Gaalla et al v. Citizens Medical Center et al
Filing
307
ORDER granting 287 Motion for Summary Judgment based on Absolute Immunity.(Signed by Judge Gregg Costa) Parties notified.(ccarnew, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
AJAY GAALLA, et al,
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Plaintiffs,
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VS.
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CITIZENS MEDICAL CENTER, et al, §
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Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6-10-14
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After two trips to the Fifth Circuit, the federal claim that remains in this case
alleges that Citizens Medical Center, a county-owned hospital, and the Individual
Defendants1 violated the equal protection rights of Plaintiffs, a group of
cardiologists of Indian origin (“the Cardiologists”). With respect to the Individual
Defendants who are members of Citizens Medical Center’s Board of Directors, the
equal protection claim is based entirely on the Resolution the hospital board passed
stating that only cardiologists who had contracts with the hospital could exercise
clinical privileges there. The Cardiologists’ claim against Individual Defendant
David P. Brown, the administrator of the hospital, relies on additional claims of
discrimination.
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Individual Defendants are hospital board members Donald Day, Joe Bland, Dr. Andrew
Clemmons, Jennifer Harman, and Luis Guerra (“Board Members”) and hospital administrator
David P. Brown.
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In dismissing the due process claims the Cardiologists alleged, the Fifth
Circuit held that the Resolution was “a legislative act” as opposed to an
adjudicative one. Relying on that ruling, the Individual Defendants seek summary
judgment on the Cardiologists’ equal protection claim. Their motion contends that
they are entitled to absolute legislative immunity because they were acting in a
legislative capacity in passing the Resolution.
Because the Fifth Circuit has
already held that the Resolution was a legislative act and the Cardiologists do not
offer a compelling reason why that same reasoning should not apply in the context
of a legislative immunity claim, the Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
Absolute Immunity is GRANTED.
I.
Background
After the Cardiologists filed this lawsuit, the Court (Jack, J.) granted a
preliminary injunction in their favor, which the hospital appealed.
The Fifth
Circuit reversed, finding that the Resolution was a legislative act for the purposes
of analyzing the Cardiologists’ due process claims. Gaalla v. Citizens Medical
Center, 407 F. App’x 810, 813–14 (5th Cir. 2010) (Gaalla I). Applying rational
basis scrutiny that applies to legislative acts, the Fifth Circuit found that preventing
cardiac surgeon Dr. Yahagi from leaving the hospital was a conceivable rational
basis for passing the Resolution. Id. at 814–15. Because the Cardiologists’ due
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process claim did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of preliminary injunction. Id. at 815.
While the injunction ruling was on appeal, Individual Defendants filed
motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, which Judge Jack
denied. On a second interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of
summary judgment with respect to the Cardiologists’ due process claim and
affirmed with respect to the equal protection claim. Gaalla v. Brown, 460 F.
App’x 469, 481 (5th Cir. 2012) (Gaalla II). The Fifth Circuit determined that its
previous finding—that passage of the Resolution was a legislative rather than
administrative act within the meaning of the Due Process Clause—was the binding
law of this case. Id. at 476. It is this ruling that the Individual Defendants now
contend warrants dismissal of Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim on legislative
immunity grounds.2
II.
Discussion
A. The Law of Legislative Immunity
Summary judgment is appropriate when undisputed facts establish an
immunity defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Beck v. Tex. State Bd. of Dental
Exam’rs, 204 F.3d 629, 633–34 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming grant of summary
judgment on absolute immunity grounds).
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Federal, state, regional, and local
See Order 1, ECF No. 286 (granting Individual Def.s’ Mot. for Leave to File a Mot. for Summ.
J. Based on Absolute Immunity, ECF No. 256).
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legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
when they act in a legislative capacity. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49
(1998). Such immunity provides protection to officials for actions that are “an
integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes” relating to “the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation.” Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
Officials outside of the legislative branch are also entitled to absolute
immunity when they perform legislative functions. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55. This
includes appointed regional officials. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 399, 405–06 (1979) (holding that appointed
members of a regional planning board were entitled to legislative immunity to the
extent they were acting in a legislative capacity); see also Bannum, Inc. v. City of
Beaumont, 236 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (explaining that legislative
immunity applies to individuals performing legislative acts “regardless of the title
of their positions, and regardless of whether they were elected or appointed” in
granting legislative immunity to members of a city planning and zoning
committee).
The Cardiologists argue that legislative immunity should not apply to
unelected officials like the Individual Defendants. Pls.’ Resp. to Indiv. Defs.’ Mot.
for Summ. J. 18, ECF No. 292. But legislative immunity’s purpose of making
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individuals “feel more comfortable volunteering to perform public-service
functions, such as serving on their local school board”—or, as in this case, the
board of a public hospital—applies regardless of whether the officials are elected.
Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 219 (6th Cir. 2011);
see also Bogan, 523 U.S. at 52 (explaining that “the threat of liability may
significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary
rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability”).
While legislative acts by public officials are entitled to absolute immunity,
acts that are administrative in nature are entitled only to qualified immunity.
Hughes v. Tarrant Cnty., 948 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1991). Whether an act
qualifies as legislative or administrative turns on the nature of the act, rather than
the motive of the official performing the act. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. Such
determinations, therefore, should be made without “considerations of intent and
motive.” Id. at 55. Legislative acts typically involve “generalizations concerning a
policy or state of affairs,” as opposed to “more specific” administrative acts that
“relate to particular individuals or situations.” Hughes, 948 F.2d at 921 (citations
omitted).
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Analysis Also Establishes Legislative Immunity
The Fifth Circuit’s description of the Resolution as a legislative act came not
in the context of an immunity analysis, but in assessing the Cardiologists’ due
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process claim. Gaalla II, 460 F. App’x at 475–77. In the due process context, a
dichotomy exists between legislative acts, which are subject to only rational basis
review, and adjudicative acts, which are subject to heightened review and certain
procedural requirements. See, e.g., Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d
475, 479 (5th Cir. 1986) (“A regulatory decision can be legislative or it can be
adjudicative, and it will be reviewed differently depending on which category it is
placed into.”)
Thus, the primary issue in this summary judgment motion is
whether the Fifth Circuit’s finding that the Resolution is a legislative act under due
process law also means the Resolution is a legislative activity in the immunity
context.
The Court concludes that the same rationale for the Fifth Circuit finding that
the Resolution was a legislative act for due process purposes establishes the
Individual Defendants’ immunity defense. An act is legislative for due process
purposes when it is “general in its scope rather than targeted on a specific
individual.” Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir.
2004).
The Fifth Circuit’s finding that the Resolution was a legislative act
“because it excludes any cardiologist seeking to practice at [the hospital] without a
contract with the hospital” turned on the same considerations that separate
legislative and administrative acts in the immunity context. Gaalla I, 407 Fed.
App’x at 813–14 (emphasis added). The similarity of the two inquiries is why the
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Sixth Circuit recently concluded that a due process “legislative act” finding also
warranted a finding of legislative immunity. Smith, 641 F.3d at 218–19 (“Because
we determined in our analysis of the teachers’ procedural-due-process claim that
the Board was performing a legislative function, we conclude that the members of
the Board are entitled to legislative immunity in their individual capacities.”).
Indeed, the Cardiologists are unable to cite any case rejecting immunity for an act
deemed legislative in the due process context, or vice versa.
The Cardiologists also contend that legislative immunity does not apply to
claims based on intentional discrimination.
But the Supreme Courts’ Bogan
decision, a leading case on absolute immunity doctrine, involved a claim of racial
animus. 523 U.S. at 47. And the Cardiologists cite no case holding that there are
exceptions to legislative immunity depending on the type of claim. Absolute
immunity protects individual legislators from claims based on a variety of
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bogan, 523 U.S. at 46–48 (detailing plaintiff’s
claims of racial discrimination and First Amendment violations); Lake Country
Estates, 440 U.S. at 394–95 (explaining plaintiffs’ constitutional takings claim).
That is why such constitutional claims are typically alleged against the
governmental entity enforcing a law rather than the legislators who enacted it.
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C. The Cardiologists’ Other Attempts to Distinguish the Fifth Circuit
Ruling Fail
The Cardiologists other attempts to get around the Fifth Circuit’s legislative
act finding fail. First, the Cardiologists contend that the Fifth Circuit rejected the
possibility of legislative immunity when it stated that evidence of intentional racial
discrimination will foreclose “any immunity defense.” Gaalla II, 460 F. App’x at
478–79 (quoting Piatt v. City of Austin, 378 F. App’x 466, 469 (5th Cir. 2010)).
This argument ignores that the context of judicial opinions matters. The “any
immunity defense” quotation, which was qualified with a “generally” and recited
only in a parenthetical quoting Piatt, comes from cases in which defendants only
asserted qualified immunity. Gaalla II, 460 F. App’x at 474; see also Piatt, 378 F.
App’x at 467. This “any immunity defense” language therefore cannot reasonably
be read as a ruling on the different type of immunity defense now before the Court.
The Cardiologists’ argument that the Individual Defendants admitted in
previous pleadings that the Resolution was an administrative act also ignores
context. None of the “admissions” Cardiologists cite were made in discussing
legislative immunity. The term “administrative” has many common usages outside
that fairly obscure corner of the law.
The Cardiologists’ attempt to draw a distinction between the Resolution’s
passage and its implementation also fails. The two alleged discriminatory acts of
implementation in this case—a memo to the hospital staff and an email to the
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emergency room director—were performed solely by Individual Defendant Brown,
on the same day as the Resolution’s passage, to inform the hospital staff of its
passage. These activities fall “‘in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity’”
contemplated by the Supreme Court in articulating the extent of absolute
legislative immunity. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 376 (1951)); see also id. at 55 (holding that introducing a budget and
signing an ordinance into law were legislative actions because they were “integral
steps in the legislative process”).
Finally, the Cardiologists contend that a legislative immunity defense does
not bar suit against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. True, but
that argument faces two other problems. First, the Cardiologists have not asserted
a claim against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. Second, if
such claims were asserted, the Court would dismiss them because claims against an
individual acting in his official capacity are properly dismissed as redundant when
the entity with which the individual is associated is also a defendant. See, e.g.,
King v. Louisiana, 294 F. App’x 77, 83 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming
dismissal of defendant state employees sued in their official capacities); Walston v.
City of Port Neches, 980 F. Supp. 872, 878 (E.D. Tex 1997) (granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant sued in his official capacity as redundant and
unnecessary); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (explaining
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that official capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity” (citations omitted)).
IV.
Conclusion
The Individual Defendants have established as a matter of law that
legislative immunity protects them from equal protection claims arising out of their
role in passing the Resolution. For the foregoing reasons, Individual Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Absolute Immunity (Docket Entry
No. 287) is GRANTED. This results in dismissal of the equal protection claim
against the Board Members and narrows the scope of the claim asserted against
Individual Defendant Brown to acts other than his involvement with the
Resolution.
SIGNED this 10th day of July, 2012.
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Gregg Costa
United States District Judge
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