Villalba et al v. The City Of Laredo et al
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting the City of Laredo's 22 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Signed by Judge George P. Kazen) Parties notified. (dmorales, 5)
O
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
JOSE VILLALBA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF LAREDO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 5:14-cv-17
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Jose Villalba and Yanet Lechuga have sued the
City of Laredo and three of its police officers under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force against
Villalba
and
that
they
falsely
arrested
both
Plaintiffs
in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Dkt. 1.)
Pending before the Court is the City of Laredo’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 22.) Plaintiffs have responded. (Dkt.
28.)
Background
The following facts are derived from the complaint, the
motion for summary judgement, the evidence submitted with that
motion1, and Plaintiffs’ response. On the evening of April 26,
The
evidence
includes
the
police
department
internal
investigation report, videos from Plaintiffs’ home surveillance
1
2012,
police
officer
Juan
Leal
was
dispatched
twice
to
the
Plaintiffs’ home in response to a loud noise complaint. When
Officer Leal first arrived, Plaintiff Villalba was outside in
his front yard watering his lawn and listening to music through
his Suburban’s radio. Officer Leal informed Plaintiff Villalba
about the noise complaint. Villalba contends that his radio was
not loud, blaming his neighbors for the noise because they were
allegedly having a party. Officer Leal then left, but Villalba
nonetheless lowered the radio’s volume.
Approximately thirty minutes later, Officer Leal returned
to Villalba’s home, now accompanied by Officer Ernesto Chavez.
What happened next was captured by video. As the officers parked
in front of the Plaintiffs’ house, Villalba was standing at the
edge of his front driveway. Villalba’s white Suburban was backed
into his driveway, and he was standing by its front driver-side
headlight.
The
video
depicted
Officer
Chavez
walking
past
Villalba toward the Suburban’s driver-side door, which was open.
Officer Chavez then reached into the Suburban to turn down the
music. Villalba
then
turned
around and
began
to walk toward
Officer Chavez. Officer Leal stopped Villalba by grabbing him
system, deposition of Plaintiff Villalba, declaration of Acting
Chief of Police Gilberto L. Navarro, Officer Juan Leal’s answers
to interrogatories, excerpts from the city policy manuals, and
the officers’ training records.
2/15
from
behind,
starting
a
physical
altercation.
Officer
Chavez
stepped away from the Suburban to help Officer Leal.
The three individuals wrestled to the ground. Once on the
ground, Villalba’s right arm appeared to rise up near Leal’s
head or arm.2 Officer Leal then began to punch Villalba’s face
and
head
repeatedly.
Officer
Chavez
was
at
Villalba’s
feet,
pulling Villalba’s legs while attempting to kneel down on them.
Then it appears Officer Leal wrapped one of his arms around
Villalba’s neck. It then seems Officer Leal had Villalba in a
choke hold and Officer Chavez had Villalba’s legs restrained.3
Plaintiff Lechuga, Villalba’s wife, was standing a few feet away
watching this incident unfold.
After about three minutes into the altercation, two other
officers arrived at the scene. All four officers were now on top
of Villalba. After about another minute, they lifted Villalba
from the ground with his hands handcuffed behind his back. The
officers took Villalba into custody. Moments later, the officers
arrested
Plaintiff
Lechuga
and
placed
her
in
a
patrol
car,
though she was released after about fifteen minutes. Villalba’s
criminal charges were later dropped and his case was dismissed.
During his deposition, Villalba was asked whether he attempted
to punch the officer. He responded in the negative.
3
Villalba testified that he “wasn’t struggling with them” but
only trying to get out of the choke hold so that he could
“breathe.”
2
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Plaintiffs
with
the
filed
Laredo
a
written
Police
complaint
Department.
The
about
the
police
incident
department
conducted an investigation into the complaint. It requested the
videos that recorded the incident, but Plaintiffs refused to
provide
them.
The
police
department
then
requested
written
statements from the officers accused of misconduct. At the end
of the investigation, the Acting Chief of Police issued a letter
to
Plaintiffs,
concluding
that
“the
facts
and
circumstances
surrounding the incident did not clearly prove” the allegations
and therefore could not be sustained.
The Plaintiffs thereafter filed this §1983 lawsuit against
the City of Laredo and its three police officers involved in the
incident. The Complaint alleges three causes of action. First,
that the officers unlawfully arrested Plaintiffs, and that they
used excessive force in doing so with respect to Villalba in
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Second, that the
officers engaged in conduct that “shocks the conscience” and
“offends the community’s sense of fair play and decency” in
violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. Third, it
alleges several theories for municipal liability. The City of
Laredo now moves for summary judgment, arguing it is not liable
because the Plaintiffs cannot show that a policy, practice, or
custom of the City was the cause behind the alleged violations.
4/15
The
City
also
seeks
summary
dismissal
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment claim.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when, taking the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Vuncannon
v. United States, 711 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2013). The movant
carries the “initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue
of material fact.”
Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v.
Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013).
The
nonmoving party is then required to identify specific evidence
in the record, and to articulate the precise manner in which
that evidence supports their claim. Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749
F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014). In deciding a summary judgment
motion, the Court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, and any reasonable inferences are
to be drawn in favor of that party. Transmaritime, 738 F.3d at
706.
Discussion
A city cannot be liable for a §1983 claim under a theory of
respondeat
Servs.,
98
superior.
S.Ct.
Monell
2018,
2036
v.
New
(1978).
York
City
Instead,
Dep’t
a
city
of
Soc.
can
be
liable only “when execution of a government’s policy or custom,
5/15
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury.” Id. at 2037-38. Such a policy can take two forms:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision that is officially adopted and promulgated
by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an
official to whom the lawmakers have delegated
policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials
or employees, which, although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents municipal policy.
Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir.
2003).
Failure to Train
Plaintiffs allege that the City is liable for its officers’
use of excessive force and false arrest because it failed to
properly train them. They observe that Officer Leal was a recent
graduate
of
the
police
happened, and that his
academy
conduct
at
the
time
the
incident
is evidence of an inadequate
training policy.
A municipality’s failure to adequately train its employees
can constitute a policy capable of subjecting a municipality to
liability under §1983. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S.Ct. 1197,
1200 (1989); see also World Wide St. Preachers Fellowship v.
Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2009). To succeed
in a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that
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the municipality’s training procedures were inadequate, (2) that
the municipality was deliberately indifferent in adopting its
training policy, and (3) that the inadequate training policy
directly caused the violations in question.” Zarnow v. City of
Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010). The Fifth
Circuit has instructed that “for liability to attach based on an
‘inadequate
training’
specificity
how
Roberts
City
v.
a
of
claim,
particular
a
plaintiff
training
Shreveport,
397
must
program
F.3d
287,
allege
is
with
defective.”
293
(5th
Cir.
2005).
Here,
Acting
Chief
Gilberto
L.
Navarro
submitted
a
declaration stating that all Laredo police officers have met
“the minimum training requirements of the Texas Commission on
Law Enforcement Officers Standards and Education (TCLEOSE)” and
that
all
officers
“have
received
the
state-mandated
training
program in the use of force and arrests at one time or another.”
He declared that all officers receive training on arrests and
the use of force at the Laredo Regional Police Academy, and that
they receive additional training on those subjects during their
twelve-month
probationary
period
after
graduating
from
the
Academy. The City attached the training records of the three
officers who were involved in the incident. The records indicate
that the officers have all taken classes on arrests, searches,
7/15
and seizures, and that Officer Chavez had taken a class on the
use of force.
Plaintiffs do not satisfy the first prong of the failureto-train standard. This prong requires them to specify how the
training
program
is
defective.
Instead,
Plaintiffs’
whole
argument appears to rely on the conduct of one person, namely
the officer who was a recent graduate of the Academy. Holding
the City liable for his conduct on this one occasion would be
akin to respondeat superior.
The Fifth Circuit has instructed that compliance with state
training requirements is “a factor counseling against a ‘failure
to train’ finding.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 171 (citing Conner v.
Travis
Cnty.,
209
F.3d
794,
798
(5th
Cir.
2000));
see
also
Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381–82 (5th Cir.
2010) (“[W]hen officers have received training required by Texas
law, the plaintiff must show that the legal minimum of training
was inadequate.”). The City produced evidence that the officers
have satisfied the state training requirements under Texas law.
Plaintiffs
have
not
addressed
this
evidence.
Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have not raised a fact issue as to whether the City
failed to adequately train its officers on arrests or the use of
force.
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Ratification of Officers’ Conduct
Plaintiffs
allege
that
the
City
is
liable
under
a
ratification theory because Chief Navarro simply issued a letter
claiming that his officers did nothing wrong.
A policymaker’s ratification of a subordinate’s misconduct
may
cause
the
municipality
to
be
liable
if
the
policymaker
approves a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it. Peterson
v.
City
of
Fort
Worth,
588
F.3d
838,
848
(5th
Cir.
2009).
However, the Fifth Circuit has limited this theory to “extreme
factual situations.” Id.
The
case
here
does
not
present
an
extreme
factual
situation. In Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th
Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit found ratification where a group
of police officers mistook a man for a fugitive, surrounded his
truck,
“poured”
gunfire
onto
his
truck,
and
killed
him.
Following this “catastrophic” event, the City policymaker failed
to reprimand, discharge, or admit that any error occurred on
behalf of its officers, and so the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
finding
of
municipal
liability.
Id.
at
171.
Conversely,
in
Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth
Circuit refused to find ratification where the Plaintiff was
shot in the back by a police officer while fleeing on foot from
police
following
a
high-speed
chase.
This
incident
was
insufficient for municipal liability despite arguments that the
9/15
City knew about the police misconduct and that it did nothing.
Id.
at
797-98.
The
Snyder
Court
noted
that
Grandstaff
was
affirmed on a highly peculiar set of facts, and that the facts
in Snyder hardly rose to the level of the “extraordinary factual
circumstances” presented in Grandstaff. In the instant case, the
officers wrestled with and punched Villalba. It is no doubt that
this was an unfortunate situation for Plaintiffs. However, the
scenario was not nearly like that in Grandstaff. Thus, liability
under a ratification theory is not established.
Failure to Supervise or Discipline
In
their
complaint,
Plaintiffs
allege
that
the
City
inadequately supervises and disciplines its officers. Plaintiffs
observe
that
no
officer
received
any
discipline
after
this
incident.
A
municipality’s
failure
to
supervise
or
discipline
its
employees can constitute a policy capable of subjecting it to
liability under §1983. These claims are analyzed using the same
framework
applied
in
failure-to-train
claims.
Deville
v.
Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 171 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Piotrowski
v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 581 (5th Cir. 2001)). Thus, a
plaintiff must show that (1) the City failed to supervise or
discipline its employees; (2) that the failure to supervise or
discipline
amounted
to
deliberate
indifference;
and
(3) that
there is a direct causal link between the failure to supervise
10/15
or
discipline
and
the
alleged
constitutional
violation.
See
Lewis v. Pugh, 289 Fed. App’x. 767, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2008).
“Deliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond mere
negligence
or
intentional
even
choice,
gross
not
negligence;
merely
an
it
‘must
amount
unintentionally
to
an
negligent
oversight.’” James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617-18 (5th
Cir. 2009).
Here,
the
City
acknowledges
that
neither
officer
was
disciplined, but it provided evidence that it demonstrated some
supervision
by
conducting
a
thorough
internal
affairs
investigation into the incident.
When
Plaintiff
Lechuga
complained
about
the
officers’
actions to the police department, she was referred to the Office
of
Public
Integrity
(“OPI”).
She
and
Villalba
completed
a
“voluntary statement form” where they gave their account of the
incident
in
writing.
The
OPI
then
issued
a
“notice
of
investigation” to the officers accused of misconduct. All three
officers submitted their written account of the incident. The
officers disputed the allegations and claimed that Villalba was
resisting the officer’s attempt to subdue him.
The
police
department
watched
a
short
video
recording
provided by the KGNS television station and it believed that the
video showed Villalba throwing a punch at Officer Leal which
indicated that Villalba was belligerent or combative. The KGNS
11/15
TV interview included statements from Officer Joe E. Baeza. He
noted that the video depicted Villalba resisting the officers’
attempts to subdue him, and that Villalba appeared to throw a
punch at Officer Leal. The Department requested the remainder of
the videos from the home surveillance system, but the Plaintiffs
refused to provide them.
At the end of the internal investigation, Chief Navarro
issued a letter to the Plaintiffs. His letter concluded that the
“facts
clearly
and
circumstances
prove”
the
surrounding
allegations,
and
the
so
incident
they
did
“cannot
not
be
sustained.” Chief Navarro explained that a disposition of “Not
Sustained” meant that there was “insufficient evidence either to
prove or refute the allegations.”
In
response
to
this
evidence,
Plaintiffs
again
rely
exclusively on the fact that the officers were not disciplined
on this one occasion. They fail to explain how this lack of
discipline amounts to deliberate indifference or how it meets
the
causation
element.
discussion about
Further,
they
completely
the supervision and investigation
omit
any
procedures
that were actually conducted here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have
failed to show that the City’s supervision and discipline were
wholly inadequate, warranting imposition of municipal liability.
12/15
Custom of Excessive Force
Plaintiffs allege that the City has a custom of tolerating
excessive force. In support, they point to one previous incident
where an officer was found to have used excessive force.
A custom or pattern is “tantamount to official policy” when
it is “so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that
fairly represents municipal policy.” Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850.
Where prior incidents are used to prove a pattern, they “must
have occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of
conduct
warrants
knowledge
accepted
that
the
the
practice
attribution
to
objectionable
of
city
the
governing
conduct
employees.”
is
Id.
A
body
the
of
expected,
plaintiff
must
demonstrate “a pattern of abuse that transcends the error made
in a single case.” Id. at 850-51 (citations omitted).
Here,
Plaintiffs
are
relying
on
one
prior
incident
of
excessive force to establish that the City had a “widespread,”
“well-settled”
policy
of
tolerating
excessive
force.
That
is
insufficient to establish a department-wide policy. Therefore,
Plaintiffs
fail
to
raise
a
fact
issue
as
to
a
custom
of
excessive force.
Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiffs allege that the officers’ use of force and false
arrest also violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. In its
motion for summary judgment, Defendant City argues that this
13/15
claim
is
“objective
properly
analyzed
reasonableness”
under
the
standard,
Fourth
rather
Amendment’s
than
under
a
substantive due process standard. In their response, Plaintiffs
merely
reiterate
that
the
officers
made
the
arrests
without
probable cause.
“Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of
government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion
of
substantive
due
process,
must
be
the
guide
for
analyzing the[] claims.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.Ct.
1708, 1714 (1998). Here, it is undisputed that the officers were
dispatched to Plaintiffs’ home to investigate a noise complaint.
Also undisputed is that the officers’ use of force happened in
the
course
of
arresting
Villalba.
These
claims
are
properly
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard.
Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (holding that all
claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—
deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other “seizure” of a free citizen should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard, rather than
under a “substantive due process” approach). Accordingly, this
claim against the City will be dismissed.
14/15
Conclusion
For
all
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment (Dkt.22) by the City of Laredo is GRANTED, and all
claims against it shall be dismissed. Plaintiffs’ claims against
the three individual officers – Juan Leal, Ernest Chavez, and
David Nieto – in their individual capacities remain. The case is
now returned to Magistrate Judge J. Scott Hacker for handling
all pretrial matters pending to prepare this case for trial.
DONE at Laredo, Texas, this 26th day of August, 2015.
___________________________________
George P. Kazen
Senior United States District Judge
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