasons for these rulings are explained below.
I.
BACKGROUND
Bellard filed his initial complaint when he was· in the· Harris County Jail
awaiting trial on a charge of robbery with bodily injury in Harris County Cause
Number 1844071. (Dkt. 1). He later filed a more definite .statement of his claims.
(Dkt. 24). Neither of these pleadings are a model of clarity.
Publicly available records, together with the summary judgment evidence,
show that on November 14, 2023, Coleman called th~ police to her apartment and
reported that Bellard had robbed her and injured her in the process. (Dkt. 34-1, p.
2/15
1). An Officer "J. Tzaquitzal" of the City of Houston Police Department responded
to the scene and took a report from Coleman. (Id.).
Bellard was not arrested at that time. See www.hcdistrictclerk.com (visited
Jan. 23, 2025). Instead, Officer Tzaquitzal filed a criminal complaint that initiated
Harris County Cause Number 1844071. (Dkt. 34-1, pp. 1-2). •City of Houston Peace
Officer Steven Castaneda signed the •complaint as a witness.
(Id. at 2).
On
November 15, 2023, a magistrate found probable cause and issued an arrest warrant
for Bellard. (Id. at 4). See also www.hcdistrictclerk.com (visited Jan. 23, 2025).
On January 17, 2024, Bellard was arrested on the warrantwhen he was again at
Coleman's apartment. (Dkt. 34-4, p. 1). The arresting offic~r was City of Houston
Police Officer Rodolfo' Trevino. (Id.). Neither an Officer Tzaquitzal nor an Officer
Castaneda were involved in Bellard's arrest. (Id.).
In his § 1983 complaint, Bellard alleges that "J. Tzaquitzal" and "Steven
Castaneda" were the officers who arrested him and "roughed him up." (Dkt. 1, p.
3). In his more definite statement, Bellard alleges that the arresting officers were
from the Harris County Sheriff's Office. (Dkt. 24, pp. 1-2). Bellard explains that
when he was told he was under arrest, he questioned it, telling the officers that his
arrest did not make sense and that he needed to call his mother. • (Id. at 1). While
Bellard was on the phone, the two arresting officers grabbed his arms and wrists to
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try to handcuff him. (Id. at 1-2). In doing so, they twisted his wrists and arms, which
prompted Bellard to grab onto a gate. (Id.). The officers continued to "rough up"
Bellard, ultimately "slamming" him to the ground. (Id. at 1). Bellard alleges that
the arresting officers continued using force against him even after he stopped
resisting and agreed to go with them voluntarily. (Id.).
Bellard contends that he suffered injuries to his arms and wrists during the
incident, and he alleges that he still takes pain medication for those injuries. (Id. at
1-2). He alleges that he also suffered mental health injuries as a result of the arrest.
.(Id. at 2). Bellard asserts that the arresting officers-who he again identifies as
Tzaquitzal and Castaneda of the Harris County Sheriffs Office-used excessive
force while falsely arresting him, and he contends that their actions constitute
malicious prosecution. (Id. at 5).
Based solely on the allegations in Bellard's complaint and more definite
statement, the complaint was served on Harris County Sheriff's Officers Juan
Tzaquitzal and Steven Castaneda. (Dkts. 26, 27, 28). Tzaquitzal and Castaneda
answered the complaint, (Dkts. 29, 31), and theiffiled a joint motion for summary
judgment. (Dkt. 34 ). They each deny that they have ever been employed by the
City of Houston Police Department; they deny that they filed the complaint against
Bellard in November 2023; and they deny that they arrested him in January 2024.
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(Id. at 8). They attach authenticated documents to their motion showing that the
criminal complaint was filed by an Officer Julio Tzaquitzal of the City of Houston
Police Department and that Bellard was arrested by an officer from the City of
Houston Police Department rather than any officer from the Harris County Sheriff's
Office.
(Dkts. 34-1, 34-4).
In addition, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda have filed
affidavits stating that they have never worked for the City of Houston Police
Department and that they did not arrest Bellard in January 2024. (Dkts. 34-2, 34-3).
They ask the Court to dismiss all of Bellard's claims against them with prejudice.
(Dkt. 34, p. 10). Bellard has not responded to the motion for summary judgment,
and his time to do so has now expired.
Publicly available records show that Bellard pleaded guilty in Harris County
Cause Number 1844071 to the lesser charge of assault on a family member on July
2, 2024. See www.hcdistrictclerk.com (visited Jan. 23, 2025). He was sentenced to
180 days' confinement with credit for 168 days already served. Id. He is no longer
confined
in
the
Harris
County
Jail.
See
Find
Someone
in
Jail,
www.harriscountyso.org (visited Jan. 23, 2024).
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Bellard sues Tzaquitzal and Castaneda under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section
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1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a
remedy for violations of statutory and constitutional rights.". Lafleur v.. Texas Dep 't
of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiarn); see also Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U;S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a valid claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Coristitution or laws of
the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. See West v, Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Gomez v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. '2021) .(per curiam). The
dispute in this case focuses on the first element: whether either Tzaquitzal or
Castaneda violated Bellard's constitutional rights ..
B.
The Summary-Judgment Standard
Tzaquitzal and Castaneda have filed a motion 'for. summary judgment.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only if 'the movant shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw."' Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57(2014) (per curiam) (quoting
FED. R. C1v. P. 56(a)). "The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions
of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine·issue of material fact."
Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)). "A factis material if its resolution
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could affect the outcome of the action." Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (5th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F .3d
134, 134 (5th Cir. 2010)). "A dispute is genuine if the eyidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Westfall v. Luna,
903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
When considering a motion for. summary judgment, the Court must view all
evidence and draw all inferences "in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving]
party." Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (quoting Adickes v. S.H Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
157 (1970)); see also Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380. When both parties have submitted
evidence that tends to show conflicting facts, "the evidence of the nonmovant is to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be. drawn in his favor." Willis v.
Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313,315 (5th Cir. 1995): However, if record
evidence clearly contradicts a party's version of events, the Court "should not adopt
that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."
Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App'x 248, 253-54 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Further, the Court will not
consider the nonmoving party's conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated
assertions as evidence. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994) (en bane).· After viewing the offered evidence in the light most favorable to
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the nonmoving party, summary judgment may be granted only if no genuine disputes
of fact exist and no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Adm 'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (5th
Cir. 2000).
C.
Pro Se Pleadings
Because Bellard is proceeding prose, the Court construes his filirigs liberally,
subjecting them to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers[.]" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But even
under this lenient standard, pro se litigants must still "abide by the rules that govern
the federal courts." E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014).
"Pro se litigants must properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed,
state a plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present
summary judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Bellard's Excessive Force Claims
Bellard alleges that Tzaquitzal and Castaneda violated his constitutional rights
by using excessive force against him during his arrest in January 2024. Tzaquitzal
and Castaneda contend that the undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that
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they were not the arresting officers in January 2024, were not present when Bellard
was arrested, and had nothing to do with his arrest or any excessive force that may
have been used.
To be entitled to relief under § 1983, the· plaintiff must prove that the
defendant was personally involved in the alleged violation of the plaintiffs
constitutional rights. "Because [§] 1983 imposes liability only upon those who
actually cause a deprivation of rights, personal involvement of defendants in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under§ 1983."
Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see also
Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (''Personal involvement is an
essential element of a civil rights cause of action." (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 371-72 {1976))).
The undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that City of Houston
Police Officer Julio Tzaquitzal responded to Coleman's November 14 call about the
robbery with injuries. He prepared the criminal complaint, which was witnessed by
City of Houston Peace Officer Steven Castaneda and which was used, to initiate
Harris County Cause Number 1844071.
The undisputed summary judgment
evidence also shows that City of Houston Police Officer Rodolfo Trevino is the
officer who arrested Bellard.
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Neither Harris County Sheriffs Officer Juan
Tzaquitzal nor Harris County Peace Officer Steven Castaneda were involved in any •
violation ofBellard's civil rights that may have occurred.
Once Tzaquitzal and Castaneda presented evidence demonstrating that they
were not personally involved in the alleged violation of Bellard's constitutional
rights, the burden shifted to Bellard to show that disputed issues of fact exist that are
material to Tzaquitzal and Castaneda's personal involvement. Bellard has not met
this burden. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment filed by Tzaquitzal and
Castaneda is granted, and Bellard's excessive force claims against them are
dismissed with prejudice.
B.
Bellard's False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims
Bellard's initial complaint included claims against Tzaquitzal and Castaneda
for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The Court stayed these claims, but
Tzaquitzal and Castaneda ask the Court to grant summary judgment. in their favor •
despite the stay.
Because Bellard's complaint was filed while the state'.'"court crimi_nal action
against him was still pending, the Court stayed the false . arrest and malicious
prosecution claims under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Heck
bars a civil-rights action challenging the legitimacy of the plaintiff's arrest and
subsequent detention on criminal charges· if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
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the civil action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the charges and potential
conviction in the criminal action. In that situation, the civil action is stayed until the
plaintiff can prove that the criminal charges have been· dismissed or otherwise
resolved in his favor. Id. at 487; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94
(2007); Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (when a
plaintiff files a civil-rights action while a related criminal prosecution is pe~ding, a
stay pending the disposition of the criminal prosecution may be appropriate, but
dismissal is not).
Tzaquitzal and Castaneda ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their
favor on Bellard' s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims as well as the
excessive force claims.
Publicly available records show that the . criminal
proceedings against Bellard have now been resolved. See www.hcdistrictclerk.com
(visited Jan. 23, 2024). Bellard pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, he was sentenced
to county jail time, he has served that time, and he has been released. Id. There is
no indication that he has filed an appeal.
Under Heck, "[i]f the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil
suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal;' otherwise, the civil
.
action will proceed absent some other bar to suit."
.
.
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394
(citations omitted). Because Bellard has been convicted and because the false arrest
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and malicious prosecution claims would impugn that conviction, Heck requires the
Court to lift the stay and dismiss the claims.
Normally, a dismissal under Heck would be without prejudice. See Cook v.
City ofTyler, Tex., 974 F.3d 537,539 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Clarke v. Stalder,
154 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1998) (en bane). But as explained in connection with
Bellard's claim for excessive force, the undisputed summary judgment evidence
shows that neither Tzaquitzal nor Castaneda were personally involved in any alleged
violation ofBellard's constitutional rights. Therefore, they are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor on his claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The
motion for summary judgment is granted, and Bellard's false arrest and malicious
prosecution claims are dismissed with prejudice.
C.
Qualified Immunity
In the alternative, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda move for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. "Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless
their conduct violates a clearly established right." Austin v. City ofPasadena, Tex.,
74 F.4th 312, 322 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mace v. City ofPalestine, 333 F.3d 621,
623 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,735 (2011)). When
the defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the defendants are not entitled to that immunity. See Thompson
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v. Upshur County, Tex., 245 F.3d 447,456 (5th Cir. 2001). And "[a] plaintiff seeking
to overcome qualified immunity 'must specifically identify each defendant's
personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.'" Jimerson v. Lewis, 94 F.4th 423,
428 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Thomas v. Humfield, 32 F.3d 566, 1994 WL 442484,
at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 1994)).
As explained above, the undisputed summary judgment evidence conclusively
shows that neither Tzaquitzal nor Castaneda were personally involved in any of the
alleged wrongdoing.
Bellard has not met his burden to show that either was
personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.
Tzaquitzal and
Castaneda are therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and Bellard's action against
them is dismissed with prejudice.
D.
Request for Attorney's Fees
Finally, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda request that the Court sanction Bellard for
filing a frivolous complaint against them by awarding them attorney's fees. (Dkt.
34, pp. 9-10). They appear to seek these fees as a sanction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11. (Id.). This request is denied because it is procedurally improper.
Rule 11 (c)(2) requires that any motion for sanctions under Rule 11 "be made
separately from any other motion." FED. R. Crv. P; ll(c)(2). Courts will not
entertain a request for Rule 11 sanctions that is improperly included in another
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motion or pleading. See, e.g.; Berry v. ADT Security Servs., Inc., Civil No. 4:19024, 2019 WL 3562150, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2019); Diggs v. Citigroup, Inc.,
No. 3:12-cv-1612-L, 2013 WL 124110, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2013); Estate of
Keys v. Union Planters Bank, NA., 578 F. Supp. 2d 629, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
("Because the request for [Rule 11] sanctions was improperly included in plaintiff's
cross-motion for summary judgment, this Court cannot entertain 1.t").
In addition, Rule 11 requires the party moving for· sanctions to serve their
motion seeking such sanctions on the opposing party at least 21 days before filing
the motion with the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(c)(2). This 21-day period operates
as a safe harbor, ·allowing the opposing party time to either correc.t the· deficiency or
withdraw the claim. See Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 2f6 (5th Cir. 1995). A Rule
11 motion is properly denied if the moving party fails to comply \¥ith this statutory
safe-harbor provision. • See Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 788 (5th Cir. 2000)
("Compliance with the service·requirement is a mandatory prerequisite to an award
of sanctions under Rule 11.").
Here, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda have not filed a separate motion for sanctions
. but instead have improperly included their request for Rule 11 sanctions in their
motion for summary judgment. In addition, they do not allege, much less offer
evidence to show, that they served a separate motion for Rule 11 sanctions on Bellard
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at least 21 days before filing the motion with the Court, as require9 by Rule 11 (c)(2 ).
For both reasons, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda's request for attorney's fees under Rule
11, included in their motion for summary judgment, is denied. To the extent that
Tzaquitzal and Castaneda are inviting the Court to exercise its discretion to impose
sanctions under Rule 11 (c)(3 ), the Court declines the invitation. _
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. The stay previously imposed on Bellard's claims_ for false arrest and malicious
prosecution is LIFTED.
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Juan Tzaquitzal and
Steven Castaneda, (Dkt. 34), .is GRANTED.
3. Bellard's civil-rights action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
4. The defendants' request for an award of attorney'.s fees-is DENIED.
5. Final judgment will be separately entered:
The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the parties.
___
J..:_':7_____,, 2025.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on--,---'--~-/--
DAVID HITTNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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