Morales et al v. Redco Transport, Ltd. et al
Filing
153
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying SDSA's 132 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot Plaintiffs' 143 MOTION for Leave to File Instanter Sur-Reply. (Signed by Judge George P. Kazen) Parties notified. (dmorales, 5)
United States District Court
O
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 21, 2015
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
CRUZ MIGUEL AGUINA MORALES,
et al.,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiffs,
v.
REDCO TRANSPORT LTD.,
et al.,
Defendants.
David J. Bradley, Clerk
Case No. 5:14-cv-129
MEMORANDOM AND ORDER
Pending
before
the
Court
is
the
Defendant Samsung SDS America, Inc.
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
Motion
to
Dismiss
by
(“SDSA”), filed pursuant to
12(b)(6).
(Dkt.
132).
Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (Dkt. 140), and SDSA
filed a reply.
(Dkt. 142).
leave
an
to
file
opposed by SDSA.
instanter
Plaintiffs also filed a motion for
sur-reply
(Dkt.
143),
which
was
(Dkt. 144).
BACKGROUND
This case was filed on August 7, 2014.
SDSA was added as a
defendant in the Third Amended Complaint on July 29, 2015.
This
is a personal-injury and wrongful-death case arising out of a
motor-vehicle collision between Plaintiffs and a tractor trailer
loaded with Samsung Electronics refrigerators.
For the purposes
of this case, SDSA is a freight broker that selected Defendant
JIT Automation, Inc. as a motor carrier. 1
Plaintiffs assert
claims of negligence, negligence per se, and exemplary damages
against SDSA.
SDSA’s Motion to Dismiss contends that relief
cannot be granted because Plaintiffs’ state common-law claims
are expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act (FAAAA).
ANALYSIS
In
1994,
to
buttress
its
deregulation
of
the
trucking
industry, Congress passed the FAAAA’s preemption provision for
trucking.
49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1).
The general clause mirrored
the airline preemption provision from the Airline Deregulation
Act (ADA).
(2008).
Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S.Ct. 989, 993
The general preemption language reads as follows:
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State,
political
subdivision
of
a
State,
or
political
authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce
a law, regulation, or other provision having the force
and effect of law related to a price, route, or
service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor
private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with
respect to the transportation of property.
49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1).
Paragraph
(2)
provides
a
relevant
exception
to
this
preemption rule, stating that the above paragraph “shall not
1
SDSA asks this Court to take Judicial Notice that the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) classifies SDSA as a
broker. (Dkt. 133). SDSA provided documentation from FMCSA and
Plaintiffs appear to agree that SDSA is a broker.
2/6
restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect
to motor vehicles.”
Id. §14501(c)(2)(A).
Specifically,
SDSA
asserts
that
Plaintiffs’
common-law
claims are provisions having the force and effect of law related
to
SDSA’s
services
as
a
broker,
should be preempted by the FAAAA.
the
Court
is
guided
by
two
and
thus
Plaintiffs’
claims
In analyzing SDSA’s argument,
preemption
principles:
(1)
“the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case,” and (2) “we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
by
the
Federal
Act
purpose of Congress.”
(2009).
FAAAA
unless
that
was
the
clear
and
manifest
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194–95
To decide whether common-law claims are preempted in
cases,
courts
scrutinize
specific causes of action.
the
underlying
facts
of
the
See Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d
254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998); Travel All Over the World, Inc. v.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 (7th Cir. 1996).
The
FAAAA’s
preemption
clause
generally
preempts
state
enforcement actions that “hav[e] a connection with, or reference
to” a carrier or broker’s services.
Rowe, 128 S.Ct. at 995.
Most FAAAA cases relate not to brokers but to motor carriers,
and no Supreme Court or Circuit Court opinion has dealt with the
extent of a broker’s services.
Although a majority of district
court opinions involving personal injury claims hold that they
3/6
do
relate
matter.
to
a
broker’s
services,
courts
are
split
on
the
Compare, e.g., Ameriswiss Tech., LLC v. Midway Line of
Ill., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.N.H. 2012), and Chatelaine,
Inc. v. Twin Modal, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 638 (N.D. Tex. 2010),
with Montes de Oca v. El Paso-L.A. Limousine Express, Inc., CV
14-9230, 2015 WL 1250139 (C.D. Cal. March 17, 2015).
This Court
need not resolve this issue if Plaintiffs’ claims are protected
under the exemption for states’ safety regulatory authority.
As
the
Supreme
Court
has
explained,
“Congress’
clear
purpose in § 14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure that its preemption of
States’ economic authority . . . ‘not restrict’ the preexisting
and
traditional
state
police
power
over
safety.”
City
of
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 122 S.Ct. 2226,
2236 (2002).
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Fifth
Circuit have refused to narrowly construe the FAAAA’s exemption
of states’ safety regulatory authority.
See id. at 2236; Cole
v. City of Dallas, 314 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 2002).
The Fifth
Circuit has even observed that courts have “on the whole given a
broad construction to the safety regulation exception.”
VRC LLC
v. City of Dallas, 460 F.3d 607, 612 (5th Cir. 2006).
This Court finds just two opinions that consider how the
safety regulatory exception applies to tort claims.
See Owens
v. Anthony, 2-11-0033, 2011 WL 6056409 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 2011)
(Campbell, J.); Huntington Operating Corp. v. Sybonney Express,
4/6
Inc., Civ. H-08-781, 2010 WL 1930087 (S.D. Tex. May 11, 2010)
(Harmon, J.).
Of the two, Owens was the only case involving
personal injury, and Judge Campbell found that the negligence
issues presented there involved highway safety, which had been
expressly exempted from the preemption statute.
6056409, at *4.
Owens, 2011 WL
SDSA argues that Owens is wrong because the
safety regulatory exception does not apply to freight brokers,
since brokers do not have care, custody, or control over motor
vehicles used to transport cargo.
However, the FAAAA does not
restrict the safety exemption only to those with some control
over motor vehicles.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has noted that
§14501(c)(2)(A)’s “safety regulatory authority” is “obviously”
broader than 49 U.S.C. §30102(a)’s definition of “Motor Vehicle
Safety,” which refers to “the performance of a motor vehicle . .
. in a way that protects the public . . . against unreasonable
risk of death or injury in an accident.”
49
U.S.C.
§30102(a)(8).
Plaintiffs’
Cole, 314 F.3d at 733;
claims
against
SDSA
essentially assert that SDSA’s negligence led to an unreasonable
risk of death or injury in a motor vehicle accident.
The
case
of
Huntington
Operating
Corp.,
although
not
involving personal injury, is at odds with the Owens conclusion.
See
2010
WL
1930087,
at
*3.
In
Huntington,
Judge
Harmon
concluded that the §14501(c)(2)(A) exception “refers solely to
the ability of the several states to define safety standards and
5/6
insurance requirements” and “is not read to permit a private
right of action.”
Id.
Yet, negligence claims can certainly
fall within states’ regulatory authority, because negligence is
the common-law regulation of misconduct.
This Court agrees with
Owens that negligence claims like the ones here are part of the
states’ safety regulatory authority.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ personal injury claims are part of a state’s
safety
regulatory
authority
and
are
preemption by 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A).
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 132) is DENIED.
exempted
from
FAAAA
Accordingly, SDSA’s
Plaintiffs’ Motion for
leave to file an instanter sur-reply (Dkt. 143) is DENIED as
moot.
The case is returned to Magistrate Judge Scott Hacker for
further pretrial processing.
DONE at Laredo, this 21st day of December, 2015.
___________________________________
George P. Kazen
Senior United States District Judge
6/6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?