Leza v. City Of Laredo et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part Defendants' 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Leza's due process claims against the City of Laredo and Carlos Villarreal are DISMISSED. Leza's Fourth Amendment claims against Villarreal are also DISMISSED. With respect to the Fourth Amendment claims against the City, Leza is ORDERED to produce some colorable evidence of an official policy capable of subjecting the City to liability under §1983. Leza shall file his response no later than June 13, 2011. (Signed by Judge George P. Kazen) Parties notified. (dmorales)

o

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

ROBERT LEZA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF LAREDO, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. L-09-65

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Robert Leza has filed suit against the City of
Laredo

and

the

City

Manager,

Carlos

Villarreal,

in

his

individual capacity, alleging violations of his rights under the
Fourth
claims

and

Fourteenth

under

imprisonment,
rights.

(Dkt.

42
and
1,

Amendments.

U.S.C.

§1983

violation
Attach.

2,

of
at

Specifically,
for
his

Leza

false

arrest,

procedural

due

asserts

22–23.)

On

May

false
process

18,

2010,

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 14.) Leza
responded and Defendants replied. (Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.) Having
considered the parties’ briefs, the evidence, and the applicable
law, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or taken in the
light most favorable to Leza, the nonmovant. On October 15,
2007, Leza was arrested by the Laredo Police Department and
charged with two counts of criminal mischief. (Dkt. 1, Attach.

1/18

o

2, at 21; Dkt. 17, at 2.) The charges were based on his alleged
involvement in illegally tapping into the City’s water supply.
(Dkt. 1, Attach. 2, at 22; Dkt. 17, at 2.) Leza spent four to
five hours in the Webb County Jail and was released on bond.
(Dkt. 14, Attach. 4, at 9–11.)
On October 18, 2007, three days after his arrest, Leza’s
employment

with

the

City’s

Public

Works

Department

was

terminated. (Dkt. 1, Attach. 2, at 22; Dkt. 17, at 3.) He filed
a

grievance

challenging

his

termination

with

the

City’s

grievance committee and the committee held a meeting to hear the
grievance. (Dkt. 1, Attach. 2, at 22; Dkt. 17, at 3.) Leza
alleges that at this meeting he demanded his grievance also be
heard

by

refused,

the

Laredo

stating

Civil

that

Service

the

Commission,

Commission

had

but
not

the
yet

City
been

established by the City Council. (Dkt. 1, Attach. 2, at 22.)
The

grievance

committee

ultimately

concluded

that

Leza

should be reinstated to his former position with the City. (Id.;
Dkt. 17, at 4.) However, the committee’s decision was vetoed by
Carlos Villarreal, the City Manager, and Leza’s termination was
upheld. (Dkt. 1, Attach. 2, at 22; Dkt. 17, at 4.)
Leza claims that the criminal mischief charges against him
were dropped at an examining trial on October 31, 2007, for lack
of probable cause. (Dkt. 1, Attach. 2, at 22.)

2/18

o

Leza initiated this action on July 3, 2008, in the 49th
Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas. (Id. at 4.) On June
1,

2009,

Defendants

removed

to

this

Court

on

the

basis

of

federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if
its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of
the lawsuit under governing law.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of
Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hamilton v.
Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000)). “An
issue

is

‘genuine’

if

the

evidence

is

sufficient

for

a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id. (quoting Hamilton, 232 F.3d at 477). In determining whether
a

fact

issue

exists,

the

Court

views

“the

facts

and

the

inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit &
Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2003).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that
there is no genuine fact issue. Condrey v. Sun Trust Bank of
Ga., 429 F.3d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)). Where the burden of proof

3/18

o

at trial rests on the nonmovant, the movant may satisfy its
initial burden by “pointing out to the district court . . . that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Cuadra v. Hous. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010). “Once the moving
party has demonstrated the absence of a material fact issue, the
non-moving party must ‘go beyond the pleadings and designate
specific

facts

showing

that

there

is

a

genuine

issue

for

trial.’” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075

(5th

conclusory

Cir.

1994)).

allegations,

This

burden

is

unsubstantiated

not

satisfied

assertions,

with

or

by

establishing “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Id. (quoting Little, 37 F.3d 1075). Rather, the nonmoving party
“is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to
articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports
his or her claim.” Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d
455,

458

(5th

nonmovant

“is

Cir.

1998).

merely

If

the

colorable,

evidence
or

is

produced

not

by

the

significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
A. Leza’s §1983 Due Process Claims

4/18

o

Leza alleges that his procedural due process rights were
violated

“when

he

was

denied

review

by

the

Civil

Service

Commission.” (Dkt. 1, Attach. 2, at 23.) This claim stems from a
new amendment to the Laredo City Charter that was adopted in a
City election held on November 7, 2006. (Dkt. 24, at 2–3.) The
amendment, Section 12.03, directed the City Council to create a
Civil

Service

officers

and

Commission
firefighters,

for

employees

“the

other

functions,

than

police

composition,

and

power” of which would be determined by City ordinance.1 The City,
however,

had

not

yet

established

the

Commission

when

Leza’s

employment was terminated in October, 2007. (Id.) Leza argues

1

The amended Section of the City Charter provides:
The City Council shall establish a Civil Service
Commission, for employees of City [sic] other than its
fire fighters and police officers, whose decision on
matters brought before it shall be final. Furthermore,
the
functions,
composition
and
power
shall
be
determined by ordinance. The Commission shall consist
of nine (9) members. The Mayor and each member of the
City Council shall nominate one member of the
Commission. Each nominee must be appointed by a
majority of a quorum of the City Council, but in no
event by less than the affirmative vote of four
Council Members. The term of the commission member
shall be for the term of the officeholder who made the
nomination. Upon vacancy, subsequent nomination shall
be by the Mayor for mayoral appointments or the
Council
Member
of
the
respective
district
corresponding to the original appointment.

Laredo,
Tex.,
City
Charter
§ 12.03
(2010),
http://www.ci.laredo.tx.us/mayor-council/city-charter/charter.pdf;
(Dkt. 24, Attach. 1, at 7.)

5/18

o

that once the amendment to the City Charter was adopted in the
2006 election, he was entitled to have the termination of his
employment with the City reviewed by an “independent, unbiased
Civil

Service

provide

that

Commission,”
review

was

a

and

that

the

violation

of

City’s
his

failure

procedural

to
due

process rights. (Id.)
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that
Leza

was

an

“at-will”

employee

when

he

was

terminated

and

therefore had no property interest in his employment and no
entitlement

to

procedural

due

process.

(Dkt.

14,

at

5.)

Defendants also argue that even if Leza did have a property
interest

in

termination
received

all

his

employment,

and

an

the

he

was

opportunity

process

he

was

notice

respond,

to

given

and

due

under

the

of

his

therefore
Fourteenth

Amendment. (Id. at 6.)
To prevail in a procedural due process claim based on his
termination, Leza must, as a starting point, show that he had a
constitutionally protected property interest in his employment
with the City. See DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 289 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“The threshold requirement of any due process claim
is

the

government’s

deprivation

of

a

plaintiff’s

liberty

or

property interest.”); Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d
101, 105 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Absent a property interest, there is
nothing

6/18

subject

to

due

process

protections

and

our

inquiry

o

ends.”); see also Rodriguez v. Escalon, 90 Fed. Appx. 776, 778
(5th Cir. 2004) (“Only government employees who can show that
they

have

entitled

a

to

Fourteenth

property
the

interest

procedural

Amendment.”).

A

in

due

continued

process

public

employment

protections

employee

has

a

of

are
the

property

interest in his or her employment “only when a legitimate right
to continued employment exists.” Conner v. Lavaca Hosp. Dist.,
267 F.3d 426, 437 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting McDonald v. City of
Corinth, 102 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1996)).
The

Constitution,

interests,

and

such

however,

interests

does

are

not

not

create

incidental

property
to

public

employment. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972);
Bolton v. City of Dallas, 472 F.3d 261, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2006).
Rather, property interests “are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577;
see also McDonald v. City of Corinth, 102 F.3d 152, 155 (5th
Cir.

1996)

(“State

law

controls

the

analysis

of

whether

[a

plaintiff] has a property interest in his employment sufficient
to entitle him to due process protection.”) Thus, we turn to
Texas law to determine whether Leza had a property interest in
his employment with the City.
In Texas, there is a presumption that employment is at-will
unless that relationship has been expressly altered by contract

7/18

o

or by “express rules or policies limiting the conditions under
which an employee may be terminated.” Muncy v. City of Dallas,
335 F.3d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 2003). At-will employees may be
terminated at any time, and therefore have no legitimate right
to

continued

employment

and

no

constitutionally

protected

property interest in their employment. Conner, 267 F.3d at 439.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants
attached the affidavit of Gilbert Sanchez, the Risk Manager for
the City of Laredo.2 (Dkt. 14, Attach. 2.) Sanchez testified that
Leza has never had an employment contract with the City and that
his employment for the City was always on an at-will basis. (Id.
at 1.) Defendants also attached City Ordinance No. 2010-O-17,
which, pursuant to the 2006 City Charter amendment, purports to
establish

a

Civil

Service

Commission

and

abolish

at-will

employment for City employees.3 (Dkt. 25, Attach. 1, at 2–6.) The
ordinance shows an effective date of February 16, 2010, which
indicates that prior to that date City employees were employed
on an at-will basis.

2

Laredo’s Department of Risk Management is a division of the
City’s Human Resources Department. See City of Laredo, Human
Resources Department, http://www.ci.laredo.tx.us/Human_Resources
/HRIndex.htm, (last visited Feb. 14, 2011); (see also Dkt. 14,
Attach. 2.)
3

The ordinance applies only to City employees not subject to a
collective bargaining agreement. (See Dkt. 25, Attach. 1, at 2.)

8/18

o

Oddly, the City’s Code of Ordinances, which claims to be
current through May 3, 2010, still states that City employees
are employees at-will.4 Thus, it seems that either the Code of
Ordinances is out of date, or Ordinance No. 2010-O-17, for some
reason, is not in effect. Under either scenario, Adams was an
at-will employee when he was terminated in October, 2007, and
therefore

did

not

have

a

constitutionally

protected

property

interest in his employment with the City.
The

only

evidence

Leza

attached

to

his

response

to

Defendants’ motion was a ballot and “return sheet” from the City
election held on November 7, 2006.5 (Dkt. 24, Attach. 1.) These
items show that City voters passed Proposition No. 72, which
added Section 12.03 to the City Charter, directing the City
Council

to

establish

a

Civil

Service

Commission

for

City

employees. (Id.)
Leza’s evidence does not indicate that he had a property
interest in his employment with the City when he was terminated

4

Section 2-87.16 is titled “Employees are employees at will” and
provides in part: “The provisions of this division do not and
shall not affect in any way the existing and current personnel
policy of the city that all employees are employees at
will . . . .”
Laredo,
Tex.,
Code
§ 2-87.16
(2010),
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=12258&stateId=43
&stateName=Texas.
5

The return sheet shows the number of votes received for and
against each proposition on the November 7, 2006 election
ballot. (Dkt. 24, Attach. 1.)

9/18

o

in

2007.

Section

Neither
12.03

presumption

Proposition

of

that

the
City

City

No.

72,

nor,

Charter,

employees

for

purports

are

employed

that
to

on

matter,

alter
an

the

at-will

basis.6 See Rodriguez v. Escalon, 90 Fed. Appx. 776, 778 (5th
Cir. 2004) (“[In Texas,] [a]ny agreement to modify the at-will
relationship . . . must be clear and specific.”).
Leza has failed to raise a fact issue as to whether he had
a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment
with the City, a threshold requirement for a procedural due
process claim. This claim will be dismissed.
B. Leza’s §1983 Fourth Amendment Claims
Leza alleges that he was arrested and incarcerated without
probable cause and thus “deprived of his right to be free from
unreasonable

seizure

under

the

Fourth

Amendment.”

(Dkt.

1,

Attach. 2, at 23.) In his response to the City’s motion, Leza
makes clear that his Fourth Amendment claims are “based on the
allegation

that

arrest.”

(Dkt.

complaint

as

6

the
25,

police
at

asserting

3.)

had

no

Thus,

claims

probable

the

for

cause

Court

construes

false

arrest

for

and

his

Leza’s
false

See
Laredo,
Tex.,
City
Charter
§ 12.03
(2010),
http://www.ci.laredo.tx.us/mayor-council/city-charter/charter.pdf.

10/18

o

imprisonment.7 These claims are considered against each defendant
in turn.
1. Against City Manager Carlos Villarreal
Leza has not alleged that he was physically arrested by
Villarreal or that Villarreal otherwise caused his arrest. (Dkt.
1, Attach. 2, at 21–23.) In fact, the only connection in the
petition between Villarreal and Leza’s arrest is an allegation
that

Villarreal,

in

some

unspecified

way,

“directed

and/or

influenced” Tomas Rodriguez, whose testimony was used for the
criminal complaint against Leza.8 (Id. at 21–22.) Lacking facts
alleging that Villarreal somehow participated in Leza’s arrest
and detainment, the Court must assume that the Fourth Amendment
claims against Villarreal are based solely on his supervisory
position as the Laredo City Manager.
Supervisors are not vicariously liable for the actions of
their employees in §1983 claims. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

7

A claim for “unreasonable seizure” requires a showing that the
seizure was conducted “in an extraordinary manner, unusually
harmful to an individual’s privacy or even physical interests.”
Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir.
2010) (quoting Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313–14 (5th
Cir. 2001)). Leza has alleged no facts suggesting that his
seizure was extraordinary. In fact, Leza testified that after he
learned that there was a warrant for his arrest, he went to the
police station, turned himself in, and was released on bond four
to five hours later. (Dkt. 14, Attach. 4, at 9–11.)
8

This allegation is unclear
supported with any evidence.
11/18

and

has

not

been

explained

or

o

1937, 1948 (2009). Supervisory liability exists in §1983 claims
when

(1)

the

supervisor

was

personally

involved

in

the

constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is an adequate causal
connection

between

the

supervisor’s

wrongful

conduct

and

the

constitutional violation. Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 274
(5th Cir. 2008) (citing Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304
(5th Cir. 1987)).
Defendants argue that Villarreal played no role in Leza’s
arrest or detainment and therefore cannot be held liable for
those

acts

under

§1983.

(Dkt.

14,

at

7–8.)

In

support,

Defendants point to Plaintiff’s deposition of Rene Rodriguez, a
detective

with

the

Laredo

Police

Department.

(Id.)

Detective

Rodriguez testified that he investigated the case against Leza,
drafted

the

complaint

outlining

the

allegations,

took

that

complaint and the evidence to the District Attorney’s office,
and secured the warrant for Leza’s arrest. (Dkt. 14, Attach. 8,
at 7, 18–22.) Rodriguez testified that his only communication
about the case with Villarreal was a fifteen-to-twenty minute
meeting with Villarreal and Raul Casso, a City Attorney, during
which Villarreal asked general questions about the status of the
case.9 (Id. at 30–32.)

9

Rodriguez testified that at that meeting, Villarreal asked
whether City employees were involved, whether the proper permits
had been issued, and what evidence had been collected. (Dkt. 14,
Attach. 8, at 31–32.) When asked whether anyone mentioned that
12/18

o

Leza does not address Defendants’ argument in his response,
stating only that his Fourth Amendment claims are “based on the
allegation

that

the

police

had

no

probable

cause

for

his

arrest.” (Dkt. 24, at 3.)
Leza

has

alleged

no

facts,

and

produced

no

evidence,

indicating that Villarreal was personally involved in his arrest
and detainment, or that his arrest and detainment was caused by
Villarreal’s wrongful conduct.10 This claim will be dismissed.
2. Against the City of Laredo
Defendants

argue

that

Leza’s

Fourth

Amendment

claims

against the City fail because there is no evidence that he was
arrested
official

and

detained

City

policy

without
or

probable
custom.

cause
(Dkt.

pursuant
14,

at

to

an

8–9.)

Alternatively, Defendants argue that there was probable cause
for Leza’s arrest. (Id. at 9.)
Typically, to prove a claim under §1983 a plaintiff must
(1) establish “a violation of rights secured by the Constitution
or

laws

of

the

United

States

and

(2)

demonstrate

that

the

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

Villarreal wanted Leza to be arrested so that he could be “held
up as an example,” Rodriguez said “no.” (Id. at 32.)
10

The only evidence Leza submitted in support of the Fourth
Amendment claims was a document purporting to show that the
criminal mischief charges were dropped at an examining trial for
lack of probable cause. (Dkt. 24, Attach. 2.)

13/18

o

color of state law.” Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice,
512 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 2007). However, when bringing a
§1983

claim

against

a

municipality,

the

plaintiff

must

also

satisfy the requirements set forth in Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that while a municipality
is a “person” subject to suit under §1983, it is not liable on
the basis of respondeat superior.11 Id. at 690–91. Rather, a
municipality

is

only

liable

under

§1983

for

acts

that

are

directly attributable to it through some “official action or
imprimatur.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578
(5th Cir. 2001). Thus, to establish municipal liability under
§1983, a plaintiff must identify: “(1) an official policy (or
custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual
or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation
whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Valle v. City of

11

Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .

14/18

o

Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v.
City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).
The culpability and causation requirements for municipal
liability under §1983 are rigorously enforced. See Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) (“Where a court fails
to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation,
municipal

liability

Culpability

is

collapses

established

by

into
the

respondeat
existence

superior.”).

of

an

official

policy. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th
Cir. 2009). The policy itself must be unconstitutional, or, if
not, it must have been adopted “with deliberate indifference to
the known or obvious fact” that the constitutional violation at
issue would result. James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics
Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 309 (5th Cir. 2004)).
“Deliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond mere
negligence

or

intentional

even

choice,

gross
not

negligence;
merely

an

it

‘must

amount

unintentionally

to

an

negligent

oversight.’” Id. at 617–18 (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty.,
973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiffs must also satisfy
a heightened causation standard. Valle, 613 F.3d at 546. This
standard

is

satisfied

by

showing

that

the

municipality’s

official policy was the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s
constitutional

15/18

violation.

In

other

words,

there

must

be

“a

o

direct causal link” between the policy and the constitutional
violation. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848.
An “official policy” can exist in various forms. In its
more

traditional

form,

it

consists

of

a

“policy

statement,

ordinance, regulation or decision that is officially adopted and
promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an
official

to

whom

the

lawmakers

have

delegated

policy-making

authority.” Pineda, 291 F.3d at 328 (quoting Webster v. City of
Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). A policy
is also deemed to exist when there is a “persistent widespread
practice

of

City

officials

or

employees

which,

although

not

authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so
common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy.” Id. (quoting Webster, 735 F.2d at
841). In the latter scenario, actual or constructive knowledge
of

the

governing

custom
body,

must
“or

be
to

attributable
an

official

to
to

the
whom

municipality’s
that

body

has

delegated policy-making authority.” Id.
To support that there is no evidence of an official custom
or

policy,

Defendants

point

to

Plaintiff’s

deposition

of

Detective Rene Rodriguez. (Dkt. 14, at 8.) In his deposition,
Rodriguez provides a fairly detailed account of his work on the
criminal mischief case against Leza. He explains how the case
came about, his investigation, and the decision to take the

16/18

o

complaint and evidence to the District Attorney’s office. (Dkt.
14,

Attach.

8.)

Defendants’

argument,

though

not

explicitly

stated, appears to be that if Leza was arrested without probable
cause pursuant to an official City policy, there would be some
evidence

of

that

policy

in

Rodriguez’s

deposition

testimony,

and, of course, that there is none.
Leza has failed to address the Monell issue altogether. He
does not allege any City policy or custom in his complaint, nor
did he address Defendants’ argument in his response. While the
Court considers Detective Rodriguez’s deposition testimony alone
as insufficient to satisfy the City’s initial burden on summary
judgment, there remains a serious question whether Leza has a
viable claim against the City. As stated above, he has not even
pled such a claim, and it is doubtful whether Leza can produce
evidence that the City has a general policy of falsely arresting
persons.

The

Court

arrested

without

will

defer

probable

considering

cause

until

whether

the

issue

Leza

was

of

City

liability is resolved. If the City is not legally responsible,
the absence of probable cause would become irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, Leza’s due process claims against the City of
Laredo

and

Amendment

Carlos

claims

Villarreal

against

are

Villarreal

DISMISSED.
are

also

Leza’s

Fourth

DISMISSED.

With

respect to the Fourth Amendment claims against the City, Leza is
17/18

o

ORDERED to produce some colorable evidence of an official policy
capable of subjecting the City to liability under §1983. Leza
shall file his response no later than June 13, 2011.
DONE at Laredo, Texas, this 26th day of May, 2011.

___________________________________
George P. Kazen
Senior United States District Judge

18/18