Ruiz v. The GEO Group Inc et al

Filing 10

ORDER. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Document No. 4 ) is GRANTED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Harris County District Court for the 165th District. (Signed by Judge David Hittner) Parties notified. (jww4)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
August 30, 2024
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

INTHE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN·DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JENNIFER RUIZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
DERRICK WAYNE COLEMAN
AND THE GEO GROUP, INC.,
Defendants.

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§ Civil Action No. H-24-2792
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ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff~ Motion to Remand (Document No. 4).
Having considered the motion, submissions, and applicable law, the Court •
determines that the motion should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a premises liability and personal injury case: On February 22, 2024,
Plaintiff Jennifer Ruiz ("Ruiz") sustained injuries after slipping in a pool of liquid
in the hallway of her place of employment, located at 806 Hilbig Street in Conroe,
TX (hereinafter "the_ Premises"). Ruiz contends that Defendant Derrick Wayne
Coleman ("Coleman"), an employee of Defendant GEO Group, Inc. ("GEO"),
_negligently created a dangerous condition in which Ruiz slipped and was injured by

failing to monitor the metal cart he was controlling and operating that had been
leaking water.
Based on the foregoing, on May 23, 2024, Ruiz filed suit against Defendants
in the Harris County District Court for the 165th District, bringing claims for
negligence, respondeat superior, and premises liability. On July 26, 2024,
Defendants removed this action to this Court on·the basis of diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On August 7, 2024, Ruiz moved to remand.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A defendant may remove a case to federal court if the federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the original complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal
courts have limited jurisdiction, so any doubts regarding whether federal jurisdiction
is proper are resolved against federal jurisdiction. Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200
F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000): When evaluating a motion to remand, all factual
allegations are considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and any
contested fact issues are resolved in the plaintiffs favor. Guillory v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 434 F.3d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 2005). Gasch v. Harford Acc. & lndem. Co., 491
F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007). A removing party must show both the existence
of federal jurisdiction and the propriety of removal. Mumfreyv. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
719 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2013).

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A federal court may only assert subject matter jurisdiction over a matter when
authorized, by the federal constitution or by statute. Energy Mgmt. Servs.,. LLC v.
City ofAlexandria, 739 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 2014). A federal court may exercise

jurisdiction over any civil action arising under the federal constitution, statutes, or
treaties. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law when a plaintiffs "wellpleaded complaint e~tablishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial
question of federal law." Griffith v. Alcon Rsch., Ltd., 712 F. App'x 406, 408 (5th
Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Ruiz moves to remand this case to state court, contending Defendants have
improperly removed this case under diversity jurisdiction.
Defendants contend that Coleman, a resident of Texas and employee on the
Premises, was improperly joined in this case, and thus, his citizenship should be
disregarded for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Considering the Fifth Circuit's
dear guidance that "the removing party bears the burden of showing that federal
jurisdiction exists, and that removal was proper," MangunO v. Prudential Property
and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir; 2002), the Court will now consider

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whether Defendants have met their burden in showing that Coleman was improperly
joined.
The Fifth Circuit has made clear that improper joinder must be determined
based on an analysis of the causes of action alleged in the complaint at the time of
removal. Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723. In evaluating a claim for improper joinder, the
Court will determine whether a possibility exists that a Plaintiff may prevail on the
merits of their claim. Rodriguez v. Sabatino, 120 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1997). In
cases where there is no claim of fraud in the pleadings, the removing party must
show there exists "no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state
defendant, which stated differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the
district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state
defendant." Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 385 F.3d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 2004).
In determining whether the plaintiff has stated a valid state law cause ofaction, the
Court may conduct a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis by applying the federal pleading
standard evaluating whether a plaintiffs pleading contains sufficient facts to state a
plausible claim of relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Here, Defendants contend in their notice of removal that Coleman is not a
proper party to this case, arguing individual liability cannot be imposed on an

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employee when the employee arid employer allegedly committed identical negligent
acts or omissions. Defendants further contend that Coleman owes no independent
duty that would have been owed· outside the context of his employment, and thus,
was improperly joined because only GEO could be liable under Ruiz's allegations.
Ruiz contends that she has asserted a facially plausible state court claim
against Coleman such that his joinder is proper. Ruiz cites a plethora of case in law
in which federal courts in Texas have recognized that an employee may have an
independent duty of care if the employee, like here, creates an unsafe condition that
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leads to a plaintiffs injury. See Monreal v. Walmart Inc., 2022 WL 500588, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2022) (finding that an employee may have an independent duty

separate from the employer's obligations if the employee engages in conduct that
causes, or knowingly fails to prevent, a plaintiffs injury); see also Land v. Wal-Mart
Stores a/Tex., LLC, 2014 WL 585408, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2014) (recognizing

an employee defendant breached an independent duty when he negligently operated
a floor cleaning machine, creating a dangerously wet floor and failing to warn others
before leaving the area); see also Salcedo v. Alberston 's LLC, 2019 WL 1319425 5,
at *3-6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2019) (granting Plaintiffs motion to remand finding the
petition stated a plausible claim against the nondiverse defendant employee by

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alleging the employee's incorrect stacking of boxes created the danger that injured
the plaintiff).
The Court finds that Ruiz has plead sufficient factual content that allows the
court to draw an inference that there is a possibility that Coleman is liable to Ruiz in
his.role as an employee at the Premises by creating the pool of water op which Ruiz
slipped. First, Ruiz's petition establishes that Coleman was an employee at the
Premises. 1 Second, Ruiz alleges that Coleman was operating and controlling a metal
cart that had been leaking water for some time, and knew or should have known of
the conditions of the Premises and the dangers it presented. 2 Third, Ruiz alleges that
Coleman created a dangerous condition on the premise and failed to remedy or warn
others of the dangerous condition, negligently. breaching his duty of care. 3 Ruiz
contends that based on the foregoing, Coleman was not improperly joined because
Ruiz's petition states a plausible claim he breached an independent duty of care by
creating a dangerous condition and not remedying it. Defendants do not contest any
portion of the facts alleged in Ruiz's petition. Based on the foregoing, the

1

Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 15.2.

2

Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 15.3.

3

Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 16.2.

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Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate there is no possibility of
recovery by Ruiz against Coleman, as is required by the Fifth Circuit.
There is no other means for this Court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over
this case. Having considered Defendants' assertion of improper joinder and
establishing that the non-diverse Coleman was properly joined in this action, the
Court notes that Coleman's inclusion as a defendant destroys the c·omplete diversity
necessary to maintain jurisdiction. The· Court also notes there is no other basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, Ruiz's motion to remand this action
to the Harris County District Court for the 165th Judicial District is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (Document No. 4) is
GRANTED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Harris County District Court

for the 165th District.
SIGNED ·at Houston, Texas, on this ~f day of August, 2024.

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.DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge